Wreck report for 'St Honorious', 1933

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. S. 353.)

STEAM TRAWLER "ST. HONORIUS"

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Guildhall, Hull, on the 4th, 5th and 7th days of April, 1933, before J. R. Macdonald, Esq., O.B.E., Stipendiary Magistrate, assisted by Captain F. W. Kershaw, O.B.E., R.N.R., R.D., Captain T. Daniel and Mr. W. Bates, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the British steam trawler "St. Honorius" on the 19th of January, 1933, at Eyrartange, Iceland.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding and loss of the said vessel were due to the default of the skipper in not correctly ascertaining his position off Langanes Light when setting the course N.W. ¼ W.; the skipper's lack of caution on approaching the western side of Thistil Fjord, and the skipper's failing to realise that the light sighted was Raufar Höfn and not Revsnes, although he knew both lights. There was ample time for the skipper after the light had been reported to him to verify it and take the measures necessary to get his vessel out of danger.

The Court finds the skipper, George Henry Furniss, alone in default and suspends his certificate, but, having in mind his previous excellent character as a skipper, for a period of three months from this date.

Dated this 7th day of April, 1933.

J. R. MACDONALD, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Guildhall, Hull, on the 4th, 5th and 7th days of April, 1933. Mr. H. Leicester Saxelbye appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. C. H. Loncaster represented the skipper, the boatswain appeared in person and Dr. T. C. Jackson represented the Underwriters, who made themselves parties to the Inquiry.

The s.t. "St. Honorius," official number 160846, was a ketch rigged single screw steam trawler, built by Messrs. Cook, Welton and Gemmell, Limited, of Beverley, in the year 1929. Her tonnage was 356.68 gross and 155.27 net register. She was fitted with reciprocating steam triple expansion direct acting inverted cylinder engines of 96 N.H.P. (600 I.H.P.) with one single ended multitubular boiler. The engines and boiler were built by Messrs. C. D. Holmes and Company, Limited, of Hull. Her registered dimensions were, length 140.3 feet B.P., main breadth 24 feet, and depth of hold 13.2 feet. She was constructed with four bulkheads.

On her last voyage she carried a crew of 14 hands all told, including the skipper, George Henry Furniss, certificate No. 13641. She carried the life-saving apparatus and boat usual in ships of her class. Her steering compass was fixed in the roof of the wheelhouse, she had a pole compass on the fore side of the verandah and there was a third in the chartroom.

The first two compasses were last' adjusted on the 22nd December, 1932, by D. Pearson, certificated compass adjuster of St. Andrew's Dock, Hull, and were certified as having no deviation.

The "St. Honorius" left Hull for the Icelandic fishing grounds on the 15th January, 1933, and reached the neighbourhood of the Langanes Light on the headland of that name on the N.E. of Iceland in the afternoon of the 19th January, 1933.

The weather was fine with good visibility, the sea smooth and a light breeze from the S.S.W. These conditions continued till after the stranding of the vessel.

After rounding Langanes Light and when the light bore S.W. at a distance estimated at 3&# to 4 miles, the skipper, at about 4 p.m. set the course N.W. ½ W. so as to reach a position 5½ to 6 miles N.E. of Revsnes Light, a distance of 41½ miles.

The second hand, who was then on watch, was instructed by the skipper to report to him when 40 miles were shown by the patent log, or if he saw anything unusual. The patent log had been set at zero at 4 p.m.

The vessel was kept on the course N.W. ¼ W. steering by the compass in the wheelhouse roof and at 6.30 p.m. the boatswain, William Midgeley Wild, relieved the second hand's watch, the wheel being taken by the spare hand Morris, who remained at the wheel until the vessel stranded.

When the boatswain relieved the second hand's watch he was instructed by the second hand to keep the same course and to call the skipper if land was sighted or 40 miles shown by the patent log. He was also informed that the log read 22 at 6 p.m.

A few moments after the second hand had been relieved, the boatswain sighted a "three flash" white light on the port bow and sent the other hand in his watch, Shakesby, to ask the second hand if he had seen and reported it to the skipper.

Shakesby, having seen the second hand and returned with the message that he had not seen any light, the boatswain called down the hatchway leading from the wheelhouse to the chartroom, where the skipper had been since shortly after 4 p.m., that there was a "three flash" light on the port bow bearing W. by N. This was at about 6.35 p.m.

In about five minutes time the skipper came up into the wheelhouse, had a look round, saw the light which was still showing white and again went below, where he consulted a chart. This chart was not an Admiralty Chart but Imrie's Chart No. 114B of Iceland. It should be noted here that the vessel had all necessary Admiralty Charts, Volume 11 of the Arctic Pilot, and the Admiralty List of Lights, on board.

