FOR OFFICIAL USE
(No. S. 351.)
Steam Trawler "FROBISHER".
THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.
REPORT OF COURT.
In the matter of a formal investigation held at the Guildhall,
Hull, on the 28th, 29th and 30th days of April and the 1st and 5th
days of May, 1931, before J. R. Macdonald, Esq., O.B.E.,
Stipendiary Magistrate, assisted by Captain H. P. Learmont, R.D.,
R.N.R., Captain F. W. Kershaw, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., and Mr. W.
Bates, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the
British steam trawler "Frobisher," of the Port of Hull, on the 1st
day of February, 1931.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances
attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the
reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding of the
vessel was due to the failure of the skipper to navigate the vessel
with proper and seamanlike care in that he:-
(1) failed to verify his point of departure when off North Cape,
Iceland;
(2) set a course which with such a starting point was
erroneous;
(3) failed, when the vessel had run the distance that should
have brought her within the close proximity of Grimsey Island, to
verify his position by taking soundings;
(4) failed, when visibility became seriously affected by snow,
to reduce the speed of the vessel, or to stop and endeavour to
ascertain his position.
The Court finds the skipper, James Alfred Grantham, in grave
default and suspends his skipper's certificate for nine months from
this date, and recommends that he be granted a second hand's
certificate during the period of such suspension.
The Court expresses its strong disapproval of the action of the
mate, Reuben Edward Brown, in altering the reading of the log
without the skipper's knowledge.
Dated the 5th day of May, 1931.
J. R. MACDONALD,
Judge.
| | H. P. LEARMONT
F. W. KERSHAW
W. BATES | Assessors. |
ANNEX TO THE REPORT.
This Inquiry was held at the Guildhall, Hull, on the 28th, 29th
and 30th days of April and the 1st and 5th days of May, 1931. Mr.
H. Leicester Saxelbye appeared for the Board of Trade. Mr. Haggitt
Colbeck represented the skipper, the second hand and the boatswain
appeared in person, and Dr. T. C. Jackson represented the
Underwriters who made themselves parties to the Inquiry.
The S.T. "Frobisher" was a trawler of the type known as the
"Mersey" type. Her official number was 144,355. She was built at
Goole in 1920 by the Goole Shipbuilding and Repairing Company,
Limited, of Goole; engines and boilers by Richardsons Westgarth and
Company, Limited, of Middlesbrough. Her engine was a reciprocating
triple expansion direct acting type, N.H.P. 87, I.H.P. 600; and the
boiler a steel multitubular one with a working pressure of 200
pounds. Her speed is given on the Board of Trade Register as 11
knots. Her registered dimensions were: length 138.5 ft., breadth
23.75 ft., and depth 12.8 ft. Her gross tonnage was 328.08 and her
registered tonnage 131.57. She was built of steel and ketch rigged.
She had four bulkheads.
She was last surveyed on deck on the 24th April, 1930, and her
bottom was surveyed in November, 1930. Her insurance value was
£9,000.
The vessel at the time of the stranding was owned by the East
Riding Steam Fishing Company, Limited, of St. Andrew's Dock, Hull,
and managed by Messrs. Thomas Hudson and Charles Hudson of
Hessle.
The general design of and arrangements in the vessel were those
of a typical modern steam trawler.
Practically amidships on the raised quarter deck and forward of
the funnel was the chart room which the skipper used as his
quarters. Above the chart room was the wheelhouse or bridge, a
small house with an outside open air "verandah." The wheelhouse had
15 windows (on either side and in front), the compass, by which the
courses set by the skipper were steered, being fixed in the
roof.
The vessel was well supplied with the requisite charts for
sailing in Icelandic waters; the skipper also had with him the
"Arctic Pilot," Volumes I and II, and two supplements.
The vessel was equipped with the three compasses usual on a
trawler of her class, viz., a pole compass, a steering compass in
the wheelhouse and a compass in the chart room roof.
The pole and wheelhouse compasses were last adjusted on the 24th
April, 1930, by D. Pearson, Certified Compass Adjuster, of St.
Andrew's Dock, Hull. The deviation cards, which showed no
corrections to be necessary, were in the skipper's possession
during the vessel's last voyage. The skipper checked the compasses
by the Killingholme Lights on his way from Hull down the Humber and
found them accurate.
The vessel was well and sufficiently equipped with lifebuoys and
lifebelts and carried aft two boats of ample capacity to carry all
the crew.
