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Wreck report for 'Sutton', 1926

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Unique ID:14003
Description:Board of Trade wreck report for 'Sutton', 1926.
Creator:UK Board of Trade
Date:1926
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

FOR OFFICIAL USE.

(No. 7835.)

"SUTTON" (S.S.).

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal In held at the Guildhall, Cardigan, on the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th and 27th days of April and 1st May, 1926, before Harold Claughton Scott, Esquire, K.C. (Wreck Commissioner), assisted by Vice-Admiral E. L. Booty, C.B., M.V.O., Captain H. P. Learmont, R.D., R.N.11., Commander C. A. Smith, C.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., and Francis H. Alexander, Esquire, M.Sc., M.Inst.N.A. (Nautical Assessors), into the circumstances attending the loss of the British steamship "Sutton," of Liverpool, official number 143676, in Cardigan Bay, during the night of the 27th-28th November, 1925, and the subsequent loss of life.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, il the absence of direct evidence, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto,that the loss of the said ship and the subsequent loss of life was probably due to the shifting of her cargo of zinc concentrates in bad weather, which caused her to take a heavy and increasing list until she foundered.

The Court desires to express its sympathy with the relatives of those lost in this peculiarly distressing casualty.

Dated this 1st day of May, 1926.

H. CLAUGHTON SCOTT,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above Report.

 E. L. BOOTY,

H. P. LEARMONT,

CHAS. A. SMITH,

FRANCIS H. ALEXANDER,
Assessors.

ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

This Inquiry was held at the Guildhall, Cardigan, on the 20th. 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th and 27th days of April and the 1st day of May, 1926.

Mr. Alfred Bucknill appeared for the Board of Trade; Mr. K. S. Carpmael (instructed by Messrs. Batesons and Co., Liverpool), for the Overton Shipping Company, Limited, the owners of the s.s. "Sutton"; Mr. L. S. Holmes (Messrs. Miller, Taylor and Holmes, Liverpool), for the Mercantile Marine Service Association; and Captain H. G. Innes, R.N. (retired), for the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. Commander Richard Gilkison Hurst, R.N. (retired), Divisional Inspector, Coastguard; Lieutenant Thomas Evans Marsh, R.N. (retired), District Officer. Coastguard; William Henry Huxtable, Station Officer, Coastguard, New Quay; William Pearson, Coastguardsman, New Quay; and Frank Brading, Coastguardsman, Penrhyn, parties, appeared in person.

The s.s. "Sutton." official number 143676, was a single-screw steamship built in 1920 at Selby by Messrs. Cochrane and Sons, and was owned by the Overton Steamship Company, Limited, of 4, Albert Buildings, 12, Preeson's Row, Liverpool.

The registered dimensions of the vessel were- length, 152 feet, breadth, 25.25 feet, depth of hold, 10.8 feet. Her gross tonnage was 485.24 tons and her net tonnage 209.75 tons.

She was a coasting vessel of the extended quarter deck type, with a short bridgehouse upon the after end of the well deck. The length of the raised quarter deck was 86 feet and the height 3 feet 6 inches. The bridgehouse was.9 feet long and 7 feet high, and the forecastle 25 feet long and 7 feet high. The well deck between bridgehouse and forecastle was 35 feet long, excluding side houses.

The propelling machinery, placed aft, consisted of one set of triple expansion engines of 85 nominal horse power, supplied by one steel multitubular boiler, built for a steam pressure of 180 pounds per square inch. The machinery was constructed by Messrs. Charles D. Holmes and Company, of Hull, and was intended to give the vessel a speed of 9½ knots.

The vesesl had three watertight steel bulkheads, namely, the collision bulkhead, about 21 feet abaft the fore perpendicular, the bulkhead separating the cargo hold from the cross bunker, situated about 53 feet forward of the after perpendicular, and the after peak bulkhead about 9.5 feet forward of the same perpendicular. There were no openings below deck in any of these bulkheads.

The steel bulwarks of the well deck were 3 feet high, well stiffened and provided with two freeing ports on each side. These ports were of the balanced hinged type 3 feet long and 1 foot 8 inches high.

The bulwarks of the raised quarter deck were 2.75 feet high, provided with three freeing ports on each side, of similar type to those in the well deck. These port doors were intended to open under pressure from water inside the bulwarks and to close under pressure from water outside.

