Crown Copyright Reserved
No. S.406
s.t. "RED GAUNTLET"
THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT,
1894
REPORT OF COURT
In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Town Hall,
Fleetwood, on the 17th, 18th and 19th days of December, 1947,
before J. V. Naisby, Esq., K.C., assisted by Captain H. A. Moore,
O.B.E., R.D., R.N.R., Captain C. E. Rathkins, R.D., R.N.R., and F.
Bee, Esq., into the circumstances attending the stranding and total
loss of the steam trawler "Red Gauntlet" at Sorkapp, Spitzbergen,
on the 10th August, 1947.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances
attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty finds, for the
reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the loss of the "Red
Gauntlet" was caused by the fault or default of the skipper,
William Henry Hicks, and by the fault or default of the second
hand, Richard Wright, and the Court suspends the Certificate of
William Henry Hicks for six months and the certificate of Richard
Wright for three months from today, and orders William Henry Hicks
to pay £100 and Richard Wright £25 towards the costs of this
Inquiry.
Dated this 19th day of December, 1947.
J. V. NAISBY, Judge.
We concur in the above Report.
| | H. A. MOORE | |
| | C. E. RATHKINS | Assessors. |
| | F. BEE | |
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The Court's Answers to the Questions submitted by the Ministry
of Transport are as follows:-
Q. 1. By whom was the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" owned?
A. Iago Steam Trawler Company, Limited.
Q. 2. (a) With what compasses was the s.t. "Red
Gauntlet" fitted?
(b) Where were they placed on board?
A. (a) Three magnetic compasses.
(b) One on a pole on the bridge; one let into the deck
head of the wheelhouse; one in the skipper's cabin (not used or
supplied for navigational purposes).
Q. 3. (a) When were the compasses last professionally
adjusted?
(b) Were deviation cards then supplied?
(c) Was a deviation book kept?
A. (a) Early May, 1947.
(b) Yes.
(c) No.
Q. 4. (a) What sounding appliances were carried by the
s.t. "Red Gauntlet" on the 10th August last?
(b) Were such sounding appliances in working order on
the last voyage?
A. (a) One Marconi echometer, Type 441; one Hughes Mark
II Depth Recorder.
(b) Yes.
Q. 5. (a) Did the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" carry a wireless
transmitter?
(b) If so, of what range?
(c) Was it in working order at the time of the
casualty?
A. (a) Yes.
(b) 250 to 300 miles by day. Up to 1,700 miles by
night.
(c) Yes.
Q. 6. With what charts and publications relating to navigation
in the waters off Spitzbergen was the vessel supplied?
A. One set of Close's Iceland charts.
One set of Admiralty Norwegian
charts.
One Scotland to Iceland chart.
(Imray).
One All Round Iceland chart.
(Imray).
Three Close's White Sea
charts.
One West Coast of Scotland
chart.
One White Sea chart, No. 105B.
One White Sea chart, No. 99B.
One British Isles to White Sea
chart.
One Close's Irish Sea chart.
Two Norway Pilots.
Two Arctic Pilots.
Q. 7. Was the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" seaworthy when she left her
home port (Fleetwood) on her last fishing voyage?
A. Yes.
Q. 8. Was the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" properly equipped with regard
to navigational aids when she left her home port (Fleetwood) on her
last fishing voyage?
A. Yes.
Q. 9. From what port and at what time on what day did the s.t.
"Red Gauntlet" sail previous to the stranding?
A. The "Red Gauntlet" sailed from Fleetwood about 8 a.m. on the
26th July, 1947, on her fishing voyage.
Q. 10. At about 12 noon on Sunday, 10th August last, after
hauling in nets did the skipper, William Henry Hicks, of the s.t.
"Red Gauntlet" decide to change fishing grounds and intend to make
for the area between Bear Island and Hope Island?
A. Yes.
Q. 11. For the purpose of navigating to the new fishing ground
did the skipper, William Henry Hicks, endeavour to ascertain his
position and set a course?
