Wreck report for 'Nolisement', 1943 - PortCities Southampton

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894.

REPORT CF COURT

No. 7938

s.s. "NOLISEMENT"

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at Cardiff on the 22nd 23rd and 24th days of September 1943 before R.F. Hayward Esq., K.C. assisted by Captains Piers de Legh and Evan Jones into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "NOLISEMENT" in the neighbourhood of the Carrick Rocks Vaaish Bay, Isle of Man.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the master Captain Thomas James Williamson was in default and censures him severely. The Court also finds that the second officer Mr. Edmund Thomas Ward was in default and censures him.

Dated this 24th day of September, 1943.

R.F. Hayward.

Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

	Piors de Legh.	Assessor.
	Evan Jones.	Assessor.

ANNEX TO THE REPORT

MR. E.M. PARSEY (of the Treasury Solicitor's Department) appeared for the Minister of War Transport.

MR. R.E. GETHING(instructed by Messrs. Ingledew, Brown, Bennison & Garrett) appeared as Counsel for the Master, Captain T.J. Williamson.

MR. E.W. BRIGHTMAN (instructed by Messrs. Gilbert Robertson & Co.) appeared as counsel for the Owners, Nolisement Steamship Company, Ltd., of Cardiff.

THE SECOND OFFICER (Mr. Edmund Thomas Ward) appeared in person.