Access to the forecastle was by means of port and starboard doors opening outwards having coamings about 1.5 feet above the deck.

Access to the bridgehouse was from the raised quarter deck by means of a doorway in the upper part of the after bridge bulkhead, having a coaming sill 1.5 feet above the deck. There was no opening in the forward bulkhead of the bridgehouse except the port holes giving light to the interior. Access to the boiler room was by means of a door in the casings, having a coaming sill 1.75 feet above the deck. Just forward of the bunker hatch and boiler casings and upon the starboard side only, there was a ventilator of 9 inches diameter, having a coaming 3 feet high and situated about 1.5 feet from the side of the ship. The various access and ventilating openings described above are those through which water could enter in the event of an extremely heavy list, and assuming the hatchways and their covers themselves remained watertight. The engine and boiler casings and the bunker hatch trunk stood 6.5 feet above deck.

The vessel had not a double bottom for the carriage of water ballast, but the fore peak was constructed to contain 48 tons and the after peak to contain 21 tons of water ballast.

In accordance with the usual practice in coasting vessels, additional strengthening of the structure of the bottom was provided so that the vessel might load while aground. This strengthening was provided by additional keelsons and intercostals, and by deeper and thicker floors than those required by Lloyd's regulations for ordinary sea-going vessels of the same size.

There were two cargo hatches. The forward hatch upon the well deck was 28.7 feet long and 13 feet wide, with coamings 3 feet high above deck. The after hatch, standing upon the raised quarter deck, was 23.5 feet long, 13 feet wide, with coamings 3 feet high above deck. These hatches were constructed with portable, shifting, transverse beams, spaced about 4.75 feet apart, thus avoiding the use of fore and afters. The wood covers were placed fore and aft and were 11 inches wide and 2½ inches thick. On No. 1 hatch these were in three sections of equal length, namely, 9.5 feet, but on the after hatch two of the sections were of 9.25 feet length and the section at the fore end of that hatch was shorter, namely, 4.75 feet in length.

Two tarpaulin covers were provided for each cargo hatch and were secured in place by battens and wedges in cleats on the coamings. In addition, each section of the wood covers on both hatches was provided with a steel locking bar, placed athwartships, hinged over the mouldings and secured by pins in special eye cleats passing through slots in the bars.

The bunker hatch at the fore end of the engine casing, which measured 6.7 feet by 14.5 feet and 6.5 feet in height, was constructed and covered in a similar manner.

A small hatch 2.25 feet square with coamings 2.5 feet high was provided just abaft the forecastle bulkhead for access to the hold. This had 2½ inch wood covers, tarpaulin and locking bar.

The hold ceiling was flush from bilge to bilge, and none of the keelsons projected sufficiently above the surface to act as a check against the sliding of cargo in the event of the ship taking a list.

The moulded depth of the vessel was 12 feet, and above this the quarter deck gave an additional 3.5 feet of depth at midships. The certificate summer freeboard was 3 feet 11 inches measured from the statutory deck line, which gave a mean draught of 11 feet 9½ inches. The winter freeboard was 2 inches greater than the summer freeboard, so that the vessel was entitled to load upon this voyage to a draught of 11 feet 7½ inches.

The vessel was provided with steam steering gear situated on the bridge deck and connected by chain and rod leads to the quadrant aft.

The regulations of the Board of Trade regarding life-boats and life-saving appliances, navigating instruments and signals were complied with. Two lifeboats, one with a square stern and the other double-ended, were stowed on platforms aft, abreast the engine room casings, about 7 feet above deck; each was provided with suitable davits and lowering gear. The capacity of each boat was sufficient to carry the whole of the crew.

The pumping arrangements were such as are usual in this class of vessel and conformed with the requirements of the Classification Society.

As regards stability, the s.s. "Sutton" was not herself subjected to an inclining experiment to ascertain the height of the centre of gravity of the completed vessel, but the builders gave the results of an experiment upon the sister ship "Weston." The Court is satisfied that the vessel had ample stability for any type of cargo stowed below decks so long as no serious shifting took place.

