THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894
REPORT OF COURT
NO. 7937
S.S. "CASTILIAN"
In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at St. George's
Hall, Liverpool on the 4th day of August and 16th and 17th days of
September 1943 before Mr. K.S. Carpmael K.C. assisted by Captain
C.A. Wilson and Captain G.L. Stout into the circumstances attending
the stranding and total loss of the steamship "CASTILIAN" on the
East Platters Rooks on the 12th day of February, 1943.
The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances
attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the
reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding and total
loss of the "CASTILIAN" were caused by the wrongful act and default
of the Master, Captain Joseph Every, and orders that his
certificate be suspended for a period of nine months from 12th
February, 1943.
| Dated this fourth day of October, 1943. |
| | | K.S. CAREMAEL | Judge. |
| | We concur in the above Report |
| | | C.A. WILSON. | Assessor. |
| | | G.L. STOUT | Assessor. |
ANNEX TO THE REPORT
MR. OWEN L. BATESON (instructed by the Treasury
Solicitor) appeared for the Minister of War Transport.
MR. EUSTACE W. BRIGHTIAN (instructed by Messrs. Hill,
Dickinson & Co.) appeared for the Managers.
MR. R.E. GETHING (instructed by Messrs. Miller, Taylor
& Holmes) appeared for the Master, Captain Joseph Every.
MR. CLIFFORD BENNISON (of Messrs. Ingledew, Brown,
Bennison & Garrett) watched the proceedings on behalf of Mr.
F.A.N. Pain, the Second Officer of the "CASTILIAN".
The Master was made a party to the proceedings by the Ministry
of War Transport. The Managers applied to be made parties and were
joined accordingly.
The "CASTILIAN" was a single-screw steamship owned by Ellerman
Lines Ltd. and managed by Westcott & Laurance Ltd. She was of
3,066 tons gross, 331 feet in length and 46 foot in beam and was
built at Middlesbrough in 1919. She was fitted with
triple-expansion engines of 288 horsepower nominal, and was manned
by a crew of 47 hands all told.
The "CASTILIAN", on leaving Eastham Locks on the afternoon of
the 11th February, 1943, was part laden with a general cargo of
about 3,000 tons and was in the course of a voyage to Lisbon.
This Inquiry has proved to be a difficult one on account of the
complete unreliability of the evidence from the ship, When speaking
of details concerning courses, speeds, cross-bearings, etc., the
witnesses were admittedly basing themselves mainly upon what
appears now on the ship's Charts which were in use at the time As,
however, these Charts contain many workings, times, etc., which
were obviously inserted after the event in an attempt to ascertain
what had actually been the course of the ship the Court has
unfortunately been quite unable to find out precisely what led up
to the stranding on the East Platters Rock and her subsequent total
loss.
A preliminary point arose with reference to the orders given by
the Naval Authorities at Liverpool with regard to the ship's
movements. The evidence from the ship was that the original
routeing instructions etc. were brought on board the vessel at
Eastham by a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R., who is stated to have given
verbal orders to the Master that if he could not arrive at Holyhead
in daylight he was to anchor in Church Bay. It was further alleged
that the Master made a vigorous protest against these orders and
asked to be allowed to anchor in the river at Liverpool and to
leave at daylight on the 12th but that this request was refused
with the intimation that the vessel must leave on the afternoon
tide of the 11th February, 1943. The evidence from the Naval
Authorities was, on the other hand, that the orders were taken on
board the vessel by a Lieutenant-Commander, Royal Navy, who gave
evidence at the Inquiry and who denied giving the instructions to
anchor in Church Bay as alleged by the Master. The Court was
satisfied that the orders were in fact taken on board the vessel by
a Lieutenant-Commander, Royal Navy, and not by a Sub-Lieutenant,
R.N.V.R., and was also satisfied that no orders were given to the
ship in conflict with the typewritten routeing instructions which
were handed to the Master. Those instructions contained information
that the Port of Holyhead was closed at night together with
information that (to use the exact words) "ships arriving after
dark may anchor in Church Bay". Church Bay is situated to the
North-Eastward of Holyhead Bay and to the South-Eastward of the
Skerries Light. But for this permission the vessel would under
standing Admiralty instructions have been forbidden to anchor in
that vicinity.
It is to be remarked in this connection that the Master clearly
did not regard the alleged order to anchor in Church Bay as a
binding one as from his own account of the matter he set a course
for the purpose of anchoring about a mile to the northward of
Holyhead Breakwater and not in Church Bay at all. Although some
kind of protest was made, the Court is of opinion that it amounted
to little if anything more than a grumble at having to leave on the
afternoon tide. It is possible that a little confusion might have
arisen owing to the deafness of the Naval Officer, but the Court is
satisfied that no vigorous protest was made as alleged.
