Wreck report for 'St Patrick', 1932

FOR OFFICIAL USE

[Crown Copyright Reserved.]

(No. 7892).

"ST. PATRICK" (S.S.).

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT OF COURT.

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Institution of Civil Engineers, Great George Street, Westminster, London, S.W.1, on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 24th days of November, 1932, before F. T. Barrington-Ward, Esq., K.C., assisted by Captain H. P. Learmont, R.D., R.N.R., and Captain W. H. Parker, C.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., into the circumstances attending the striking of a rock by the British steamship "St. Patrick" of London, Official Number, 161,385, off La Corbière Point, Jersey, Channel Islands, on the 5th August, 1932.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the striking of a rock by the vessel was due to the setting by the master of too fine a course from a position off Grosnez Point, the position having been only approximately ascertained, and the continuing on that course when the visibility was poor, owing to dense fog, at an excessive speed and without any attempt to check the position of the vessel from time to time by soundings.

The Court finds that the casualty was caused by the wrongful acts and default of the master, Captain Charles Waine Sanderson. Having regard, however, to the long and excellent record of service of the master prior to the casualty the Court refrains from making any order in relation to his certificate; but the Court censures the master, Captain Charles Waine Sanderson, for the said wrongful acts and default, and orders that he do pay to the Board of Trade the sum of one hundred pounds on account of the expenses of this Investigation.

Dated this 24th day of November, 1932.

F. T. BARRINGTON-WARD,

Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the Institution of Civil Engineers, Great George Street, Westminster, London, S.W.I, on the 14th, 15th, 16th and 24th days of November, 1932. Mr. G. St. Clair Pilcher and Mr. N. V. Craig (instructed by the Solicitor to the Board of Trade) appeared for the Board of Trade. Mr. R. F. Hayward and Mr. George Billam (instructed by Messrs. G. F. Hudson Matthews & Co., Solicitors, London) appeared on behalf of the master of the vessel, Captain Charles Waine Sanderson. Mr. Wilfred Lewis and Mr. George Bankes (instructed by the Solicitor to the Great Western Railway Company) appeared on behalf of the owners of the vessel, the Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Company.

The S.S. "St. Patrick," official number, 161,385, registered at the Port of London, is a twin screw passenger and cargo steamship, built by Alex. Stephen & Sons, Ltd., of Linthouse, Glasgow, in 1930. The vessel is owned by the Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Company, which is a subsidiary of the Great Western Railway Company, and has its principal place of business at Paddington Station, London, W.2. Mr. Frederick Charles Edward Hockridge, of Paddington Station, London, W.2, is the person to whom the management of the vessel is entrusted by and on behalf of the owners. The vessel is employed on the Cross Channel Service to the Channel Islands during the summer months. She was classed 100 A.1. at Lloyd's.

The length of the vessel is 281.3 feet, beam 41.1 feet, depth of hold from tonnage deck to ceiling amidships 16.35 feet. The gross tonnage is 1921.95, the registered tonnage 791.74. The propelling machinery consists of two rotary single reduction geared turbines, and four single-ended steel boilers fitted to burn oil fuel. Her full speed is given as 19 knots. The vessel had 6 boats capable of accommodating 300 persons, and also 10 lifebuoys and 1,001 life jackets, and buoyant apparatus capable of supporting 768 persons. She had 11 bulkheads and two ballast tanks and was fitted in every way up to the highest class required by the Board of Trade regulations and held a passenger certificate for a Home Trade passenger vessel. Her passenger accommodation is as follows:-first class, 381, third class, 182; and there is accommodation for a crew of 57. The wireless installation included a "Direction Finder." She had a Kelvin (Patent) Sounding Machine which on the voyage in question was in good order. Three Kelvin Compasses were provided, one on the bridge, one in the wheelhouse, and one aft; they were in good order and last adjusted in February, 1931. An Azimuth book was kept up to date and therein the compass deviations were shown. A certificate, dated 23rd October, 1931, signed by A. G. Lewis, a former master, and by W. Y. Larbalestier, mate, shows that the compasses were in all respects satisfactory and that correct deviation cards were supplied.