A. He stated in evidence that he did endeavour to ascertain his
position. This matter is dealt with in the Annex to the Report. He
did set a course.
Q. 12. How did the skipper, William Henry Hicks, endeavour to
obtain his noon position on 10th August last, and what course did
he set?
A. The Court is not satisfied as to what steps the skipper took
to ascertain his position. See below. The course set was S.E. XE. ½
E. nothing southerly by steering compass.
Q. 13. Did the skipper, William Henry Hicks, take every proper
and seamanlike precaution in fixing his noon position on 10th
August last, and was the course set a proper one?
A. No. The course set was a proper one from the position in
which the skipper thought the vessel was, but an improper one from
the position in which she in fact was.
Q. 14. What was the nature of the weather, wind and sea at the
time the skipper, William Henry Hicks, fixed his noon position on
Sunday, 10th August last, and set a course for a new fishing
ground?
A. Weather clear except that there was probably fog round
Sorkapp; little wind; smooth sea.
Q. 15. At what time on 10th August last did the skipper, William
Henry Hicks, take his midday meal, and at what time thereafter did
he return to the bridge?
A. Probably from about 12.20 p.m. to 12.50 p.m. He returned to
the bridge about the latter time.
Q. 16. Was the skipper called by the second hand, Richard
Wright, during the afternoon of 10th August last?
A. Yes.
Q. 17. Did the skipper, William Henry Hicks, go at once when
called to the wheelhouse, or was he called on more than one
occasion?
A. The second hand called the skipper twice, but the Court is
satisfied that on the first occasion the skipper was not really
wakened, although he answered the second hand. The skipper was
usually easy to wake and we do not think any blame should be
attributed to the second hand for thinking that the skipper was
sufficiently awake. On the second occasion that he was called the
skipper immediately started to go to the wheelhouse.
Q. 18. At what time and in what position did the s.t. "Red
Gauntlet" strand?
A. About 3.15 p.m. on the 10th August, 1947, on the southern tip
of the rocks south of Sorkapp.
Q. 19. What was the cause of the stranding?
A. The position from which the skipper set his course was wrong
and the course set brought the vessel to the point of stranding,
but there was an insufficient lookout and an insufficient
appreciation of the danger in which the vessel was by the second
hand, first upon it being reported to him that there was a rock
visible fairly fine on the port bow, and later on running into
fog.
Q. 20. What were the conditions of weather, wind and sea at the
time the skipper, William Henry Hicks, was called by the second
hand?
A. The vessel was running into a bank of fog. There was little
wind or sea.
Q. 21. When the skipper, William Henry Hicks, came on deck after
being called in the afternoon of 10th August last by the second
hand, what action did he take?
A. As soon as he was called on the second occasion the skipper
ordered the engines full astern, but there was no time to carry out
the order before the stranding. The stranding occurred before he
got on the bridge.
Q. 22. Did the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" strike the rocks before the
skipper, William Henry Hicks, reached the Bridge?
A. Yes.
Q. 23. What visibility was there at the time the s.t. "Red
Gauntlet" stranded?
A. Thick fog.
Q. 24. What action, if any, had the second hand, Richard Wright,
taken before calling the skipper, William Henry Hicks?
A. The second hand before calling the skipper the first time had
taken soundings and obtained 15-17 fathoms. After the first call he
blew a fog signal on the whistle, took a further sounding and
obtained 20 fathoms. As the skipper was on his way up to the bridge
the second hand stopped the engines, and about the same time the
man at the wheel began to put his helm to starboard.
Q. 25. How were the 22 persons on board the s.t. "Red Gauntlet"
saved when the vessel stranded?
A. All on board the "Red Gauntlet" were saved by getting into
the trawler's own lifeboat and rowing off to the trawler "Northern
Spray," which had responded to an S.O.S. message sent out on the
radio telephone set of the "Red Gauntlet."