Besides giving information as to the route to be followed for
the purpose of getting to Holyhead a route was also indicated into
Moelfre Bay. The Court was satisfied from the evidence that it was
necessary for the vessel to leave Liverpool when in fact she did -
that is during the late afternoon of the 11th February - in order
to arrive at Holyhead in tine to join a convoy which was to leave
Holyhead on the following afternoon. As the vessel did not reach
the Bar Lightship until about 5.30 p.m. on the 11th February it was
clear that she could not reach Holyhead in daylight that day and
there were accordingly three alternatives which were open to the
Master as follows: (a) he could have anchored in Moelfre Bay; (b)
he could have adjusted his speed as necessary for the purpose of
arriving at Holyhead at daybreak and (c) he could have anchored in
Church Bay or to the Northward of Holyhead breakwater.
The Master of the ship, Joseph Every, joined the "CASTILIAN" for
the first time at Manchester at the beginning of the voyage. He
obtained his Master's Certificate in October, 1920, and had been
serving as Master of ships belonging to the owners of the
"CASTILIAN" for about seven years. This was his first casualty and
he had had an excellent record with his Company.
The vessel duly proceeded down river and disembarked her Pilot
off the Bar Light vessel and proceeded seaward more or less in
accordance with the Admiralty routeing instructions. The only
information which the Master had as to the speed of the vessel was
that obtained from the previous convoy form left by the Master whom
he had relieved, which gave a speed of 9½ knots. The vessel had not
been in dry-dock since the previous June. No real attempt was made
on the outward passage to calculate the speed of the vessel through
the water by the distance run between the buoys, nor was any
calculation made with regard to the strength of the tide, which was
neaps. The tracks laid down by the routeing instructions had been
laid off on Chart 1825b. on the afternoon of the 11th February by
the Second Officer of the vessel. On the outward passage the Chief
Officer, who was on watch up till 8 p.m., saw and recorded on the
Chart the times of passing the first two buoys, Numbers 01 and 02.
Although a time now appears on the Chart as that at which Buoy
Number 03 was passed this does not appear to have been recorded by
the Chief Officer and the Court is left in doubt as to whether or
when this buoy was seen. The next buoy, Number 04, was admittedly
never seen, and if the proper route was being followed it is
difficult to understand how this happened.
The case presented on behalf of the ship was that after passing
No.03 buoy and having failed to see No.04 buoy it was calculated
that the vessel had over-run the distance laid down and that
thereupon a course was set to the south-westward parallel to the
course indicated in the routeing instructions. If the vessel had
indeed over-run her distance the setting of the course in such a
way would naturally bring the vessel to the westward of the proper
positions. Thereafter cross-bearings arc stated to have been
obtained of the Skerries and the South Stack Lights at about 0030
on the 12th February which placed the vessel about eight miles to
the westward of the Skerries Light. The evidence further was that
the vessel was allowed to run on for ten minutes with an estimated
speed of nine knots. and that then the vessel was put on a course
of South 65 degrees East true for Holyhead Breakwater. The Master
stated that in setting that course he was intending to proceed to a
position about a mile to the northward of Holyhead Breakwater and
there anchor and he further stated on at least two occasions that
he did not then intend to anchor in Church Bay. It was also stated
that in setting that course an allowance of 5 degrees southerly was
made to overcome north-east drift due to wind and tide. The wind at
the time was stated to be a fresh south westerly breeze and the
weather was clear with good visibility, but no precise calculation
was made with regard to the strength of the tide. The course so set
was stated to have been maintained until the South Stack was abeam
at about 1.20 a.m. 30th the South Stack and the Skerries Lights
were being exhibited on the night in question at intervals and both
lights should have been visible on the run in several times on
three occasions. The evidence as to how often the South Stack was
seen was not at all clear. The Master at one time said that he saw
it about twice and later on he stated that he saw it regularly. The
Master does not claim ever to have seen the Skerries Light during
the run-in and thereafter and said that he was not interested in
it, but stated that this was seen on one occasion by the Second
Officer, who, however, did not support this suggestion.
