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Wreck report for 'Kingston Peridot', 1934

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Unique ID:14069
Description:Board of Trade wreck report for 'Kingston Peridot', 1934.
Creator:GB Board of Trade
Date:Unknown
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. S. 364.)

STEAM TRAWLER "KINGSTON

PERIDOT."

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Guildhall, Hull, on the 1st, 2nd and 4th days of May, 1934, before J. R. Macdonald, Esq., O.B.E., Stipendiary Magistrate, assisted by Captain E. Barkley, Captain Piers de Legh and W. Bates, Esq., into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steam trawler "Kingston Peridot", of the Port of Hull, on the 24th day of February, 1934.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding of the said vessel was due to the wrongful act of the skipper, Albert Edward Ball, and was contributed to by the default of the third hand, Charles Thomas Powdrell.

The Court finds the skipper, Albert Edward Ball, in grave default and suspends his certificate for nine months from this date, and the Court orders that the third hand, Charles Thomas Powdrell, do pay the sum of five pounds towards the costs of the Inquiry.

Dated this 4th day of May, 1934.

J. ROBERT MACDONALD, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

 E. BARKLEY,

PIERS DE LEGH,

W. BATES,
Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Guildhall, Hull, on the 1st, 2nd and 4th days of May, 1934. Mr. H. Leicester Saxelbye appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. C. H. Loncaster represented the skipper, and Dr. T. C. Jackson represented the underwriters who made themselves parties to the Inquiry. The third hand was not legally represented.

The "Kingston Peridot", official number 160,840, is a steel built steam trawler, ketch-rigged, built by Messrs. Cook, Welton and Gemmell, Limited, of Beverley, Yorkshire, in 1929. Her gross tonnage is 351.81 and her net register tonnage is 151.98.

She is fitted with reciprocating steam triple expansion direct acting inverted cylinder engines of 96 N.H.P. (600 I.H.P.), with one cylindrical multitubular steel boiler of 200 lbs. loaded pressure. The engines and boiler were built by Messrs. C. D. Holmes and Company, Limited, of Hull, Yorkshire. The designed speed of the vessel is 11 knots.

Her registered dimensions are:-length, 140.3 feet; main breadth, 24 feet, and depth of hold 12.9 feet.

She is owned by the Kingston Steam Trawling Company, Limited, of Hull.

She is constructed with four watertight bulkheads, and is equipped with the boats and life-saving appliances usual in vessels of her class.

She carried Admiralty Charts Nos. 565 and 2733 corrected to date and the General Fishing Chart of Iceland, No. 114B, corrected to 14th July, 1933.

The Admiralty List of Lights was not on board, but the skipper had with him the "Fisherman's Almanac" and Volume 2 of the "Arctic Pilot".

She carried two leads (28 lbs. and 14 lbs.) which were not used on the portion of the voyage covered by this Inquiry, and was equipped with a Marconi fathometer fixed in the wheelhouse on the bridge.

On the voyage, from which the present Inquiry arose, she carried a crew of 13 hands including the skipper, Albert Edward Ball, certificate number 19,679, dated 22nd June, 1931.

The skipper was well acquainted with Icelandic waters, having sailed them in trawlers for about eight years.

The vessel left Hull on the 9th February, 1934, for a fishing voyage in Icelandic waters.

On the way down the Humber the skipper checked his compasses by means of observation of Thorngumbald Clough and Killingholme Lights.

On arriving on the east coast of Iceland the vessel fished at various points, proceeding west towards North Cape and Brede Bugt. Weather conditions and floating ice then decided the skipper to make down the west side of the island and he arrived off Svortuloft Light on that coast at about 8.45 p.m. on the 23rd February, when he made his position 3½ to 4 miles W.N.W. of the light.

The weather was moderate, clear, intermittent snow showers, wind N. to N.E. and sea moderate, and the skipper had no difficulty in picking up the light.

He streamed the log and set a course S. ¼ W. which would take him 3½ miles off Reykjanes Light on the south east corner of Iceland, a run of 75 miles.