Her sounding gear consisted of a patent sounding machine, two 28
lbs., one 10 lbs., and one 7 lbs. lends with plenty of lead line.
She also had a Walker Cherub Patent Log mounted on the taffrail
aft.
On the 13th January, 1931, the vessel left Hull for the
Icelandic fishing grounds with a crew of 14 hands including the
skipper, James Alfred Grantham, who held a skipper's certificate of
competency No. 15691, dated 31st July, 1925, and the mate (or
second hand as the second in command is usually termed in
trawlers), Reuben Edward Brown, who also held a skipper's
certificate, No. 18435, dated 28th October, 1929. The crew
consisted of the skipper, mate, boatswain, third hand, deck hand,
cook, three spare hands, decky learner, two engineers and two
firemen trimmers.
Thirteen days after leaving Hull the vessel reached the fishing
ground and for about six days fished round about a point some 15
miles off Isafjord, about 30 miles west of North Cape.
On the 31st January having taken on board some 50 tons of fish,
the skipper decided to sail for Hull with the intention of having
12 hours more fishing en route off the east coast of Iceland.
Before setting his course for the homeward voyage the skipper took
a bearing of the North Cape, which he thought gave him the Cape's
position as 23 miles S.W.½S. magnetic of his vessel, but took no
soundings or second bearing to check this. In fact, his assumed
position was wrong as he was considerably nearer the land.
Believing his position to be as above set out the skipper at 4
p.m. on the 31st January set the vessel's course at S.E.½E.
magnetic, and had the Cherub Patent Log set at zero. Barker, who
was then at the wheel, steadied the vessel on this course, the
skipper instructing him "Nothing southerly of S.E.½E.," and the
vessel proceeded on the course at her full speed of about 9¾ knots.
The course so set from the skipper's assumed point of departure,
when laid out on the chart, strikes in 101 miles the island known
as Grimsey Island. Of this the skipper was well aware, but he set
this course deliberately relying on an assumption that the vessel's
tendency to steer to port and the currents in these waters of which
he had had experience in the past, would take her some five or more
miles north of the island.
At this time the weather was fine there being a slight westerly
wind and a smooth sea, land being visible until about midnight on
the starboard beam. The skipper was constantly on the bridge until
8 p.m., when he went below to the chart room leaving orders that he
was to be called when the patent log showed 90 miles.
Up to 1 a.m. on the 1st February the weather continued fine and
at about that time Allan reported to the skipper that it was clear
weather and 90 on the log; the skipper answering to call him again
in half an hour. At 1.30 a.m. Allan reported to the skipper that it
had commenced to snow and that the log showed 95 miles. The skipper
at once came up into the wheelhouse and at 2 a.m. had the vessel's
course altered to S.E. by E.½E. magnetic. At 2.15 a.m. the skipper,
who while on deck had been keeping a look-out through the
wheelhouse windows, went below leaving orders to call him when the
log showed 25 miles (i.e., 125 miles).
Snow squalls of varying intensity continued to pass over until
the mate took over the watch at 3 a.m. The mate had Hailes (spare
hand) and Agnes (decky learner) in his watch. Hailes took the first
trick at the wheel and the mate, who had considerable previous
experience of these waters and therefore expected soon to pick up
the Rodehuk Light to starboard, kept a good look-out but did not
see it.
At about 4.30 a.m. Agnes reported to the mate "25 miles on the
log." The mate then went below and told this to the skipper and
that he could see nothing, to which the skipper replied "I don't
suppose you can, we are a long way off land. Call me in another
half hour."
The mate, uneasy at not seeing Rodehuk Light towards 5 a.m.,
sent Agnes again to read the log which showed 29 miles. At 5 a.m. a
snow shower from N.E. struck the vessel and the mate went below and
told the skipper the log figure and that it was snowing. The
skipper at once followed the mate on deck where they found the snow
falling very thickly, completely obscuring all vision. The skipper,
after a look round, at about 5.10 a.m. ordered Agnes, who was then
at the wheel, to alter the course to S.E. by E. magnetic, standing
beneath the roof compass to see he did so accurately.
A few minutes later the skipper asked what was now on the log
and the mate sent Agnes to ascertain the figure, at the same time
whispering to him so that the skipper should not hear to put the
hand of the log back two miles.
The reason the mate gave for his improper order to Agnes was
that he did not like the idea of the skipper altering the
course.