The "NOLISEMENT", owned by the Nolisement Steamship Company, Ltd., of Cardiff, and managed by the Merel Steamship Company, Ltd., also of Cardiff, is a single screw steel steam-ship built in 1928 at Howden-on-Tyne by the Northumberland Shipbuilding Company (1927), Ltd. She is 5084.47 tons gross and 3146.88 registered tonnage, 412 feet in length, 55 feet in beam, and 29 feet in depth. She is fitted with wireless telegraphy and direction finders and a sounding machine of the Kelvin type. Her crew of 48 hands included three wireless operators. She was fitted with three compasses - steering compass in the wheelhouse, standard compass on the top of the wheelhouse, and a steering compass aft which was not adjusted owing to the degaussing gear with which the ship was fitted. The two former compasses were adjusted by a Cardiff adjuster in Barry Roads on the 11th March, and deviation cards were supplied to the ship. Her steering gear was telemotor. She carried the Regulation boats and life-saving gear and was supplied with an adequate number of charts. She is fitted with reciprocating quadruple expansion direct action vertical engines of 442 nominal horse-power, giving a registered speed of 10¼ knots. At the time in question her speed was about 9 to 10 knots. She was laden with about 5,500 tons of Government stores and drew about 23 feet of water fore and aft. After extensive repairs, mainly to machinery, the "NOLISEMENT" sailed from Cardiff bound to the Clyde on 11th March, 1943. Her master and deck officers were all new to the ship and to each other, having only been aboard her for a few days. After adjusting compasses at Barry Roads the "NOLISEMENT" proceeded. Whilst in the Bristol Channel her machinery developed defects and her telemotor gear acted sluggishly. She put into Milford Haven, where repairs were executed, and the telemotor gear was examined, overhauled, repaired and adjusted to the satisfaction of the ship's chief engineer. The "NOLISEMENT" continued her voyage on the 21st March at about 7 a.m., having been provided with Admiralty route instructions. At about 10 a.m. in the neighbourhood of the Bishops the steering gear did not function properly. It was disconnected, examined and adjusted by the chief engineer and the managers' engineer superintendent who was on board, and the ship continued on her voy age at about noon. At 6.47 p.m. Bardsey Island was abeam, distant three miles, and a course of 006 deg. was set. At 9.40 p.m. South Stack Lighthouse was abeam at a distance, ascertained by four point bearing, of four miles. Shortly afterwards the master ported a point, and having run on for about ten minutes, put the ship back on her original course. At about 10.30 p.m. Skerries Light was seen nearly abeam. The master set a course of north by standard compass, allowing 9 deg. westerly error. (The only observation for deviation taken during the voyage was a sun azimuth at about 3 p.m. taken by the second officer and giving an error of 11 deg. W.) In setting his course, the master estimated that there would be two hours flood tide, one hour slack and one hour ebb tide, before making the Isle of Man. He estimated his ship's speed at 9 knots and the tide at 2 knots. His intention was not to steer for the position given in his instructions, but to make the Chickens Light ahead or slightly on the starboard bow. The master described the visibility at all material times as clear. The third officer at midnight recorded the weather as hazy. The weather record from Chickens Lighthouse makes no mention of haze. Having been on deck since about 6 a.m. on the 21st, the master retired to his day room at about 12.30 a.m. on the 22nd, leaving the second officer in charge and assisted only by an A.B., who was on the look-out at the material times, and an O.S. who was at the wheel. The master's instructions to the second officer were that he had not made any alteration in the course as an allowance for tides, but that the officer should see the land or the Chickens Light ahead or fine on the starboard bow, and that he was to call the master as soon as he saw either, or if it came on thick. On coming on watch the second officer had examined the chart and the master had informed him as to his intentions, etc., but at no time did the second officer himself check the course, tides, etc. The second officer's evidence as to the visibility was that at midnight there was bright moonlight with a fresh breeze and very little haze, and that by 1 a.m. the haze had increased, giving a visibility of only two to three miles, and that this condition continued. At about 2.10 a.m. the second officer on the starboard wing of the bridge observed land about six points on the port bow at an estimated distance of a mile or a little over a mile. He at once ordered hard-a-starboard, keeping the engines at full speed, and called the master who quickly arrived and ordered: "Keep your helm hard to starboard and come round to the West." Shortly afterwards a beacon (which subsequently proved to be the beacon on Carrick Rock) was observed by the master about 4 points on the starboard bow at a time when the ship had turned at least eight points to starboard. The master then ordered the engines full speed astern, and various ahead and astern movements were made during which the ship stranded on the Isle of Man inside the Carrick Rock. Attempts were made to refloat her by means of the engines, but they had to be stopped on account of a broken eccentric strap, The ship was subsequently salved, after receiving heavy structural damage. No lives were lost. No report of the land was ever made by the look-out man, and at no time was the Chickens Light seen by those on board the "NOLISEMENT." There was no real evidence of abnormal tide and no evidence of bad steering. In the opinion of the Court the fact that the ship, apparently keeping her course, arrived some four miles to the wrong side of the Chickens Light after a run of only some 40 to 50 miles, in fine veather, from her point of departure, of itself shows that the course set was in all the circumstances most unseamanlike. The court is satisfied that the high land seen distant only about a mile or 1½ miles should have been soen very much earlier than it was seen. The question of sounding has been considered, and the Court is of the view that it would not have given any assistance to the navigation in that locality. The master was faced with many uncertainties: the constancy of his compasses, the lack of observations for error, uncertainty as to the accuracy of the patent log or the engines' speed, an untried and unproved staff of officers, look-outs and helmsmen, uncertain tides and visibility of lighthouses and land. In these circumstances the Court is of opinion that the master in addition to setting a more Westerly course should have remained on the bridge until the Isle of Man was sighted, or should have given orders to be called at a definite clock-time calculated to ensure his presence on the bridge before the ship could have arrived in close proximity to the land. When land was sighted broad on the wrong bow the ship's engines should have been reversed and her way stopped until endeavours had been made to ascertain her then position.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry of War Transport are as follows: -