The s.s. "Sutton" was chartered by The British Metal Corporation, Limited, 3, Abchurch Yard, London, E.C. 4, to load a maximum cargo of 260 tons of metal concentrates at Aberystwyth for Antwerp. She bunkered in Ayr and arrived at Aberystwyth early in the morning of the 26th November, 1925. She commenced to load at 7 a.m. the same day; loading proceeded continuously until 5.10 p.m. on the 27th of November. The cargo consisted of 17 tons of lead concentrates which were loaded in the fore part of No. 1 hatch, 52 tons of zinc concentrates from the Erwtoman Mine which were loaded in the after part of No. 1 hatch, and 170 tons of zinc concentrates from the Lisburn Mine of the Cambrian Electrolytic Zinc Company, which were loaded in the fore part of No. 2 hatch, making a total of 239 tons of cargo. The ship had also about 50 tons of bunker coal, thus making a grand total of 289 tons dead weight. The maximum dead-weight carrying capacity on winter draught was 515 tons.

The draught on leaving Aberystwyth was--forward, 8 feet 4 inches; aft, 11 feet 6 inches; mean, 9 feet 11 inches; making an excess freeboard of 1 foot 8½ inches. This was a suitable and proper trim.

Her crew consisted of the master (Captain William H. Terretta) and 9 hands, making a crew of 10 in all. In addition to the crew the master's wife and a daughter were on board. Captain Terretta had been in the employment of the owners of the "Sutton" for many years: he had been in command of the "Sutton" since she was built, and bore the highest reputation.

The lead concentrates which formed part of the cargo of the "Sutton" call for no comment.

The zinc concentrates were produced by two different processes, the "jigger" process and the "flotation" process. In the jigger process the ore is ground and then passed with water through jiggers or sieves. The concentrate consists largely of coarse grains measuring 2 to 3½ millimetres. The water drains readily from such concentrates. In the flotation process the ore is ground into a fine powder and is mixed with water and a small quantity of oil. The concentrate produced by this process results in a slime from which the water will not readily escape. The 52 tons of zinc concentrates from the Erwtoman Mine were prepared solely by the jigger process, and contained when shipped 4.09 per cent. of moisture. The 170 tons of concentrates shipped by the Cambrian Electrolytic Zinc Company comprised a mixture of about 40 per cent. of jigger concentrates and 60 per cent. of flotation concentrates. This parcel (mixed as above stated) contained when shipped between 11 and 12 per cent. of moisture. There was evidence that the last part of the cargo to be put on board contained a greater percentage of moisture than the average above given.

Zinc concentrates produced by the flotation process, containing a certain undetermined percentage of moisture, exhibit this peculiarity, that upon agitation the solid matter sinks, and the moisture appears upon the surface. Thus, when loaded into a cart, the material falls in the shape of a cone, and so remains whilst the cart is at rest, but on a very short journey, owing to the agitation it receives, the load flattens out, the surface becomes wet and sloppy, and the heavy ore matter sinks to the bottom.

The danger which this phenomenon is liable to cause to a vessel loaded with a cargo of such concentrates in bulk is shown by the experience of the s.s. "Maralie" and the s.s. "Fluor." The s.s. "Maralie," a vessel of 341 tons gross, in February. 1926, loaded a part cargo of 238 tons of zinc concentrates in bulk from the shippers of the "Sutton" cargo at Aberystwyth. When tipped into the hold it formed a (one. The cargo was trimmed. The vessel sailed from Aberystwyth for Antwerp at 10 a.m. on the 17th February, 1926, in a fresh westerly wind. She was then upright with nearly a foot extra freeboard. After rounding the Bishops at about 5.55 p.m. the ship began to roll and to pitch. At about 7 p.m. she took a list to starboard. The captain brought her up to the wind and sea and she came upright again. He consequently put the vessel on her course se once more, the wind then being strong from the south-west accompanied by a heavy westerly swell. In less than half an hour the ship took such a heavy list to port that the captain changed his course for Milford Haven, where he arrived at 8.45 p.m. with a list of 20 degrees and the port bulwark under water. The bilges remained dry throughout and no water entered the hold from outside. On opening the hatches it was found that the surface of the zinc concentrates had become flat, the top portion of the concentrates was in a fluid state, and between 20 and 30 buckets of fresh water were bailed from it. By moving a portion of the cargo, consisting of bagged lead concentrates, the ship was again brought upright.

Captain Walter Frederick Trott, a nautical surveyor to the Board of Trade, was sent to inspect the "Maralie" and her cargo. At his inspection on the 19th February lie found that on the starboard side the cargo of concentrates was 6 feet 7 inches below the deck, and on the port side only 3 feet. The upper portion of this cargo had slipped and had retained its altered position.