On getting the South Stack abeam it was the case for the
"CASTILIAN" that her course was altered to East true for a short
period and that the ship was then turned head to wind and her
starboard anchor was let go with 45 fathoms; thereafter the vessel
dragged, whereupon her port anchor was let go and cable was veered
to 90 fathoms on the starboard anchor and 45 fathoms on the port,
after which the vessel brought up. After anchoring a sounding of 17
fathoms was obtained (which should have indicated that the vessel
was not where she was intended to be). According to the engine room
records the engines were rung off at 1.45 am. About 2 o'clock or
shortly afterwards it was again ascertained that the vessel was
dragging, whereupon it was decided to heave up anchors and proceed
out to sea. According to the engine room records, stand-by was rung
for this purpose at 2.10 a.m. giving a period of about twenty-five
minutes at anchor. Difficulty was said to have been experienced in
getting up both anchors together but eventually first one anchor
and then the other was raised and full speed ahead was rung on the
engines and a course was set of South 30 degrees West true.
According to the engine room records full speed ahead was rung at
2.53 a.m. Full speed was continued on the course so set until 3.20
a.m. when the vessel struck on the starboard side forward. Shortly
after ringing full speed ahead and setting the course of South 30
degrees West true the Master went below and remained below until
the vessel struck. The place where she struck was the East Platters
Rocks which are situated about half a mile to the south-eastward of
the Skerries Light.
There are manifest difficulties in regard to the case as so
presented on behalf of the ship, and the Master was quite unable to
explain how it was on that story that his vessel ever reached the
position where she stranded. It is quite clear that upon the run-in
and thereafter, had a proper look-out been kept, both the Skerries
Light and the South Stack Light should have been observed at
intervals and it is difficult to understand why the Master should
not have been interested in the Skerries Light. He was proceeding
into a place where he had never been before and he should have been
interested in all the aids to navigation which were available to
him. No attempt was made to obtain soundings on the way in. Further
it is quite clear from this story that the vessel must either have
dragged or been set some 4 or 5 miles or more in a north-easterly
direction without the Skerries Light being seen at any time before
she stranded, although that light must have been at least abeam of
the ship and probably forward of the beam while she was heading
south-westerly to the wind and tide while at anchor or while
heading South 30 degrees West true during the period of. 27 minutes
at which she was proceeding at full speed ahead before she
stranded.
The Court us left in doubt as to how the vessel got into the
position in which she undoubtedly was - that is between the
Skerries Light and the land, but considers that what most probably
happened was as follows. The Court does not accept the evidence
that cross-bearings were obtained at 0030 of the Skerries and the
South Stack Lights which placed the vessel about eight miles to the
westward of the Skerries Light, and it is probable that an
over-estimation of the vessel's run had been made of about 4 to 6
miles. If that was the case and courses were set as alleged by the
Master these would have taken the vessel to a position 1 to 2 miles
to the northward and eastward of the Skerries Light, in which
position a sounding of 17 fathoms could well have been obtained.
Such a position is, in the opinion of the Court, a likely one and
is consistent with a grounding on the East Platters Rock after a
period of 27 minutes full speed ahead on a course of South 30
degrees West true. Such a state of facts would involve the Skerries
Light having been mistaken for the South Stack, which is not
improbable having regard to the evidence from the ship as to the
look-out kept during the run in towards the land. It would also
account for no light having been seen on the port side during the
run in.
Upon any view of the facts and even assuming that the case
presented for the ship was approximately correct, it is apparent
that no proper look-out was kept at all on board the "CASTILIAN"
and no proper means wore taken to ascertain the correct position of
the vessel. It is also apparent that there was no proper
co-operation between the Master and the Second Officer who was
Officer of the Watch. For example, the Second Officer stated that
at the time the engines were put full speed ahead upon the final
course of South 30 degrees West true he could see land on both
sides. It is clear that at this time the vessel must have been in
such a position that land would have been visible on the port side
and it is also probable that something could have been soon of the
Skerries on the starboard side. The Second Officer, however, stated
that he did not tell the Haster of what he saw, although he
appreciated that his vessel was not in a very good position. How it
was that the Master did not observe this for himself is quite
incomprehensible.
It was intimated to the Court that in the opinion of the
Minister of War Transport this was a case in which the Court should
deal with the Mastert's Certificate. The Court agrees and having
regard to all the circumstances and bearing in mind the previous
excellent record of the Master, the Court orders that the Master's
Certificate be suspended for a period of nine months from 12th
February, 1943.
The Court further considers that the Second Officer, Mr. Pain,
failed in the proper discharge of his duty, but as he was not made
a party to the proceedings the Court does no more than express its
strong condemnation of such failure.
