Wreck report for 'Eastway', 1927

FOR OFFICIAL USE.

(No. 7844.)

"EASTWAY" (S.S.).

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the Matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Law Courts, Cardiff, on the 31st day of March and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 22nd days of April, 1927, before ST. JOHN FRANCIS-WILLIAMS, Esquire, Stipendiary Magistrate for the City of Cardiff, assisted by Admiral OWEN FRANCIS GILLETT, C.B.; Captain DAVID LANDLES NEILSON, R.N.R.; Captain PERCY FRANCIS WARD BLAKE, M.B.E., F.R.A.S., and Major S. H. HAMBLING, M.I.N.A., into the circumstances attending the foundering of the Steamship "Eastway," ex s.s. "Krasnoiarsk," of Cardiff, Official Number 142462, in or near Latitude 31°00'N., Longitude 63°00'W., Atlantic Ocean, whereby loss of life ensued.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the cause of the foundering of the vessel was a large influx of water through the port bunker hatch, the covers of which were washed away by heavy seas owing to the vessel having a heavy list to port and lacking reserve buoyancy in consequence of her overladen condition.

The Court also finds that the conduct of the registered manager, Watkin James Williams, is blame-worthy and culpable and therefore orders him to pay £1,000 towards the costs of this Inquiry.

Dated this twenty-second day of April, 1927.

ST. JOHN FRANCIS-WILLIAMS, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

This Inquiry was held at the Law Courts, Cardiff, on the 31st day of March, and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th 6th, 7th and 22nd days of April, 1927. Mr. A. Bucknill (instructed by Mr. L. H. A. Pratt) appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. J. V. Naisby (instructed by Messrs. Vaughan & Roche) for the owners of the "Eastway" and Mr. Watkin James Williams, the registered manager, and Dr. B. W. Ginsburg (instructed by Messrs. G. F. Hudson, Matthews & Co.) for the Navigators and General Insurance Company. Mr. Gilbert Robertson watched the proceedings on behalf of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild.

The "Eastway," ex "Krasnoiarsk," Official Number 142462, and registered at the Port of Cardiff, was a single screw steamer. She was built by the Northumberland Shipbuilding Company, of New-castle, in 1915, and her machinery was constructed by Richardsons Westgarth and Company, of Sunderland. Her registered dimensions were as follows:-Length 400 feet, breadth 52 feet, depth of hold 35 feet 4 inches. Her gross tonnage was 5,832 tons, and her registered net tonnage 3,655 tons.

The vessel was built under Lloyds Special Survey and classed *100 Al "Shelter deck with freeboard"; the total deadweight being 9,400 tons and the mean summer draught 28 feet 6 inches. The summer freeboard from the top of the statutory deck line to the centre of disc was 9 feet 11 inches, and the total depth of the vessel at the side from the top of the statutory deck line to the bottom of the keel was 38 feet 5 inches. She had three decks, namely, the shelter, upper and main, which were of steel, the main deck being omitted in the engine room.

The cubic capacities, measured to inside of shell and underside of decks, of the various cargo holds and 'tween decks were as follows:-

The camber of all decks was 12 inches and the sheer of weather deck at stem 9 feet, and at sternpost 4 feet 6 inches.

There were six watertight bulkheads fitted, of which the collision bulkhead extended to the shelter deck, and the other five to the upper deck; a non-watertight wooden bulkhead was fitted on frame 113 (to upper deck) forming a reserve cross-bunker forward of the stokehold; no other arrangements were fitted for taking wooden bulkheads in the holds apart from that on frame 113 above referred to, except that wooden bulkheads were fitted in the shelter 'tween decks at the forward and after ends of the machinery casings to form bunkers abreast these casings. The non-watertight wooden bulkhead, normally fitted in the lower 'tween decks on frame 113, was on her last voyage, in order to accommodate the additional bunkers, removed and fitted at or about frame 123.

There was an opening 5 feet 5 inches by 1 foot 9 inches clear in bulkhead 147, the bottom of which was about 6 feet above the tank top, and a similarly placed opening of the same kind in bulkhead 42, both of which being fitted with bolted plate covers; two vertical sliding watertight doors 4 feet by 2 feet 3 inches were fitted in the stokehold bulkhead (No. 99), whilst there were also two coaling doors in this bulkhead at stokehold floor level, 3 feet by 1 foot 9 inches opening, with sliding non-watertight doors; these openings were non-watertight as watertight coal shoots were fitted on the forward side of the bulkhead enclosing the openings.

The following erections were fitted on the shelter deck:-

Forecastle, 36 feet long by 7 feet high, of steel, with opening in centre to crew space.

Saloon House, 30 feet by 23 feet 6 inches amidships with wood doors.

Engine Casings, frames 76 to 99, of steel, 18 feet broad, standing 7 feet above the shelter deck and fitted with 18 inch coamings.

There were two weathertight steel doors to the fidley, and two similar ones to the engine room, both about 2 feet by 4 feet 6 inches, and having 18-inch coamings; an extension of the casings aft containing galley, etc., was fitted with two weathertight steel doors to galley and two wood doors to steward's room and office. The top of the casings was of steel with gratings and steel covers of usual type over fidley; a steel skylight 14 feet 3 inches by 11 feet 6 inches was fitted over engine room on top of casings with eight hinged flaps; the saddle back coal shoot abaft funnel had 2½-inch wood covers with cleats, battens and tarpaulins. Sidehouses were fitted abreast the engine casings of steel. The house aft, containing the steering gear, was of steel on .sides and top, with a steel weathertight door each side with 19-inch coamings. A steel house containing chart room and Captain's room on top of the saloon house completed the erections on the shelter deck.

The main ventilators were as follows:-To No. 1 hold and 'tween decks, 4-21-inch diameter vents were fitted with 18-inch tubes in shelter 'tween decks and 15-inch tubes in lower 'tween decks; the coamings were 21 inches diameter and 3 feet high by 3/8-inch thick; the ventilators to Nos. 2, 3 and 4 holds were similar except that the two after ventilators to No. 4 hold were replaced by the after derrick posts, which were 21 inches in diameter and had cowls on top. All ventilator coamings were of steel and the cowls of iron 14 W.G. Steel caps were supplied for closing the ventilator coamings. Two 15-inch diameter cowl ventilators led to No. 2A hold, the coamings being 2 feet 6 inches high by 5/16-inch thick, and two 12-inch cowl ventilators to shelter 'tween deck bunkers with 2 feet by ¼ inch coamings; a 21-inch diameter ventilator with a 3-feet high by 3/8-inch thick coaming was fitted to the after end of the tunnel, leading into a rectangular escape trunk below the upper deck.