A trench was dug longitudinally through this cargo and boarded on each side, making a trunkway. The cargo so taken out was bagged and placed back in the trunkway. On digging through this cargo it was found to be fluid on the top, gradually increasing in density towards the bottom.

The vessel continued her voyage to Antwerp in fair weather without further mishap. In the opinion of Captain Trott the "Maralie" was in a highly dangerous condition, and but for the prompt action of her master in putting in to port would probably have been lost. When shipped this parcel of zinc concentrates was found to contain by estimation 8 per cent. of moisture.

The s.s. "Fluor" was chartered to carry a cargo of zinc concentrates from Requejada (about 3 miles up the inlet of St. Martin de la Arena) to Dunkirk. On the 1st and 2nd December, 1925, she loaded her cargo of about 950 tons in bulk leaving her with a margin of a foot above her winter marks. The cargo appeared sticky but not wet. The ship crossed the bar at about 4.30 p.m. on the 2nd December, 1925, and was then upright. The sea at that time was smooth, but afterwards got up rapidly, and the ship began to roll heavily. At 5.40 p.m. the ship fell over suddenly to starboard and took a list of 16 degrees. The forward bulwarks were under water. The master promptly made for Santander, the list increasing gradually. She was brought to anchor at Santander at 10.40 p.m. with a list to starboard of 21 degrees. The hatches were opened on the morning of the 3rd December. The cargo in the after hold "looked like a puddle": it was quite flat, covered with water, and had shifted bodily. After the cargo had been levelled trenches were cut fore and aft and athwart-ships, shifting boards were fitted so as to form bins, and the cargo dug out was replaced in these bins. The cargo in the fore hold, which appeared to be of a drier nature, had not flattened out or shifted. The vessel proceeded to Dunkirk, where she arrived without further incident. The master of the "Fluor" had on four previous voyages carried cargoes of zinc concentrates in bulk from Requejada without any shifting of the cargo. None of these four cargoes appeared to the master of the "Fluor" to be wet.

The cargo of the s.s. "Sutton" was loaded in bulk and was untrimmed beyond being tipped into the holds from barrows to trim the ship as required by the master. The cargo formed three cones in the hold, the largest one, under No. 2 hatch, being just abaft the centre of the ship. No shifting boards were provided, nor were any other precautions taken to prevent the cargo shifting. This is in accordance with the usual custom at this port. At 5.10 p.m. on the 27th November, 1925, the ship cast off in charge of the pilot. The hatches had been covered and battened down before casting off. It was high water at 5.47 p.m. In turning the ship touched first forward and then aft, and she appears to have been more or less dragged over the bottom until reaching deep water in the channel, crossing the bar at 7.10 p.m., when the pilot, accompanied by Mr. Perry, the clerk of the British Metal Corporation, Limited, left the ship in a small boat. The wind was light from N.W., freshening, with very little sea.

The ship was bound to the southward and presumably steered a course of approximately W. by S. (magnetic) at from 8 to 9 knots. Assuming that all went well New Quay would have been abeam by about 8.50 p.m., and by that time the "Sutton" would have begun to feel the full force of the wind. The wind was recorded at Strumble Head at 9 p.m. and at midnight as N.N.E. force 8, and at Bardsey Island at the same times as N.N.E. force 7. There would consequently have been a considerable sea on her starboard quarter, and by 8.50 p.m. she would have been rolling heavily. By 10 p.m. the "Sutton" would have arrived off Pen Cribach, near Aberporth, in approximately lat. 52 degrees 13 minutes N., long. 4 degrees 39 minutes W., and by or before that time she appears to have been in distress. She could not have been in difficulties much before 10 p.m., or she would not have reached this point.

Having regard to the evidence as to the nature of her cargo and as to the experience of the "Maralie" and the "Fluor," the Court is of opinion that the motion of the ship caused the cargo to shift. If this happened the ship would have soon become unmanageable. It would have been impossible to launch the weather lifeboat.

The port lifeboat was afterwards found, badly damaged, on the rocks to the west of Pen Cribach. She probably broke adrift on being turned out. The Court is of opinion that it may be assumed that the ship made signals of distress, and that some of the lights seen by the witnesses (as detailed in the Answer to Question 7) were these signals.

