Wreck report for 'Sicyon', 1933

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. S. 358.)

STEAM TRAWLER "SICYON."

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Town Hall, Grimsby, on the 25th, 26th and 31st days of May, 1933, and the 1st day of June, 1933, before Joseph Smith, Esquire, assisted by Captain F. J. Thompson, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., Captain W. E. Whittingham, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., and William Addy, Esquire, D.S.C., into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steam trawler "Sicyon" of Grimsby at Eyrartange, on the north coast of Iceland, on the 15th January, 1933.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, and in the Answers to the Questions, that the stranding of the "Sicyon" was due to the default of the skipper, Albert Henry Barratt, and suspends his certificate as skipper of a steam trawler (No. 15299) for a period of five months from this date.

An application for a second hand's certificate during the period of suspension was refused.

Dated this 1st day of June, 1933.

JOSEPH SMITH, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

Judgment.

This is an Inquiry into the stranding of the steam trawler "Sicyon" on the westward cape of the Thistil Fjord on the north coast of Iceland. The Thistil Fjord is a large fjord, the distance from its eastern cape of Langanes to its westward cape being approximately 40 miles. it is a well-known fact that at times there is a very considerable indraught into the fjord caused by the polar drift. The tides and currents are uncertain and calculated to render its navigation difficult, and it is also believed that a certain amount of magnetic attraction exists, likely to disturb the action of the compass. Particular attention is drawn to these matters in all the works dealing with the navigation of the north coast of Iceland. No evidence was given in this Inquiry which adds to what has been known on these points for many years, or which in any way determines the respective influence of the polar drift or of the magnetic attraction. It remains that it is essential that those navigating this coast should give the coastal points a very wide berth and should not rely upon compass courses without verifying them by bearings, soundings, and all other means available.

At 8.0 p.m. on the night of Sunday, the 15th January, 1933, the "Sicyon" commenced to cross the mouth of the fjord from a point three miles north of Langanes, the eastern cape, and the skipper set a course of north-west, which was continued without change until the time of the stranding. This course, if made, and not deflected by inward polar drift or by magnetic attraction disturbing the compass, would have taken the vessel clear of the westward cape of the fjord, but the course, owing to one or both of the causes mentioned or some other reason, was not made, and at 11.45 p.m. the vessel stranded some one or two miles south of the westward cape, fortunately in the result without loss of life. The question to be determined is whether the skipper navigated the vessel with proper and seamanlike care in allowing her to go ashore there, and whether the stranding was caused by his default in not properly verifying his course by taking bearings of the Raufar Höofn Light on the western side of the fjord, and in not ensuring that an efficient lookout was being kept when he went below half-an-hour before the stranding, during the whole of which period except for a very few minutes before the vessel grounded, the third hand was alone in the wheelhouse, his watch-mate being late in coming to join him. This is obviously a question on which the Court is bound to rely upon the advice of its experienced Assessors, and relying upon their advice, with which the Court fully agrees, the Court finds, for reasons which will appear in the Answers to the Questions put by the Board of Trade which I am about to read, and more fully in the Annex to our Report, that the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care, and that the stranding was caused by the skipper's default in not verifying his position by taking and working out on his chart bearings of the Raufar Höofn Light, which would have shown that the vessel was considerably to the southward and westward of the course set, and that the skipper was in default in leaving the bridge before the third hand was joined by his watch-mate, and in not ensuring that there was an efficient lookout during the half-hour preceding the stranding. Had such a lookout been kept, the Court is of opinion that the casualty might have been averted. The Court desires emphatically to negative the suggestion of the skipper that the man at the wheel can keep an efficient lookout at any time, but more particularly at night-time, when, his eyes being necessarily fixed constantly upon the white lighted compass, his vision is, in the opinion of the Court, not in a condition properly to distinguish objects in the darkness without.

I will now read the Answers we give to the Questions submitted by the Board of Trade.

