Wreck report for 'Highland Hope', 1931

(7885).

"HIGHLAND HOPE" (M.V.)

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at Court "A," The Quadrangle, Strand, London, W.C., on the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th days of January, 1931, and on the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 9th and 26th days of February, 1931, before John H. Harris, Esq., assisted by Capt. P. F. W. Blake, M.B.E., F.R.A.S., A.I.N.A., Capt. F. J. Thompson, O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., A.I.N.A., and John McLaren, Esq., M.I., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.N.A., into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the British passenger motor vessel "Highland Hope," of Belfast, Official Number 148,170, on the Farilhoes Rocks off the coast of Portugal, on or about the 19th November, 1930.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned casualty finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding and loss of the ship was due to the failure of the master to navigate the ship with proper and seamanlike care in that he:-

The Court finds the master, Captain Thomas Johnson Jones, in grave default and suspends his certificate for six months.

The Court considers that the second officer, Herbert Robert Welsh, was remiss in his duties, especially in not reporting to the master when the latter came on the bridge shortly after 4.13 a.m. on the 19th November, that a position had been obtained by a bearing of the Leixões Light by the third officer.

The Court severely reprimands the chief officer, Horace Hugh Thomas, for his conduct in concealing the fact that he had brought the deck scrap log ashore whereby the duration and expense of the Inquiry were much increased, and for his conduct in subsequently destroying the deck scrap log whereby the Court was greatly hampered in its investigation. The Court therefore orders the chief officer, Horace Hugh Thomas, to pay to the Solicitor to the Board of Trade the sum of ten pounds on account of the expenses of this investigation.

The Court thinks it right to add that the work of disembarking the passengers after the stranding of the ship was carried out by all concerned under the supervision of the chief officer with great skill and promptitude in circumstances of great difficulty, and desires specially to commend the fourth officer, Mr. Gerald Joseph Parry, for his courage and resource in dealing with the situation created by the accident to lifeboat number 9.

The Court considers that the Owners cannot be absolved from all blame for this casualty in that they employed as master of their ship a man whose age was such that he could not reasonably be expected to withstand the mental and physical strain involved in commanding a large and fast passenger vessel.

The Court orders that the Board of Trade do pay, on account of the expenses of this investigation, to Mr. James Horace Nelson, third officer, the sum of fifty pounds, and to Mr. Gerald Joseph Parry, fourth officer, the sum of fifty pounds.

Dated this 26th day of February, 1931.

JOHN H. HARRIS, Judge.

We concur in the above Report:

ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

This Inquiry was held at Court "A," the Quadrangle, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, W.O., on the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th days of January, 1931, and on the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 9th and 26th days of February, 1931. Mr. J. St. Clair Pilcher (instructed by the Solicitor to the Board of Trade) appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Cyril Miller (instructed by Messrs. William Crump & Son, Solicitors, London) for the Nelson Steam Navigation Company, Ltd., the owners of the vessel, Mr. K. S. Carpmael (instructed by Messrs. Thomas Cooper & Co., Solicitors, London) for Captain Thomas Johnson Jones, the master of the vessel, Mr. H. J. Willmer (instructed by Messrs. William Crump & Son) for Mr. Horace Hugh Thomas and Mr. James Horace Nelson, the first and third officers, and Mr. R. F. Hayward, M.C. (instructed by Messrs. W. & W. Stocken, Solicitors, London) for Mr. Herbert Roger Welsh and Mr. Gerald Joseph Parry, the second and fourth officers.

The "Highland Hope." official number, 148,170, registered at the port of Belfast, was a steel twin screw motor vessel, built at Glasgow in 1929 by Messrs. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., of Glasgow, for the Nelson Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. She was classed 100 A.1 at Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The gross tonnage of the vessel was 14,129.41, the register tonnage 8,732.54. Her length was 523.43 feet beam 69.4 feet. The depth of the hold from the tonnage deck to ceiling at amidships was 37.15 feet. She was clencher built, was fitted with two masts and was schooner rigged. There were nine ballast tanks with a capacity of 2,193 tons of water ballast and nine water-tight bulkheads; the water-tight bulkheads could be operated from the bridge. The vessel had six hatchways. The steering gear was of the electric hydraulic type. All winches were electrically driven., There was on board a Siemen's latest type of wireless installation which was fitted with an auto alarm. There was also a Siemen's Wireless Direction Finder, Type 1094. The vessel had 14 lifeboats under davits capable of carrying 936 persons, buoyant apparatus for supporting 264 persons, 18 lifebuoys and 843 life jackets. She was fitted with a system of flood lighting to facilitate the working of the lifeboats. The vessel was certified to carry 135 first class passengers, 66 second class passengers and a crew of 179. Space was provided for carrying emigrants.

The vessel had two vertical reciprocating internal combustion engines of the Diesel type, built by Messrs. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., Belfast. Each engine had six cylinders; each cylinder was 680 m/m. in diameter with a stroke of 1,600 m/m. The N.H.P. of the engines was 2.190, B.H.P. 7.000 and I.H.P. 9,600. The speed of the vessel was about 16 knots per hour. She had one steel boiler with a working pressure of 100 lbs. per square inch, and was fitted with the usual pumps for a vessel of her type.

The "Highland Hope" left London at 6.41 a.m. on Saturday, the 15th November, 1930, bound for Buenos Ayres. It was her fifth voyage. She had on board a crew of 139 all told and about 150 cabin passengers.

At 8.30 a.m the vessel anchored off Gravesend. At 11.15 a.m. boat drill was carried out, all hands available being called to their stations and boats Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 being swung out but no⁴ lowered. At 1.1 p.m. the vessel weighed anchor and proceeded to Boulogne, where she arrived at 8.20 p.m. At 10.20 p.m., having embarked mails and a few additional passengers, she left for Vigo on the coast of Spain, her next port of call. On Sunday, November the 16th, at 11 a.m., boat drill was held, at which passengers were expected to attend, but very few did so. Proper notification had been given that the drill would be called that day, but apparently the majority of the passengers were disinclined to leave their bouillon, which was being served in the lounges when the bugle sounded for the drill.

After leaving Boulogne course was set down Channel and the vessel proceeded towards Vigo. There was considerable fog at intervals in the Bay of Biscay. Entries in the chief officer's log book show that the Casquets Lighthouse was passed at 9.23 a.m.; distant 2.7 miles, Ushant at 6.45 p.m., distant 3 miles, and that Cape Torinana Light was a beam at 12.19 a.m., distant 1.8 miles only. in the opinion of the Court, all these dangerous points should have been given a wider berth as advised by the Admiralty Sailing Directions, especially Cape Torinana.

The vessel arrived at Vigo at 5.59 a.m. on the 18th November. At Vigo she embarked 217 Spanish and Portuguese emigrants and shipped about 400 tons of general cargo, mostly fresh fish and chestnuts. The emigrants were berthed forward on the shelter deck.

