Wreck report for 'Ben Strome', 1934

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. S. 363)

STEAM TRAWLER "BEN STROME"

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Moot Hall, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th days of March, 1934, before Ernest Leonard Beckingham and Edward Richmond Newbigin, Esquires, two of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace acting in and for the City and County of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, assisted by Captain W. E. Whittingham, O.B.E., R.D,. R.N.R., and Lieutenant-Commander F. S. Murray, R.D., R.N.R., Nautical Assessors, and W. Bates, Esquire, Fishery Assessor, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steam trawler "Ben Strome," of Aberdeen, on Skerry Rock, near Buchan Ness, on the 5th day of January, 1934.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding of the vessel was contributed to by (a) the wrongful act and default of Ernest Walter Ray, the skipper, in handing over the charge of the vessel to an unqualified man and, in view of the uncertainty of the point of departure from the fishing grounds, in not exercising due vigilance on approaching the land, and, further, in neglecting to give adequate orders, when leaving the wheelhouse, to Andrew Burgon, the third hand, who was left in charge of the vessel, and (b) by the said Andrew Burgon failing to take proper steps to identify the light in sight and altering the course without consulting the skipper. The Court finds both men in default and hereby suspends the skipper's certificate, No. 17361, for a period of six months from the date hereof and orders the third hand to pay the sum of two pounds on account of the expenses of this Investigation.

Dated this 24th day of March, 1934.

We concur in the above Report.

Annex to the Report.

This was an Inquiry into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steam trawler "Ben Strome" of Aberdeen, and was held at the Moot Hall, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, on the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th days of March, 1934, before Ernest Leonard Beckingham and Edward Richmond Newbigin, Esquires, assisted by Captain W. E. Whittingham, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., and Lieutenant-Commander F. S. Murray, R.D., R.N.R., Nautical Assessors. and W. Bates, Esquire, Fishery Assessor. Mr. E. N. Robinson appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. R. W. Flintoff represented the skipper, the third hand appeared in person, while Mr. F. H. Kidd appeared for the underwriters and applied for them to be made parties, to which the Court acceded.

The "Ben Strome," official number 137153, is a steel single screw steam trawler, ketch-rigged, built by Messrs. Hall, Russell & Co., Ltd., of Aberdeen, in the year 1914. She is of 197.7 gross, and 86.04 net registered tonnage, and is fitted with an inverted direct action triple expansion engine, of 78 nominal and 475 indicated horse power, and one multitubular steel boiler with a loaded pressure of 180 lbs. giving a speed of 10½ knots. Her registered dimensions are as follows:-Length 115.5 feet between perpendiculars, main breadth 22.1 feet and depth of hold 13.6 feet. She has three watertight bulk-heads.

She was equipped with one boat and life-saving appliances usual in vessels of her class, and also an echo sounding machine, a sextant, a Cherub patent log and a hand lead. The only compass carried was a liquid one, fitted overhead in the roof of the wheelhouse. It was last adjusted by Messrs. John Lilley & Son, Ltd., of North Shields, on the 27th December, 1933, and a deviation card was supplied to the skipper. She also carried the following charts:-Olsen's North Sea Chart 1931, Admiralty Chart of the North Sea, Iceland and Faroe Chart, Iceland Chart, Faroe Chart, and Orkney and Shetland Islands Chart, also an Olsen's Nautical Almanac. No Pelorus or other means of taking bearings was carried. Her owners are Messrs. Richard Irvin & Sons, Ltd., Fish Quay, North Shields.

The vessel sailed from North Shields at 2 p.m. on the 2nd January, 1934, with a crew of 9 hands all told, for a fishing voyage to the North Sea. Her draught was 8 feet forward and 15 feet aft at the time of sailing.

After steaming along the coast the skipper took his departure 6 miles E.S.E. of May Island and steered 75 miles E.N.E. from that position to the grounds where he proposed fishing, keeping round about that position till noon on the 5th January, when he decided to stop fishing. He started his voyage to Aberdeen at about 2.30 p.m. on the same day, his estimated distance and bearing from that port being 45 miles E. by S. ½ S. During the time of fishing several soundings were taken with the echometer, but not recorded, also one sounding was stated to have been taken to determine the point of departure from the fishing grounds, but no record was kept of that.