Agnes returned and reported 32 miles on the log. Almost
immediately the vessel struck, sliding up on the shore until she
was fast and remained at rest. She then lay in one fathom of water
forward and two fathoms aft.
The moment she struck the skipper rang the telegraph "full speed
astern" and the engines continued to go astern for 1¾ hours when
blades stripped and the engineer stopped the engines.
Immediately the vessel struck it was ascertained that she was
not making water and a boat was prepared for launching. This boat,
unfortunately, was lowered without orders and before the painter
was made fast. As a consequence the wash of the propellor carried
the boat away and she was lost.
No further attempt was made to get the vessel off after the
propellor blades stripped. The second boat was launched
satisfactorily and the whole crew went ashore at 10 a.m. and got
quarters at a farmhouse. The skipper re-visited the vessel the same
day and she was still making no water but was listing slightly to
port.
During the night of the 1st February a strong wind arose and the
vessel was found the following day to have water in the engine-room
to the level of the dynamo bed plate.
The skipper succeeded in salving three or four boat loads of
fishing gear along with his charts, books and ship's documents.
The Danish Fishery Cruiser "Odin" and the S.T. "Cape Delgado"
arrived and an unsuccessful attempt was made to bail out the
"Frobisher."
The crew of the "Frobisher" were then taken in the "Odin" to
Akureyri in Iceland whence they reached Hull by mail steamer.
At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Saxelbye. on behalf of the
Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion
of the Court:-
(1) When the S.T. "Frobisher" last left Hull on the 13th of
January, 1931, was she adequately equipped for a voyage to the
Icelandic fishing grounds with
(a) Boats and lifesaving appliances.
(b) Sounding appliances.
(c) Arctic Pilot, Volume II, and requisite charts of
Iceland?
(2) What compasses had the vessel?
When had they last been professionally adjusted?
Were they sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel?
Had the skipper ascertained the deviation of the compasses by
observations from time to time since the vessel last left Hull?
Had the errors been correctly ascertained and recorded and did
the skipper know the proper corrections to be applied to the
various courses steered?
(3) When did the vessel leave the Icelandic fishing grounds on
her last voyage towards Hull?
From what position and at what time did the skipper take his
departure?
Was that position correctly ascertained?
(4) What course was set from the point of departure? Was that a
safe and proper course and were due and proper allowances made
for:-
(a) Tide.
(b) Currents and possible set.
(c) The decrease in the variation as the vessel
proceeded to the eastward.
(d) Compass disturbance due to magnetic attraction?
(5) At what speed did the vessel proceed from the point of
departure? Was any alteration in her speed made before she
stranded?
(6) What were the weather conditions when the vessel left her
point of departure? Was there any, and if so what, change in the
weather conditions before the skipper left the bridge?
(7) When did the skipper leave the bridge? Who was in charge of
the navigation of the vessel after the skipper left the bridge? Was
that person duly certificated?
(8) What orders, if any, did the skipper give when he left the
bridge? To whom did he give them? Were such orders proper and
sufficient and were they carried out by those in charge of the
navigation of the vessel?
(9) What were the weather conditions between the time when the
skipper left the bridge and 11 p.m. on 31st January? Were land
and/or shore lights observed at any, and if so what, time or times
during this period? If so, how did they bear and how far distant
were they?
(10) Who took charge of the watch at 11 p.m. on 31st January?
What were the weather conditions between that time and 3 a.m. on
1st February? Were land and/or shore lights observed during this
period? If so, how did they bear and at what distance were they
from the vessel?
(11) Were any, and if so what, reports made to the skipper
during this period? By whom were they made? What, if any, orders
were given by the skipper?
(12) Did the skipper go up on to the bridge during this period?
If so, at what time did he go there? What were the weather
conditions at that time?
(13) Was any, and if so what, alteration made in the course
whilst the skipper was on the bridge?
Had any, and if so what, measures been taken to ascertain the
position of the vessel before the course was altered?
Was the course, as altered, a safe and proper course?
(14) When did the skipper next leave the bridge?
What were the weather conditions at that time?
(15) What, if any, orders did the skipper give when he left the
bridge on this occasion?
To whom did he give them?
Were such orders proper and sufficient and were they carried
out?
(16) Who took charge of the watch at 3 a.m. on 1st February?
What were the weather conditions at that time?
Were land and/or shore lights observed between 3 a.m. and the
time when the vessel stranded? If so, how did they bear and how far
distant were they?
(17) Were any, and if so what, reports made to the skipper
between 3 a.m. and the time when the skipper next returned to the
bridge? By whom were they made?