No shifting boards or longitudinal steel bulkheads were supplied or fitted in the main holds or 'tween decks, but the pillars and steelwork in holds were arranged to suit boards.

Steel bulwarks were fitted on the shelter deck all fore and aft except in way of the hatchways where rails were fitted; these bulwarks were 3 feet 6 inches high and the openings abreast the hatchways formed freeing ports; nine Collinson type scuppers were fitted overboard from shelter deck each side of the vessel, and the scuppers from the upper deck led to the bilges.

Hatchways on the shelter deck were as follows:-

The hatches were secured by means of tarpaulins, stamped steel cleats being fitted to hatch coamings about 2 feet apart arranged to take iron battening bars and hard wood wedges. Bunker hatchways-apart from No. 2A cross-bunker already described-were four in number, serving side bunkers in shelter 'tween decks; the two between frames 88 and 90 were 4 feet 4 inches by 3 feet, and the two between 96 and 99 frames 6 feet 6 inches by 3 feet, all four having bulb angle coamings 10 inches by 3½ inches by ½ inch.

No locking bars or other fastenings were fitted apart from those already described, but ring bolts were fitted on the coamings to take rope lashings.

Air pipes with open goose-neck on weather deck were fitted to the tanks.

The capacity of the forepeak tank was 62 tons of salt water and the flat forming the crown was 26 feet below the shelter deck. The afterpeak tank capacity was 115 tons of salt water, a watertight hatch 5 feet 6 inches by 6 feet with bolted plate cover being fitted on the upper deck which formed the crown of the tank. The cellular double bottom capacities and sizes were as follows:-

The steering gear was of the direct-acting (Wilson-Pirrie) type, situated in the house aft on the shelter deck, and controlled from the bridge amidships by telemotor gear; there was also a steering control pedestal on top of the house aft. A right and left hand screw steering gear was fitted in the steering gear house to rudder head with two 6-feet wheels.

The following engine room pumps were fitted for bilge and/or ballast purposes:-

Two bilge pumps, worked from main engines, 4 inches diameter by 27-inch stroke, 8-inch bilge injection (connected to centrifugal circulating pump) and with 12-inch overboard discharge.

One bilge and ballast pump, 150 tons per hour capacity, Watson's Westminster Flywheel type, 9 inches by 11 inches by 10 inches, 6-inch main bilge suction line and 4-inch direct bilge suction in engine room, 6-inch pump suction and 6-inch overboard discharge.

One Auxiliary Duplex feed pump, 7½ inches by 5 inches by 6 inches, not connected to bilges but arranged to draw from tanks; 3-inch suction.

Ballast tank suctions were fitted at the after end of No. 1, No. 2, Dry Tank, and No. 3 tanks; at each end of No. 4 and No. 5 tanks.

A 6-inch Downton pump was fitted in the engine room at upper deck level with a 3-inch bore suction connected to the main line of bilge suctions.

The propelling machinery was amidships and consisted of one set of triple expansion engines, 535 nominal horse power, 2,750 indicated horse power, supplied by three steel cylindrical boilers, and built for a steam pressure of 180 pounds per square inch, forced draught. The designed speed was about 11 knots on a consumption of about 45 tons per day-good coal. According to the logs of all previous voyages since April, 1923, the average speed when loaded was 8.12 knots for a consumption of 28.5 tons per day; when light, 8.70 knots for a consumption of 29.37 tons per day, with varying qualities of coal. For the last two voyages from Norfolk, Va., to River Plate and Las Palmas under similar conditions to the final voyage, her average speed was 8.15 knots on a consumption of 27.55 tons per day.

She was fitted with Morison's 25-ton radial type evaporator, and carried an efficient wireless apparatus. She had two lifeboats and two "D" type boats,^* each lifeboat being capable of carrying 39 men. She was supplied with the required life-saving appliances, which were inspected by a Board of Trade surveyor on the 16th of March, 1926.

The "Eastway," which was purchased on the 7th April, 1923, was owned by the St. Mary Steamship Company Limited, and Mr. Watkin James Williams, of Pacific House, Mount Stuart Square, Cardiff, was designated manager by advice received the 16th April, 1923, under his hand as public officer of the company. She was mortgaged to the National Provincial Bank Limited, by mortgage dated 1st May, 1923, to secure sums due on account current with interest. Mr. Watkin James Williams held 11,000 shares in the company out of a capital of 100,000 shares. He and his brother, Mr. Pardoe Williams, were directors of the company, and constituted the firm of Williams Brothers (Cardiff). They both received £3,000 per annum, which included office expenses and the cost of the office staff.

Between the date of her purchase and the voyage on which she was lost the "Eastway" made six complete voyages, viz.:-

(1) Commencing 5th May, 1923, from Newport, Mon., to Rio de Janeiro with coal; Buenos Aires to Genoa with heavy grain.

(2) Commencing October, 1923, from Rotterdam to Shanghai with general cargo; Vancouver to Havre with wheat.

(3) Commencing 19th June, 1924, from Newport, Mon., to Bahia Blanca with coal; Bahia Blanca to Antwerp with light grain.

(4) Commencing December, 1924, from Barry to Santos with coal; Fremantle to Avonmouth with bagged wheat.

(5) Commencing September, 1925, from Barry to Santos with coal; November, 1925, from Norfolk, Va., to Rio de Janeiro with coal; from Buenos Aires to Antwerp with grain.

(6) Commencing March, 1926, Cardiff to Rio de Janeiro with patent fuel; May, 1926, from Norfolk, Va., to Rio de Janeiro with coal; Bahia Blanca to Antwerp with grain.

On the first four of these voyages the regulations as to draught and freeboard were complied with.

On a portion of the 5th, viz., leaving Norfolk, Va., on 13th November, 1925, the cargo and bunkers together amounted to 9,307 tons-besides other deadweight-and the draught was 28 feet 10½ inches. Whereas, in order to comply with the regulations for winter months, the total deadweight and draught should not have exceeded 9,120 tons and 27 feet 11 inches respectively.

On a portion of the 6th voyage, viz., leaving Norfolk, Va., on 23rd May, 1926, the cargo and bunkers together amounted to 9,518 tons-besides other deadweight-and the draught was 29 feet 2 inches. Whereas, in order to comply with the regulations for summer months, the total dead-weight and draught should not have exceeded 9,400 tons and 28 feet 6 inches respectively.

