Wreck report for 'Dulcibelle', 1933

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. S. 357.)

STEAM TRAWLER "DULCIBELLE."

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at Aberdeen on the 25th day of May, 1933, before John Dewar Dallas, Esquire, Advocate, Sheriff Substitute of Aberdeen, Kinoardine and Banff, assisted by Commodore H. Stockwell, C.B., D.S.O., R.D., Captain Edward Barkley and Walter Bates, Esquire, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steam ship "Dulcibelle" of Aberdeen, official number 143904, at Fifeness, on the 15th April, 1933.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding of the said vessel was due to the grave defaults of the skipper, George Bruce, and the second hand, John Bruce.

The Court finds the skipper, George Bruce, in default and suspends his certificate for 12 months, and the second hand, John Bruce, also in default and suspends his certificate for 9 months, both from the date hereof.

Dated this 30th day of May, 1933.

J. D. DALLAS, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Sheriff Court, Aberdeen, on Thursday, the 25th May, 1933. Mr. M. M. Duncan appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. John C. Richards appeared for the skipper, George Bruce, and the second hand, John Bruce, appeared in person.

The s.t. "Dulcibelle," official number 143904, is a ketch-rigged single screw steam trawler, built and engined by Messrs. Hall Russell and Co., Ltd., of Aberdeen, in the year 1918. Her tonnage is 203.10 gross and 81.40 tons net register. She is fitted with inverted vertical direct acting triple expansion engines of 56.7 N.H.P. (430 I.H.P.) with one steel marine boiler.

Her registered dimensions are, length 1154 feet B.P., main breadth 22.1 feet and depth of hold 12.1 feet. She is constructed with three bulkheads.

On the voyage in question she carried a crew of nine hands all told, including the skipper, George Bruce, certificate No. 15481. She carried the life-saving apparatus and boat usual in ships of her class. Her steering compass is fixed in the roof of the wheelhouse, and she has a second compass in the skipper's berth. The wheelhouse compass was last adjusted on the 10th February, 1933, by Mr. W. Murray of Messrs. Berry and Mackay, certificated compass adjusters of Marischal Street, Aberdeen. She was insured for £5,000, the skipper being part owner.

She left Aberdeen on the 14th April, 1933, at 5.30 p.m. bound for Methil, the draught being 8 feet forward and 12 feet aft. The weather was fine and the course was set S.W. by S. The skipper remained on the bridge from the time of departure until 11 p.m.; the Bell Rock Light was in sight, and the course steered was taking the vessel down inside this light. The skipper had steered this course many times, having made a number of passages from Aberdeen to Methil. Before leaving Aberdeen he had received a copy of the Notices to Mariners dated the 16th February, 1933, but had failed to make himself acquainted with the change in character of the lights on the North Carr Lightship which was given in the Notices.

On leaving the bridge at 11 p.m. he handed the navigation over to the second hand, but did not give him any particular orders other than his understood "standing order" to be called at any time if in doubt; he expected the second hand to alter the course when necessary during the passage without any reference to him; and evidently had intended to rest until the vessel arrived off Methil.

The Bell Rock Light was abeam at 0.20 a.m. on the 15th April, 1933, and at that time the second hand could also see May Island Light and the light on the North Carr Lightship. As he did not know of the change of character of the North Carr Light he was puzzled when he saw it, and about 1 a.m. he stopped the engines and went below to the skipper's berth to look up the description of lights in the Fisherman's Almanac. When doing this he actually saw the skipper sleeping in the berth, but did not think it necessary to call him and tell him of his doubts. He returned to the bridge, put the engines at full speed again and set a course S.S.W. and on that course the vessel stranded at 1.30 a.m. on the North Carr rocks quite close to the beacon on those rocks. From the engineer's evidence it appears that the vessel was actually stopped for a period of 10 minutes. The stopping of the vessel did not waken the skipper, but he was aroused when the stranding occurred, by the bumping on the rocks. He did not put the engines astern immediately, but after lie had been on the bridge about 10 minutes, and doing this stripped three blades off the propeller. At 2 a.m. the rising tide floated the vessel off the rocks and she drifted to the northward of the North Carr Lightship. She was making water in the forehold, the engineroom and bunkers. The skipper made towards St. Andrew's Bay with the speed that the one blade of the propeller would give, continuing to put up flares and blowing the horn. He also made a call on the wireless telephone and was answered by Wick Radio and by Valencia Station in Ireland. The coastguard officer on duty at Fife Ness coast-watching station put on the coastguard light and sounded the foghorn two or three times, but these signals were not seen or heard on board the "Dulcibelle." About 4.30 a.m. the trawler "Fair Isle" came alongside, and towing commenced about 7 a.m., Aberdeen being reached at 5 p.m. without further mishap. At the commencement of the tow, the skipper, the second hand and the engineer were on board the "Dulcibelle"; they left her for the s.t. "Fair Isle" between 7.30 a.m. and 8 a.m. and remained on board until 1 p.m., when they all three returned on board the s.t. "Dulcibelle" and remained on board her until arrival at Aberdeen. She was put on the slip for repairs two days after arrival at Aberdeen, being kept afloat during those two days of waiting by the ship's pumps assisted by a motor pump that had been placed on deck. The cost of repairs to the vessel was £1,800.