At about 6 p.m. on the 18th November the "Highland Hope" left Vigo with the master, Captain Jones, the third officer, Mr. Nelson, and the fourth officer, Mr. Parry, on the bridge. Before getting under weigh Mr. Parry, following the usual practice, communicated the time by the bridge clock to the engine-room so as to enable the engine-room clock to be synchronised with it. At 6.1 p.m. the engines were put full speed ahead and the master ordered the ship's head to be steadied on a point midway between the Brasileira and Borneira Beacons. These orders were carried out by Mr. Nelson, the third officer. After passing between the Beacons the master ordered the fourth officer, Mr. Parry, to steady the ship's head between Cape Vicos and Punta Lameda, and set the course S.65°W. by compass, which the master reckoned was S.50°W. true. This was done at 6.18 p.m. Soon afterwards course was temporarily altered about a point to the westward, the master thinking that the vessel was getting rather too close to the southern shore of the Bay. Course was then resumed. At about 6.35 p.m. the position of the vessel was taken by means of a four point bearing on Cape Vicos by Mr. Parry, the fourth officer, on the instructions of the master, which gave it a distance abeam of about one mile, and an entry "Cape Vicos abeam 1 mile" was made in the deck scrap log by Mr. Parry. Cape Silleiro Light was now sighted, bearing, according to Mr. Parry's evidence, about 3 points on the port bow. The master ordered Mr. Parry to take a four point bearing on it, which he did, taking also the patent log reading, which, Mr. Parry said, involved a quick descent of the ladder on his part. Mr. Parry called out the log reading to the master, and the Chief Officer, Mr. Thomas, having come on the bridge, Mr. Parry was permitted to go down to his dinner, leaving Mr. Thomas to take the beam bearing, the master saying that he would himself take the log reading when Cape Silleiro was abeam. According to the master's evidence the log reading stood at 5 when Cape Silleiro was 4 points on the bow and at 8 when it was abeam, and he himself reset the log. In a deposition made at the preliminary inquiry before the Receiver of Wreck, the chief officer, Mr. Thomas, deposed as follows:- "At 6.54 p.m. took our departure from Cape Silleiro bearing S.E. magnetic, distant 3 miles. The log was set there at zero by the fourth officer … the position was, I understand, ascertained and verified by a 4 point bearing "-which does not suggest that Mr. Thomas himself took any part in the observation. When before the Court, however, Mr. Thomas was positive that he had taken the beam bearing and that the master took the log reading and reset the log. He stated that he made no entry of the bearing in the deck scrap log, but passed on the information to Mr. Nelson, the third officer, who relieved him while he went down to his dinner. Mr. Nelson, the third officer, stated that he took no part in the observations. The master stated that the vessel was abeam of Cape Silleiro when on the course S.65°W. by compass at 6.53 p.m., and that the vessel's distance from Cape Silleiro was then three miles.

The evidence as to the taking of this important observation of the ship's position off Cape Silleiro, from which the master intended to take his departure, was very unsatisfactory. The impression it left on the mind of the Court was that the means adopted to verify the ship's position at this juncture were not calculated to produce a very accurate result with several officers engaged on the task of ascertaining the different factors necessary, and the Court cannot regard the result obtained as more than approximately correct.

From the position thus ascertained as three miles from Cape Silleiro on a bearing S.40°E. true, the master took his departure at 6.53 p.m., the log having been reset. According to the master, he then starboarded his helm about 4 points on a course of S.25°W. by compass and rounded Cape Silleiro on the arc of a circle which brought his vessel three miles abeam of it on her new course. No bearings were taken to verify the position of the vessel when abeam of Cape Silleiro on her S.25°W. course. This could easily have been done by means of cross bearings, and, in the opinion of the Court, it should have been done. The distance of three miles abeam, on the course S.25°W. given by the master was a mere estimate based upon an assumption that the vessel rounded Cape Silleiro on the are of a circle whose radius, with Cape Silleiro Light as a centre, was exactly three miles. In the opinion of the Court such an assumption was quite unwarranted and the vessel's distance from Cape Silleiro when she came abeam of it on the course S.25°W. by compass was certainly not more than 2½ miles and probably less, even if the ship's position, when abeam of it on her S.65°W. course, was accurately ascertained.

The course now set by the master, i.e., S.25°W. by compass, was stated by him to have been intended as a temporary course only, his purpose being to steer such a course down the coast of Portugal as would bring him five miles off the Burlings Islands. In pursuance of this intention the course was subsequently altered to S.24°W. by compass, which the master reckoned was S.11°W. true. The time at which this alteration of course was made was left in doubt by the evidence, which was conflicting. In his deposition before the Receiver of Wreck the master stated that the alteration was made about 8 p.m., by which time the vessel, going full speed ahead as she was, i.e., making 16.2 knots, would have travelled about 17 miles from Cape Silleiro. To the Court the master stated that the alteration was not made until 9 p.m., when the vessel had travelled 33 miles, and Mr. Nelson, the third officer, agreed with him. On the other hand, the quartermaster who was at the helm from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. was quite positive that no alteration of course was made during his trick at the wheel. Mr. Nelson, the third officer, whose watch commenced at 8 p.m., was in fact on the bridge from 7 p.m. to 7.40 p.m., relieving the chief officer, who had gone to his dinner. It was Mr. Nelson who worked out the course on the master's instructions and in view of the quartermaster's evidence the Court is satisfied that the course S.24°W. by compass was set between 7 p.m. and 7.40 p.m. and not later.

The master's instructions to Mr. Nelson were, according to Mr. Nelson and the master, to work a course three miles from Cape Silleiro to five miles off the Burlings and to correct it for variation and deviation and find out what the compass course was. The result of Mr. Nelson's calculations, which the master stated were verified and approved by him, was to make the proposed course S.10½°W. true according to Mr. Nelson's evidence: according to the master's evidence S.10°38'W. true. The course was plotted by Mr, Nelson on the chart, which was before the. Court, and upon it there appeared the figure "S.10°W." with the figure "11" underneath it. The Court is unable to say when these figures were placed upon the chart, but it would appear that the course line on the chart was first marked S.11°W. and the figure of 10 written over it at a later time. The master stated to the Court that in order to be on the safe side and to give the Burlings a wider berth than five miles he set the course S.11°W. true, which he reckoned in a calculation submitted by him to the Court would take him 6.6 miles off Burlings Island and 3.8 miles off the outer rock of the Farilhoes.