On the voyage during which she was lost, the "Eastway" arrived, from Rotterdam, at Hampton Roads at 5.40 p.m. on the 15th October, 1926. On the 16th October the master received instructions from the owners by cablegram, viz.: "She is fixed to load not above San Lorenzo copy of charter party Pernambuco take only sufficient coal with safe margin to carry you to Las Palmas increase coal consumption to 30 tons per day from Norfolk to River Plate homeward consumption per day as usual." This message was acknowledged by the master by cable and the acknowledgement confirmed. by letter on the same day-16th October.

In order to ascertain the bunker coal required for the voyage it is probable that the master had regard to his experience in connection with the two previous voyages from Norfolk, Va., to the River Plate and Las Palmas. A calculation made on the bases of coal consumption and speed for such voyages, and taking into consideration the extra 3 tons per day ordered to be consumed between Norfolk, Va., and the River Plate and a supply of four days coal (or 110 tons) as a safe margin, shows that the amount of bunker coal necessary to comply with the instructions contained in the cablegram would be 1,761 tons. This amount plus the minimum cargo required by the charter party, i.e. 7,500 tons, would give a total of 9,261 tons or 141 tons more than the amount authorized on a winter load line, the deadweight being 9,120 tons on a draught of 27 feet 11 inches. This total of 9,261 tons is for cargo and bunkers only, and does not include the extra weight for water, stores, etc., which must necessarily be carried.

The "Eastway" went alongside the coaling pier at Lambert's Point, Norfolk, Va. She commenced loading cargo and bunkers at 9.30 a.m. on the 17th October and completed at 11 a.m. on the 18th.

The amount of cargo coal loaded in the vessel (according to the affidavit of the stevedore's foreman) was as follows:-

This amount is 284 tons 1,640 pounds in excess of the charter party minimum. In addition to the cargo 1,636 tons 1,060 pounds of bunkers were loaded. She also had 80 tons in the bunkers on arrival, and received 15 tons of drinking water. The above figures represent a deadweight of 9,516 tons 460 pounds. Further, according to the displacement scale for draught, she must have carried 132.5 tons of deadweight.

The master informed the owners in the sailing telegram that she had 7,785 tons of cargo, 1,637 tons of bunkers and a surplus of 80 tons.

Her draught at Lambert's Point after loading and taking in fresh water, just prior to sailing, was 29 feet 10 inches forward and 29 feet aft, being a mean draught of 29 feet 5 inches. Captain Henry Eagleton, Surveyor, of Norfolk, Va., took a sample of the water at Lambert's Point in January, 1927, at a stage of the tide which corresponded with 11 a.m. of the 18th October, 1926. He found the specific gravity to be 1.008, which would allow a reduction of freeboard (increase of draught) for a steamer of the "Eastway's" size of 4¾ inches. This figure has been used in computing the salt water draught of the vessel. Captain Eagleton observes that it is probable the density is lower in January than in October, and that 4¾ inches should be regarded as a maximum allowance. On the two previous voyages from the same pier in November, 1925, and May, 1926-according to the vessel's logs-allowances of 1 inch and 3½ inches respectively were made. Hence it is considered that the mean salt water draught was at least 29 feet ¼ inch.

The deadweight by displacement scale for a draught of 29 feet ¼ inch is 9,648.7 tons. The known dead-weight on board was 9,516.2 tons, and therefore the extra deadweight carried, including water, stores, etc., must have been 132.5 tons.

After loading, the "Eastway" left the pier and anchored in Hampton Roads. She was under the command of Captain J. H. Vanstone, whose certificate was No. 040040, and had a crew of 35 hands all told. At 4.30 p.m. on the 18th October the pilot came on board and conducted her to sea. After passing Cape Henry a south-easterly course was steered.

During the 19th October the coal which had been placed on No. 3 hatch, amounting to between 20 and 40 tons, was passed into the casing side bunkers through the hatches on the shelter deck, which were afterwards properly secured.

Between 8 p.m. and midnight on the 21st October wireless warning of an approaching hurricane was received. It appears from the evidence of the acting 3rd officer that the master judged that the storm was to the westward of the "Eastway" and would not cross her track. A south-easterly course appears to have been maintained. This course was towards the vessel's objective and away from the path of the storm centre.

At about 10 p.m. on the 21st the force of the wind was a strong breeze. It increased to gale force during the forenoon of the 22nd, when apparently the vessel was steered so as to keep the wind on the starboard bow.

During the forenoon of the 22nd the wind and sea appear to have increased rapidly, the vessel rolling as the sea increased. The list, or the mean between the weather and lee rolls, appears to have been slight at 8 a.m. but gradually became heavier.

At about noon damage was done by the sea to the chocks of the port lifeboat, which was remedied; and a ventilator, just abaft the lifeboat, was carried away. The opening was immediately plugged, so that little, if any, water got below thereby. The sounding machine was washed away before noon.

At noon seas were coming on board from both sides and the port side of the deck was awash.

About 1 p.m. the tarpaulin covering the saddleback hatch was lifted by the wind but re-secured.

During the afternoon the wind and sea got worse and the list gradually increased. At about 3 p.m. the master personally inspected some of the hatchway covers at some risk to his life-being at one time saved by a line thrown to him by seaman Ali Mahomed. Soon after 3 p.m. the port lifeboat, the lifebelts, and the carpenter's shop round the main mast were washed away.

Shortly before 4 p.m. the tarpaulins covering the port bunker hatch were carried away. An attempt to place a fresh tarpaulin was made by apprentice Johnson and some seamen, working with life lines attached. This failed, so the master himself, without a life line, tried, but was washed overboard. It is not clear from the evidence how the vessel was then manoeuvred. Life buoys and lines were thrown in the direction of where he disappeared and a sharp lookout kept in the vicinity, but without result.

About 5 p.m. the wooden covers to the port bunker hatch were carried away and water entered the hatch in considerable quantities. At this time the vessel had a list-according to the acting 3rd officer's estimate-of about 15 degrees to port. An attempt was made during the afternoon to counteract the list by pumping out the port and filling the starboard ballast tanks.

After water entered the port bunker hatch the list rapidly increased, and the situation of the vessel became critical. An S.O.S. wireless message was sent out at 5.38 p.m. and replied to by the s.s. "Luciline," which was then 30 miles south of the "Eastway's " position. Another S.O.S. wireless message was sent by the "Eastway" at 6.13 p.m. and the "Luciline" replied that she was then steaming at full speed to-wards the "Eastway's" position. The "Eastway" sent up a rocket shortly before the final catastrophe.