At the time there was a strong N.W. wind, moderate sea and swell with good visibility and the tide about one hour from high water at Aberdeen.

The skipper went below at about 3 p.m. but the evidence of this and other times was so conflicting that the Court was unable to place much reliance on it.

Before going below, he handed over the charge of the vessel to Andrew Burgon, the third hand, his only instructions being, to steer a course W. by N. ½ N., at a speed of about 8½ knots, to split the watch, and to use the steam whistle and telegraph, if necessary. In the opinion of the Court these instructions were inadequate, as no orders as to being called at any stated time, or if lights were sighted, or the patent log showed a specified distance run, were given, neither did the skipper inform the third hand as to the character of the lights to look out for, or at about what time he ought to sight them. Neglect on the part of the skipper in leaving the wheelhouse and turning in without giving adequate instructions showed him, in the opinion of the Court, to be greatly lacking in a sense of his responsibility.

The vessel proceeded on a W. by. N. ½ N. course at a speed of about 8½ knots, the wind and sea moderating up to the time of stranding.

Between 6 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. the third hand observed a light on the starboard bow, which he assumed to be Girdle Ness Light and altered the course to N.W. by W. to bring the light on the port bow, expecting to open out the leading lights into Aberdeen.

At about 6.30 p.m. he sent the deck hand, Henry Clay, to call the skipper and the rest of the crew and, shortly afterwards, reduced speed to slow ahead.

The skipper in his evidence stated that he saw the third hand come into his cabin at about 6 p.m. and look at Olsen's Almanac, but the third hand made no remark. Neither did the skipper speak to the third hand, although, in the opinion of the Court, he should have done, as he must have known that the vessel by that time would be within range of the lights.

On being questioned by the Court as to the third hand leaving the wheelhouse with only the deck hand in charge the skipper stated that he did not see anything wrong in it.

He came on deck at about 6 p.m. but apparently did not appear to trouble himself in any way as to the position of his vessel. He remained a few minutes only and then went below again.

The evidence as to the time that the skipper took to come up to the wheelhouse after being called shortly before the stranding, ranged from four to twenty minutes and is therefore very conflicting, but the Court is of opinion that he ought to have been on deck much sooner than he was.

The vessel stranded on Skerry Rock at about 7 p.m.

The skipper reached the wheelhouse just before the stranding and immediately rang the telegraph to full speed astern. The engines made a few revolutions astern and then stopped. The skipper stated that this was due to the engines jamming, but the second engineer, Peter McGill, who was in charge of the engines at the time, denied this, and in his evidence stated that he immediately complied with the order to go full speed astern, but that after the vessel struck, which was almost simultaneous with the reversing of the engines, he felt the propeller grating and stopped the engines immediately without orders from the wheelhouse.

The fireman, George Wilson, who was in the same watch as the second engineer, stated that the time between the orders to go slow ahead and full speed astern was not more than four minutes and that the vessel stranded about two minutes later. This however is not in accordance with the evidence of the other witnesses.

The third hand stated that he took over the charge at about 3 p.m. and not at 2.30 p.m., as stated by the skipper. He was ordered to steer a course W. by N. ½ N. and was informed by the skipper that the vessel had about 55 to 60 miles to run, and that, owing to the force of the wind, she might log 50 miles. He sighted a light between 6 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. which he assumed to he Girdle Ness Light, but which was in reality Buchan Ness Light. Acting on this assumption, he altered the course to N.W. by W. to bring the light on the port bow. It would appear that after doing so he must have felt some doubt and went down to the skipper's cabin to look at Olsen's Almanac, but, although the skipper was awake, he did not report having sighted any light, or that he had altered the course.

On returning to the wheelhouse he rang the engine telegraph to slow ahead, giving as his reason for so doing, that it would give the hands time to turn out and get the vessel ready for entering port.