It is apparent from inspection of the chart and from Mr. Nelson's evidence, that in working the course a position was taken bearing S.79°E. true 3 miles off Cape Silleiro as the point of departure. The course set by compass was S.24°W. which was arrived at by allowing 14° 45' variation and 1° 45' E. for deviation. The amount allowed for deviation was, in the opinion of the Court, excessive. No observations to ascertain deviation had been possible on the voyage, owing to the fact that all celestial bodies had been obscured, but the records of previous voyages in the Compass Deviation Book showed that the mean easterly deviation on this course was under one degree. An error of half a mile at the point of departure, coupled with an error of one degree in the course steered, would bring the vessel about one mile inside her expected distance off the Leixões Light, which was the next point from which a bearing could be taken to verify the ship's position, and approximately half a mile off the outer rock of the Farilhoes. In the calculation submitted by the master to the Court it was assumed that a course of S.25°W. by compass had been steered for 33 miles from the point of departure. As already stated, the Court does not think that the vessel had travelled anything like this distance when the course was altered to S.24°W. by compass.

It is to be observed also, in dealing with the question whether the course set and steered was safe and proper, that no allowance would appear to have been made for possible current or set. A very little set to the eastward was needed, if her course of S.24°W. by compass was maintained, to bring the vessel on to the Farilhoes Rocks. The master had experienced an easterly set of 0.9 mile on a previous voyage. On the ship's fourth voyage he had found that she had overrun her distance by two miles or more. The coast of Portugal is a dangerous one; the master knew from his own experience that the currents were indeterminate; it was doubtful whether the coast lights would be picked up, as the land on leaving Vigo was overcast with cloud or haze, and the Farilhoes Light, as the master knew, was not being exhibited. In these circumstances to set so fine a course as S.24°W. by compass and to hold it as the master did through the fog which enveloped the vessel from 4.15 a.m. onwards was, in the opinion of the Court, running a grave risk which should never have been incurred.

At 10.18 p.m. the Leixões Light (Boa Nova) was sighted by the third officer, Mr. Nelson, the master having by this time retired to his cabin after leaving his night orders on a pad in the chart room. A running fix of the Light was obtained by Mr. Nelson, which made the distance of the Light 19 miles abeam. This meant, if the observation was accurate, that the vessel was at that time about two miles inside her expected course line. According to Mr. Nelson's evidence, he did not regard the observation as a reliable one, because he had been unable to see more than the "loom" of the Light; and he so informed the second officer, Mr. Welsh, when that officer relieved him at midnight. Mr. Welsh said he regarded the observation as quite useless and for that reason did not pass on the information which he had received from Mr. Nelson to the master-an omission on which the master laid great stress at the Inquiry; in the opinion of the Court, not without reason. The point is dealt with later. Upon the question whether the light itself or only the "loom" of it was seen, the Court came to the conclusion that it was the Light itself and not merely the "loom" which Mr. Nelson saw and from which he took his bearing, although, as Mr. Nelson himself admitted, he may have seen it through haze. It is pertinent to observe that the first bearing taken of this light was 37° before the beam. This was exactly on the range of the light, allowing for the height of eye from the ship's bridge. It is noticeable, also, that the observation was said by Mr. Nelson to have been entered by him in the deck scrap log without any words to qualify it as other than accurate. The entry was, according to Mr. Nelson's memory, "10.18 p.m. Leixões Light abeam, distance 19 miles, log 52.5." The ship's position as verified by the observation was also marked by Mr. Nelson on the chart. The marking on the face of it showed the ship to be inside her expected course line at 10.18 p.m. Furthermore, the quartermaster who was at the wheel when the bearing was taken, stated that he saw the light and was quite sure about it.

Making allowance for the fact that the light may have been seen through haze or mist and for possible error due to the means adopted to obtain the bearing, the Court is of opinion that the distance of 19 miles was approximately correct within one mile and that the vessel was certainly inside her expected course line at the time mentioned.

At midnight, Mr. Welsh, the second officer, relieved Mr. Nelson who, before leaving the bridge informed him of the Leixões light observation. As already stated Mr. Welsh appears to have regarded the observation as quite useless and in no sense to be taken as a warning even that the ship was possibly off her course line. Apparently he relied upon picking up the Cape Mondego light which is a powerful one with a range of 24 miles. In fact this light was never sighted, although if the ship was on her expected course and the light was unobscured, the vessel would have passed well within range of it allowing for height of eye from the bridge. On failing to sight it, Mr. Welsh seems to have at once assumed that the vessel was in fact outside her expected course line-an assumption which in the opinion of the Court was a dangerous one to have made, the more so having regard to Mr. Nelson's report of the Leixões light observation. It was at least as probable that the Cape Mondego light was obscured by mist or cloud which on this coast and in the winter months is notoriously wont to lie over the land. The Court is satisfied that the light was in fact obscured by mist or cloud and that the vessel at this time, so far from being outside her expected course line, was in fact inside it.

At 4 a.m. the log was said to have read 144.8 and this figure appears on the chart. In the opinion of the Court this figure does not correctly represent the distance run at that time. The time at which the vessel struck and the log reading at that time are not in doubt. The vessel struck at 4.57 a.m. by the bridge clock and the log reading then was 163 miles which corresponds with the distance between Cape Silleiro and the Farilhoes Rocks as measured on the chart. If the vessel had only covered 144.8 miles from Cape Silleiro at 4 a.m. she must nave run 18.2 miles in the last 57 minutes although for the last 12 minutes of that period she was running at reduced speed.

Shortly before 4 a.m. Brown, the look-out man, reported by bell that he had seen a light roughly a point on the port bow. The "Highland Hope" should by this time have been well within the range of the Burlings Light, which the Court finds was burning, and there can be little doubt that she was within it. The light, whatever it was, was not seen by Mr. Welsh, the second officer, who was on the bridge. It was not acknowledged from the bridge and Mr. Welsh seems to have at once made up his mind without personal investigation that no light of any kind had been seen. He came to this conclusion apparently because he put no trust in Brown whom he described as a boy of 17-(he was in fact 23)-having found him unreliable on one occasion during a voyage in another ship. The weather at this time was misty and though the Court can express no definite opinion upon it, it is possible that the light seen by Brown was the Burlings Light. it was, according to Brown, a long way off.

At 4 a.m. Mr. Welsh was due to be relieved, but the chief officer, Mr. Thomas, whose watch began at that hour, had not appeared. Apparently he had not been called at the time he should have been. Mr. Welsh, therefore, remained on the bridge and continued to navigate the vessel after 4 a.m. The fourth officer, Mr. Parry, joined him on the bridge at 4 a.m. or a minute or two after.