Were such reports adequate and accurate?
(18) When did the skipper next return to the bridge ?
What were the weather conditions then?
(19) What was the speed of the vessel at this time?
Was such speed safe and proper in the prevailing conditions of
weather and visibility?
(20) Was any, and if so what, alteration in the course of the
vessel made by the skipper after he returned to the bridge? If so,
when was it made? Was the course, as altered, a safe and proper
course?
(21) After the skipper returned to the bridge were any, and if
so what, reports made to him as to the distance indicated by the
patent log? If so, by whom were such reports made and were they
accurate?
(22) Was any alteration made in the distance indicated by the
patent log? If so, what was the alteration?
When, by whose orders, and by whom was it made?
(23) If such an alteration was made, did it, by misleading the
skipper as to the actual distance run, cause, or contribute to the
subsequent stranding of the vessel?
(24) Were proper measures taken to ascertain the positions of
the vessel from time to time on the voyage between her point of
departure from the Icelandic fishing grounds and the place at which
she stranded
(a) by bearings of objects on shore.
(b) By taking soundings?
(25) Where and when did the vessel strand? What were the depths
of water, fore and aft, when she had stranded and what was the
state of the tide?
(26) What was the cause of her stranding?
(27) After the vessel had stranded what orders were given to the
engine-room by the skipper? Were such orders prudent in the
circumstances which existed?
(28) Were all proper steps taken to attempt to get the vessel
off after she had stranded? If not, in what respect were the steps
taken improper or insufficient?
(29) When did the skipper leave the vessel? What were the
conditions of the weather, wind and sea at that time? Was the
vessel making any water at that time?
(30) Did the skipper and/or any other members of the crew return
to the vessel after they first left her? Did the skipper take all
proper measures to ensure that the logs, charts and other documents
in the vessel should be saved? Were any of such logs, charts or
documents lost? If so, which of them were lost and why?
(31) When was the vessel abandoned by the skipper? Was the
abandonment premature?
(32) Was the stranding and subsequent loss of the S.T.
"Frobisher" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default
of James Alfred Grantham, the skipper, Reuben Edward Brown, the
mate, or George Allan, the boatswain, or any, and if so, which of
them?
Dr. Jackson on behalf of the Underwriters, Mr. Colbeck on behalf
of the skipper, having respectively addressed the Court (the second
hand and the boatswain did not say anything although invited so to
do), and Mr. Saxelbye having replied on behalf of the Board of
Trade, the Court gave judgment and returned the following answers
to the questions of the Board of Trade:-
(1) When the S.T. "Frobisher" last left Hull on the 13th
January, 1931, she was adequately equipped for a voyage to the
Icelandic fishing grounds with
(a) Boats and lifesaving appliances.
(b) Sounding appliances.
(c) Arctic Pilot, Volume II, and requisite charts of
Iceland.
(2) The vessel had three compasses, viz.:-
(a) A pole compass.
(b) A compass in the roof of the wheelhouse by which
the courses were set and steered.
(c) A compass in the roof of the chart room.
They had last been professionally adjusted on the 24th April,
1930.
They were sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel.
The skipper ascertained the deviation of the compasses by
observation of the Killingholme Lights on the Humber when the
vessel last left Hull.
The absence of errors had been correctly ascertained and
recorded and the skipper knew that there were no proper corrections
to be made in the courses steered.
(3) The vessel left the Icelandic fishing grounds on her last
voyage towards Hull on the 31st January, 1931.
The skipper took his departure from a position off North Cape,
Iceland, at 4 p.m.
This position was not correctly ascertained.
(4) From the point of departure the course set was S.E. ½ E.
magnetic.
This was not a safe and proper course and due and proper
allowances were not made for:-
(a) Tide.
(b) Currents and possible set.
(c) The decrease in the variation as the vessel
proceeded to the eastward.
(d) Compass disturbance due to magnetic attraction.
(5) The speed of the vessel from the point of departure was
about 9¾ knots.
No alteration was made in her speed before she stranded.
(6) The weather was fine when the vessel left her point of
departure with a slight westerly wind and a smooth sea.
There was no change in the weather conditions before the skipper
left the bridge.
(7) The skipper left the bridge at 8 p.m. on the 31st January,
1931.
After the skipper left the bridge the third hand, Wiseman, was
in charge of the navigation of the vessel.
This person was not duly certificated.