The second engineer, Peter McGill, stated that the chief engineer came down to the engineroom immediately after the vessel stranded, ordered him on deck to get some clothes on, started the pumps going and then reported to the skipper that the vessel was making water. The skipper then ordered the ship's boat to be lowered and sounded the whistle to attract attention. The boat however was not used. A small motor boat came alongside shortly after the stranding and offered assistance which was refused.

Later the Peterhead lifeboat came alongside and took the whole of the crew, including the skipper, ashore. Some time after, the lifeboat returned to the vessel with the skipper and some of the crew, when it was found that she had floated off the rock, and that there was a man on board. There was no evidence however as to who he was or how he got there. The vessel was boarded and a rope passed to the lifeboat to take her in tow. During the towing the rope parted but connection was again made and she reached Peterhead Harbour where she eventually sank.

The Court considers the skipper blameworthy in not taking more soundings before setting his course from the fishing grounds and also in not giving adequate instructions to the third hand when leaving him in charge of the vessel. Having regard to the favourable conditions prevailing-clear weather, lights in sight and wind and sea moderate, the vessel ought not to have stranded. In view of the comparatively short time that it would take to reach port, the Court considers that the skipper should either have remained on deck all the time, or at any rate, left orders to be called when the log registered not more than 25 miles, or if the lights were sighted before that time.

In view of the weather conditions prevailing at the time of the stranding and also that a lifeboat was in attendance, the Court is also of opinion that the crew left the vessel with undue haste.

At the conclusion of the evidence the following questions were submitted on behalf of the Board of Trade. Mr. F. H. Kidd, Mr. C. J. Temperley, appearing in place of Mr. R. W. Flintoff, and the third hand addressed the Court, and Mr. Robinson replied.

Questions.

1. When the steam trawler "Ben Strome" left North Shields for the North Sea fishing grounds on the 2nd January, 1934, was she in good and seaworthy condition?

2. What charts had she on board when she left North Shields on the 2nd January, 1934? Were such charts properly corrected up to date, and adequate for the voyage?

3. Had the vessel on board the Admiralty List of Lights, 1931 ?

4. What compasses did the vessel carry and where were they situated? When and by whom had they last been professionally adjusted? Were deviation cards supplied to the skipper after such adjustments?

5. Were the compasses sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel?

6. Was the skipper provided with a Pelorus or other suitable means of taking accurate bearings in order to ascertain the error of the compasses? Did he know the proper corrections to apply to the compasses?

7. Had the skipper ascertained the error of the compasses by observation from time to time?

8. When did the vessel cease fishing on the voyage on which she stranded? Where was she when she ceased fishing on that voyage?

9. What steps were taken to ascertain her point of departure before she set out on her voyage to Aberdeen? Were such steps adequate and sufficient?

10. What was the state of-

at the time when the vessel took her departure from the fishing grounds on her voyage to Aberdeen?

11. On what course and at what speed did the vessel proceed after taking her departure as mentioned above?

12. Who was in charge of the navigation of the vessel after she took her departure on the voyage to Aberdeen? Was he a proper person to be left in charge of the vessel on that voyage?

13. When did the skipper go below after the vessel took her departure from the fishing grounds? What instructions did he give to the person who was left in charge of the vessel? Were such instructions proper and sufficient?

14. Did the person in charge of the navigation of the vessel sight a light, and if so, when did he sight it and how did it bear?

15. If he sighted a light, did he identify it correctly?

16. Was the person in charge of the navigation of the vessel provided with information which would enable him to identify the light which he saw? If not, should he have been so provided?

17. When the light was sighted was any, and if so what, alteration made in the course of the vessel?

18. Did the person in charge of the navigation who made the alteration in the course inform the skipper what alteration he proposed to make and obtain the skipper's permission to make it? If not, should he have done so?

19. If an alteration of course was made was the course as altered a safe and proper one?

20. Was any alteration made in the speed of the vessel? If so, when and why was it made?

21. If an alteration was made in the speed of the vessel did the person in charge of the navigation appreciate accurately the position in which the vessel then was?