Shortly after 4 a.m. a heavy bank of fog was seen to be rolling up on the starboard bow and Mr. Welsh gave the "Stand-by" to the engine-room and set the automatic fog whistle going. The time at which this was done was in dispute at the Inquiry, but the Court is satisfied that it was 4.13 a.m. by the engine room clock or 4.11 a.m. by the bridge clock. The night orders left by the master on a pad in the chart room were "Course S.24°W. Call me when the log registers 157 or before, if necessary": and Mr. Welsh accordingly sent the fourth officer to call the master, who however had already left his cabin upon hearing the fog whistle being sounded; and he and Mr. Thomas arrived on the bridge within a few moments of one another. The fog at this time, according to Mr. Welsh, was as thick as a blanket.

On the arrival of the master and the chief officer there was apparently a discussion about the light which Brown, the look-out man, had reported. Inquiries were made, not of Brown who had gone off watch, but of Leary, the look-out man, who succeeded him. Leary reported that he had seen no light since he had come on look-out, and apparently the conclusion come to was that Brown had been mistaken. At any rate no action was taken. Mr. Welsh, the second officer, then left the bridge. Before he left, however, the master had asked him what the log reading was and the speed of the vessel and whether he had seen any lights, to which Mr. Welsh replied that he had seen none. The master was thus not informed about the Leixões light bearing and he told the Court that he never heard of it until he got to Lisbon after the vessel had stranded. In the opinion of the Court, the information should have been conveyed to the master by the second officer, if only as a matter of routine, and notwithstanding that the master could have ascertained the information himself by inspection of the deck scrap log and the chart. The master told the Court that he never looked at the deck scrap log and that he did not see the marking of the Leixões Light position on the chart. The master stated that, had the information been conveyed to him, he would have hauled the ship out at once. Whether he would have done so must remain a matter of speculation especially as the second officer regarded the observation as quite unreliable and would no doubt have so informed the master. At any rate, at a later time which the chief officer put at 4.23 a.m., when the fog had become dense and the chief officer had suggested to the master the advisability of hauling the ship out, the master did not accept the suggestion and continued on his course, giving as his reason for doing so that lie expected the fog to lift and to sight the Burlings Light.

Soon after coming on the bridge the master ordered the patent sounding apparatus to be rigged and this was done-apparently in order that soundings might be taken after the vessel had rounded the Burlings. The vessel meanwhile proceeded ahead at full speed through the fog, and it was not until 4.45 a.m. that any reduction of speed was made. The ship's engines were then put at half speed. Up to that time no measures had been taken by the master to verify his position. The lead was not used nor was any attempt made to use the wireless direction apparatus. The clock was not looked at nor the log. It would seem that the master was confident that he had set the ship on a safe course, that she had held it and that he had only to keep the ship going straight ahead to pass the Farilhoes in safety; or else that he was counting on the fog lifting before he got too close to the Burlings and so disclosing the Burlings Light.

At 4.47 a.m. by the engine room clock the master gave the order "slow" and at 4.57 a.m. "dead slow." At this time the helm was put hard-a-port to avoid some fishing vessels whose flares had been sighted on the port bow and right ahead. Almost immediately afterwards the master ordered the port engine to be put full ahead in order, so the master said, to help the vessel to answer her helm. At 4.58 a.m. both engines were put slow ahead. At this moment the master thought he heard the whistle of another vessel approaching him on the port bow, from which, as he informed the Court, he concluded that the "Highland Hope" was well on her expected course line. The chief officer, Mr. Thomas, thought that the whistle was only an echo of the ship's own whistle, which it undoubtedly was, and told the master so. The master ordered the whistle to be sounded again and the echo was heard. A second or two later the look out man shouted that there was land ahead and before anything could be done the "Highland Hope " ran on to the N.E. Farilhoes Rocks for the greater part of her length.

The Court considers that the navigation of the "Highland Hope" by her master from the time that she ran into fog in the early hours of 19th November, 1930, until she struck was of an utterly imprudent and unseamanlike character, and for that the master, Captain Jones, must take full responsibility. In the opinion of the Court, when the fog became dense, speed should have been at once reduced and a line of soundings taken. Seeing that the vessel was approaching dangerous rocks which, to the master's knowledge, were without light or fog signal; that the vessel was, on the master's own view of it, on a course which was to take him less than four miles from the outer rock; that the vessel's course after leaving Cape Silleiro had not, so far as his knowledge went, been verified except by dead reckoning at 4 a.m.; that he knew that the currents to be expected were of indeterminate direction and force, and that he had on a previous voyage overrun his course by two miles; that he had on one occasion at least experienced an easterly set of nearly a mile; it seems inexplicable that he should not have taken the elementary precaution of hauling his vessel out to the westward as soon as she ran into fog, or of reducing speed and using the lead.

It should be stated here that there was much controversy at the Inquiry as to the times at which the events of the last hour took place. The deck officers, i.e., the master, the chief officer, and the fourth officer, all put the times of the engine movements very much earlier than those which have been given above. Mr. Welsh, the second officer, and Mr. Parry, the fourth officer, both deposed that the "Stand-by" was ordered at 4 a.m. or very shortly afterwards. On the other hand, it was not disputed that the vessel struck at 4.57 a.m. by the bridge clock. Mr. Parry was sent by the chief officer to take the time when the vessel struck for the express purpose of recording it, and Mr. Parry said the time was 4.57 a.m. and the log reading 163. This agrees within two minutes with the time recorded in the engine room scrap log book which was before the Court. Two minutes was stated to be the usual difference between the two clocks before synchronisation.

It was suggested at the Inquiry that the entries of the times recorded in the engine room scrap log were not contemporaneous entries and should be rejected. The Court is satisfied that they were contemporaneous entries, and accepts them as correct. They were substantially in accordance with the evidence of Quartermaster Wylie, whom the Court considered to be a most reliable witness, and others. The times given by the deck officers referred to could not be reconciled with known facts.

As soon as the vessel struck the master stopped the engines; the watertight doors were closed and wireless messages were sent out; the signal was given for boat stations and the stewards went round the passenger accommodation warning the passengers. At 5.2 a.m. the engines were put slow ahead on the suggestion of the chief officer to keep the vessel from slipping off the rocks into deep water. Maroons were fired from the bridge. Although the evidence was, not unnaturally, somewhat contused as to the details of what occurred in getting out the boats and so forth, the Court is satisfied that the disembarkation of the passengers was effected with great promptitude and skill. It was estimated by all the witnesses that the passengers were clear of the ship in about half an hour, and the Court sees no reason to doubt the correctness of this estimate. The superintendence of the work of disembarkation devolved upon the chief officer, and the Court has nothing but praise for the manner in which he and everyone else concerned carried out their duties in this respect. The vessel was lurching heavily from side to side, with an irregular motion, and this rendered the task of lowering the boats and getting the passengers safely into them exceedingly difficult. The lowering apparatus seems to have worked excellently and the flood lighting arrangements, with which the ship was equipped, were of great assistance. There was no panic, which is perhaps remarkable, as there were over 200 Spanish and Portuguese emigrants on board who could not understand English. Part of the ship's crew, including some of the stewards, were Spanish and Portuguese seamen who had been specially shipped at Vigo to deal with the emigrants who embarked then, and no doubt these men were able to do much to allay the anxiety of their compatriots when the disaster occurred.