Two bodies were found. The body of seaman Booth was found on the shore between Pen Cribach and Pen-Pel-es on the 29th November. The medical evidence was to the effect that he died from exposure and not by drowning. Close by the body were found a ladder and life belt attached thereto, and two hatches. A quantity of fresh red paint and tar adhered to his hands and clothes.

The body of Mrs. Terretta was found on Penbryn Beach, a mile and a half to the east of Aberporth, on the morning of the 30th November. The medical evidence showed that she died by drowning. On the following day a hatch and other wreckage was found at about the same spot.

The port lifeboat of the "Sutton" was found on the 30th November on the rocks by Pen-Pel-es, badly damaged, the bottom having been torn away. The boat was subsequently washed away.

Early in March, 1926, another body was washed ashore in the neighbourhood. This body could not be identified: it may have been that of Captain Terretta's daughter.

The system of coast watching from New Quay to Penrhyn is described in the Answer to Question 5.

In view of the suggestions and criticisms offered by certain of the witnesses the Court thought it necessary to visit.the various stations in the district.

As a result of the evidence and of their inspection of the stations, the Court submits the following observations for the consideration of the Board of Trade:-

(1) The look-out lint at Careg Draenog (New Quay) is placed on the best available site, though at a greater height than is desirable.

(2) The look-out hut at Llangranog is at too great a height, and a better site is available on the plateau below, which is more accessible and at a height of approximately 100 feet.

(3) Aberporth is not a suitable site for a look-out on account of its restricted are of vision seaward.

(4) In view of all the circumstances the Court does not consider it advisable to move the look-out from Llangranog to Pen Cribach.

Fen Cribach possesses the advantage of being approximately equidistant from Careg Draenog (New Quay) and Cemmaes, and if the policy of the Board admits the addition of another station an auxiliary look-out might be established on that point.

(5) The look-out hut on Cemmaes is on the best site available, though it is at a greater height than is desirable.

(6) The coastguard instruction that all watchers should immediately report to the lifeboat any light the import of which they cannot clearly distinguish, should be impressed upon all coastguards and auxiliary watchers.

(7) The definition of "thick weather" in M. 5714/23, paragraph 2 (a), appears to the Court to call for reconsideration, as they consider "one mile or less" to be an unduly low visibility.

(8) The provision of a night telephone service at Aberporth is a valuable addition to the system of coast watching. The availability of the service should be made known in the district.

The Court, as a result of this Inquiry, is of opinion that the carriage by sea of zinc concentrates in bulk is liable to be dangerous to the safety of the ship.

The evidence before the Court related only to the carriage of such cargo in small vessels, in which it formed the greater portion or the whole of the cargo, and in which no measures were taken to prevent the cargo from shifting. The Court desires it to be clearly understood that their observations relate to such cases only.

The Court is of opinion:-

(1) That concentrates produced by the flotation process form a more dangerous cargo than concentrates produced by the jigger process.

(2) That the danger depends mainly upon the percentage of moisture in the concentrates.

(3) That flotation concentrates containing as much as 8 per cent. of moisture are liable to cause danger to the ship.

(4) That the Court is unable to state what is a safe percentage of moisture in such cargoes, and suggests that this question should be investigated.

(5) The Court suggests that until the safety percentage is ascertained, all flotation zinc concentrates should be carried in bags or in specially constructed bins.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Bucknill, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted certain Questions for the consideration of the Court.

These Questions and the Answers of the Court thereto are as follows:-

Question 1. What was till cost of the vessel to her Owners? What was her value to her Owners when she last left Aberystwyth? What insurances were effected upon and in connection with the ship?

Answer. The cost of the vessel to her Owners was £29,43. Her value to her Owners when she last left Aberystwyth was £24,000. The total of the insurances offected upon and in connection with the ship was £15,000.

Question 2 (a). When the s.s. "Sutton" last left Aberystwyth was she in good and seaworthy condition as regards hull, machinery and equipment?

Answer. Yes.

Question 2 (b). With what boats and life-saving appliances was the vessel supplied? Were they adequate and in good order and properly equipped, and what were the means on board for launching the boats and were they sufficient and in good order?

Answer. She was supplied with two seventeen-foot lifeboats, ten life-jackets and two life-buoys. Each boat was adequate to carry the whole of the crew and was in good order and properly equipped. Each boat was provided with suitable davits and hand-lowering gear, which were sufficient and in good order.