Q. 26. Was the stranding of the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" caused or
contributed to by the wrongful act or default of her second hand,
Richard Wright?
A. Yes.
Q. 27. Was the stranding of the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" caused or
contributed to by the wrongful act or default of her skipper,
William Henry Hicks?
A. Yes.
Q. 28. Was the stranding of the s.t. "Red Gauntlet" caused or
contributed to by the wrongful act or default of any other
person?
A. No.
Annex to the Report
At this Inquiry Mr. S. E. Pitts appeared for the Minister of
Transport, Mr. Lawrence Jones (of Lawrence Jones and Company) for
the Owners of the "Red Gauntlet," Mr. Leo Gradwell (instructed by
Messrs. Hill, Dickinson and Company, Liverpool) for the skipper,
and Mr. R. Blackburn (of Blackburn and Company, Fleetwood) for the
second hand.
The steam trawler "Red Gauntlet," official number 163160, was a
single screw, single deck vessel, built of steel in 1933 at
Beverley. She was owned by the Iago Steam Trawler Company Limited,
of Fleetwood; her gross tonnage was 410.03 and her length 154.6
feet. She was fitted with hand and steam steering gear, and at all
material times was in hand gear. Her engines were triple expansion
steam engines driven by an oil fired boiler. She carried the
necessary life-saving appliances including a life-boat, all of
which were appropriate to a vessel of her size and class and were
in good order and in accordance with the regulations. She was
fitted with wireless telegraphy including a direction finder, and
with radio telephony. She was also equipped with two sounding
machines, one on each forward corner of the bridge, and they also
were in good working order.
She sailed from Fleetwood on the 26th July, 1947, manned by a
crew of 20 hands all told, but before the stranding two Norwegian
fish gutters had been shipped so that at the time of the casualty
there were 22 persons on board. On the morning of the 10th August,
1947, the "Red Gauntlet" was fishing to the West of the Southern
end of Spitzbergen, and had been fishing there for some four or
five days. During the morning of the 10th August her skipper
decided to change fishing grounds and move to an area between Bear
Island and Hope Island. The trawl was hauled about 11.45 a.m., and
about noon, or shortly after, dinner was served for the first
sitting. The number of people on board necessitated two
sittings.
The procedure on the "Red Gauntlet" was that whilst the vessel
was fishing the skipper was always on the bridge, the remainder of
the crew being divided into five watches of which four were on duty
at one time, and that whilst steaming there were three watches in
charge, respectively, of the second hand, who had a skipper's
Certificate, the bosun, who also had a skipper's Certificate, and
one of the deck hands named Pook, who was stated to be an
experienced man. The second hand, the bosun and Pook were all
included in the first sitting for dinner, and before they had
finished their meal they were joined by the skipper. Just before
going down to dinner the second hand ordered one of the deck hands
named Hudson to go on the bridge and relieve the skipper. On
reaching the bridge, Hudson went to the wheel and was given a
course to steer of S.E. by E. half E. nothing southerly. The
skipper supervised Hudson's bringing the ship on to that course and
ensured that the vessel was on the course before going down for his
dinner. The engines at that time were working full speed ahead.
About 12.50 p.m. the skipper returned to the bridge, ascertained
that the vessel was still on the course that he had ordered, and
the weather being clear, with good visibility and little wind or
sea, told Hudson to tell the second hand when he came up that he,
the skipper had turned in and to tell him the course.
Whilst they were having dinner together the skipper told the
second hand to have the trawl overhauled during the afternoon, and
when he had finished his dinner the second hand detailed a deck
hand named Stables to go and relieve Hudson, and the second hand,
with some of the other hands, proceeded to overhaul the gear. The
second hand was in fact working just forward of the bridge and not
far from it and within easy hailing distance therefrom. The work of
overhauling the trawl lasted till 2.30 p.m. or a little later, and
the second hand thereupon proceeded to go and wash his hands before
going on to the bridge. About this time Stables, who had been
relieved at the wheel by Hudson, came to the second hand and told
him that there was a rock visible sharp on the port bow about 8
miles away. Hudson's evidence was that when he went to the bridge
to relieve Stables he found him looking out of one of the windows
through binoculars at a rock, and that at that time the wheel was
free and the vessel was heading about E. by S. Hudson thereupon put
the vessel back on her course and continued to steer that course
until a few moments before the stranding, as will appear later.