About 7 p.m. the "Eastway" turned on her beam ends and foundered. Her approximate position was then latitude 31° N. and longitude 63° W.

The falls of the starboard lifeboat had been un-hooked and the lashings cut, and the boat floated clear when the vessel sank. Those of the crew, twelve in number, who were in the vicinity managed to scramble into her. The remainder, twenty-two, unfortunately lost their lives. Those below probably being unable to come up when the vessel was on her beam ends, and those on the bridge being unable to get aft by reason of the heavy seas and the list.

The wind appears to have reached its strongest, approaching storm force, between 4 and 6 p.m. on the 22nd. The seas were subsiding when the vessel sank and the boat floated clear.

The engines seem to have been running at full speed until stopped by stress of circumstances.

The survivors in the boat drifted all night and hoisted a sail at daybreak. The "Luciline" arrived on the scene of disaster at 10 p.m. on the 22nd but could find no signs of the "Eastway." She cruised about in the vicinity all night and continued the search at daybreak. She picked up the boat containing the survivors at about noon on the 23rd and transferred them to the tug "Powerful" at Bermuda at daybreak on the 24th.

The following is a list of the crew who were drowned when the vessel sank:-

It was stated in evidence that no inclining experiment was made for the "Eastway." The master therefore had no information from which he could ascertain the initial stability of the vessel under different conditions of loading. The Court recommends that an inclining experiment should be conducted for all ships and such other data supplied as may be necessary to enable a master to ascertain the stability of his vessel.

The Court also recommends that:-

(1) Effective precautions should be taken by the Board of Trade to prevent British ships leaving foreign ports in an overladen condition.

(2) Open ended air pipes to ballast tanks should be protected against inflow of sea water.

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Bucknill, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted there was a prima facie case against the owners and Mr. Watkin James Williams, the registered manager, showing that blame should attach to them for the loss of the "Eastway." He also submitted the following questions upon which he desired the opinion of the Court:-

1. What was the cost of the s.s. "Eastway" to her owners? What was her value for purposes of insurance when she last left the United Kingdom?

What insurances were effected upon and in connection with the ship?

2. Was the vessel chartered on the voyage on which she was lost?

If so, to whom was she chartered and what were the terms of the Charter Party?

3. When did the vessel arrive at Norfolk, Va., to load her last cargo?

4. Whilst the vessel was at Norfolk, Va., what communications passed between the owners and master of the ship?

What instructions were given by the owners to the master?

5. Was it possible for the master to carry out the instructions given him by the owners as to the amount of bunker coal to be shipped and to take on board an amount of coal for cargo sufficient to comply with the terms of the charter without loading the vessel beyond her winter load line?

6. From whom was the bunker coal shipped on board the vessel at Norfolk, Va., obtained? Who ordered it? Who paid for it?

7. What weights of (a) cargo (b) bunker coal were loaded on board the ship at Norfolk, Va.?

Who decided the amounts to be shipped?

8. When did the loading of cargo and bunker coal on board the vessel at Norfolk, Va., commence and finish?

Were the cargo and bunker coal properly stowed and adequately trimmed to prevent shifting?

9. When the loading had been completed and the vessel was ready for sea-

(a) What was the total deadweight on board the ship?

(b) What amount of bunker coal was carried on deck and where was it stowed?

(c) What was the vessel's draught of water forward and aft? What would the draught have been in salt water?

10. Was any protest or complaint as to the condition of the ship when loaded made by any of the crew to anyone before the vessel left Norfolk, Va.?

11. When the vessel left Norfolk, Va., on the 18th October last-

(a) Was she in good condition as regards hull and machinery and equipment?

(b) Was she properly supplied with boats, life-saving appliances; spare tarpaulins, hatches and wedges for securing hatchways?

(c) Was she upright?

(d) Were all hatchways and other deck openings properly covered, protected and secured?

(e) Had she the freeboard required for a winter voyage?

(f) Was the vessel as loaded in proper trim and in fit condition to safely encounter bad weather which might be expected at that time of year?

(g) Had the master received any warning of approaching bad weather?

12. After leaving Norfolk, Va., was the bunker coal stowed on deck removed into the bunkers?

If so, when was this done? Into which bunkers was the coal put, and were the bunker hatches properly covered, battened down and secured thereafter?

13. On the 21st October were wireless warnings of an approaching hurricane received on board the ship?

What was the course and speed of the ship thereafter?

14. At what time on the night of the 21/22nd October did the wind commence to increase? From what direction was it blowing? Did the wind reach gale or hurricane force, and if so, when?

15. How was the vessel heading during the morning of the 22nd October? How did she behave in the rough weather?

16. What was the cause of the vessel commencing to list to port at or about noon of the 22nd October?

17. What was the cause of the damage sustained on deck after noon of the 22nd October and were all efforts possible made to repair it and prevent water getting below?

18. Did water get below during the afternoon of the 22nd October, and if so, how?

19. What were the circumstances in which the master was washed overboard and drowned at or about 4 p.m. of the 22nd October?

What efforts were made to save him?

20. What was the cause of the vessel listing very heavily to port after 4 p.m. of the 22nd October and the subsequent damage received on deck?

21. When were wireless calls for assistance sent out from the vessel?

Were they picked up by other vessels?

What responses were received by the s.s. "Eastway"?

22. What was the cause of the capsizing and foundering of the vessel at or about 7 p.m. on the 22nd October last?

What was the approximate position of the ship at this time?

23. What happened to the crew of the vessel when she captized and foundered?

Was the starboard lifeboat which remained large enough to accommodate all hands?

How many of the crew succeeded in getting into the lifeboat?

How many lost their lives?

24. When did the s.s. "Luciline" arrive on the scene of the disaster?

When did she pick up the survivors from the crew and land them at Bermuda?

25. Was the loss of the ship caused or contributed to by the instructions or any of them sent by the owners or Mr. Watkin James Williams, the registered manager, to the master?

26. Does blame for the loss of the s.s. "Eastway" attach to the owners and/or Mr. Watkin James Williams, registered manager?

The Court then considered the questions and answered as follows:-

1. The cost of the s.s. "Eastway" to her owners was £31,803. She was purchased by them on the 7th April, 1923, from the Admiralty Marshal. According to the evidence of the registered manager her value at the time of her loss was £50,000. He states that when the insurances were effected upon the hull and machinery in August, 1926, she could not be insured for a less value than £40,000. It would appear, therefore, that her value, for the purpose of insurance, when she left Rotterdam in September, 1926, was about £40,000.