The Court finds the skipper, Albert Henry Barratt, alone in default. Taking his previous good record into consideration, the Court suspends his certificate for a period of five months from this date.

Annex to Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Town Hall, Grimsby, on the 25th, 26th, and 31st days of May, 1933, and the 1st day of June, 1933.

Mr. Walter West, Solicitor, of Grimsby, appeared for the Board of Trade; Mr. H. S. Bloomer, Solicitor, of Grimsby, appeared for the Grimsby Steam Fishing Vessels' Mutual Insurance and Protecting Company, Limited, the Underwriters of the "Sicyon," who upon their own application were made parties to the Inquiry; and Mr. M. Collinson, Solicitor, of Grimsby, represented the skipper of the vessel.

The "Sicyon," official number 123,575, registered at Grimsby, was a ketch-rigged single screw steam trawler, built of steel by Messrs. Cook, Welton and Gemmell, Ltd., of Beverley, in the year 1906. Her tonnage was 28251 gross and 120.35 net register. She was fitted with triple expansion direct acting vertical engines of 92 N.H.P. (520 I.H.P.) giving her a speed of 10 knots. The engines and boiler were built by Messrs. Amos and Smith, Ltd., of Hull.

The "Sicyon" was 130 feet in length, 22.35 feet in breadth, and 12.27 feet in depth, and was constructed with three bulkheads.

She was owned by the Standard Steam Fishing Co., Ltd., of Fish Docks, Grimsby, the managing owner being Mr. W. W. Butt, of Grimsby.

On her last voyage the "Sicyon" carried a crew of 12 hands, including the skipper, and she left Grimsby on the 3rd January, 1933, at about 8.30 a.m., bound for the Icelandic fishing grounds. The "Sicyon" was well found and in good condition. She was fitted with two compasses, one on a pedestal in the wheelhouse and the other, by which the vessel was steered, overhead in the roof of the wheelhouse. Both compasses were last adjusted on the 5th October, 1932, by Messrs. H. A. Johannessen (Grimsby), Ltd., and a copy of the deviation card applicable to both the compasses was supplied to the skipper.

The "Sicyon" was equipped with a full set of charts necessary for sailing in Icelandic waters, but the skipper stated that the Admiralty Chart, No. 2,978, Siglu Fjord to Njardvik, was not corrected to date, and that it did not show the light at Raufar Höofn. The vessel also carried a book of "Tidal Streams" issued by the Underwriters, together with Olsen's Fishermen's Nautical Almanack. She had not on board a copy of the Arctic Pilot (Vol. II).

She carried three hand leads and lines for sounding, two of 28 lbs. and one of 14 lbs., and two Cherub patent logs.

After leaving Grimsby, the "Sicyon" steered a northerly course. On the 5th January, 1933, an epidemic of influenza broke out in the vessel, and one deck hand collapsed at the wheel. The epidemic developed and, six of the crew being incapacitated by it, the skipper shaped a course for Nordfjord, where the vessel arrived on Saturday, the 7th January, 1933, and remained until the 15th January, 1933, when she left at about 10 a.m. to continue her voyage to the fishing grounds on the north coast of Iceland. The vessel approached Langanes, steering north, and at about 6.30 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, Langanes Light was sighted bearing about two points on the port bow.

The course of north was continued and at about 7.30 p.m. the vessel had the light abeam about 1½ miles distant. At this time the log, which had been streamed on leaving Seydisfjord, recorded 55 miles.

The Court finds that no careful bearing was taken of Langanes Light, and that the vessel's position was not fixed when she was abeam of the light. The skipper stated that he did not consider it necessary to fix the vessel's position, but calculated that the vessel was about one and a half miles east of the light. The skipper also stated that on account of a snowstorm he could not take a four point bearing.

The course of north was continued until 8 p.m., when the log recorded 58 miles.