The Court finds it difficult to understand how this vessel came to be stranded under the conditions prevailing at the time of the accident, with all three lights in sight, namely: May Island Light, North Carr Lightship Light and Bell Rock Light. The Court is forced to the opinion that grave laxity has been shown in the navigation of the vessel. The skipper's failure to make himself acquainted with the alteration in the character of the light on the North Carr Lightship was apparently the primary cause of the accident; but there is no justification whatever for him in electing to be sleeping at the most critical part of the passage, for had he been on the bridge when nearing Fife Ness, the Court does not think the accident would have happened.

His admission that he expected the second hand to alter course without reference to him, shows, in the opinion of the Court, a grave lack of sense of responsibility on his part.

The actions of the second hand were extraordinary. Although puzzled about a light, the character of which was so strange to him that he stopped the vessel and went below to consult the list of lights in the almanac, and in doing so actually stood beside the sleeping skipper, nevertheless he failed to call him and tell him of his doubts, which was his obvious duty, he himself having admitted that he knew he was to call the skipper if in any doubt at any time. He returned to the bridge, continued at full speed, the vessel stranding shortly afterwards. Furthermore, no satisfactory explanation was given by either the skipper or the second hand, as to why they left the "Dulcibelle" for a period of five hours, during the time that she was being towed to Aberdeen.

At the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. M. M. Duncan, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:-

Questions.

(1) When the steam trawler "Dulcibelle" last left Aberdeen on the 14th April, 1933, on her intended voyage to Methil, was she in good and seaworthy condition?

(2) Was she equipped for the voyage with-

(3) What compasses had the vessel and where were they situated? When and by whom had they last been professionally adjusted? Were deviation cards supplied to the skipper after such adjustment?

(4) Were the compasses sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel? Had the skipper corrected the compasses by observation from time to time and did he know the proper corrections to apply to the compasses?

(5) At what time on the 15th April, 1933, was the Bell Rock Lighthouse abeam of the vessel? Were all proper steps taken to verify the distance of the vessel from the Bell Rock Lighthouse when it was abeam? If so, how far was the vessel from the Bell Rock Lighthouse?

(6) Were any other, and if so what, lights seen by the second hand of the vessel when the Bell Rock Light was abeam? If so, how did they bear?

(7) What was the course and speed of the vessel at the time when the Bell Rock Lighthouse was abeam? Was the course a safe and proper one?

(8) Were any alterations in the course and speed of the vessel made between the time when the Bell Rock Lighthouse was abeam and the time when the vessel stranded? If so, why were such alterations made? If an alteration of the course was made was the new course set a safe and proper one?

(9) Did the second hand, when he sighted the light which afterwards proved to be the North Carr Lightship, identify the light? If not, was there information on hoard the vessel which would have enabled him to identify it?

(10) Had the skipper corrected the chart in accordance with the information as to the change in the characteristics of the North Carr Lightship contained in the Board of Trade Notices to Mariners dated 16th February, 1933, and subsequent Notices? If not, should he have done so?

(11) Had the skipper drawn the attention of the second hand to the said Board of Trade Notices to Mariners? If not, should he have done so?

(12) Had the second hand access to the said Board of Trade Notices to Mariners? If so, did he consult them? If not, why not?