The master, Charles Waine Sanderson, whose certificate of competency is number 006243, was educated in the Thames Nautical Training College, H.M.S. "Worcester." On leaving her in 1908 he served as a cadet with the British India Steam Navigation Company, and later as a junior officer on the Indian coast with the same Company. On the outbreak of war he became a midshipman in H.M.S. "Oceanic," and afterwards served as sub-lieutenant and lieutenant in H.M.S. "Donegal," attached to the Grand Fleet, subsequently retiring from the Royal Naval Reserve in 1926 with the rank of Lieut.-Commander. After the war he obtained his master's certificate. In September, 1919, he joined the Great Western Railway Company as second officer. He was promoted in due course to first officer and ultimately master, in which capacity he has served the same company for the past five years. His local knowledge of the navigation of the Channel Islands should be, and is, extensive, for he has been engaged continuously in this service in command of various of the company's steamers throughout the last five years. making as many as three or four complete voyages each week in the summer time. He holds a Pilotage licence for Weymouth, also for Guernsey and Jersey.

The s.s. "St. Patrick" left Weymouth at 1.40 p.m. on 5th August, 1932. She had on board a crew of 49 hands, the master and 295 passengers, and also a certain amount of baggage and mails. She was bound for Jersey and was not to call at Guernsey, as she was to be in readiness at Jersey to take the sailing back from there on the following day. When the vessel left Weymouth her draught was 12 feet 3 inches forward and 13 feet 10 inches aft.

At the time of starting the weather was fine and clear, the sea smooth, the wind W.S.W., force 1 to 2. After Weymouth was cleared various courses were steered to a position off Portland Bill, where a departure was taken at 2.7 p.m., when Shambles Light Vessel bore E. by S., distance 3½ miles, and a course was set S.6° W. mag., at full speed, 18 to 19 knots. About 2.45 p.m. patchy and intermittent fog came on with clear intervals, when visibility was 3 to 4 miles. Various wireless direction bearings were obtained approaching the Casquets, and from these it was ascertained that the ebb tide on the port side was not so strong as had been anticipated, viz., 3 to 3½ knots, an allowance which on a course of S.6° W. mag. would have put the vessel about two miles to the west of the Casquets. The course was accordingly altered at 3.55 p.m. to S.10° W. mag., S.11° W. standard. The course was altered again at 4.10 p.m. to S.17° W. mag., and at about 4.38 p.m. the vessel was off the Casquets Lighthouse, which was then bearing from it N.59° E. mag. by D.F. bearing. The master himself as a check laid off the bearing of N.59° E. after the officer of the watch had done so, and the master fixed the distance of the Casquets at 1¾ miles. This figure he arrived at by calculation from the patent log readings at 4.10 p.m. and 4.38 p.m. and change of bearings. On passing the Casquets continuous fog came on, the visibility being about a cable. Up till 2.40 p.m. the vessel had been at full speed. At 2'.40 p.m. "Stand-by" was ordered, at 3.15 p.m. "Half Speed," at 3.16 p.m. "Full Speed" and "Stand-by," at 4.26 p.m. "Half Speed," at 4.27 p.m. "Stop," at 4.28½ p.m. "Slow Ahead," and at 4.29 p.m. "Full Speed." These alterations were made on account of hearing other vessels in the vicinity.

Having obtained the position off the Casquets at 4.38 p.m. the master set a course S.8° E., which he estimated would take him 1 mile east of the Blanchard Buoy. A wireless bearing of the Casquets taken at 5 p.m. gave the relative bearing 200, showing that the vessel was getting the set of the tide to the W.S.W. At 5.13 p.m. another relative bearing, 194½, was obtained, showing that the vessel had got out of the westerly set, and the tide, if any, was more or less astern.