The following insurances were effected upon and in connection with the vessel:-

The actual value of the insurance on premiums reducing at the time of her loss was £2,250.

An insurance of £6,656 on excess R.D.C. was also effected upon the vessel.

2. The vessel was chartered on the voyage on which she was lost to the Flat-Top Fuel Co., Inc., of Bluefield, West Virginia. According to the charter party, dated 15th September, 1926, and made by the Charterer's Agents (Moxon Salt & Co., Ltd., of London) with the owners, she had to proceed to Hampton Roads and there load a full and complete cargo of nominated coal not exceeding 8,000 tons nor less than 7,500 tons, and then proceed to Pernambuco (Brazil), where she had to discharge at the rate of 500 tons per working day. The penalty for non-performance of the charter party was proved damages, not exceeding the estimated amount of freight. The freight was 21s. per ton, which included the cost of trimming at the loading port. One half of the freight was payable in London on receipt of cable that bills of lading had been signed (ship lost or not lost) less 3 per cent. for insurance and interest.

3. The vessel arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia, at about 5.40 p.m. on the 15th October, 1926. She went alongside Lambert's Point Pier, Norfolk, Va., on the 16th October.

4. The following documents were produced by the registered manager as being the only communications which passed between the owners and the master whilst the vessel was at Norfolk, Va.:-

(1) Letter from owners to master, dated 27th September, 1926, dealing with the victualling, allotments and portage bill in connection with the previous voyage which was completed in Antwerp in September, 1926.

(2) Cablegram from master on the 15th October announcing arrival at Hampton Roads.

(3) Cablegram from owners on the 16th October, as follows:-

"She is fixed to load not above San Lorenzo copy of charter Pernambuco take only sufficient coal with safe margin to carry you to Las Palmas increase coal consumption to 30 tons per day from Norfolk to River Plate homeward consumption per day as usual telegraph as soon as possible prospects and bunkers remaining how many tons of bunkers have you on board."

(4) Cablegram from master at 12.55 p.m. on the 16th October and received at Cardiff at 8.23 p.m., as follows:-

"Arrived Friday P.M. Prospects 18th October shall only have 80 tons bunkers left on arrival."

(5) Cablegram from master at 1.32 p.m. on the 16th and received at Cardiff at 8.33 p.m. as follows:-

"Your telegram is received It is quite clear In bunkers 80 tons Prospect of 18th October."

(6) Letter from master dated 16th October, which contained the following:-

"I received your telegram of to-day instructing me to burn 30 tons bunker coal from here to the River Plate port, and to burn the usual quantity on the homeward passage, also note your instructions to bunker for 'Las Palmas.' We burnt a lot of 'Antwerp' coal on the passage across averaging 34.4 tons per day as you will see by enclosed abstract, but it was advisable to burn it to get the steamer along while there was a bit of fine weather about. We had 92 tons left when we anchored in Hampton Roads but as we have had to move the steamer twice and have still to go alongside the piers, I gave you 80 tons remaining in my telegram, and that gentlemen will be every ton there is in the steamer when we start bunkering here. We shall have 29 to 30 days steaming (viz.) the distance from here to Pernambuco and the 'River Plate' ports at the increased consumption of 3 ton per day which means 90 tons of coal. I am ordering 1,750 tons bunker coal here which should take us to 'Las Palmas.'"

(7) Cablegram from master at 10.28 p.m. on the 18th and received in Cardiff at 5.42 a.m. on the 19th, as follows:-

"Sailed Monday P.M. Cargo 7,785 tons. Bunkers shipped 1,637 surplus 80 tons. Total disbursements 2,500 Dollars."

The cablegrams Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 were in code, the translation being furnished by the registered manager.

The customary sailing letter on this voyage from the master to the owners is, however, not produced. It is stated that it has not been received by them.

Although there is no direct evidence showing that the master had received a copy of the charter party mentioned in answer to question 2, or knew the terms thereof, it must be assumed that he had knowledge of its contents, and of his obligation to take at least 7,500 tons of cargo from Norfolk, Va. According to the evidence of the registered manager, the instructions given to the master while at Norfolk, Va., were those contained in the cablegram of the 16th October.

5. In the opinion of the Court it was not possible for the master to carry out the instructions given by the registered manager as to the amount of bunker coal to be shipped and to take on board an amount of coal for cargo sufficient to comply with the terms of the charter without loading the vessel beyond her winter load line.

Her winter load line was 27 feet 11 inches which gave a lift of 9,120 tons.

By the terms of the charter she had to take on board not less than 7,500 tons of coal for cargo. The maximum amount of bunker coal therefore which could be shipped without loading her beyond her winter load line was 1,620 tons, without making any allowance for other deadweight, such as water and stores.

The Court is of opinion that 1,620 tons of bunker coal would not be sufficient with safe margin to carry the vessel to Las Palmas, for the following reasons:-

6. The bunker coal shipped on board the vessel at Norfolk, Va., was obtained from C. G. Blake Company of Norfolk, Va. It was ordered by the master, but there is no evidence as to who paid for it.

7. The evidence as to the weight of the (a) cargo, and (b) bunker coal loaded on board the vessel at Norfolk, Va., is as follows:-

According to the affidavit of the stevedore's foreman, the cargo and bunker coal was weighed in the railroad cars by automatic scales by the weighmaster of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company, just before the cars came on the pier for delivery to the vessel.

The registered manager, however, states that he is not prepared to accept the weights as being correct as he contends that there is generally a shortage in the cargo, and that such shortage is recognized by an allowance of 2 per cent. in charter parties. It must be pointed out that, assuming an allowance be made for shortage, the 2 per cent. under a charter party is for loading and discharging the cargo, and that there-fore not more than I per cent. should be allowed for shortage in loading. On this basis, the master's estimate of a total of 9,422 tons would be reduced by about 95 tons, which would give a net weight of cargo and bunker coal shipped of 9,327 tons.

The Court accepts the corroborated statement of the master in his telegram, i.e. that 7,785 tons of cargo coal and 1,637 tons of bunker coal were loaded on board the vessel. There was also on board, as pointed out in a telegram, a surplus of 80 tons of bunker coal from the last voyage. This fact is confirmed by the bills of lading.