At about 7.10 p.m. as the skipper was coming up to the wheelhouse for the second time the colour of the light changed to red. When he saw this red light, which was now approaching the beam apparently only a few miles off, he appeared to be puzzled and remarked to the boatswain something to the effect that the lights had been changed since he was last in these waters and gave the helmsman the order "Nothing westerly that course." In fact, although the skipper had considerable experience of Iceland (for instance, he had previously at least 100 times set the course on which he then believed the vessel to be sailing), he had not been in Thistil Fjord since the winter of 1931-32 when the old weaker fishing light was replaced by the present one.

Shortly after the skipper came on the bridge he took a sounding with the echometer and got 12 fathoms. On getting the sounding 12 fathoms the skipper realised he was close into the land (he thought within one mile) and at once ordered the helmsman to starboard the helm and "Get her out to sea." The helmsman, helped by the boatswain, attempted to execute the order, but before they had moved the wheel more than a few spokes the vessel struck.

Just before she struck the skipper rang the engines "full astern." He had to ring twice as the chief engineer was in the stokehold filling ashes and did not answer until the second ring.

The chief engineer who only heard one, probably the second ring, was thrown down by the shock of the vessel grounding, but as speedily as possible ran aft to the engine-room, reversed the engines and kept them opened out for 10 minutes when the skipper ordered "stop." This attempt to get the vessel off was unsuccessful.

Immediately after she struck the vessel developed a very heavy list. Except for the order to drive the engines full speed astern no effort was made to get the vessel off.

Calls for assistance were made by rockets and flares, and a man, Starr, was ordered by the skipper to send, and did transmit, a wireless S.O.S. call. The order given him by the skipper was to send out the vessel's position as being "right under Revsnes with red sector showing," an order which indicated that he was still under the belief that the Raufar Höfn Light was that at Revsnes.

No ships arrived in answer to the S.O.S. until the following day (20th January).

The boat was got out and, the second hand having reported that there was water above the cabin floor, the vessel was abandoned at 11 p.m., low water having been at 9.30 p.m.

The crew obtained shelter at a farmhouse and returned to the vessel in the morning of the 20th January. She was found to be full of water, and in such circumstances it was impossible for them to do anything towards getting her off.

When later in the day three trawlers (two of the same Company as the "St. Honorius") arrived, they also were unable to do anything to salve the vessel.

On the 21st January the Government vessels "Odin" and "Aegir" arrived and also could do nothing.

The vessel would not have been lost had the skipper (1) fixed his position when off Langanes Light accurately by time bearings or cross bearings, (2) made more allowance for possible deviation of the compass and inset into Thistil Fjord, and (3) above all verified the identity of the light seen at 6.35 p.m. or headed the vessel out to sea when the changing of the light from white to red should have made him realise that it was not the Revsnes Light.

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Saxelbye on behalf of the Board of Trade submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:-

1. When the steam trawler "St. Honorius" last left Hull on the 15th January, 1933, for the Icelandic fishing grounds, was she in good and seaworthy condition?

2. Was she equipped for the voyage with

3. What compasses had the vessel? When and by whom had they last been professionally adjusted? Was a deviation card supplied to the skipper after each adjustment?

4. Were the compasses sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel? Had the skipper corrected the compasses by observation from time to time, and did he know the proper corrections for the compasses to be applied?

5. When was the Langanes Light sighted on the vessel's northward course? At what time was the light abeam on that course? Did the vessel alter course when Langanes Light was abeam on that course? How far was she from the light when she altered course?

6. At what time did she alter course? Were proper and sufficient measures taken by the skipper to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel off Langanes Point at the time when the alteration of course was made?

7. What alteration of course was made at that time? Was the new course set a safe and proper one? Was due and proper allowance made for tides, currents, and possible inset into Thistil Fjord?

8. What were

at the time when the course was altered off Langanes Point? Did any change in the weather or visibility take place before the vessel stranded? If so, what was it?

9. Was any, and if so, what, light sighted by the person in charge of the navigation of the vessel at or about 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933? Who was the person then in charge of the navigation of the vessel?

10. How did the light bear from the vessel when it was sighted? Was the sighting and bearing of the light reported to the skipper by the person in charge of the vessel? If so, at what time?

11. Did the skipper go to the wheelhouse shortly, and if so, how soon after the sighting and bearing of the light were reported to him?. If he did go to the wheelhouse at that time, did he observe the light himself? If so, did he appreciate correctly what light it was?

12. What distance was the vessel from the light at the time when it was abeam of her? Had the vessel at that time made good the course which was set when she was off Langanes Point? If not, why not?

13. Was the patent log reset at zero when the course was altered off Langanes Point? What was the reading of the patent log when the vessel was abeam of the light which had been sighted at or about 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933?