About 5 p.m. the "St. Patrick" passed the Trinity House boat "Patricia", which was heading to the northwards. The master says they passed her at a distance of two ships' lengths, that is, about a cable, the chief officer of the "St. Patrick" gives the distance as 2½ to 3 cables, and various estimates of the distance are given by the crew of the "St. Patrick," whereas the chief officer of the "Patricia" gives the distance as about 120 feet. The "Patricia" was engaged in lighthouse inspection and had just paid a call at the Casquets. She left the Casquets at 4 p.m., and as the fog was too thick for her to make Guernsey decided to run a safe distance of 6 miles to the south-south-east of the Casquets and then anchor, and it was while anchoring and while paying out cable that the "St. Patrick" passed along her port side.

At 5.27 p.m., the master of the "St. Patrick" sighted "the low land line of Sark and the white square patch of Creux Harbour." The master says that the visibility which had been about a cable when off the Casquets had improved as the vessel approached Sark and that he could observe this "white square patch" clearly, bearing N.70° W., mag. He also heard the fog signal on Sark. He did not see the Blanchard Buoy, but heard it and saw the eddy of the Blanchard Rock on the starboard quarter after he passed it. He estimated the distance from La Creux Harbour as 2¾ miles, and from the Blanchard Buoy as 1 mile. Asked how he estimated the distance, the master says: "By my two direction finding bearings which I had already obtained from the Casquets and the bearing (i.e., of La Creux). I had it worked in with the log which I estimated at the time." The tide was at this time in a southerly direction and astern of the vessel. The course was altered at 5.27 p.m. to S.21° W. mag.; the patent log then read 65. At 5.48 p.m., when the patent log read 71, the master observed the eddy of the Bane Desormes. It was also observed by the chief officer. The master says that the fog about this time was intermittent and that the visibility at this particular place was about two miles. He estimated the distance of the eddy to be about a quarter of a mile. He says that he took the eddy to be to the westward of the Banc Desormes and about a quarter of a mile from the Banc Desormes, and reckoned therefore that his vessel was about half a mile from the Banc Desormes. It seems probable in view of the set of the tide that the eddy of the Banc Desormes was much more to the southward of the Banc Desormes than to the west-ward and that the master therefore passed close to the bank and not about half a mile to the west-ward of it.

About 6 p.m. the fog came on thick and so continued till the vessel struck. The visibility was about a ship's length, at 6 p.m. the patent log showed 74.3, and, allowing for tide, the master reckons he had run 10½ to 10¾ miles from the Blanchard Buoy. He did not see Grosnez Point, but estimated that it was E. ½ S. at a distance of 2¾ miles, an estimate based upon what had been seen of Sark and upon the patent log readings. The course was then altered from S. 21°W. mag. to S. 6° E. mag., which the master calculated would take him about one mile from La Corbière. Immediately, the course was set the master posted a man aft to ring up the log every mile to him. At 6.9 p.m. the explosive fog signal at La Corbière was heard. The engines were put to half speed, i.e., 14 to 15 knots, and at 6.10 p.m. to slow, i.e., about 10 knots. The records of La Corbière Lighthouse show four "Extra shots for the 'St. Patrick,' 6.5, 6.9, 6.11 and 6.14," but the master heard only the signal at 6.9 p.m. and two repetitions, and says that all three were very diffused and hard to take. After the third shot was heard eddies were observed on the port bow about half a ship's length away. The master gave the order "Hard a port" immediately, and the engines were stopped. The vessel grazed a submerged rock with her port bilge abreast the bridge, and as she swung more grazings were felt aft, about three in all. It is observed that the starboard engine was not reversed; this would have eased the vessel's way to some extent and canted her head more quickly.