The skipper went below telling the second hand then in charge of the vessel to call him when the log showed 50 miles, or if the weather changed, or there was any unforeseen occurrence. The course and speed of 10 knots were maintained until 10 p.m. when Malarif Light was sighted bearing E. at an estimated distance of about 4 miles. A sounding with the fathometer gave 55 fathoms. The skipper, who until now had been up and down from his chartroom, now turned in. He was called by the second hand at 1.45 a.m. on the 24th February as the log showed 50 miles.

At 1.50 a.m. the skipper returned to the bridge and at 2.20 a.m. took a bearing of Skagi Light S.E. by E. at an estimated distance of between 10 and 12 miles. The fathometer gave 47 fathoms. The skipper had expected to be at least 13 miles off Skagi Light and, finding he had been set in, altered the vessel's course to S. by W. He checked his position on the chart and then came back on the bridge where he remained until 3.15 a.m.

At 3.5 a.m. the third hand, Charles Thomas Powdrell, took the wheel, his mate, Cowlam, a deck hand, coming on watch and relieving him at the wheel a few minutes later.

At 3.10 a.m. Stafnes Light bore S.E. by E., and Reykjanes bore S. A cross bearing of these two lights was taken by the skipper who made the position on the chart four miles off Stafnes Light. The skipper was not satisfied and altered course to S. by W. ½ W. and at 3.15 a.m. went below to see if, by using his wireless receiving set, he could pick up any information from trawlers in the neighbourhood, as to weather and fishing conditions.

Before leaving the bridge the skipper told Powdrell to let him know when the "flash light" (Stafnes Light) was abeam, and to take a sounding.

At 3.20 a.m. Powdrell reported the said light abeam and a sounding of 42 fathoms.

The skipper, satisfied that he was 4 miles off Stafnes Light, and that the course S. by W. ½ W. would take him three miles off Reykjanes, remained below until 3.40 a.m., when, as he was returning to the bridge, the vessel struck.

From the time Cowlam took the wheel Powdrell had been on the lookout, but it appeared from the evidence that he carried out this duty in the most inefficient fashion, as, although he was stationed at the forward starboard (open) window, he neither saw the land, nor saw nor heard breakers. In fact, when the vessel struck, he opened the after door of the wheelhouse to see if the bump was caused by a sea coming aboard. The Court is forced to the conclusion that Powdrell was asleep at the time.

As the vessel struck, the skipper rang the engines "full astern" but it was not possible to get her off.

She went ashore on a ledge with sand on the starboard and rocks on the port side; there being 3 fathoms of water aft and 1 fathom abeam the galley.

Rockets were sent up and the s.t. "St. Amandus" came to assist, but it being dangerous to attempt to help to seaward, she informed the shore. Assistance came from Reykjavik and the crew were landed by rocket apparatus, but the vessel being in no danger, they returned. Coal was jettisoned to put the vessel on a starboard list and she was got off on the 27th February, and, after temporary repairs at Reykjavik, was able to make Hull under her own steam on the 3rd March.

The Court is of the opinion that the skipper was in grave default in not remaining on the bridge after passing Stafnes Light. He too lightly assumed his vessel's position at that point. Had he compared the sounding then obtained with those marked on the chart he must have realised that he was well inside his estimated position.

In conclusion the Court desires to call the attention of the Board of Trade to the apparent absence in trawlers generally of any instrument whereby the skipper can take reasonably accurate bearings.

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Saxelbye, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court:-

(1) When the s.t. "Kingston Peridot" left Hull on her intended voyage to the Icelandic fishing grounds on the 9th February, 1934, was she in good and seaworthy condition?

(2) What charts had she on board when she left Hull on the 9th February, 1934? Were such charts properly corrected up to date?

(3) What compasses did the vessel carry and where were they situated? When and by whom had they been last professionally adjusted? Were deviation cards supplied to the skipper after such adjustments?

(4) Were the compasses sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel?