Owing to the presence of rocks some of the boats on the port side could not be launched. All of the boats which were launched seem to have been safely lowered and got away with a full complement-with the exception of boats No. 9 and No. 6. No. 6 was damaged in lowering and swung back on board. No. 9 was being lowered into the water after being filled with about 60 passengers from the promenade deck, when the ship gave an unexpected lurch, described by the chief officer as a "bump" and a "stagger" with the result that the boat was thrown against the side of the ship. This caused the boat to heel over, throwing some half dozen of its occupants into the water. These were all picked up by other boats. It was suggested by Commander Pink, a passenger who gave evidence, that the boat was tilted in a fore and aft direction which, if true, implied either that the boat was being carelessly lowered or that the lowering apparatus was at fault. The Court is satisfied that this was not the case and that the accident happened as stated. The boat reached the water safely but immediately filled, her side having been stove in by the collision with the side of the ship. Her tanks, however, kept her from sinking. Mr. Parry, the fourth officer, who had been getting the passengers, mostly emigrants, on board, seeing the boat's plight, at once shinned down the fall from the boat-deck and got into the boat, which now drifted away from the ship's side. Mr. Parry, thinking that the best thing to do was to get the people back on board, shouted up to the deck for a line. But apparently no one on board heard, and Mr. Parry accordingly went overboard and swam to the ship, got a line which was hanging down and threw it to the carpenter's mate, who, by Mr. Parry's orders, was standing in the bow of the boat. The line was secured, but the boat was so waterlogged that it was impossible to haul her in. Mr. Parry then climbed back to the ship and lowered the starboard gangway in case the boat should be able to get back. Then as the boat was no longer visible in the darkness and fog, Mr. Parry turned his attention to another boat. No. 9 boat was eventually picked up by one of the Portuguese trawlers which were in the vicinity and towed ashore.

The Court considers Mr. Parry's conduct deserving of high commendation.

The work of getting the passengers ashore after disembarkation was greatly assisted by the action of the trawlers already referred to and the passengers and crew were all safely landed at Peniche. One passenger, however, sustained injuries-how or when there was no evidence to show. It was reported to the chief officer that he had attempted, against orders, to jump into one of the boats. He was a Portuguese emigrant named Manoel Perez y Perez. He was conveyed ashore and removed to hospital, where he subsequently died.

While the passengers were being embarked and afterwards, soundings were taken from time to time in various parts of the ship. It was obvious that the ship had been badly holed and was rapidly filling with water, especially in the after part, although the engine room remained dry. By 7 a.m. Nos. 4 and 5 holds contained 9 to 11 feet of water. It was noticed that the sounding pipes had been forced up through the deck and there were indications that the main mast was being forced up also. At about this time the master, who, with the chief officer, the chief engineer and the carpenter, had remained on board, decided to leave the ship by one of the boats which had returned to the vessel. As they were about to do so two passengers appeared on deck, who stated that they had been unaware that the ship had struck ?? The master ordered them into the boat, and the other officers having entered it, he followed, being the last to leave the ship. The Court is satisfied, from the fact that he did return to her later on, that the master left the ship with the intention of returning to her.

Everything was done by the ship's officers to ensure as far as possible the comfort of the passengers on shore. The Portuguese authorities rendered great assistance and the people of Peniche did everything in their power to aid the passengers. The British Vice-Consul was quickly on the scene and the owners' agent arrived as soon as possible and made the necessary arrangements to convey the passengers to wherever they desired to go.

After the master had left the ship, Portuguese fishermen from some of the trawlers already mentioned got on board the ship and commenced pilfering. While there may have been no reason to anticipate this, the Court considers that steps should have been taken as a matter of course to protect property on board. The Court considers that a boat's crew under the master and/or chief officer, could have remained, either on board the ship with the lifeboat made fast alongside, or in the lifeboat alongside, until assistance had arrived from the shore or from one of the salvage vessels which answered the wireless calls for help from the master.

The Portuguese Government salvage vessel "Patras Lopez" arrived on the scene at 4.22 p.m. on the 19th November. Her commander boarded the "Highland Hope" for the purpose of taking soundings and verifying her position. Seeing a number of fishermen on board the ship he ordered them to leave. The "Highland Hope" was completely abandoned at sunset, but a watch was maintained by means of a searchlight from the "Patras Lopez" during the night. At 6.50 a.m. on the 20th November a naval force from the "Patras Lopez" was placed on board the "Highland Hope" as a guard. A quantity of cargo and baggage was salved by the salvage vessels, and inventories were made showing that many articles of baggage had been stolen.

There remains to be dealt with the question of the ship's documents. The master admitted that he gave no orders for any of the ship's documents to be brought off the vessel before he left her, although he says he subsequently told the chief officer to get the log book. The master explained this omission by saying that the passengers and the saving of life was still his chief thought and it did not occur to him to see that the documents were got. The only ship's document brought ashore on the 19th November seems to have been the engine room scrap log which was secured by Mr. Johnstone, the second engineer. On the afternoon of that day the master returned to the vessel in a fishing boat with the chief officer and the third officer to inspect it and to see whether it was possible to salve the mails and the passengers' luggage. The master and the chief officer apparently came to the conclusion that it was then impossible to go on board or to do anything, but the third officer, Mr. Nelson, scrambled on board and got some private documents of his own. Before he could make any inspection of the vessel, however, he was hailed and saw that the fishing boat had left the ship's side. He concluded that he had better clear off, and did so, being taken off by another fishing boat; apparently the other fishing boat had broken down. No ship's documents were thus brought from the ship on the 19th November, except the engine room scrap log already referred to.