Question 2 (c). Was the vessel supplied with rockets or other means of making the recognised signals of distress set out in the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea?

Answer. The vessel was not supplied with rockets. She was fitted with the usual steam whistle, and supplied with the regulation flags and shapes, fog-horn, and flare-up lamp. Each lifeboat was supplied with one dozen red lights in watertight tin.

Question 2 (d). What amount and description of cargo did the vessel carry?

Answer. Her cargo consisted of 17 tons of lead concentrates and 222 tons of zinc concentrates. In addition she carried about 50 tons of bunkers.

Question 2 (e). Who was responsible for the safe and proper loading of the cargo?

Answer. The master.

Question 2 (f). Was the cargo properly stowed and were the weights so distributed as to make the vessel easy in a seaway?

Answer. The weights were so distributed as to make the vessel easy in a seaway; and, so far as could be foreseen at the time of loading, the cargo was properly stowed.

Question 2 (g). Was the cargo or any portion of it liable to alter its position in the ship at sea if precautions were not taken against shifting?

Answer. A portion of the cargo, namely, part of the zinc concentrates, was liable to alter its position in the ship at sea in the absence of precautions, but this fact was not known at the time when the cargo was loaded.

Question 2 (h). In the loading of the cargo could measures have been taken to prevent it shifting? If so, were any, and, if any, what measures taken to prevent it shifting? Ought any such measures to have been taken?

Answer. Measures could have been taken to prevent the cargo from shifting. No measures were taken to prevent it from shifting. In the light of our present knowledge, measures ought to have been taken.

Question 2 (i). Did the vessel receive any damage during loading or at the time of leaving Aberystwyth?

Answer. She received no damage during loading. The ship touched the ground twice in leaving her berth at Aberystwyth; there was no indication of any damage.

Question 2 (j). Had the vessel the freeboard required for a winter voyage?

Answer. Yes.

Question 3. After leaving Aberystwyth at or about 6.30 p.m. on the 27th November last, was the vessel at any time in distress? If so, at what time or times? In what position or positions was the vessel at such time or times, and what was the cause of her being in distress?

Answer. Presumably the "Sutton" was lost, and, judging from the lights which were seen from the shore, some at least of which may be assumed to have been shown by the "Sutton," she was in distress at about 10 p.m. off Aberporth, in lat. 52 degrees 13 minutes N., long. 4 degrees 39 minutes W. The cause of her being in distress was, again presumably, due to her cargo shifting, which caused her to take a heavy list and become unmanageable.

Question 4. On the night of the 27th-28th November last did the "Sutton" fire any rockets or display any flares or lights in the nature of distress signals? If so, what signals were made, at what time or times were they made, and what was the position of the vessel at such time or times?

Answer. The "Sutton" had no rockets, but apparently did display flares or lights in the nature of distress signals between 9.50 and 11 p.m. in about the same position as given in the preceding answer.

Question 5. What was the system of Coast Watching from New Quay to Penrhyn existing on the night of the 27th-28th November last, and did the system provide for a reasonably sufficient watch being kept having regard to the requirements of this part of the coast? Were there means of communication between the look-out stations? When in proper working order, were such means adequate? Were proper measures taken to ensure that they should be in good working order? Were they in good working order on the night in question?

Answer. The system of Watching from New Quay to Penrhyn existing on the night of the 27th-28th November, 1925, was (and still is) as follows:-

The coast in question lies within the Fishguard District, which is under a District Officer residing at Fishguard. The Fishguard District is within the Mumbles Division, which is under an officer residing at Mumbles. At New Quay there was a Coastguard Station having a complement of 1 station officer and 2 coastguardsmen. Some two miles from New Quay Coastguard Station there was a look-out hut on a headland named Careg Draenog. This hut is about 300 feet above sea level. It was manned by the complement of the New Quay Station.

At Llangranog there was an auxiliary look-out in chargee of a farmer as watchman in charge. The look-out hut was situate some 700 yards from the farmer's house, on a promontory called Pen Ynys Lochtyn. This hut is 350 feet above sea level.

At Penrhyn there was a Coastguard Station with a complement of 2 coastguardsmen. Upwards of a mile and a half from this station there was a look-out hut placed on a promontory called Cemmaes Head, and at an altitude of 250 feet above sea level. This hut was manned by the complement of Penrhyn Station, which had authority when necessary to call in an auxiliary watcher.