(5) Was the vessel provided with facilities for taking bearings of sufficient accuracy to enable the skipper to ascertain the error of his compasses? Had the skipper taken observations for this purpose from time to time? Did he know the proper corrections to apply to the compasses?

(6) When did the vessel take her departure from Svortuloft Light on the 23rd February, 1934?

(7) What steps were taken by the skipper to ascertain his point of departure from off Svortuloft Light? Were such steps adequate and sufficient?

(8) What was the state of-

(a) the weather;

(b) the wind;

(c) the tide, and

(d) the visibility,

at the time when the vessel took her departure from off Svortuloft Light?

(9) On what course and at what speed did the vessel proceed immediately after taking her departure as mentioned above?

(10) Were such course and speed safe and proper in the circumstances?

(11) What was the next light seen by those on board the vessel after taking her departure as aforesaid? How did that light bear and at what distance was the vessel from it? What steps did the skipper take to ascertain the bearing and distance of the light? Were such steps proper and sufficient?

(12) When did the skipper go below after passing the last mentioned light? What orders did he give to the man in charge of the vessel? Were such orders proper and sufficient?

(13) Did the man in charge of the vessel report to the skipper when the log read 50 miles? If so, at what time was this?

(14) Did the skipper return to the bridge after receiving the above report? If so, at what time did he so return?

(15) What was the next light which was seen by the skipper after he returned to the bridge? How was it bearing and at what distance was the vessel from it? How were the bearing and distance of the last mentioned light ascertained? Were the steps taken by the skipper to ascertain his position off this light proper and sufficient?

(16) Did the skipper make any, and if so, what alteration in the course of the vessel after sighting the last mentioned light? If so, why did he make such alteration and was the alteration proper and sufficient?

(17) Did the skipper, after the last mentioned alteration of course, take a bearing or bearings of any. and if so, what light or lights? If so, when did he take such bearing or bearings, and what bearing or bearings did he obtain?

(18) When was the vessel abeam of Stafnes Light? Were soundings taken then? If so, what soundings were obtained?

(19) What distance was the vessel from Stafnes Light when it was abeam? Did the man at the wheel report to the skipper that Stafnes Light was abeam and the soundings which he had obtained? After this report was made did the skipper order any, and if so, what alteration of course?

(20) Was such alteration of course, if made, proper and sufficient in the circumstances?

(21) What light or lights were seen by the man at the wheel and the man on the lookout after the skipper went below?

(22) Was a good lookout kept on board the vessel?

(23) When and where did the vessel strand?

(24) What was the cause of the stranding of the s.t. "Kingston Peridot"?

(25) Was the stranding of the s.t. "Kingston Peridot" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of Albert Edward Ball, the skipper, or Charles Thomas Powdrell, the third hand?

Dr. Jackson, on behalf of the underwriters, and Mr. Loncaster, on behalf of the skipper, having respectively addressed the Court, and Mr. Saxelbye having replied on behalf of the Board of Trade, the Court gave judgment and returned the following answers to the questions of the Board of Trade.

(1) When the s.t. "Kingston Peridot" left Hull on her intended voyage to the Icelandic fishing grounds on the 9th February, 1934, she was in good and seaworthy condition.

(2) When she left Hull on the 9th February, 1934, she had on board the General Fishing Chart of Iceland, No. 114B and the Admiralty Charts, Nos. 565 and 2733. No. 114B was corrected to 14th July, 1933. Nos. 565 and 2733 had small corrections to 1934.

(3) The vessel carried three compasses:-

(a) a pole compass in the centre of the verandah;

(b) a steering compass forward of the wheel in the roof of the wheelhouse, and

(c) a compass on the roof of the skipper's chartroom.

The pole and steering compasses were last professionally adjusted on the 9th February, 1934, by Mr. D. Pearson, of St. Andrew's Dock, Hull. Deviation cards were supplied to the skipper after such adjustments.

(4) The compasses were sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel.

(5) The vessel was provided with no facilities for taking bearings of sufficient accuracy to enable the skipper to ascertain the error of his compasses. The skipper took observations for this purpose after leaving Hull when off Thorngumbald and Killingholme Lights. He knew the proper corrections to apply to the compasses.