On the morning of the 20th November the chief officer, Mr. Thomas and the second officer, Mr. Welsh, visited the ship. There were Portuguese on board, Mr. Welsh said, doing salvage work. The chief officer later on, according to Mr. Welsh, said "What about the log book: will you go and have a look" Mr. Welsh stated that he entered the chart room but found everything in confusion. "Consequently you could not do anything. . . . Of course I came down and said 'I cannot see anything' and then I never bothered any more about it." He said that he left the ship before the chief officer. The chief officer was more fortunate. In the chart room he found the compass deviation book, the two working charts and the deck scrap log. His own log book, he said, he found in his own room. He said that he was unable to find the night order pad, the engine movements book, or the official log book. The documents which he did obtain were before the Court, with the exception of the deck scrap log book. This was a most important document because it contained entries of great materiality to the Inquiry. Until the Inquiry had proceeded for two days it was not known that the scrap log book had been brought ashore at all. The Inquiry was opened and conducted for two days on the footing that it had not been brought off the ship and much time was spent in questioning the witnesses about it. On the third day of the Inquiry the Court was informed by Mr. Willmer, who appeared as Counsel for Mr. Thomas, that he had just been told by the chief officer that the deck scrap log book had been brought ashore by him but that it had subsequently been destroyed. When giving evidence, Mr. Thomas, on being asked how he had destroyed it, answered "If I remember rightly, it was thrown into the Bay of Biscay," and later he explained that he had thrown it through a porthole in the vessel which brought him back to England. The Court does not believe this to be the truth. It considers it far more probable that Mr. Thomas brought the deck scrap log book home with the other documents. In his deposition made on 5th December at the preliminary inquiry before the Receiver of Wreck Mr. Thomas swore that the only document he could find when he boarded the ship was his own log which he kept in his own room. When asked by the Court why he had given an untrue answer he said that he wanted some advice first before giving up the documents because he had heard there was going to be an Inquiry. At what precise period Mr. Thomas disclosed to anyone in authority that he had brought home the two charts and the compass deviation book did not appear, but it is evident that he retained these documents for some time without disclosing the fact that he had brought them off the ship. In these circumstances the Court could not accept the chief officer's statement that he destroyed the deck scrap log because he feared that he might get into trouble if the Marine Superintendent should discover that a scrap log had been used instead of the slates provided. The chief officer said or implied that there was a rule of the Nelson Line that slates only were to be used. The Court finds that there was no such rule, although apparently the owners preferred that slates should be used. The explanation in any case was quite insufficient to explain the destruction of such an important document. The absence of this document greatly hindered the Court's investigation. It should have contained and did contain, according to other officers' evidence, entries recording the time at which course was changed between Cape Silleiro and the Burlings, the log readings at 8 p.m. and at midnight, and the engine movements up to the time when half speed was ordered. The deck scrap log was used, so Mr. Thomas said, to make up his own log on the night of the 18th November. He said that he completed his log, with the exception of the last page which he filled in at Lisbon and which contains entries as to cargo only made from memory, between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. on that night and then took it to the master for signature. The log book when inspected appeared to the Court to have been all written up at the same time, with the exception of one entry which may have been inserted later. On the last page but one which Mr. Thomas said he wrote up before 10 p.m. on the 18th November there was an entry of the wind and the barometer reading at midnight on the same date. None of the pages in the log book bore the rubber stamp expressly provided for use above the master's signature, and it was said that this stamp had been lost. The general impression left on the mind of the Court by Mr. Thomas' evidence on these matters was in the highest degree unfavourable to Mr. Thomas. The Court felt that an attempt had been made and was being made to prevent it arriving at the truth. The Court considers Mr. Thomas' conduct, in regard to the ship's documents, as most reprehensible; it can find no extenuation for it except, possibly, a mistaken sense of loyalty to others. In fact he did them a great disservice.

At the conclusion of the evidence of the witnesses called by the Board of Trade Mr. Pilcher submitted the following questions for the consideration of the Court:-

1. What was the cost of the m.v. "Highland Hope" to her owners?

What was her value when she last left the United Kingdom?

What Insurances were effected upon and in connection with the ship?

2. When, where, and by whom were the chronometers of the m.v. "Highland Hope" last professionally rated? What was the result of such rating?

3. What number of compasses had the vessel? Were they in good order and sufficient for her safe navigation? When and by whom were they last adjusted?

Had the master ascertained the deviation of the compasses by observations from time to time?

Had the errors been correctly ascertained and recorded and did the master know the proper corrections to be applied to the various courses steered?

4. When the m.v. "Highland Hope" last left London on or about the 15th November, 1930:-

5. Did the m.v. "Highland Hope" hold a passenger certificate and was she so provided as to comply with all the requirements of the Merchant Shipping (Life Saving Appliances) Rules dated 6th August, 1924?

6. What was the system in force on the m.v. "Highland Hope" for informing:-

7. Before leaving London and/or on the way to Boulogne and Vigo were boat drills held on board the m.v. "Highland Hope"?

If so, when were they held, who attended them and what procedure was carried out?

8. When did the vessel arrive at Vigo?

9. What number of passengers and amount and description of cargo if any were shipped at Vigo?

10. When did the vessel leave Vigo? What was the complement of crew and number of passengers of all classes on board at that time?

11. Were the chart room and engine room clocks corrected whilst the vessel was at Vigo and did they agree on leaving the Port?

12. From what position did the master take his departure from Vigo? When were the engines put full speed ahead? Were safe and proper courses set and steered out of Vigo Bay?

13. Was the vessel's distance from Cape Silleiro Light correctly ascertained when she was abeam of it and, steering a course S.65°W magnetic at or about 6.53 p.m. on the 18th November, 1930? At this time and from this position was a course set S.12°W true? If so was that a safe and proper course and was due and proper allowance made for tide, currents, and possible set?

14. When was Cape Silleiro Light abeam when the vessel was steering a course S.12°W true? At this time how far distant was the Light and were proper measures taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel? What was the speed of the vessel thereafter?

15. Was an alteration made in the course between 7.30 p.m. and midnight of the 18th November last? If so at what time was the course altered? What was the course then set and was it a safe and proper course and was due and proper allowance made for tide, currents, and possible set?

16. What instructions did the master leave in the night order book or with the officer of the watch before retiring to his cabin shortly after 9 p.m. on the 18th November last or whenever it was that he did retire to his cabin? Were such instructions proper and sufficient and were they carried out by the officers of the ship?

17. Was the Leixões Light or the loom of it seen by Mr. J. H. Nelson, third officer, at or about 10.20 p.m. on the 18th November last? If so was the distance of the Light when abeam correctly ascertained by the third officer? How far distant was the Light? Was the Light and the ship's distance from it when abeam reported to the master and if not should they have been reported to him?

18. At the time he was relieved at midnight of the 18-19th November did Mr. J. H. Nelson inform the second officer who relieved him that Cape Leixos Light had been seen at or about 10.20 p.m. or give him any particulars as to the distance at which the Light had been passed?

19. What measures, if any, were taken during the period between the time the vessel was abeam of Cape Silleiro Light on the evening of the 18th November and 4 a.m. on the 19th November to verify the position of the vessel and to ascertain whether she was making good her course?

20. Was a light seen by the lookout man at about or shortly before 4 a.m. on the 19th November last? If so what were the description, bearings and distance of the light?

Was it reported by bell by the lookout man and if so was such report acknowledged from the bridge: Was the light seen at any time by the second officer on the bridge or any person on board other than the lookout man?

Was the sighting of this light brought to the knowledge of the master? What action, if any, was taken with regard to it?