Upon arrival on the bridge the second hand saw the rock which
Stables had reported to him and estimated that the vessel would
pass well clear of it. The land was still visible on the port side
from right aft to about four points on the port bow, but there was
a bank of fog lying ahead. The second hand took soundings which
gave 15 and 17 fathoms and went below to the skipper's berth to
call him. His evidence was that he went to the doorway of the
skipper's cabin and called him, the skipper mumbling something that
sounded like "Hello." The second hand reported the soundings he had
had and that the weather was very thick. The skipper replied "All
right" and the second hand returned to the bridge, expecting the
skipper to follow him very quickly.
Upon his return to the bridge the second hand blew a prolonged
blast on the whistle for fog, took another sounding and got 20
fathoms and, as the skipper had not appeared, went down to his
berth and called him again. This time the skipper was really
awakened, and about the same time the man at the wheel called out
to the second hand to come on to the bridge quickly, and upon
arriving on the bridge the second hand saw a rock close to, forward
of the port beam, and found Hudson, the man at the wheel, pulling
his wheel over to starboard. The second hand stopped the engines.
Very shortly afterwards the skipper shouted to him to put them full
astern, but before this could be done the vessel stranded. She
struck the rocks once, and a few seconds later struck again and
remained fast, swinging round on to a heading stated to have been
about south west. An S.O.S. message was sent by radio telephone and
replied to by the trawler "Northern Spray," which was in the
vicinity. The "Red Gauntlet" pounded, and shortly afterwards all on
board got into the lifeboat, and after remaining in the vicinity of
the vessel for some little time the fog cleared and they rowed to
the "Northern Spray," which had not been able to approach the near
vicinity of the stranded vessel by reason of the rocks. An attempt
was made by part of the crew of the "Red Gauntlet" shortly
afterwards to reboard the vessel, but this was unsuccessful. The
"Red Gauntlet" became a total loss.
The skipper of the "Red Gauntlet" gave a position in which he
said the vessel was at the time when his course of S.E. X E. ½ E.
nothing southerly was set. He gave this position as being Latitude
76° 28½ &'N., Longitude 14° 45'E., and stated that he fixed
this position partly with reference to the bank on the edge of
which he had been fishing, and partly by a bearing which he stated
was E. ½ S. taken, as he said, of the southern edge of the mainland
of Spitzbergen. The Court is not satisfied that the position spoken
to by the skipper is correct. Indeed, we are satisfied that it is
wrong. The bearing spoken to by him does not fit with the position
given by him, and the Court is satisfied that in fact the vessel
was substantially further to the northward than the skipper says
when he set his course. It is unlikely that he would be able to see
the southern end of the mainland or had studied the chart
sufficiently to estimate where the end of the mainland was from the
high ground which he did see. In any event, this bearing ought to
have raised in his mind a doubt as to the accuracy of the position
he had estimated. The Court is satisfied that from this point of
departure the course ordered was substantially steered and that the
failure of the skipper to ascertain his point of departure, and his
failure to heed the warning which his own bearing gave to him,
resulted in the vessel arriving at the place of the stranding,
instead of clearing the rocks off Sorkapp by about 10 miles as the
skipper intended to do.