In the letter of the 16th October above mentioned, the master stated that he was ordering 1,750 tons of bunker coal. According to the affidavit of the stevedore's foreman, the chief officer first asked for 7,700 tons of cargo coal and 1,800 tons of bunker coal to be loaded, and that during the process of loading the chief officer directed that the quantity of bunker coal should be reduced by 164 tons and the cargo coal increased by 84 tons. The chief officer, in giving such orders, must have been acting under the instructions of the master. No reason is assigned for the master giving such instruction, but it may be pointed out that he had made two voyages from Norfolk, Va., with similar cargoes, viz., in November, 1925, and May, 1926, when the vessel had carried 7,600 and 7,826 tons of cargo respectively, and 1,715 and 1,692 tons of bunker coal.

As above stated, the actual amount loaded was 7,785 tons of cargo coal, and 1,637 tons of bunkers.

8. The loading of cargo and bunker coal commenced at 9.30 a.m. on the 17th October and finished at 11 a.m. on the 18th. It appears from the affidavit of the stevedore's foreman that the cargo coal was reasonably stowed in accordance with custom and adequately trimmed to prevent shifting.

The Court finds, from calculations based upon the cubic capacity of the bunker spaces as shown by the ship's plans, that she was carrying within 63 tons of her full bunker capacity. The Court is therefore of opinion that the master's allegation that the bunker coal was badly trimmed is ill founded, and that the bunker coal was properly and adequately trimmed to prevent shifting.

9. When the loading had been completed and the vessel was ready for sea

(a) Her draught gave a total deadweight of 9,648 tons, which was made up as follows:-

The records of the cargoes and draughts of previous voyages show that there has always been some dead-weight carried in addition to the cargo and bunkers.

(b) Between 20 and 40 tons of bunker coal was carried on deck and stowed on No. 3 hatch abaft the engine room casing.

(c) It has been contended that the evidence as to the vessel's draught of water forward and aft when leaving is unreliable and should not be accepted. The acting 3rd officer gives the draught as 29 feet 10 inches forward and 29 feet aft, and states that this was entered by him in the log upon the instructions of the chief officer. One witness states that the water was a little over the 30-foot mark forward. This observation was made when looking over the side on the forecastle head. An apprentice states that the disc was 7/8ths under water on the port side and he considered the vessel had no appreciable list. A motor boat was working its propeller along-side when he noticed the disc. According to the affidavit of the pilot, the master informed him when he went on board that the vessel's draught was 29 feet 9 inches, but on leaving the vessel the master handed him a card which gave the draught as 29 feet 5 inches. The card was signed by the master. The account furnished by the Flat Top Fuel Company gives the draught as 29 feet 5 inches. The account for the watchman's services on the vessel shows her draught to have been 29 feet 10 inches forward and 29 feet aft. The Court is satisfied that the evidence of the acting 3rd officer is amply corroborated, and therefore considers that the draught was 29 feet 10 inches forward and 29 feet aft, being a mean draught of 29 feet 5 inches.

According to the affidavit of Captain Eagleton, Surveyor, of Norfolk, Va., who took a sample of the water at Lambert's Point on January 29th, 1927, at a stage of the tide corresponding with 11 a.m. on the 18th October, 1926, the specific gravity of the water would allow a reduction of freeboard for a steamer the size of the "Eastway" of 4¾ inches. He observed that it is probable that the density is lower in January than in October. The chief officer's log books for two voyages from Norfolk, Va., show that in November, 1925, an allowance of 1 inch was made for density, and in May, 1926, 3½ inches. The Court therefore considers that the maximum allowance for reduction of freeboard should be 4¾ inches, but that probably it should be less.

10. There is no evidence that any protest or complaint as to the condition of the vessel when loaded was made by any of the crew before the vessel left Norfolk, Va.

11. When the vessel left Norfolk, Va., on the 18th October last

(a) She was in good condition as regards hull and machinery and equipment.

(b) She was properly supplied with boats, life saving appliances, spare tarpaulins, hatches and wedges for securing hatchways.

(c) There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the vessel was upright when leaving. The acting 3rd officer, two apprentices, a seaman and a fireman state that she was upright, while according to another seaman and fireman and the steward she had a slight list of about 3 degrees to port. This evidence would tend to show that she was upright.

(d) All hatchways and other deck openings were properly covered, protected and secured.

(e) She had not the freeboard required for a winter voyage.

(f) The vessel, being 10 inches by the bows, was not in proper trim, and being overloaded, according to the draught, to the extent of at least 1 foot 1¼ inches, was not in fit condition to safely encounter bad weather which might be expected at that time of the year.

(g) There is no evidence that the master received warning of approaching bad weather before leaving Norfolk, Va.

12. After leaving Norfolk, Va., the bunker coal stowed on deck was removed into the casing sides, during the 19th October. The bunker hatches were then properly covered, battened down and secured.

13. Wireless warning of an approaching hurricane was received on board the vessel on the 21st October between 8 and 12 p.m. A wireless message was sent out by the s.s. "Canadian Forester" at 10.25 a.m. on the 22nd October, giving warning of a gale in-creasing to a hurricane and its direction, but there is no direct evidence that such message was received on the "Eastway." The course of the vessel appears to have been south-easterly until about noon of the 22nd, and afterwards it was altered in order to keep the wind on the starboard bow.

The engines were kept at full speed, but the way was much reduced by the force of the wind and sea, and it is impossible to determine what was her actual speed.

14. According to the evidence of the acting 3rd officer, the wind commenced to increase at about 10 p.m. on the 21st October, and its direction was from S.E. It continued to increase, and, according to an apprentice, sea was coming on board between 4 and 8 a.m. on the 22nd October.

During the acting 3rd officer's watch, from 8 a.m. until noon, it was blowing hard. At noon it was blowing very hard and the vessel was shipping much water. She was steaming full speed but making little way. The acting 3rd officer states he had experienced worse weather. At 4 p.m. it was blowing harder and the rail on the port side was under water. At about 7 p.m., when the vessel sank, the sea was moderating.

An apprentice, named Johnson, states that at 8 a.m. on the 22nd October, the wind was fresh and the vessel shipping water. The steward went to the Captain's berth at 7 a.m. He states that she was then taking the seas well and was not wet. Johnson states that in the afternoon, after 3 p.m., the weather was worse than he had ever experienced during his 3½ years at sea. One of the firemen, whose sea experience extended over 12 years, states that many times in his career he had known heavier weather.

According to the reports of the s.s. "Luciline," which was about 30 miles south of the "Eastway," there was a strong wind at about 8 a.m. on the 22nd. At noon it developed into a strong gale, with heavy seas; at 6 p.m. into a strong S.S. westerly gale, and 8 p.m. into a gale.