14. At what speed was the vessel travelling from the time of the alteration of course off Langanes. Point until 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933? Was any alteration in the speed made before she stranded, and if so, what alteration and when was. it made?

15. Did the skipper go below after his first visit to the wheelhouse? If so, when did he go below and when did he return to the wheelhouse?

16. When the skipper returned to the wheelhouse, how did the light bear? What colour was it showing then? What was the reading of the patent log. at that time?

17. After the skipper returned to the wheelhouse, did he take a sounding with the echometer? If so, what sounding did he get?

18. Did the skipper give any, and if so, what, order to the helm before the vessel stranded? If so. when did he give it? Was it promptly carried out?

19. Was a good and proper look out kept?

20. At what time and where did the vessel strand? Were all possible efforts made to save her?

21. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

22. What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?

23. Was the stranding and loss of the s.t. "St. Honorius" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of George Henry Furniss, the skipper, or of William Midgeley Wild, the boatswain, or of either, and if so, which of them?

Dr. Jackson addressed the Court on behalf of the Underwriters, Mr. Loncaster on behalf of the skipper, and Mr. Saxelbye having replied on behalf of the Board of Trade, the Court gave judgment and returned the following answers to the questions of the Board of Trade:-

1. When the steam trawler "St. Honorius" last left Hull on the 15th January, 1933, for the Icelandic fishing grounds she was in good and seaworthy condition.

2. She was equipped for the voyage with

3. The vessel had three compasses; one on the verandah, one overhead in the wheelhouse and a third in the chartroom. The first two had last been professionally adjusted on the 22nd December, 1932, by D. Pearson of St. Andrew's Dock, Hull. A deviation card showing no deviations or corrected courses was supplied to the skipper after each compass was adjusted.

4. The compasses were sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel.

The skipper had not corrected the compasses by observation from time to time. He knew of no corrections to be applied.

5. The Langanes Light was sighted on the vessel's northward course before 4 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933. The light was abeam shortly before 4 p.m. The vessel did not alter her course when she was abeam of the Langanes Light. She was about 3½ to 4 miles from the light when she altered course.

6. The vessel altered her course at 4 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933.

Proper and sufficient measures were not taken by the skipper to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel off Langanes Point at the time when the alteration of course was made.

7. The vessel's course was altered to N.W. ¼W. The new course set was not a safe and proper one. Insufficient allowance was made for tides, currents and possible inset into Thistil Fjord.

8. At the time the course was altered off Langanes Point,

9. At about 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933, a three flash white light was sighted by the person in charge of the watch. This person was William Midgeley Wild, the boatswain.

The skipper was the person then in charge of the navigation of the vessel.

10. The light bore from the vessel W. by N. The sighting and bearing of the light were reported to the skipper by the boatswain at about 6.35 p.m.

11. The skipper went to the wheelhouse within about five minutes of the report, had a look round and observed the light himself.

He did not appreciate correctly what light it was.

12. The vessel was about 31 miles from the light when it was abeam of her. The vessel at that time had not made good the course which was set when she was off Langanes Point.

The vessel's compasses must have developed deviations since adjustment.

13. The patent log was reset at zero when the course was altered off Langanes Point. No reading of the patent log was taken when the vessel was abeam of the light which had been sighted at or about 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933.

14. The vessel was travelling at 9.8 knots from the time of the alteration of course off Langanes Point until 6.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933.

No alteration in the speed was made before she stranded.

15. The skipper did go below a very few minutes after his first visit to the wheelhouse and did not return to the wheelhouse again until about 7.10 p.m.

16. When the skipper returned to the wheelhouse the light was 2 to 3 points before the port beam. it was changing from white to red.

The patent log was not read at this time.

17. When the skipper returned to the wheelhouse he took a sounding with the echometer getting a sounding of 12 fathoms.

18. Before the vessel stranded the skipper ordered the helm to be starboarded and "Get her out to sea." This order was given immediately before she struck. The order was promptly carried out.

19. A good and proper lookout was kept.

20. The vessel stranded at about 7.35 p.m. on the 19th January, 1933. at Eyrartange, 4 miles N. by E. ¾E. (Mag.) of Raufar Höfn Light.

Except for reversing the engines full speed for about 10 minutes no efforts were made to save the vessel.

21. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

22. The causes of the stranding of the vessel were:-

23. The stranding and loss of the s.t. "St. Honorius" was caused by the default of George Henry Furniss, the skipper; and not by the wrongful act or default of William Midgeley Wild, the boatswain.

J. R. MACDONALD, Judge.

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Wednesday the 10th day of May, 1933)

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses

Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh 2

York Street, Manchester; 1, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff

15, Donegall Square West, Belfast

or through any Bookseller

1933

Price 6d. Net