QUESTIONS and ANSWERS
The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry
of War Transport are as follows:-
| Q.1 | By whom was the s.s. "CASTILIAN" (a) owned; and (b)
managed? |
| A.1 | (a) Ellerman Lines Ltd. (b) Westcott & Laurance Ltd. |
| Q.2 | When the vessel left Eastham, Manchester Ship Canal, on the
11th February, 1943, was she in good and seaworthy condition? |
| A.2 | Yes. |
| Q.3 | Was the vessel fitted with (a) wireless telegraphy; and (b)
direction finding apparatus? |
| A.3 | (a) Yes. (b) No.. |
| Q.4 | With what sounding appliances was the vessel fitted and were
they in efficient working order when the vessel left Eastham? |
| A.4 | Kelvin type sounding machine and hand lead. It is not known
whether the sounding machine was in efficient working order when
the vessel left Eastham. |
| Q.5 | With what patent logs was the vessel supplied? Were they in
efficient working order when the vessel left Eastham? |
| A.5 | Two Walker type patent logs. One was in use from the beginning
of the voyage and appears to have been in working order. There is
no information as to the second. |
| Q.6 | With how many compasses was the vessel fitted? Where were they
situated? When and by whom were they last professionally adjusted?
Were they in efficient order when the vessel left Eastham? Were the
correct deviations to be applied to then Known to those on board
throughout the voyage? |
| A.6 | A steering compass in the wheelhouse and a standard compass
above on monkey's island liquid type marked in points and degrees
up to 90. They were last adjusted in October, 1942, and were in
efficient order when the vessel left Eastham. The correct
deviations based on the October adjustment were known to those on
board. There was an additional compass aft which was not shipped
and was not adjusted. |
| Q.7 | Were any, and, if so what, instructions, either oral or in
writing, given to the Master (a) by the Owners; and (b) by the
Naval Control Officers concerning the voyage? |
| A.7 | (a) The usual Owners' printed instructions were on board but
have no relevance to the present inquiry. |
| | (b) Typewritten routeing instructions issued by the Naval
Control Service were handed to the Master at Eastham. |
| | There was also on board a light list issued by the Naval
Authorities. |
| | The routeing instructions were to proceed to Holyhead by a
route indicated and stated amongst other things that the port of
Holyhead was closed from half an hour after sunset until sunrise
daily. The instructions further stated that "Ships arriving after
dark may anchor in Church Bay". |
| | Verbal instructions were to leave the Mersey on the afternoon
tide of 11th February which would involve leaving the Bar light
vessel about 5 p.m. Otherwise there were no verbal orders
conflicting with the routeing instructions and in particular there
was no definite instructions given to the Master that he was to
anchor in Church Bay if he arrived off Holyhead during the dark
hours. |
| Q.8 | (a) When was the vessel's position last ascertained before the
vessel anchored; (b) in what manner was it ascertained; (c) by whom
was it ascertained; and (d) what was it? |
| A.8 | (a) The last ascertained position, as established by more or
less reliable evidence, was at No. 02 buoy about 11½ miles from the
Bar light vessel at 7 p.m. (b) Observation. (c) Chief Officer. (d)
As above stated. |
| Q.9 | What courses were set after the vessel's position was last
ascertained until she anchored? When and by whom were they set?
Were they steered? |
| A.9 | After passing No, 02 buoy the ordinary outward course is stated
to have been followed and 03 buoy is stated to have been passed at
19.35 p.m. but 04 buoy was never seen. There is no reliable
evidence as to how long this outward course was maintained. At some
time unknown an alteration of course is stated to have been made to
the south westward but there is no reliable evidence as to what the
course actually was. Cross bearings of the Skerries and South Stack
lights are stated to have been obtained at 00.30 a.m. 12th February
giving a position 8 miles. to the westward of the Skerries and a
course of S. 65 E. true is stated to have been set at 00.40 am. A
change of course to E. true is stated to have been made at 1.20
a.m. when the South Stack light was abeam. For reasons given in the
Annex the position stated to have been fixed at 00.30 is regarded
as quite unreliable but it is possible that alterations of course
were made as and when stated. |
| Q.10 | At what speed or speeds did the vessel proceed from the time
when her position was last ascertained until she anchored? |
| A.10 | The vessel was proceeding with her engine room telegraph at
full speed ahead from the Bar Light Vessel. At the outset the speed
through the water was not more than about seven knots and it is
probable that her speed at no time exceeded eight knots through the
water. The speed was reduced as necessary for the purpose of
anchoring. |
| Q.11 | During the period referred to in Question 10, were any, and if