The distances, as the crow flies, between the points mentioned are, approximately, as follows: Careg Draenog to Lochtyn, 5½ miles; Lochtyn to Cemmaes Head, 12 miles.

The system of Coast Watching was as follows:-

By day in fair weather one man was kept on duty at each of the coastguard stations for the purpose of keeping an eye on the weather and answering the telephone, and in order to be ready to set watch if and when the weather should become bad or thick.

By night one station in the district kept a watch at the look-out ready to warn the other stations of the district if and when the weather should become bad or thick. The telephone forms an essential link in the efficiency of the Coast Watching. The two coastguard stations, the auxiliary watchman's house and the three huts were each connected with the telephone.

Before the 11th November, 1925, these several points had been connected by a coast communication circuit. On the date named this system, for reasons which appear to the Court to be sound and sufficient, was altered, and each point was connected to the Post Office Exchange system. For some time after the 11th November, 1925, the new system did not work smoothly; it was not in perfect working order by the night of the 27th-28th November, 1925.

The Court is of opinion that provided the means of communication by telephone were in proper working order, the system provided for a reasonably sufficient watch being kept having regard to the requirements of this part of the coast.

Under the former system the telephone line was tested each evening. Owing to a misunderstanding of his instructions by the Station Officer at New Quay, this practice with regard to the line to Llangranog was discontinued by him when the new system was installed. Save as aforesaid, the Station Officer at New Quay, and others, made every reasonable effort to secure the line being in good working order.

About 10.10 p.m. on the night of the 27th November, 1925, the Station Officer of New Quay, when at the look-out hut at Careg Draenog, endeavoured to communicate by telephone with the auxiliary watchman at Llangranog. For some reason which remains unexplained he was unable to get into communication with the auxiliary watchman.

Question 6. Were the Coastguard and other Watchers who were engaged for the service of coast watching from New Quay to Penrhyn properly instructed in the duties which they were expected to perform? Did they know and understand the duties?

Answer. The Coastguard and Watchers were properly instructed in their duties. The Station Officer at New Quay at the time in question failed to understand that he ought to put the auxiliary watchman at Llangranog on duty whenever he thought the weather was "bad enough," but thought that he was only entitled to put that watchman on duty in "thick weather," that is, "when visibility was one mile or less."

The auxiliary watchman at Llangranog failed to understand that it was not necessary for him on all occasions to await instructions before going on watch, and that if he were unable to communicate by telephone with New Quay or Fishguard it was his duty to go on watch on his own account if in his opinion the weather conditions made it desirable.

Question 7. Were rockets, flares or lights seen by the Coastguard or other Watchers or by any other person or persons on shore? If so, by whom, at what time or times, and in what position or positions, and from what point or points on the coast were they seen, and what appearance did they present?

Answer. No rockets were seen by anyone.

At 9.10 p.m. on the 27th November, 1925, P.C. Thomas Evans, from the neighbourhood of Llanon, saw "three red flashes" within a space of five minutes, which he described as being close to the shore at New Quay (a distance of 9 miles). The witness took these to be lights of trawlers seeking shelter at New Quay.

At 9.50 p.m. Coastguardsman Pearson, on duty at Careg Draenog look-out (above New Quay), observed a light bearing N. 70 degrees W., which he estimated to be 8 to 9 miles distant. Immediately afterwards he was joined at the hut by Station Officer Huxtable, who also observed the light. Both these men examined the light through their binoculars, and described it as a large dirty white light. They concluded it to be the working light of a trawler taking in her trawl.

About 10 o'clock Pearson went off duty, and Huxtable took his place. Huxtable kept the light under observation until 10.8 p.m., when he lost sight of it during a heavy hail storm. He did not see the light again.

Tom Rees Jones, a farmer near Aberporth (who, between 7.30 and 8 p.m. and again at about 9 p.m. on the night of the 27th November, saw certain lights off the coast which in the opinion of the Court could not have been the lights of the "Sutton"), at about 10.15 p.m., from his farm at Pennar to the west of Aberporth, saw what he described as "a steady light," which he did not take as a signal of distress, off Pen-Pel-es Point.