21. At what time on the morning of the 19th November did the master return to the bridge?

What was the state of the weather, position by dead reckoning, and speed of the vessel at that time?

22. At and after 4 a.m. or the 19th November last:-

23. Was a good and proper look-out kept on board the vessel after 4 a.m. on the 19th November last?

24. At what time on the 19th November last and where did the vessel strand?

25. Were the Farilhoes and/or the Burlings Island Lights being exhibited and was the fog horn at Burlings Island being sounded between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on the 19th November last?

Were the lights or either of them seen and was the fog horn heard before the vessel struck and, if not, why not?

If the light on the Farilhoes Rocks was out of order and not being exhibited was the fact known to the master before he left Vigo?

26. After the vessel struck were prompt and proper orders given and measures taken for getting out and lowering the boats for the safety of those on board the ship?

27. What was the cause of the accident to No. 9 boat? Did any loss of life result from it?

28. Did the master remain on board the ship until all the passengers had left her in the boats? If so, what officers, engineers or other persons, if any, remained with him?

29. At what time on the 19th November last did the master and others still on board leave the ship? What was her condition at that time, and was there reason to apprehend danger to life by remaining any longer on board?

Was it the master's intention to return to the ship after landing?

30. Before leaving the vessel on the 19th November last or subsequently, did the master take any and, if so, what measures to ensure that the log books, scrap log books, night order book, compass deviation book and charts of the vessel, or any of them should not be lost?

Which of these documents were saved? When, by whom, and how were they saved. Were they all preserved?

Could the documents which were lost have been saved? How was it that they were not saved?

31. Could any measures have been taken to prevent unauthorised persons boarding the ship and pilfering after the master and others had left her and gone ashore on the 19th November last?

Were any such measures taken and if not should they have been taken?

32. Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

33. What was the cause of the stranding and loss of the ship? Were any lives lost?

34. Was the stranding and loss of the M.V. "Highland Hope" caused by the wrongful act or default of Captain Thomas Johnson Jones, master; Horace Hugh Thomas, chief officer; Herbert Robert Welsh, second officer; James Horace Nelson, third officer; and Gerald Joseph Parry, fourth officer; or any and, if so, which of them?

Mr. Miller addressed the Court on behalf of the owners, Mr. Haywood on behalf of the second and fourth officers, Mr. Willmer on behalf of the chief officer and third officer, and Mr. Carpmael on behalf of the master. Mr. Pilcher replied on behalf of the Board of Trade. The Court delivered judgment and returned the following answers to questions submitted by the Board of Trade:-

1. The cost of the m.v. "Highland Hope" to her owners was £660,302 3s. 11d. Her value when she last left the United Kingdom was £633,920 5s. 2d.

The following insurances were effected upon and in connection with the ship:-

2. The chronometers of the m.v. "Highland Hope" were last professionally rated by Messrs. Kelvin, White & Hutton at London on the 14th November, 1930.

The results of such rating were as follows:-

3. The vessel had three compasses. They were in good order and sufficient for her safe navigation. They were 'last adjusted by Messrs. Kelvin, White & Hutton of London on the 16th April, 1930.

The master had ascertained the deviation of the compasses by observations from time to time, but no observations were possible during the voyage in question owing to the fact that all heavenly bodies were obscured by overcast skies.

The errors had been correctly ascertained on previous voyages and recorded in the compass deviation book. The master knew the proper variation to be applied, but for deviation he had only the records obtained on previous voyages to guide him.

4. When the m.v. "Highland Hope" last left London on or about the 15th November, 1930:-

5. The m.v. "Highland Hope" held a passenger certificate and was so provided as to comply with all the requirements of the Merchant Shipping (Life Saving Appliances) Rules dated 6th August, 1924.

6.-(a) Boat station lists were placed in prominent positions in the quarters of the crew for their information. In each of the first and second class cabins was hung a-printed card showing the number of the boat to which the occupants of the cabin were allotted. In the emigrants' quarters boat lists were exhibited in a prominent position, but on the voyage in question this had not been done at the time of the casualty as the emigrants had been embarked only the night before at Vigo.

(b) Instructions where to obtain life jackets and how to put them on were posted in the passengers' cabins and the emigrants' quarters. These instructions were printed in English, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Polish and were illustrated to show the fitting of the life jackets. Instructions were also given at boat drills.

7. Boat drills were held on board the m.v. "Highland Hope" before leaving London and on the way to Boulogne.

The first boat drill was held at Gravesend on the 15th November, 1930. It was attended by all the officers and crew available; all hands were sent to boat stations. Six boats were swung out, but not lowered.

The second boat drill was held when proceeding down the Channel at 11 a.m. on the 16th November. All the crew available were mustered at their boat stations. The passengers were invited to attend, but not more than 30 did so.

8. At 5.59 a.m. on the 18th November, 1930.

9. 217 emigrants were embarked and about 400 tons of general cargo, mostly fresh fish and chestnuts, were shipped at Vigo.

10. The vessel left Vigo at about 6 p.m. on the 18th November, 1930. Her complement was then: crew 154, passengers 157, and emigrants 217.

11. The evidence does not enable the Court to answer this question with precision. It was the practice to synchronize the chart-room and engine-room clocks at noon each day and on leaving port. There was not more than two minutes difference between the two clocks at any material time.

12. The master set a course S.65°W. magnetic from a position approximately midway between the Brasileira and Borneira beacons. The engines were put full speed ahead at 6.1 p.m. Safe and proper courses were steered out of Vigo Bay until the vessel was abeam of Cape Silleiro on the course S.65°W. magnetic.

13. The vessel's distance from Cape Silleiro Light as ascertained was approximately correct when she was abeam of it and steering a course S.65°W. magnetic at or about 6.53 p.m. on the 18th November, 1930.

At this time and from this position a course was set S.25°W. by compass which the master calculated to be S.12°W. true. The Court however, is of opinion that the course set was owing to excess of easterly deviation allowed nearer S.11°W. true. No allowance was made for tide, currents, and/or possible set.

14. There is no evidence to enable the Court to fix with certainty the time at which Cape Silleiro Light was abeam when the vessel was on the course S.25°W. by compass, but it was probably about 7 p.m.

At this time the Light was distant approximately two and a half miles. No measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at this time.

The speed of the vessel thereafter was full speed. viz., about 16.2 knots, until 4.45 a.m.

15. An alteration in the course was made between 7.30 p.m. and midnight on the 18th November; 1930. The evidence is conflicting as to the exact time when this alteration was made; in the opinion of the Court it was a good deal earlier than 9 p.m., the time given by the master and the third officer. The course then set was S.24°W. which the master calculated to be S.11°W. true, but which in the opinion of the Court was nearer S.10°W. true owing to excessive easterly deviation allowed. This was not a safe and proper course. No allowance was made for tide, currents, and/or possible set.