The course was then altered to north-west by compass, but no allowance was made for the correction of one-eighth of a point to the northward shown on the deviation card.

The skipper stated that he intended to fish in a position off Rifstangi Light on the Melrakka Flak, and he expected the course of north-west would bring him to a position about five and a half miles off Rifstangi Light.

The skipper of the vessel went below immediately he had altered the course at 8 p.m., but instructed the second hand, who was on watch, to keep a sharp lookout and to call him if he sighted any lights, or vessels fishing.

The vessel then continued on her course of north-west by compass with the second hand in charge and a deck hand at the wheel.

The engines were working at what was termed "easy full ahead," the engines making 108 revolutions per minute. The evidence as to the vessel's speed was to some extent conflicting, the skipper stating that the speed was 8 miles per hour, whereas the second hand, third hand, and second engineer estimated the "easy full ahead" speed at 8½ to 9 miles per hour. The Court came to the conclusion that the speed was about 9 miles per hour.

At 10 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, the second hand, who was still in charge in the wheelhouse, sighted a white flash light on the port bow. He called the skipper, who came on to the bridge and took a bearing of the light, which bore west by north half north. The second hand had also taken a bearing of this light, and his bearing agreed with the one taken by the skipper.

The skipper stated that he knew the light that had been sighted to be the Raufar Höofn Light, but that it was not on his chart, and although he had seen the light on many occasions he had not marked it on his chart. He knew the particulars of the light from Olsen's Almanack and that its range was 14 miles. The skipper stated that he estimated this light to be 18 miles distant, and attributed his ability to see the light 18 miles off to the abnormally clear visibility, but in the opinion of the Court, he arrived at a distance of 18 miles by applying his dead reckoning of the distance travelled at 8 knots to his course of north-west by compass, and he ought to have drawn the inference that the inset of the polar drift, of the existence of which he was well aware, had set his vessel to the southward and westward.

The patent log had been reset when the course was altered to north-west, and the skipper stated that after taking the bearing of the light he sent the deck hand to take the log reading, and that in his absence the second hand went to the wheel. The deck hand reported that the log had frozen. The skipper attributed this to the vessel turning on to a north-west course three miles north of Langanes, with the result that the spray, carried by the south-west wind, froze as it came into contact with the log and line. He was therefore unable to check his distance by log. No attempt was made to clear the ice from the log or to put out the spare log. The skipper stated that the frost and spray were such that it would almost immediately have rendered it useless.

The skipper then instructed the second hand to tell the third hand, who was to come on watch at 11 p.m., to keep a lookout for Rifstangi Light, and that if he had not sighted it at midnight to call the skipper. The skipper then went below at about 10.20 p.m.

The second hand stated that the skipper also told him to report to him if he opened the red sector of the Raufar Höofn Light, but the skipper refuted this statement and contended that whilst he expected to enter the red sector he was not seeking to take any bearing of it as in his opinion it was only for the use of vessels entering Raufar Höofn Harbour. The second hand then continued his watch, and at about 11.15 p.m. he took another bearing of the Raufar Höofn Light which then bore west by south. He reported this bearing to the skipper who came up into the wheelhouse and checked and confirmed the bearing, estimating the distance of the light at eleven miles. The skipper again went below after checking the bearing, leaving the second hand alone in the wheelhouse, the deck hand having left the wheelhouse to call the watch. The third hand entered the wheelhouse to relieve the second hand as the skipper was descending the ladder to his room. It appears from the evidence that the second hand instructed the third hand to continue on a north-west course and to call the skipper if he did not see the Rifstangi Light by midnight. The second hand also informed the third hand of the bearing of the Raufar Höofn Light, which the third hand stated was bearing west by south to west half south, and was in his judgment about six to seven miles distant. The third hand stated that the second hand did not mention the red sector of the light.