(6) The vessel took her departure from a point 3½ to 4 miles W.N.W. of Svortuloft Light at about 8.45 p.m. on the 23rd February, 1934.

(7) The skipper ascertained his point of departure from off Svortuloft Light by taking a bearing by his steering compass and a sounding with the fathometer. These steps were not adequate and sufficient, but there was nothing further the skipper could do under the then existing circumstances.

(8) At the time when the vessel took her departure from off Svortuloft Light-

(a) the weather was moderate;

(b) the wind was variable, N. to N.E.;

(c) the tide was early flood, and

(d) the visibility was clear, with intermittent snow showers.

(9) The vessel immediately after taking her departure as mentioned above sailed S. ½ W. at a speed of 10 knots.

(10) Such course and, speed were safe and proper in the circumstances.

(11) The next light seen by those on board the vessel after taking her departure as aforesaid was the Malarif Light. The light bore E. at about 4 miles distance from the vessel. The skipper ascertained the said bearing with the aid of the roof compass and estimated the distance by eye and by sounding with the fathometer. The said steps taken by the skipper were proper and sufficient.

(12) The skipper went below at about 10 p.m. soon after passing Malarif Light. He gave the man in charge of the vessel orders to call him when the log read 50 miles or if there was any change in the weather or upon anything unforeseen occurring. Such orders were proper and sufficient.

(13) The man in charge of the vessel reported to the skipper that the log read 50 miles at about 1.45 a.m. on the 24th February, 1934.

(14) The skipper returned to the bridge at about 1.50 a.m. after receiving the above report.

(15) The next light seen by the skipper after he returned to the bridge was Skagi Light. It was bearing S.E. by E. at about 10 to 12 miles distance from the vessel. The skipper estimated the said bearing with the aid of the roof compass, and estimated the distance by eye and by sounding with the fathometer. The said steps taken by the skipper were proper and sufficient.

(16) After sighting the last mentioned light the skipper altered the course of the vessel to S. by W. because he considered the vessel had been set to the eastward of her course. The said alteration was proper and sufficient.

(17) After the last mentioned alteration of course, the skipper at about 3.10 a.m. took a bearing (S.E. by E.) of Stafnes Light and a bearing (S.) of Reykjanes Light.

(18) The vessel was abeam of Stafnes Light at about 3.20 a.m. A sounding of 42 fathoms was then taken with the fathometer.

(19) The Court cannot say what distance the vessel was from Stafnes Light when it was abeam, save that the distance was considerably less than the skipper's estimate. The man at the wheel did report to the skipper that Stafnes Light was abeam and the sounding which he had obtained. No alteration of course was made by the skipper on receipt of this report.

(20) No such alteration of course was made.

(21) After the skipper went below at about 3.15 a.m. the man at the wheel and the man on the lookout saw two or three lights which they took to be trawler stern lights.

(22) A good lookout was not kept on board the vessel.

(23) The vessel stranded at about 3.40 a.m. on a point of land called Hafnarberg, on the S.W. corner of Iceland.

(24) The stranding of the s.t. "Kingston Peridot" was caused:-

(i) by the negligence of the skipper in-

(a) misjudging his position when abeam of Stafnes Light, and

(b) in being absent from the bridge on a dangerous coast and leaving the vessel in charge of an unqualified man; and

(ii) by the absolutely inefficient lookout kept by Charles Thomas Powdrell, the third hand.

(25) The stranding of the s.t. "Kingston Peridot" was caused by the wrongful act of Albert Edward Ball, the skipper, and was contributed to by the default of Charles Thomas Powdrell, the third hand.

J. ROBERT MACDONALD, Judge.

We concur,

 E. BARKLEY,

PIERS DE LEGH,

W. BATES,
Assessors.

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Wednesday, the 30th day of May, 1934.)

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses

Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh 2

York Street, Manchester 1; 1, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff

80, Chichester Street, Belfast

or through any Bookseller

1934

Price 6d. Net.

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