16. The instructions left by the master on the pad used for night orders were as follows:-

In the opinion of the Court such instructions were proper and sufficient.

17. The Court is of opinion that not merely the loom hut the Leixões Light itself, was seen by Mr. J. H. Nelson, the third officer, at 10.18 p.m., possibly through haze. The distance of the light when abeam as ascertained by the third officer by means of a running fix was 19 miles. In the opinion of the Court this was approximately correct within a mile. The Light and the ship's distance from it when abeam were not reported verbally to the master. An entry of the vessel's position and distance from the Light at 10.18 p.m. was made in the deck scraplog and plotted on the chart. These facts should also have been reported verbally to the master by Mr. H. R. Welsh, the second officer when the former came on the bridge shortly after 4.13 a.m. on the 19th November.

18. At the time when he was relieved at midnight of the 18th/19th November Mr. J. H. Nelson, the third officer, did inform the second officer who relieved him that Cape Leixões Light had been seen by him at a distance of 19 miles abeam at 10.18 p.m.

19. Apart from the bearings of Leixões Light taken by Mr. J. H. Nelson, the third officer, and the reading of the log at 8 p.m. and at midnight no measures were taken during the period between the time the vessel was abeam of Cape Silleiro Light on the evening of the 18th November and 4 a.m. on the 19th November to verify the position of the vessel or to ascertain whether she was making good her course.

20. A light was seen by Brown the look-out man shortly before 4 a.m. on the 19th November. The light was said by Brown to have been of a yellowish colour and to have shown up roughly about a point on the port bow. It was a long way off and was only seen momentarily.

The light was reported by bell by the look-out man but the report was not acknowledged from the bridge.

The light was not seen at any time by the second officer on the bridge or by any person on board other than the look-out man.

The sighting of the light was brought to the knowledge of the master; no action was taken with regard to it, except that inquiries were made of the look-out man who relieved Brown and who stated that he had seen no light since he came on look-out.

21. The master returned to the Bridge on the morning of the 19th November, shortly after 4.13 a.m.

The weather at that time was foggy. The position by dead reckoning had been last ascertained at 4 a.m., when the patent log reading was stated to have been 144.8 miles, a figure which the Court does not accept as the distance run. The speed of the vessel was "full ahead" with the engine-room telegraph at "Stand by."

22.-(a) At 4 a.m. the weather was fairly clear but inclined to be misty, with haze or cloud over the land. Shortly after 4 a.m. a heavy bank of fog was rolling up on the starboard bow. From 4.15 a.m. onwards the vessel was enveloped in fog.

(b) No measures of any kind were taken to ascertain or verify the ship's position at or after 4 a.m. other than the reading of the patent log at 4 a.m. referred to in the previous answer.

(c) No alteration was made in the ship's course, except that the helm was put hard-a-port to avoid some fishing vessels whose flares had been sighted on the port bow. This occurred shortly before the ship struck. The ship was being steadied on her course in accordance with the master's order to resume course when she struck. The speed of the ship was altered as follows:-

23. Yes.

24. The vessel stranded on the North-East Farilhoes Rocks at about 4.58 a.m. on the 19th November, 1930.

25. The Farilhoes Light was not being exhibited between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. on the 19th November. This Light was out of order, and the fact that it was out of order and not being exhibited was known to the master before he left Vigo.

The Burlings Island Light was being exhibited and the fog horn at Burlings Island was being sounded between the hours mentioned. The light seen and reported by Brown, the look-out man, shortly before 4 a.m. may have been the Burlings Island Light, but the evidence does not enable the Court to do more than hazard an opinion as to this. The Burlings Island Light was not seen between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. nor was the fog-horn heard. The Burlings Island Light was not seen because it was obscured by fog. The Court is unable to say why the fog-horn was not heard.

26. Yes.

27. While No. 9 boat was being lowered a heavy and unexpected lurching of the ship caused the boat to foul the ship's side, with the result that the boat was listed, throwing several of the occupants into the sea. No loss of life resulted from this accident.

28. The master remained on board the ship with the chief officer, the chief engineer and the carpenter until all the passengers had left her in the boats, except two, who were apparently unaware that the ship had struck. These two passengers were ordered by the master into a boat which had returned to the ship, and the master, the two officers mentioned and the carpenter left in the same boat, the master being the last to leave the ship.

29. The master and others still on board left the ship at about 7 a.m. on the 19th November. The condition of the ship at that time was that she was badly holed in the after part. She was dry in the forward bilges, in the engine-room and in No. 6 hold, but there was between 9 and 11 feet of water in Nos. 4 and 5 holds. The sounding pipes were being forced up through the deck and there were signs that the mainmast was being forced up also. The ship was lurching violently at intervals from side to side. In the opinion of the Court there was reason to apprehend danger to life by remaining longer on board.

It was the master's intention to return to the ship after landing.

30. Before leaving the vessel on the 19th November the master took no measures to ensure that the log-books, scrap log-books, night order book, compass deviation book and charts of the vessel or any of them should not be lost. Subsequently, the master gave instructions to Mr. H. H. Thomas, the chief officer, to get the chief officer's log-book.

The documents saved were the chief officer's log, the deck scrap log, the engine-room scrap log, the compass deviation book and the two charts of the coast of Portugal. All of these, except the engine-room scrap log, were brought off the vessel by the chief officer on the 20th November. The engine-room scrap log was brought on deck after the vessel stranded by the second engineer, Mr. G. Johnstone, and handed by him to the chief engineer. It was brought ashore by the fourth engineer in one of the lifeboats. Mr. Johnstone subsequently took charge of it and brought it home. All of the documents saved were preserved, except the deck scrap log, which was subsequently destroyed by the chief officer.

The documents which were lost could have been saved if orders had been given to save them before the master left the vessel on the 19th November. They were not saved because no orders were then given.

31. Measures could have been taken to prevent unauthorised persons going on board and pilfering after the master and others had left the ship and gone ashore on the 19th November.

No such measures were taken. In the opinion of the Court measures should have been taken.

32. The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

33. The stranding and loss of the ship was due to a combination of causes, namely:-

No lives were lost from the ship, but one of the emigrants was injured and subsequently died in hospital at Lisbon.

34. The stranding and loss of the m.v. "Highland Hope" was caused by the default of Captain Thomas Johnson Jones, master, and not by the wrongful act or default of Horace Hugh Thomas, chief officer, Herbert Robert Welsh, second officer, James Horace Nelson, third officer, or Gerald Joseph Parry, fourth officer.

JOHN H. HARRIS, Judge.

We concur,

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Tuesday, the 24th day of March, 1931.)

LONDON:

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:

Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh;

York Street, Manchester; 1, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;

15, Donegall Square West, Belfast;

or through any Bookseller.

1931.

Price 9d. Net.