A report from the s.s. "Ariquani," which was on the south side of the path of the storm, shows that the wind was strong at noon, and was at gale force about 4 p.m. A report from the s.s. "Santi," also on the south side of the storm's path, gives the wind as being storm force at noon. Having regard, therefore, to all this evidence, the Court is of opinion that the wind at the position of the "Eastway" never exceeded storm force. Had the wind been of hurricane force the vessel would probably have sustained heavy structural damage and none of the crew would have been able to leave the ship. Whereas the structural damage suffered was comparatively small and some of the crew were able to save their lives by getting into the starboard lifeboat, which floated clear of the vessel. They were in the boat for 17 hours until rescued by the "Luciline." Although the "Luciline" gives maximum strength of the wind as being gale force, the Court, in estimating the wind as being of storm force in the neighbourhood of the "Eastway," takes into consideration that the "Eastway" was nearer to the storm centre than the "Luciline." The wind probably reached hurricane force at the centre of the cyclone, but the "Eastway" was about 120 miles from the path of the centre of the storm.

15. There is no direct evidence as to the direction the vessel was heading during the morning of the 22nd October, but, having regard to her objective and the weather, the master probably kept her on a south-easterly course.

The evidence clearly shows that she was labouring heavily, shipping heavy water and steering badly.

16. When fully laden with a homogeneous cargo this vessel was tender, according to the experience and evidence of two of her previous masters. One of them states that she was generally tender when loading was completed. A representative of the builders of the vessel expressed the opinion that this type of vessel usually was tender. By reason of her tenderness, the vessel was unable to resist the force of the wind on the starboard side, and consequently took a list to port. Further, as the coal was consumed from the lower cross bunkers, the vessel would become still more tender, probably with a negative metacentric height which would result in an increased list. This list, aided by the rolling motion, would cause loose coal to shift to leeward which would have the effect of increasing the list still further.

17. About 4 p.m. on the 22nd October the only substantial damage sustained on deck was in connection with the tarpaulins on the port forward bunker hatch, which were blown or washed away. This damage was caused by the heavy wind and sea acting on the overladen vessel which then had a considerable list to port. Every effort was made to repair the damage and prevent water getting below.

18. During the afternoon of the 22nd, after the list to port had increased, water probably got into the ballast tanks through the goose-neck air pipes, which were intermittently, if not continually, submerged on the lee side. When the hatch covers were washed away, i.e. between 5 and 5.30 p.m., large quantities of water got below through the port forward bunker hatchway.

19. About 4 p.m. on the 22nd October, after an unsuccessful attempt by the apprentice Johnson-to whom a lifeline was attached-to put another tarpaulin on the port bunker hatch, the master, without a lifeline, made a similar attempt, but unfortunately he was washed overboard. Lifebuoys and lines were thrown towards him, and every effort was made to save him, but without success, owing to the heavy weather, the labouring of the vessel and the list to port.

20. Between 5 and 5.30 p.m. the list had increased-according to the acting 3rd officer's estimate-to about 15 degrees, and the port bunker hatch covers were then washed away owing to the heavy seas on that side. Water afterwards poured through the hatchway and further increased the list to port as mentioned in the answer to question 16.

21. Wireless calls for assistance were sent out from the vessel between about 5.30 to 5.45 p.m. She was not then answering her helm and water was pouring through the port bunker hatchway. The wireless operator of the "Eastway" went down in the vessel while at his post of duty, and, according to the affidavit of the master of the s.s. "Luciline," the following messages were sent out by the "Eastway" and by the "Luciline" after calls for assistance from the "Eastway" were received:-

From "Eastway."

G.M.T. 21.50. Ship's time 5.38 p.m.

From "Luciline" to "Eastway."

22.08 G.M.T. Ship time 5.56 p.m.

From "Eastway."

G.M.T. 22.25. Ship time 6.13 p.m.

From "Luciline" to "Eastway."

22.30 G.M.T. Ship time 6.18 p.m.

Messages for assistance from the "Eastway" were also picked up by the s.s. "Fort St. George" and the s.s. "Cadiz."

22. The cause of the foundering of the vessel at about 7 p.m. on the 22nd October was a large influx of water through the port bunker hatch, the covers of which were washed away by heavy seas owing to the vessel having a heavy list to port and lacking reserve buoyancy in consequence of her overladen condition.

The approximate position of the vessel when she foundered was Latitude 31£N., Longitude 63£W.

23. Before the vessel foundered the falls of the starboard lifeboat were unhooked so that, on the vessel sinking, the lashings could be cut and the lifeboat easily released. When she foundered the lifeboat floated off, and twelve of the crew, who were standing by, were able to get into her. The remainder unfortunately lost their lives. Those below probably being unable to come up when the vessel was on her beam ends, and those on the bridge being unable to get aft by reason of the heavy seas and the list.

Although the lifeboat was large enough to accommodate all hands, twelve only of the thirty-four then remaining of the officers and crew succeeded in getting into her, and all others were, unfortunately, drowned.

24. The "Luciline" arrived on the scene of the disaster at 10 p.m. on the 22nd but could find no signs of the "Eastway." She cruised about all night in the vicinity and continued the search at daylight. She picked up the boat containing the twelve survivors at about noon of the 23rd, and transferred them to the tug "Powerful" at Bermuda at daybreak on the 24th.

The Court wishes to record its deep appreciation of the great services rendered by the officers and crew of the "Luciline" in their efforts to rescue the survivors of the "Eastway."

25. The Court is of opinion that the loss of the vessel was contributed to by the instructions sent by the registered manager to the master.

For the reasons mentioned in the answer to question 5 it was not possible for the master to carry out the instructions with reference to bunker coal without loading the vessel beyond her winter load line.

When she left Norfolk, Va., she was laden beyond her winter loadline to the extent of at least 13¼ inches.

The amount of bunker coal considered necessary by the master, i.e. 1,717 tons, plus minimum amount of cargo and necessary allowance for other deadweight, would put her beyond her winter loadline to the extent of 6¼ inches. The difference of 7 inches is due to the master shipping 285 tons of cargo beyond the minimum mentioned in the charter party.

The total quantity shipped by the master represents an amount equal to the average of the amounts shipped on the vessel's two previous voyages from Norfolk with a coal cargo.

In the opinion of the Court the loss of 6¼ inches of freeboard, and still more the loss of 13¼ inches of freeboard, materially contributed to the loss of the vessel, for the following reasons:-

(1) When laden with a cargo of coal the "Eastway" was a tender vessel and every additional ton would tend to increase her tenderness.