From the evidence given in this Inquiry it is clear that on the
"Red Gauntlet" insufficient attention was paid to navigation, and
that anything connected with the catching of fish, or the storage
and preservation thereof after being caught, took priority over
questions of safe navigation. The second hand admitted in terms
that this was so, and the Court is quite satisfied that the skipper
was aware of this fact. His action in handing over the charge of
the bridge to a deck hand who was told the course and told to hand
it on to the second hand when he arrived on the bridge is much to
be deprecated. The "Red Gauntlet" was well supplied with charts,
but they were all kept in the skipper's berth and, although
available for consultation, it is clear that any member of the crew
including the second hand would be 10th to invade the skipper's
berth when he was endeavouring to obtain a much needed rest. In
this case the skipper never told anyone what his point of departure
was, or made available to them any information to enable them to
check whether the vessel was in fact making good the course ordered
by him, or not.
In the opinion of the Court the second hand, who gave his
evidence well and with candour, was gravely at fault despite the
lack of information which might have been given to him by the
skipper in not appreciating that the presence of a rock sharp on
the port bow was an indication, not only of its own presence, but
of the possibility of other rocks in the vicinity, and the fact
that the vessel had reached a position which was not intended by
her skipper when he set his course. In the opinion of the Court the
second hand was slow to realize the implications of the knowledge
which was at his disposal, and his responsibility to take action.
In fact no effective action was taken before the vessel struck, and
whilst feeling some sympathy with the second hand because of the
lack of knowledge, which it is felt he ought to have had, the Court
feels that this failure on the part of the second hand to act,
which undoubtedly contributed to the stranding, is inexcusable and
blameworthy. Quite apart from any action required as a result of
the observation of the rock, to continue to go into a fog bank at
full speed was extremely imprudent. The Court is also satisfied
that the second hand knew at or before noon that the vessel was
steaming to a new fishing ground although he did not know how long
the passage would take or exactly where she was going, and in the
opinion of the Court he also knew that the skipper was likely to
turn in. The failure to go on the bridge until about 2.45 p.m., in
these circumstances, seems to the Court also to be culpable.
As stated above, the Court is satisfied that the course ordered
by the skipper was substantially steered. The evidence given by the
deck hand Hudson as to what he found on his return to the bridge
not long before the vessel struck is accepted, but the Court has no
doubt that what happened was that Stables, seeing the rock whilst
at the wheel, took the binoculars in order to get a better sight of
it and looked out of the window, an action which necessitated his
letting go of the wheel for a short time, during which the vessel
fell about a point and a half off her course and towards the land.
This was one of the dangers inherent in one man being left alone on
the bridge to perform the duties of both helmsman and look-out.
Whilst sympathising to some extent with both the skipper and the
second hand, the Court is clearly of opinion that it would be
failing in its duty unless it expressed the strongest
disapprobation of the practice of leaving a single hand in the
wheelhouse in sole charge-a practice which is clearly consequent
upon putting matters relating to fishing in priority to the
paramount duty of ensuring safe navigation. It cannot be too.
strongly impressed upon the minds of all skippers and watchkeepers
that they have in their charge, depending upon their skill and
care, a number of valuable lives and a valuable property. In this
case the Court is satisfied that the failure properly to organize a
watch when steaming was at least one of the main causes of the
stranding, and that for this failure neither the skipper nor the
second hand can be acquitted of responsibility. After careful
consideration the Court has decided that the least penalty which it
can inflict is to suspend the certificate of skipper William Henry
Hicks for six months, and of second hand Richard Wright for three
months, both suspensions to run from this date.
The Court also feels that it should not be impossible to arrange
that a chart is readily available for the person in charge of the
watch, without his having to descend to the skipper's berth in
order to consult a chart, and that it is desirable that the person
in charge of the watch should also know when he takes over the
watch where his ship is supposed to be, as well as the course that
she is to steer.
The Court orders the skipper, William Henry Hicks, to pay £100,
and the second hand, Richard Wright, £25 towards the costs of this
Inquiry.
J. V. NAISBY, Judge.
| | H. A. MOORE | |
| | C. E. RATHKINS | Assessors. |
| | F. BEE | |
(Issued by the Minister of Transport
in London, in February, 1948)
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