The master immediately gave orders for the water-tight doors to be closed and for lifeboats and lifebelts to be got ready, and sent the quartermaster round to sound the ship. Ascertaining that there was no immediate danger, he sent the chief officer and chief steward to reassure the passengers. At 6.27 p.m. the vessel was anchored with 60 fathoms on the port cable. It was found that a film of oil was coming on to the surface of the water which was rising in the boiler room. The fires were shut off; a S.O.S. was sent to Jersey. Between half-past eight and nine the Jersey States tug boat, "The Duke of Normandy," and the Southern Railway mailboat, "The Isle of Sark," arrived. The passengers were all safely transferred to the "Isle of Sark" and landed in Jersey the following morning. The "St. Patrick" was taken in tow by the Great Western steamship "St. Julien" the following morning and ultimately on Saturday evening berthed in St. Helier Harbour, Jersey, where some temporary repairs were done. The total cost of all repairs necessary in consequence of the damage done was £6,283.

It would appear that the rock struck by the "St. Patrick" was in the neighbourhood of La Boue and Les Boiteaux. These are part of a series of rocks which stretch for about half a mile to the westward of La Corbière. Clearly the vessel was quite half a mile to the eastward of the course the master believed himself to be on. The last course set was S.6° E. from an estimated position off Grosnez Point. The master says that he was confident of this position by reason of the sights he had previously obtained of La Creux Harbour, Sark, and the eddy of the Banc Desormes. There is, as indicated above, a possibility that the vessel was at the Banc Desormes a quarter of a mile or so to the eastward of the course the master believed her to be on. Further, he did not see Grosnez Point, and relied upon an estimated bearing and an estimated distance therefrom, based upon an estimated position off the Banc Desormes and the log readings, to fix the position at which he altered the course from S.21° W. mag. to S.6° E. mag. The master says that his confidence in this course was strengthened by not seeing the eddy of the Rigdon Bank, which lies to the south-west of Grosnez Point, leading him to believe that he was outside the bank, but as the visibility at the time was on the master's admission only about a ship's length this negative evidence of the vessel's position was of doubtful value. In the opinion of the Court the master's confidence was not justified. The fixing of the position off Grosnez Point was based on inadequate data, and the possibilities of error are more than sufficient to account for the vessel striking the rock. These factors should have been present in the mind of the master and should have induced him (a) to set a course with a large margin of safety from the rocks off La Corbière; (b) to take special precautions by reduction of speed and frequent soundings. An inspection of the chart indicates that a line of soundings would have shewn the master that he was inside his course.

The course set by the master when off Grosnez Point was calculated to take him one mile from La Corbière, that is, half a mile from the rocks off La Corbière. In the opinion of the Court this was too fine a course. The master gives as his reason for setting so fine a course that he wished to be close enough to hear La Corbière fog signal in order that he might definitely know his position before rounding that corner and entering the dangerous channels that lead into St. Helier Harbour. He says that it was for the same reason that he maintained the full speed of the vessel at 18 to 19 knots; a reduced speed, he says, owing to the uncertain effect of the tide would have made any estimation of the position of his vessel less reliable, and he adds that at full speed it was not practicable to take soundings. The Court cannot accept the view that it was impracticable to take soundings at full speed, especially in comparatively shallow waters, and the Court considers that, even if it were so, the uncertainty of his position necessitated taking soundings although speed might have to be reduced for that purpose. As regards La Corbière signal it is clear that the master was aware of the difficulty of hearing the signal. He had himself on 29th June, 1929, joined with others in a petition through his owners, the Great Western Railway Company, to the Jersey authorities concerned, complaining of its inaudibility. He should therefore have placed little reliance on this means of checking his position. Moreover his vessel was proceeding at a speed of 18-19 knots, and, as the signal sounded only every 7½ minutes, there was grave risk of his vessel in that interval travelling a distance that would set her in jeopardy.

Another factor in this case was the weather conditions. About 2.45 p.m. fog came on; intermittent at first, it later, about 6 p.m., became dense. On this matter all rules issued to mariners as well as the dictates of prudent seamanship demand the use of special precautions including in particular navigation at a moderate and safe speed and the use of the lead. It is only fair to the master to mention that for the whole voyage he was himself on the bridge and posted and maintained double look-outs. For the earlier part of the voyage when the fog was intermittent full speed was maintained save for a few minutes. The Court does not consider that all proper steps were taken during this part of the voyage to conform the speed of the vessel to the weather conditions and visibility then prevailing. From 6 p.m. onwards when the fog was thick the vessel continued at full speed. The Court considers that for that part of the voyage reduction of speed and the taking of soundings was imperative.