(2) On the 22nd October the vessel, in consequence of her tenderness, developed a list to port owing to the strong wind on her starboard side.

(3) In her overladen state the vessel lacked stability and was unable to right herself, and the list increased until the rail on the vessel's port side was under water.

(4) Whilst in this position heavy seas washed away the port bunker hatch, and water flowed into the vessel causing her to founder.

(5) After the master was washed overboard, the chief officer, in discussing with the acting 3rd officer the dangerous list which the vessel had taken, accounted for it by saying," It was the extra 200 tons that made her list."

(6) If the vessel had not lacked stability and reserve buoyancy she would probably have weathered the storm, of which apparently she did not feel the full force, for:-

(a) Very little damage, beyond the loss of the port bunker hatch, the port lifeboat and ventilators, was sustained by the "Eastway";

(b) It was possible for some of the crew to get into, and escape from the foundering vessel in, the starboard lifeboat;

(c) The "Eastway's" position and course, deduced from information in wireless messages, show that she never experienced the full force of the hurricane.

26. The Court is of opinion that blame for the loss of the "Eastway" attaches to Watkin James Williams, sole registered manager.

In November, 1925, the "Eastway" in charge of Captain Vanstone left Norfolk, Va., with a cargo of coal. On leaving, her mean draught was 28 feet 10½ inches and the weight of her cargo and bunker coal was 9,307 tons, making, with her stores, etc., a total deadweight of 9,580 tons. Her mean draught should not have exceeded 27 feet 11 inches, and her deadweight should not have exceeded 9,120 tons. On this voyage, therefore, the "Eastway" was overladen. This fact was communicated to the owners and to Watkin James Williams, registered manager, in a sailing telegram dated the 14th November, 1925, and was also entered in the vessel's log. No explanation was demanded by the owners or offered by the master.

In May, 1926, the "Eastway," in charge of Captain Vanstone, left Norfolk, Va., with a cargo of coal. On leaving her mean draught was 29 feet 2 inches, and the weight of her cargo and bunker coal was 9,518 tons, making, with her stores, etc., a total deadweight of 9,720 tons. Her mean draught should not have exceeded 28 feet 6 inches, and her deadweight should not have exceeded 9,400 tons. On this voyage, therefore, the "Eastway" was again overladen. This fact was communicated to the owners and to the registered manager in a sailing telegram dated the 24th day of May. 1926, and was also entered in the vessel's log. The registered manager, in his evidence, stated that the information in the sailing telegram suggested to him that the "Eastway" had carried a "good" cargo, but not that she was overladen.

The registered manager also stated that lie had instructed his marine superintendent to discuss this "good" cargo with the master. The marine superintendent stated that he discussed the matter with the master who assured him that the "Eastway" was not overladen, which assurance the marine superintendent said he accepted, although in direct contradiction of the information contained in the sailing telegram and in the vessel's log.

The registered manager also stated that he met the master-Vanstone-at Rotterdam after receiving the sailing telegram dated the 24th May, 1926, but that he, the registered manager, did not discuss the matter with the master. The registered manager gave two reasons for this remarkable omission to seek an explanation:-

(1) That he had instructed his marine superintendent to do so, and that having placed the matter in his hands he felt that it would be improper for him, the registered manager, to take any steps in the matter;

(2) That when at Rotterdam the matter was entirely forgotten by him.

On the 18th day of October, 1926, the "Eastway," in charge of Captain Vanstone, left Norfolk, Va., with a cargo of coal. On leaving, her mean draught was 29 feet¼ inch, and the weight of her cargo and coal bunkers was 9,502 tons, making, with her stores, etc., a total deadweight of 9,648 tons Her mean draught should not have exceeded 27 feet 11 inches, and her deadweight should not have exceeded 9,120 tons. On this voyage, therefore, the "Eastway" was overladen-for the third time within a period of eleven months.

It was admitted by the registered manager that it was a part of his duty to take such steps as might be necessary to prevent the vessel being overladen. What steps, if any, did he take to prevent her leaving Norfolk, Va., in an overladen condition on the 18th day of October, 1926? The registered manager stated in his evidence that in order to ascertain what amount of bunker coal would be required to carry the "Eastway" from Norfolk, Va., to Las Palmas on her last voyage he consulted his marine superintendent and engineer superintendent. He also stated that at this consultation it was decided that 1,550-1,600 tons of coal would be the required quantity.

Having regard to the unsatisfactory and evasive manner in which the registered manager gave his evidence, the Court is unable to place any reliance upon his testimony and does not accept his statement that any calculation was made by him as to the amount of bunker coal that would be required. If such calculation were made the figure said to have been arrived at is at variance with the figures arrived at upon calculations based upon previous voyages, and also with the estimate of the master, H. Vanstone. Moreover, no suggestion has been made that the result of this calculation or of any other calculation was communicated to the master. The responsibility of deciding what amount of bunker coal would be required was therefore placed upon him. In order to arrive at a decision the master would himself have to make certain calculations. These calculations would have to be based on certain factors, including the amount and quality of coal on similar voyages and Iris experience of the vessel's requirements. Although there is no direct evidence on the point it must be assumed that the master knew the weight of the cargo he would have to carry, inasmuch as this know-ledge would be a material factor in calculating the amount of bunker coal that should be carried. The factors or bases of calculation which were available for the master were equally available for the registered manager. The master having made his calculation came to the conclusion that he would require not less than 1,717 tons of bunker coal. The master informed the owners in a telegram dated October 18th, 1926, that lie had left Norfolk, Va., with that amount of banker coal on board.

In the opinion of the Court this amount of bunker coal certainly was not in excess of what was required. This opinion is based upon the calculations set out in answer to question 5. The registered manager there-fore left to Captain Vanstone the decision as to the amount of cargo and hunker coal that the vessel should carry from Norfolk, Va. on this voyage. This decision was left by the registered manager to a master who on two previous occasions had left Norfolk, Va., with an overladen vessel without censure and without reproof.

It was no advantage to the master to imperil his own life and the lives of his crew by sailing in an over-laden vessel unless done with the approval of the registered manager.

The Court is therefore irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the s.s. "Eastway" was overladen on her last voyage with the sanction of the registered manager, who abstained from taking any steps or giving any instructions, as it was his duty to do, to guard against such overloading.

Hence, the Court finds that the conduct of the registered manager, Watkin James Williams, is blameworthy and culpable, and therefore orders him to pay £1,000 towards the costs of this Inquiry.

ST. JOHN FRANCIS-WILLIAMS, Judge.

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Saturday, the 28th day of May, 1927.)

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