(8) When he left the bridge, the skipper gave Wiseman orders to
keep the vessel's course S.E.½E., nothing southerly, and for him to
be called when the log showed 90 miles.
These orders were proper and sufficient. They were carried out
by those in charge of the navigation of the vessel.
(9) The weather continued clear between the time when the
skipper left the bridge and 11 p.m. on the 31st January. Land was
on the starboard beam during the whole of this period at an
undefined distance, but no shore lights were observed.
(10) The boatswain, Allan, took charge of the watch at 11 p.m.
on the 31st January. At that time the weather was still fine with
no wind at all, but at about 1 a.m. it commenced to snow and slight
snow was still falling at 3 a.m. on the 1st February.
Land was observed during the earlier portion of this period, but
no shore lights were observed.
(11) Reports were made to the skipper during this period and
orders were given by him as follows:-
At about 1 a.m. 1st February, Allan reported "Clear weather and
90 on the log." The skipper ordered him to call him again in half
an hour. At about 1.30 a.m. Allan reported that it was snowing and
95 on the log.
(12) The skipper went up on the bridge at about 1.30 a.m. At
this time it had started to snow.
(13) The skipper when on the bridge altered the vessel's course
to S.E. by E.½E.
No measures had been taken to ascertain the position of the
vessel before the course was so altered.
The course as altered was not a safe and proper course.
(14) The skipper next left the bridge at about 2.15 a.m. At this
time it was snowing.
(15) When the skipper left the bridge he told Allan to call him
when the log read 25.
This order was proper and sufficient and was carried out.
(16) The mate, Reuben Edward Brown, took charge of the watch at
3 a.m. on the 1st February.
At this time there were snow squalls.
No shore lights or land were observed between 3 a.m. and the
time when the vessel stranded.
(17) At about 4.30 a.m. the mate reported to the skipper that
the log showed 25 miles and at about 5 a.m. that it showed 29 and
that it was then snowing.
These reports were adequate and accurate.
(18) The skipper returned to the bridge at about 5 a.m. The snow
was then falling thickly.
(19) The vessel at this time was still at full speed.
This speed was not safe and proper in the prevailing conditions
of weather and visibility.
(20) At about 5.10 a.m. the skipper altered the vessel's course
to S.E. by E.
This was not a safe and proper course.
(21) Just before 5.15 a.m. the mate reported to the skipper 32
on the log. This was not accurate.
(22) An alteration was made in the distance indicated by the
patent log by putting it back 2 miles at about 4.30 a.m. by the
"decky learner" Agnes on the mate's orders.
(23) This alteration did not, by misleading the skipper as to
the actual distance run, cause or contribute to the subsequent
stranding of the vessel.
(24) No proper measures, by bearings of objects on shore or by
taking soundings, were taken to ascertain the positions of the
vessel from time to time on the voyage between her point of
departure from the Icelandic fishing grounds and the place at which
she stranded.
(25) The vessel stranded on the coast of Iceland, position 66
degrees 23' N. latitude, 16 degrees 32 W. longitude, at about 5.15
a.m. on the 1st February, 1931.
The depths of water were 1 fathom forward and 2 fathoms aft. The
tide was ebbing.
(26) The stranding of the vessel was caused by negligent
navigation.
(27) After the vessel had stranded, the skipper immediately
telegraphed "full speed astern" to the engine-room, which was a
prudent order had it been followed by others when it was found
ineffective.
(28) All proper steps were not taken to attempt to get the
vessel off after she had stranded.
The skipper should have stopped his engines until the tide was
near the full and laid out his kedge anchor astern of him and
attempted to warp the vessel off.
(29) The skipper left the vessel at 10 a.m. on the 1st
February.
Up to this hour there had been no particular change in the
conditions as to weather, wind and sea.
The vessel was not making water at that time.
(30) The skipper and members of the crew did return to the
vessel after they first left her.
The skipper did take all proper measures to ensure that the
logs, charts and other documents in the vessel were saved.
No such logs, charts or other documents were lost.
(31) The skipper abandoned the vessel at 10 a.m. on the 1st
February.
The abandonment was premature.
(32) The stranding and subsequent loss of the S.T. "Frobisher"
was caused by the default of James Alfred Grantham, the skipper,
alone.
J. R. MACDONALD, Judge.
We concur.
| | H. P. LEARMONT,
F. W. KERSHAW,
W. BATES, | Assessors. |
(Issued by the Board of Trade in London
on Monday, the 1st day of June, 1931.)
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