(13) If the second hand was in doubt as to the identity of this light did he report his doubt to the skipper? If not, should he have done so?

(14) Did the second hand, whilst he was examining the light of the North Carr Lightship, give any, and if so what, orders to the engines? When were these orders given?

(15) What were the next orders given to the engines and what course was steered after those orders were given? How did the light of the North Carr Lightship then bear?

(16) Were any soundings taken between the time when the Bell Rock Light was abeam of the vessel and the time of the stranding? If so, what soundings were obtained? If not, should soundings have been taken?

(17) Were any warnings given to the vessel by the coastguard at Fife Ness? If so, were the warnings seen or heard on board the vessel? If not, why not?

(18) Was a good and proper lookout kept on the vessel?

(19) At what time and where did the vessel strand?

(20) Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

(21) What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?

(22) Was the stranding of the steam trawler "Dulcibelle" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of George Bruce, the skipper, or of John Bruce, the second hand, or of either, and if so, which of them?

Answers to Questions.

(1) She was in good and seaworthy condition.

(2) (a) One 14 lb. lead and 100 fathoms line.

(b) No.

(c) Requisite charts, but not corrected to date.

(d) Yes.

(3) Two compasses-one fitted overhead in wheelhouse and one below in skipper's berth-last adjusted by Mr. W. Murray of Messrs. Berry and Mackay, certificated compass adjusters of Aberdeen, on the 10th February, 1933. Deviation cards were supplied to the skipper.

(4) The compasses were sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel. The skipper knew the proper corrections to apply, and was satisfied with the compasses.

(5) Bell Rock Lighthouse was abeam of the vessel at 0.20 a.m. on the 15th April, 1933. No, the distance was estimated by eye. As stated in the evidence, she was two to three miles distant approximately.

(6) Yes, May Island Light bearing right ahead, and another flashing light on the port bow, which was the North Carr Lightship.

(7) Course S.W. by S. speed 7 knots. No, it was leading dangerously near the North Carr Rock.

(8) Yes, at about 1 a.m. the ship was stopped for 10 to 15 minutes, and on proceeding the course was altered to S.S.W. This stoppage was made because the second hand did not know that the North Carr Lightship's light had been altered, and seeing the new light, he stopped the ship, and went below to look up the description of this light in the Fisherman's Almanac. in the circumstances the new course was not a safe and proper one.

(9) No, he did not identify it. Yes, information was on board, in the Monthly Summary, Board of Trade Notices to Mariners for home trade and fishing vessels, dated 16th February, 1933.

(10) No, the skipper had not corrected the chart. Yes, he should have done so.

(11) No, he had said nothing about it. Yes, he should have informed the second hand.

(12) Yes, but he did not know they were on board. He did not consult them. Because he did not know they were on board.

(13) He did not report his doubt of the identity of the light to the skipper. Yes, he should have done so.

(14) Yes, he stopped the engines. At 1.10 a.m.

(15) Full speed ahead and course S.S.W. The North Carr Lightship was on the port bow.

(16) No soundings were taken. Soundings would have shown the vessel to be to the westward of her assumed position; in the circumstances with all three lights shining, soundings were not essential, but it is difficult to understand how any seaman of experience in these waters, and holding a skipper's certificate, could possibly have any doubt as to the ship's accurate position.

(17) Yes, the coastguard at Fife Ness burned a light and blew his foghorn two or three times. They were not seen or heard on the vessel. There is no evidence to show why they were not seen or heard.

(18) Yes. A good and proper lookout was kept.

(19) Stranded at 1.30 a.m. on the 15th April, 1933, on North Carr Rocks off Fife Ness.

(20) No, she was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

(21) The stranding of the vessel was due (1) to the skipper not having made himself acquainted with the change in the character of the light on the North Carr Lightship; (2) to his leaving the navigation of the ship entirely to the second hand from 11 p.m. and (3) to the second hand failing in his duty of calling the skipper when he was in such extreme doubt about the North Carr Light that he went to the extent of stopping the ship, and then proceeding on a course at full speed which ran the ship on to the rocks.

(22) The stranding of the "Dulcibelle" was caused by the default of the skipper, George Bruce, and was largely contributed to by the default of the second hand, John Bruce.

J. D. DALLAS, Judge.

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Saturday, the 15th day of July, 1933.)

LONDON

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