The master attributes the casualty to an unusual and unexpected easterly set; the Tidal Charts show that such a set was possible but it was a possibility the master should have guarded against.

The Court is of opinion that the casualty was due-

It appears from the evidence in this case that complaints have been made that the fog signal at La Corbière Lighthouse is unsatisfactory and that additional protection for mariners by the installation of an efficient lighthouse and fog signal at Grosnez Point is essential. In the opinion of the Court there are grounds for these complaints and the Court respectfully suggests that the Board of Trade might consider what steps could be taken further to explore the matter with a view to the provision of such remedies as might be found necessary.

At the conclusion of the evidence of the witnesses called by the Board of Trade Mr. Pilcher submitted the following questions for the consideration of the Court:-

Questions.

Mr. Wilfred Lewis addressed the Court on behalf of the owners, and Mr. Hayward on behalf of the master. Mr. Pilcher replied on behalf of the Board of Trade. The Court delivered judgment and returned the following answers to the questions submitted by the Board of Trade:-

Answers to Questions.

(1) The owners of the British steamship "St. Patrick" are the Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Company, having their principal place of business at Paddington Station, London, W.2.

(2) The S.S. "St. Patrick" left Weymouth at 1.40 p.m. on August 5th, 1932.

She was then in good and seaworthy condition.

(3) She was provided with:-

(4) A Kelvin (Patent) Sounding Machine was installed in the vessel.

This was proper and sufficient for the voyage.

(5) Clear and fine, smooth sea, wind W.S.W., force 1 to 2.

About 2.45 p.m., patchy and intermittent fog came on with clear intervals when visibility was 3 to 4 miles.

(6) When a change in weather conditions occurred all proper steps were not taken to conform the speed of the vessel to the altered condition of (a) the weather conditions; (b) the visibility.

(7) The positions approaching and passing the Casquets were fixed by wireless bearings and patent log readings. The position when off Sark was fixed by visual bearing of La Creux Harbour and an estimate of the distance therefrom confirmed by hearing the Blanchard Buoy. The position off the Bane Desormes was fixed by visual bearing of the eddy and an estimate of the distance therefrom.

The bearings were reliable and adequate; the estimated distances were unreliable and inadequate. The positions of the vessel were not accurately fixed.

(8) The courses set and steered on the voyage from Weymouth towards Jersey were safe and proper in view of the existing weather conditions and visibility until 6 p.m., but the course set and steered thereafter was not.

(9) When the vessel was approaching La Corbière Lighthouse the explosive fog signal from La Corbière Lighthouse was heard indistinctly by the master and others on board and then repeated at the master's request twice and heard muffled.

(10) The S.S. "St. Patrick" was not navigated at a moderate and safe speed having regard to the visibility.

(11) No soundings were taken by those on board the S.S. "St. Patrick" when approaching La Corbière Lighthouse. Soundings should have been taken.

(12) The S.S. "St Patrick" struck a rock at 6.13 p.m. on the 5th August, 1932, in the neighbourhood of La Boue and Les Boiteaux off La Corbièere.

(13) The cause of the S.S. "St. Patrick" striking the rock was the setting by the master of too fine a course from a position off Grosnez Point, the position having been only approximately ascertained, and the continuing on that course when the visibility was poor, owing to dense fog, at an excessive speed and without any attempt to check the position of the vessel from time to time by soundings.

(14) The accident to the S.S. "St. Patrick" was caused by the wrongful acts and default of Captain Charles Waine Sanderson, her master.

F. T. BARRINGTON-WARD,

Judge.

(Issued by the Board of Trade in London

on Saturday, the 17th day of December, 1932).

LONDON

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