The Court found that the deck hand who was to keep the watch with the third hand was about twenty minutes late in arriving on watch, and, the second hand having left the wheelhouse when relieved, the third hand was alone in the wheelhouse for about twenty minutes. During this time, the third hand was at the wheel and keeping a lookout for Rifstangi Light through the front starboard window, which, he stated, was open, and from his evidence he did not concern himself with the Raufar Höofn Light after about 11.30 p.m., at which time, he stated, it was white in colour and bearing about south-west by south. This, he stated, he observed through the port side windows, two of which, he said, were open.

At about 11.30 p.m. the skipper called up from his chartroom below the wheelhouse and asked the third hand whether Raufar Höofn Light was still visible. The third hand replied that he could still see the light which appeared to be a long way off but made no report as to its colour, although he stated in evidence that it was white at this time which was the last occasion on which he saw the Raufar Höofn Light.

At about 11.35 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, the deck hand who was watch-mate to the third hand, came on the bridge and went to the wheel, the third hand going to the starboard window to keep a lookout for Rifstangi Light. The deck hand stated in evidence that when he went to the wheelhouse all the windows were closed, and his evidence therefore conflicted with other evidence on this point which has already been referred to. The Court is of opinion that the starboard window was opened whilst a lookout was taken for Rifstangi Light, and that two port windows were open at the time bearings were taken of the Raufar Höofn Light, but came to the conclusion that only one window or set of windows was open at the same time. The evidence of the skipper, second hand and third hand was to the effect that the red sector of Raufar Höofn Light was never opened before the stranding, but the deck hand who went to the wheel at about 11.35 p.m. stated in evidence that when he entered the wheelhouse he could see the red sector of Raufar Höofn Light just aft of the beam on the port side about six miles distant and that he reported the light to the third hand, who made no reply, but went to the port window, which he lowered, and looked out through binoculars. It was suggested by Mr. Collinson on behalf of the skipper, that the witness was mistaken as to the light he saw and that it was a light further to the northward, but the Court came to the conclusion that the light the deck hand saw was the Raufar Höofn Light.

After looking out of the port window for a minute or two the third hand exclaimed, "There's the breakers," and ordered the man at the wheel to pull the wheel over to starboard, but before the wheel could be moved sufficiently to affect the helm, the vessel stranded at 11.45 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, at Eyrartange, four miles north of Raufar Höofn, bumping heavily. The third hand was thrown to the floor when the vessel struck, but regaining his feet, went to the wheel to help the deck hand to get it over, but on the vessel stranding he at once went to the telegraph and rang the engines to stop. By this time the skipper was in the wheelhouse, reaching the telegraph at the same time as the third hand, and immediately rang the engines full speed astern, which order was carried out by the second engineer who was on watch in the engineroom.

Almost immediately after the order was carried out, the engineer called up through the voice tube and reported that the propeller had stripped, a conclusion he arrived at by the racing of the engines, and the skipper gave orders for them to be stopped.

The vessel was sounded immediately after stranding, and was at first found to be making no water. Soundings were taken round the vessel, which showed one fathom forward, two fathoms on both sides amidships, and three fathoms aft. No evidence was given as to the soundings other than the skipper's deposition, but the Court found difficulty in appreciating how the propeller was stripped having regard to the depth of water aft, although this may have been accounted for by the vessel swinging after the stranding.

The skipper ordered distress rockets to be sent up, and the boat to be got out, but in endeavouring to launch the boat it became damaged against the chocks owing to the vessel bumping and lurching in the heavy swell prevailing on the beach.

At 12.30 a.m. on the 16th January, 1933, the engineers reported water in the engineroom which increased with the bumping of the vessel, and the boat, which had been repaired with tarpaulins, was lowered and the vessel was abandoned, the crew subsequently landing on the beach where they later met a rescue party. No effort other than reversing engines was made to get the vessel off as the swell made further effort impracticable.