22. When did the skipper come to the wheelhouse? Did he take any, and if so what, action when he arrived there?

23. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

24. When and where did the vessel strand?

25. What was the cause of the stranding of the s.t. "Ben Strome"?

26. Was the stranding of the s.t. "Ben Strome" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of Ernest Walter Ray, the skipper, or Andrew Burgon, the third hand, or either, and if so, which of them?

To which the Court replied as follows:-

Answers to Questions.

1. When the s.t. "Ben Strome" left North Shields for the North Sea fishing grounds she was in good and seaworthy condition.

2. The vessel had the following charts on board:-

Olsen's North Sea Chart, the only one in use on this particular voyage, was not corrected up to date but the Court considers that it was adequate.

3. No, but there was an Olsen's Nautical Almanac which had a list of lights and their descriptions.

4. The vessel carried one overhead compass (liquid) in the roof of the wheelhouse. It was last adjusted by Messrs. John Lilley & Son, Ltd., of North Shields on the 27th December, 1933. A deviation card was supplied to the skipper after such adjustment.

5. The Court considers that one compass was not sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel, and that at least two compasses should be carried on all trawlers.

6. The vessel was not provided with a Pelorus or with other suitable means of taking accurate bearings. The skipper knew the proper corrections to apply to the compass from the deviation card supplied.

7. The skipper stated that he had not ascertained the error of his compass owing to it having been adjusted only a few days before.

8. The vessel ceased fishing at about 2 p.m. on the 5th January, 1934. The skipper's assumed position was Latitude 57° 8' North, Longitude 0° 41' West, but this position on being worked back from Skerry Rock, the place of stranding, shows that he was in error, the position being Latitude 57° 25' North, Longitude 0° 18' West.

9. A sounding was taken by the echometer but not recorded. Such steps were not adequate and sufficient.

10. The conditions were as follows:-

11. The vessel proceeded on a W. by N. ½ N. course at a speed of 8½ knots, but by the reading of the patent log after stranding she must have made about 9 knots.

12. The skipper was in charge of the navigation of the vessel until the course was set for Aberdeen when he handed over the charge to Andrew Burgon, the third hand. In the opinion of the Court the third hand was not a proper person to be left in charge of the vessel when approaching the land.

13. The skipper went below at about 3 p.m. but the evidence as to time is very conflicting. The instructions given by the skipper to the third hand were to steer a course W. by N. ½ N. and, when necessary, to use the whistle or telegraph and to split the watch. Such instructions were not sufficient.

14. The third hand, Andrew Burgon, sighted a light on the starboard bow between 6 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. but did not take a bearing.

15. He failed to identify it correctly, assuming it to be Girdle Ness Light when in fact it was Buchan Ness Light.

16. The third hand, Andrew Burgon, was not provided with information by the skipper to enable him to identify the light, but Olsen's Almanac was available in the skipper's cabin.

17. When the light was sighted the course was altered to N.W. by W. bringing the light on the port bow.

18. The third hand, Andrew Burgon, did not inform the skipper of the alteration of the course. He should have obtained the skipper's permission before doing so.

19. In view of the fact that the third hand had not definitely assured himself as to what light was in sight, the alteration of the course was not a safe and proper one.

20. Speed was reduced to slow ahead at about 6.30 p.m. so that the crew could turn out and get the ship ready for entering port.

21. The third hand, Andrew Burgon, did not appreciate accurately the position the vessel was in at the time of altering speed.

22. The skipper arrived in the wheelhouse shortly before the vessel stranded. He immediately rang the engineroom telegraph to full speed astern.

23. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

24. The vessel stranded on Skerry Rock at about 7 p.m. on the 5th January, 1934.

25. The stranding of the vessel was caused by Buchan Ness Light being mistaken for Girdle Ness Light by Andrew Burgon, the third hand, who was in charge of the vessel at the time, and by his acting on that assumption.

26. The stranding of the s.t. "Ben Strome" was contributed to by:-

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Thursday, the 10th day of May, 1934)

LONDON

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