At "about a quarter past ten," John Lewis, a farmer living at Traeth-y-Mwnt on the coast some four miles west of Aberporth, observed a long reddish light seaward for about ten minutes at a distance which lie estimated to be 3 to 4 miles.

Thomas Jenkins, a lad 15 years of age, and David James Jenkins (his father) a farmer, both living at Ffrwd Wenith some three miles west of Aberporth, about 10.20 p.m. observed a light for about 20 minutes to seaward. These two witnesses did not agree as to the appearance of the light. Both considered it to be an unusual light, and the father thought" it was something like a distress signal."

At 11 p.m., Evan Lewis Davies, a chauffeur living at Aberporth, when in the street at Aberporth, observed a light, which lie described as a flame which leaped up from the sea which lasted a few seconds and went out as suddenly as it came on. Two minutes later lie and Mrs. Hannah Jenkins (whom he had called out of doors in consequence of what he had already seen), from approximately the same spot saw another light of the same character in the same position on the sea. Evan Lewis Davies was able to fix the direction of the light as being slightly to the east of Pen Cribbach, say about N. 36 degrees W. (true). He estimated the distance as four miles from where he stood. Evan Lewis Davies, his brother and his father kept a look-out throughout the night, and none of them saw anything more.

If the bearings taken by Huxtable and Pearson and by Evan Lewis Davies are accepted as approximately accurate, and the light had not moved in the interval between 9.50 and 11 o'clock, the position of the light was in lat. 52 degrees 13 minutes N., long. 4 degrees 39 minutes W. This roughly agrees also with the direction of the light seen by other witnesses.

Question 8. If seen from the shore were any such rockets, flares or lights recognised by anyone seeing them as signals of distress made by a vessel at sea requiring assistance? If not, why were they not recognised as signals of distress? Ought they to have been so recognised, and, if so, by whom, and what action, if any, ought he or they to have taken?

Answer. The lights seen were not distinctly recognised by any of the witnesses as signals of distress, though certain of the witnesses were of opinion that they might be.

They were not distinctly recognised as signals of distress because they were not of such a distinctive nature as to make them clearly distinguishable from lights ordinarily seen at sea. On this account the Court cannot say that they ought to have been recognised as signals of distress.

Question 9. Was a good and proper look-out kept on the night in question by the Coastguards and other Watchers from New Quay to Penrhyn? Did the persons responsible for the coast watching service carry out properly the duties entrusted to them?

Answer. A good and proper look-out was kept by the coastguards on the night in question. Having regard to the weather conditions, the auxiliary watcher at Llangranog ought to have been put on duty by the Station Officer at New Quay, and was not. The Station Officer failed to put the auxiliary watcher on duty owing to a misunderstanding of his instructions.

Further, the Court is of opinion that Station Officer Huxtable and Coastguard Pearson ought to have reported the light which they had seen to the Honorary Secretary of the lifeboat at New Quay, but that their failure to do so was due to an error of judgment on their part.

Question 10. What was the cause of the loss of the s.s. "Sutton" and the loss of life? How was it that no assistance was rendered to the vessel and her crew from the shore?

Answer. In the absence of any direct evidence, the Court is of opinion that the loss of the s.s. "Sutton" and the loss of life consequent thereon, was due to the shifting of her cargo of zinc concentrates in bad weather, which caused the ship to take a heavy and increasing list until she foundered.

No assistance was rendered to the vessel or her crew owing to the fact that none of her signals were recognised for signals of distress.

Question 11. Was the loss of the s.s. "Sutton" and/or the loss of life caused by the wrongful act or default of any person or persons, and, if so, of whom?

Answer. No.

Question 12. In the opinion of the Court, is it desirable that all merchant vessels of the size of the s.s. "Sutton" should be obliged by law to be supplied with rockets or shells throwing stars as signals to be used when they are in distress and needing assistance?

Answer. In the opinion of the Court it is desirable that every merchant vessel of the size of the s.s. "Sutton," and all other sea-going vessels, whether engaged in the coasting trade or otherwise, should be supplied with rockets or shells throwing stars to be used as signals when in distress or needing assistance.

H. GLAUGHTON SCOTT,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above Report.

 E. L. BOOTY,

H. P. LEARMONT.

CHAS. A. SMITH,

FRANCIS H. ALEXANDER,
Assossors.

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Saturday, the 19th day of June, 1926.)


LONDON:

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1926.

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