The skipper and the third hand attributed the departure of the vessel from her course to magnetic attraction of the compass, but the Court finds, for the reasons set out in the Judgment and Answers to the Questions, that the skipper should have been aware of the indraught known to exist as a rule into the Thistil Fjord due to polar drift and magnetic influence, and should have taken suitable and adequate precautions against it.

The Court recommends that in fixing compasses in fishing vessels they should, as far as possible, be placed in such positions that bearings can be taken with accuracy and facility, and that a suitable instrument for obtaining bearings should be supplied to fishing vessels.

It is further recommended that an additional caution should be inserted on Admiralty Chart, No. 2978, near to the Thistil Fjord, giving a strong warning of the inset that is to be expected as a rule into the Thistil Fjord due to the polar drift, and of the possible deflection of the compass by magnetic attraction.

Questions.

1. When the steam trawler "Sicyon" last left Grimsby on the 3rd January, 1933, for the Icelandic fishing grounds, was she in good and seaworthy condition?

2. Was she equipped for the voyage with

3. What compasses had the vessel?

When and by whom had they last been professionally adjusted? Were deviation cards supplied to the skipper after such adjustments?

4. Were the compasses sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel?

Had the skipper corrected the compasses by observation from time to time and did he know the proper corrections for the compasses to be applied?

5. When was the Langanes Light sighted on the vessel's northward course? Were proper and sufficient measures taken by the skipper to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel off Langanes Light at the time when it was abeam of her? If not, why not?

6. For how long did the vessel keep on her northward course after she passed Langanes Light?

What alteration of her course was then made? Was the new course set a safe and proper one?

Was due and proper allowance made for tides, currents, and possible inset into Thistil Fjord?

7. Was the skipper aware of the possibility of magnetic disturbances affecting the compass?

What, if any, steps did he take to ascertain whether the compasses were being so affected? If such steps were taken, were they proper and sufficient for the purpose?

8. Was any, and if so what, light sighted by the person in charge of the navigation of the vessel at or about 10 p.m. on Sunday, the 15th January, 1933? Who was the person then in charge of the navigation of the vessel?

9. How did the light bear from the vessel when it was sighted and what colour was it?

Were the sighting and bearing of the light promptly reported to the skipper?

10. Did the skipper go to the wheelhouse shortly after the light was reported and did he observe the light himself? If so, did he appreciate correctly what light it was?

11. Did the skipper lay the bearing of the light off on the chart in order to ascertain the vessel's position? If so, had the vessel made good her position at the course and speed at which she was estimated to be travelling? How far off was the light at this time?

12. Did the skipper go below at or about 10.30 p.m.? If so, when did he return to the bridge?

Was the light then still plainly visible, and if so, how did it bear and what colour was it?

13. Was the second hand relieved by the third hand at or about 11.15 p.m.? Did the skipper give the third hand any, and if so what, orders? When did the skipper next go below?

14. Did the third hand observe the light when he took over the watch? If so, how did it bear and what colour was it?

15. What were

when the third hand took over the watch? Were there any, and if so what, changes in this respect before the vessel stranded?

16. Was any, and if so what, change made in the course or speed of the vessel before she stranded?

17. Was a good and proper lookout kept on board the vessel?

18. At what time and where did the vessel strand? Were all possible efforts made to save her?

19. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

20. What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?

21. Were the stranding and subsequent loss of the s.t. "Sicyon" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of Albert Henry Barratt, the skipper, or of Albert Arthur Grapes, the third hand, or of either, and if so, which of them?

Answers to Questions.

1. When the steam trawler "Sicyon" last left Grimsby on the 3rd January, 1933, for the Icelandic fishing grounds, she was in good and seaworthy condition.

2. She was equipped for the voyage with

She was not equipped with Arctic Pilot (Vol. II), but carried a book of Tidal Streams issued by The Grimsby Steam Fishing Vessels' Mutual Insurance and Protecting Co., Ltd., and also Olsen's Fishermen's Nautical Almanack.