Q.1	By whom was the s.s. "NOLISEMENT" owned?
A.1	The Nolisement Steamship Company of Cardiff.
Q.2	When the vessel left Milford Haven on the 21st March, 1943, was she in good and seaworthy condition?
A.2	Yes.
Q.3	With how many compasses was the vessel fitted, and where were they situated? When and by whom were they last professionally adjusted? Were the correct deviations to be applied to them known to those on board throughout the voyage?
A.3	Three, Standard Compass on top of wheelhouse, Steering Compass in wheelhouse, and a steering compass aft. The two former were adjusted on the 11th March, 1943, by Messrs. T.J. Williams & Son, Ltd., Compass Adjusters, of Cardiff. Yes.
Q.4	With what sounding appliances was the vessel fitted? Were they in efficient order when the vessel left Milford Haven on the 21st March, 1943?
A.4	A Relvin type of sounding machine, in efficient order.
Q.5	Did the vessel carry any, and if so what, patent logs?
A.5	One Walkers Patent Log of the usual type.
Q.6	Was the vessel adequately supplied for the voyage with charts and publications concerning navigation?
A.6	Yes.
Q.7	During the voyage from Milford Haven was any trouble experienced with the steering gear? If so (a) what was it; and (b) was it corrected?
A.7	Yes. (a) At about 10 a.m. on the 21st March, the steering gear ceased to function properly. The trouble was due to air in the pipes. (b) This was corrected.
Q.8	At what time did the vessel leave Milford Haven on the 21st March, 1943?
A.8	At 7.20 a.m.
Q.9	When was the vessel's correct position last ascertained before the stranding? (a) in what manner was it ascertained; (b) by whom was it ascertained; and (c) what was it?
A.9	9.40 p.m. on March 21st (a) by four-point bearing; (b) the Master; (c) South Stack four miles bearing S.66.E (True).
Q.10	At What speed or speeds did the vessel proceed on her voyage from the time when her correct position was last ascertained?
A.10	Full speed.
Q.11	What courses were set after the correct position of the vessel was last ascertained? When and by whom were they set?
A.11	After passing S. Stack the course N.24.E(True) was altered to about N.13.E(True) and maintained for about 10 minutes when the original course was resumed. These alterations were made by the Master. On passing Skerries Light at an uncertain time and distance, course was altered to North by standard compass by the Master.
Q.12	Between the time when the vessel's correct position was last ascertained and the time of the stranding, were soundings taken? If so, Where was the vessel when they were taken, and what were they?
A.12	No.
Q.13	Between the times referred to in Question 12, what was the state of (a) the weather; (b) the wind; (c) the tide; and (d) visibility?
A.13	(a) fine; (b) easterly force 4 to 5; (c) setting to the North-eastward for about 2 hours at the rate of about 3 knots; slack for about one hour, and running to the south-eastward at about 2 to 3 knots for about one hour. (d) the evidence was conflicting. The Court finds that when approaching the Calf of Man visibility was reduced by haze to a range of probably 2 to 3 miles.
Q.14
A.14.
Q.15	Was a good and proper lookout kept on board the vessel?
A.15	No; the lookout man stationed on the port side of the bridge saw land but thought it was a bank of fog and did not report it, The Second Officer who was on the starboard wing of the bridge, and expecting to make the land on the starbozrd side or ahead, did not observe land until it was nearly on the port beam, when it could only have been considerably less than 2 miles distant.
Q.16	Was the vessel navigated in a proper and seamanlike manner?
A.16	No; a safe course was not set; it should have been much more westerly (1) to comply with Admiralty instructions; and (2) having regard to the uncertain factors of haze, tide, and lack of certainty as to behaviour of compasses, and an unproved ship's company. The Court considers the Master should have ordered the Second Officer to have called him at a definite time to enable him to make the landfall, especially having regard ?? to the above-mentioned circumstances. The Court further considers that th?? ship should have been stopped and reversed immediately land was sighted, near the port beam.
Q.17	When and where did the vessel stand?
A.17	Northward of the Carrick Rocks, off the south coast of the Isle of Man, ?? about or before 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd arch, 1943.
Q.18	What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?
A.18	B??d navigation; see ?? to Nos. 15 and 16.
Q.19	Was the stranding of the s.s. "NOLISEMENT" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of her Master, Captain Thomas James Williamson, and Second Officer, Edmund Thomas Word, and her owners, The Nolisement Steamship Company Ltd., or any, and, if so, which of them?
A.19	Cause of the stranding was the wrongful acts or omissions of the Master, Captain Thomas James Williamson, and the Second Officer, Edmund Thomas Ward.

Certsi?? pertions of the Report of the Court h??ve been ommitted in this copy in ??ecordance with a direction made under Section 6 of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939.

NOTE

Report No. 7940 relates to a 1944 casualty ("Clearpool") and will be found in the subsequent bound volume.