so, what soundings taken? Thereafter were any, and, if so what,
soundings taken? |
| A.11 | The only reliable evidence showed that one sounding of 17
fathoms was obtained after anchoring, and that no other soundings
were taken. |
| Q.12 | During the period referred to in Question 10, were any, and, if
so what, lights seen by those on board? If no lights were seen, why
were they not seen? If lights were being shown, and were not seen,
why were they not seen? |
| A.12 | During the period from 00.40 until anchoring, the only reliable
evidence is that one light only, which was taken to be the South
Stack, was seen. If the vessel had started from the supposed
position on the course stated, both the South Stack and the
Skerries Lights should have been seen several times on three
separate occasions, and only a bad look-out can account for both
lights not having been seen and identified. For reasons stated in
the Annex, it is probable that the Skerries Light was mistaken for
the South Stack. |
| Q.13 | When and where was the vessel anchored? Was her place of
anchoring ascertained correctly, or at all? |
| A.13 | The vessel anchored at about 1.30 a.m. and finally brought up
to both anchors at about 1.45 a.m. Her place of anchorage was not
ascertained correctly. The position marked on the chart is about 2½
miles to the. N.N. eastward of the South Stack, but as events
proved this was quite inaccurate. |
| Q.14 | Was the vessel (a) anchored in a safe and proper place; and (b)
did the anchors hold? If not, was adequate action taken to secure
the safety of the vessel and her crew? |
| A.14 | (a) The vessel was not anchored in a safe and proper
place. |
| | (b) The anchors hold for about 25 minutes and then started to
drag. |
| | The place of anchorage had not been correctly ascertained and
although the bearing of the Skerries Light should have given
warning of what the approximate position was, this was not
appreciated owing to a bad look-out. In consequence adequate action
was not taken to ensure the safety of the vessel and her crew. |
| Q.15 | After the vessel anchored were any lights seen by those on
board? Were they correctly identified, and, if so, when and what
were they? If no lights were seen, why were they not seen? If
lights were being shown, and were not seen, why were they not
seen? |
| A.15 | There was no reliable evidence as to what lights if any were
seen between the time the vessel anchored and the time she
grounded. If lights were not seen and correctly identified this was
due to bad look-out. |
| Q.16 | For how long was the vessel anchored? Did she remain stationary
throughout this time? If not, what happened to her? |
| A.16 | The vessel remained at anchor for about 25 minutes and then
began to drag. |
| Q.17 | Was the vessel subsequently put on a course? If so what was it?
What was the position of the vessel when it was set? Who set the
course and at what speed and for how long did the vessel remain on
that course? |
| A.17 | At about 2.53 a.m. after both anchors had been got up the
vessel was put on a course of S. 30 degrees W. true by the Master
and the engines were worked at full speed ahead for about 27
minutes until she grounded at 3.20 a.m. The position of the vessel
at the time the course was set was probably to the north north
eastward of the Skerries. |
| Q.18 | If the vessel was so put on a course was any, and, if so what,
action taken to find the correct position of the vessel before the
course was set? Was the correct position of the vessel
ascertained? |
| A.18 | The correct position of the vessel was not ascertained when the
course of S. 30 degrees W. true was set and no action was taken to
find the correct position. |
| Q.19 | When and where did the vessel strand? |
| A.19 | The vessel stranded on the East Platters Rocks abouthalf a mile
to the south eastward of the Skerries Light at about 3.20 a.m, on
12th February, 1943. |
| Q.20 | Was a good and proper look-out kept on board the vessel
throughout the voyage? |
| A.20 | A good and proper look-out was not kept on board the
vessel. |
| Q.21 | Was the vessel navigated in a proper and seamanlike
manner? |
| A.21 | The vessel was notnavigated in a proper and seamenlike
manner. |
| Q.22 | What was the cause of the stranding of the s.s.
"CASTILIAN"? |
| A.22 | The cause of the stranding was due to bad look-out; failure to
ascertain the correct position of the vessel by means at the
disposal of those on board; and attempting to approach and take up
an anchorage on a dangerous coast during darkness, in adverse
conditions, without having first fixed the position of the vessel
beyond all doubt. There was no use made of the Sounding
machine. |
| Q.23 | Was the stranding and subsequent total loss of the s.s.
"CASTILIAN" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default
of her Master, Captain Joseph Every? |
| A.23 | The stranding and subsequent total loss of the "CASTILIAN" were
caused by the wrongful act and default of her Master, Captain
Joseph Every. |
| | We concur | K.S. CARPMAEL, |
| | | C.A. WILSON, |
| | | G.L. STOUT. |