3. The "Sicyon" had two compasses; a standard compass on a pedestal in the wheelhouse, and a steering compass fitted in the roof of the wheelhouse.

The compasses were last adjusted by Messrs. H. A. Johannessen (Grimsby), Ltd., on the 5th October, 1932, and a copy of the deviation card applicable to both compasses was supplied to the skipper.

4. The compasses were sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel.

The skipper had not corrected the compasses since they were adjusted, and did not apply the correction of one-eighth of a point north on a north-west course shown on the deviation card.

5. The Langanes Light was sighted at about 6.30 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933.

Sufficient measures were not taken by the skipper to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel off Langanes Light at the time it was abeam.

The skipper did not consider it necessary to fix his position when abeam of Langanes Light, but judged by eyesight that he was 1½ miles east of the light, and stated that snow squalls interfered with the taking of a four point bearing.

6. The "Sicyon" maintained her course of north by compass for a distance of three miles by log after passing Langanes Light.

The course was then altered to north-west by compass.

The new course was not a safe and proper one in view of the caution shown on the chart, and the warning reference on page 3 of "Tidal Streams."

No allowance was made for the deviation shown on the deviation card, nor was due and proper allowance made for the polar drift and possible inset.

7. The skipper was aware of the possibility of magnetic disturbance affecting the compasses.

The skipper took no steps to ascertain whether the compasses were being affected.

8. Raufar Höofn Light was sighted at 10 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, by George Henry Yarlott, the second hand, who was the person in charge of the navigation at that time.

9. The light bore west by north half north by compass and was white in colour.

The sighting and bearing of this light was promptly reported to the skipper.

10. The skipper did go to the wheelhouse very shortly after the light was reported and observed the light himself.

The skipper did correctly appreciate that it was the Raufar Höofn Light.

11. The skipper did lay off the bearing of the light on the chart. Applying his dead reckoning on the chart this placed him at a distance of eighteen miles from the light if he was making a north-west course.

The distance so calculated by the skipper was greater than the range of the light, which is fourteen miles.

The fact that the light was visible at that time should have shown him that he was to the southward and westward of the course he was intending to make. In the opinion of the Court the distance of the light from the vessel was about fourteen miles.

12. The skipper did go below at about 10.30 p.m. and returned to the bridge at about 11.15 p.m.

The light was then still plainly visible and was bearing west by south by compass and was white in colour.

13. The second hand was relieved by the third hand at about 11.15 p.m.

The skipper did not give the third hand any direct orders but left instructions with the second hand to pass orders to the third hand to keep the same course of north-west and to call him at midnight if he did not see Rifstangi Light on Revsnes further to the westward before that time.

The skipper went below again at about 11.15 p.m. and was going down the hatchway to his room as the third hand entered the wheelhouse.

14. The third hand did observe the light when he took over the watch. The light was white in colour and was bearing west by south to west half south.

15. The weather was fine and clear with a light south-westerly wind and smooth sea, and it was freezing.

The visibility was good.

The weather conditions remained unchanged up to the time of the stranding.

16. There was no change in the course or speed of the vessel before she stranded.

17. A good and proper lookout was not kept on board the "Sicyon."

18. The vessel stranded at 11.45 p.m. on the 15th January, 1933, at Eyrartange Point, about four miles north of Raufar Höofn Light, on the north coast of Iceland.

In view of the fact that the propeller was stripped and a heavy swell prevailing, no further efforts were made to save the vessel, nor were any such efforts considered practicable.

19. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

20. The causes of the stranding were:-

21. The Court finds that the stranding of the "Sicyon" was caused by the default of the skipper, Albert Henry Barratt, as set out in the Answer to the last Question.

The Court finds that the stranding of the "Sicyon" was not caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of Albert Arthur Grapes, the third hand.

JOSEPH SMITH, Judge.

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London.

on Tuesday, the 25th day of July, 1933.)

LONDON

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