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Wreck report for 'Epine', 1948

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Unique ID:14174
Description:Board of Trade wreck report for 'Epine', 1948.
Creator:GB Board of Trade
Date:17/9/1948
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894

REPORT OF COURT

(No. S. 409)

s.t. "Epine" O.N. 160860

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Guildhall, Kingston-upon-Hull, on the 15th and 16th days of September, 1948, before J. V. Naisby, Esq., K.C., assisted by Captain J. W. Grimston, R.D., R.N.R., Lieutenant Commander C. V. Groves, R.N.R., and Mr. G. H. Nicholson, M.I.M.E., into the circumstances attending the stranding and total loss of the steam trawler "Epine" on the 13th of March, 1948, to the westward of Malariff Light, Iceland, with the loss of fourteen members of her crew.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the said loss was due to the fault or default of the skipper, Alfred Loftis.

Dated this 17th day of September, 1948.

J. V. NAISBY, Judge.

We concur in the above Report,

 JOHN WM. GRIMSTON 
 CHARLES V. GROVESAssessors
 G. H. NICHOLSON 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry of Transport are as follows:-

Q.   1.By whom was the "Epine" owned?
A.The Premier Steam Fishing Company, Limited.
Q.   2.(a)With what compasses was the "Epine" supplied?
A.Three.
 (b)Where were they placed on board?
A.One on a pole, one in the wheelhouse, one spare in the skipper's berth.
Q.   3.(a)When were the compasses last adjusted professionally?
A.November, 1947.
 (b)Were deviation cards then supplied?
A.Yes.
 (c)Was a deviation book kept?
A.Yes.
Q.   4.(a)What sounding apparatus was carried on board the "Epine" on her last voyage?
A.One Marconi echometer.
 (b)Was such sounding apparatus in working order on the last voyage?
A.Yes, when the voyage began.
Q.   5.(a)Was the "Epine" equipped with a wireless transmitter?
A.Yes.
 (b)What was the type and range?
A.T.G.Y.I.C. Range for telephone 400 miles, for telegraph 1,000 miles in good conditions.
 (c)Was the wireless transmitter in working order at the time of the casualty?
A.Yes.
Q.   6.What navigational aids were on board the vessel other than sounding apparatus, and were such navigational aids in working order on the last voyage?
A.Wireless direction finder, wireless transmitter and receiver, radio telephone and patent log; all the foregoing were in working order. The vessel was also supplied with adequate charts and sailing directions.
Q.   7.What charts and publications relating to navigation in the area where the s.t. "Epine" was lost were supplied to the ship on the last voyage?
A.An adequate supply.
Q.   8.Was the s.t. "Epine" well found in every respect and in good condition when she left Grimsby Docks on the 1st of March, 1948?
A.Yes.
Q.   9.On what voyage was the s.t. "Epine" lost?
A.An Icelandic fishing voyage.
Q. 10.What crew were carried on the s.t. "Epine" on her last voyage?
A.Nineteen hands all told.
Q. 11.How many members of the crew lost their lives in the casualty?
A.Fourteen.
Q. 12.How were the survivors saved?
A.Four by breeches buoy, and one jumped overboard and swam or was washed ashore
Q. 13.From what port did the s.t. "Epine" sail on her last voyage, and when?
A.Grimsby. 1st March, 1948.
Q. 14.Did the s.t. "Epine" take shelter in Keflavik Bay on March 13th, 1948, and at what time?
A.At midnight on 12th/13th March the "Epine" was sheltering in Keflavik Bay.
Q. 15.What were the conditions of wind, weather, sea and visibility when the s.t. "Epine" sheltered in Keflavik Bay?
A.S.W. gale. No evidence as to state of sea or visibility.
Q. 16.(a)After leaving Keflavik Bay on the 13th March, 1948, was Utskalar passed?
A.Yes.
 (b)If so, at what time and at what distance?
A.No evidence.
Q. 17.What course was set after leaving Keflavik Bay?
A.No reliable evidence.
Q. 18.What were the conditions of wind, weather, sea and visibility when passing Utskalar?
A.Moderate to fresh, south-west wind. No evidence as to visibility.
Q. 19.Was the s.t. "Epine" engaged in fishing during the afternoon of the 13th March, 1948?
A.Yes.
Q. 20.Is there sufficient evidence to fix the positions where the trawl was shot and hauled?
A.No.
Q. 21.At what time did the skipper, A. Loftis, decide to move in towards Utskalar?
A.About 4.30 p.m. on the 13th of March.
Q. 22.When the trawl was hauled were three watches organised?
A.Yes.
Q. 23.What were the conditions of wind, weather, sea and visibility when the s.t. "Epine" commenced to steam in towards Utskalar, and at what time on the 13th March, 1948, was it?
A.Wind freshening. No evidence of the state of the sea; visibility fairly good. 5.30 p.m.
Q. 24.At what speed was the trawler steaming in towards Utskalar?
A.About nine knots.
Q. 25.Did the skipper, A. Loftis, then decide to steam to a position off Adalvik where the s.t. "Hargood" was fishing?
A.Yes.
Q. 26.Did the skipper show this position on the chart to the mate? At what time was this?
A.No.
Q. 27.At 19.25 hours on the 13th March, what course was set, and at what speed was the s.t. "Epine" steaming? Was the patent log set?
A.Course set North by East, half East by steering compass. Speed 9 to 9½, knots. The log was set.
Q. 28.Did the skipper about this time take a sounding by echometer? What reading did he get?
A.Yes. About seventy fathoms.
Q. 29(a)Did the skipper then go below leaving the mate and the deck hand on watch?
A.Yes.
 (b)What instructions did the skipper give about being called to the bridge?
A.That he was to be called if the weather deteriorated, if there were any snow storms, if any vessels or lights were seen, and when the patent log read 40.
Q. 30.During the next hour did the mate take two soundings by echometer? What readings did he get?
AYes. Just over seventy fathoms.
Q.31.(a)At what time was the watch relieved?
A.About 8.30 p.m. on March 13th.
 (b)Was the new watch kept by two uncertificated deck hands?
A.Yes.
 (c)What course was given to the two deck hands?
A.N. by East half East.
 (d)What instructions were given to the two deck hands?
A.In addition to the course, that the skipper was to be called if the weather deteriorated, if there were snow storms, if lights were seen, and when the log read 39.
Q. 32.At what time did the mate go below?
A.About 9.10 p.m.
Q. 33.When was the log next read and what was the reading?
A.The next reading of the log spoken to was a reading of 37½ about 11.30 p.m.
Q. 34.What were the conditions of wind, weather, sea and visibility?
A.At that time the wind was S.S. Westerly a moderate gale, the weather and sea were rough. The visibility was variable but to the northward was very much reduced.
Q. 35.(a)Did the skipper call up from below to the bridge asking if it was clear?
A.Yes. Shortly after half-past nine.
 (b)What answer was he given?.
A.Clear.
Q. 36.At 21.30 hours did deck hand Yates switch on the echometer? With what result?
A.Yes. None.
Q. 37.Were any lights observed?
A.The lights of two vessels, one on the port bow and the other on the starboard quarter, were seen. About 10.45 p.m. a glimpse or two of a light on the starboard bow was observed.
Q. 38.At 23.35 hours was the log read? What was the reading? Was the skipper called?
A.About this time yes. 39. Yes.
Q. 39.At what time did the skipper come on the bridge?
A.Shortly after 23.35 hours.
Q. 40.At what time did the s.t. "Epine" run aground?
A.About 23.50 hours.
Q. 41.Did the ship immediately make water in the engine room, and were all lights extinguished shortly after the ship stranded?
A.Yes.
Q. 42.Was a distress message sent out on the ship's wireless set and picked up by the s.t. "Spurs"?
A.Before the 'Epine" sent out a distress signal she was in communication by radio telephone with the "Spurs", and reported that she was ashore and in distress.
Q. 43.(a)Were distress rockets fired?
 (b)How many?
 (c)Was a fire lighted?
A.(a)Yes; (b) Six. (c) Yes.
Q. 44.Did an Icelandic motor boat arrive in the vicinity?
A.Yes.
Q. 45.Did weather conditions make a sea rescue impossible?
A.Yes.
Q. 46.Did a shore rescue party arrive overland and finally rescue four members of the crew by breeches buoy?
A.Yes.
Q. 47.Did one member of the crew reach the shore alive after jumping overboard in a life jacket?
A.Yes.
Q. 48.Was it wrong to have left the navigation of the s.t. "Epine" from 20.45 to 22.40 hours on the 13th March, 1948, to two uncertificated deck hands?
A.Yes.
Q. 49.Was the loss of the s.t. "Epine" and fourteen lives caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the late skipper, A. Loftis?
A.Yes.

ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

At this Inquiry, Mr. S. E. Pitts appeared for the Minister of Transport, Mr. H. S. Bloomer (Messrs. H. K. and H. S. Bloomer, of Grimsby), appeared for the owners and underwriters of the "Epine.' Mr. Edward Terrell, instructed by Messrs. Arthur Pyke and Company, of 24, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W.C.2, appeared for the widows of two deceased members of the crew, Mrs. M. Birch and Mrs. Dracup.

The steam trawler "Epine" was a single screw single deck vessel built of steel in 1929 She was owned by the Premier Steam Fishing Company, Limited, of Grimsby. Gross tonnage 357.55. Length 140.3 feet.

She carried the necessary lifesaving appliances including a life boat, all of which were appropriate to a vessel of her size and class and were in good order, and in accordance with the regulations.

She was fitted with wireless telephony and telegraphy, including a direction finder, and was equipped with a Marconi echometer.

She sailed from Grimsby on the 1st March, 1948, for a fishing voyage to the Icelandic fishing grounds, manned by a crew of nineteen hands all told. Her fishing voyage had been somewhat interrupted by weather, but on the 13th March she was fishing some forty miles or more to the westward of Hvalsnes, on the West coast of Iceland, in about 90 fathoms. Fishing was bad, and her skipper decided to put into Keflavik Bay, and accordingly about 5.30 p.m. a course of East South East was set, and the vessel proceeded towards the land at easy full speed making about nine knots. About 6.50 p.m. the engines were stopped, and the skipper had a conversation by radio telephone with the skipper of the steam trawler "Hargood'. The "Hargood", which was fishing off Adalvik, reported better weather and good fishing.

The skipper of the "Epine" accordingly decided to proceed to the fishing grounds off Adalvik, and about 7.25 p.m. set a course of North by East half East by steering compass, and the vessel proceeded at easy full speed ahead making nine to nine and a half knots through the water.

The watch on duty at this time consisted of the mate and one deck hand. There was a fresh South-West wind, and visibility was about five miles. Shortly afterwards the skipper told the mate that he was going to turn in, and gave the mate instructions that he was to be called if the weather deteriorated, if there were any snow storms, if any vessels or lights were seen, or when the log reading was 40. The log had been streamed and set at zero, about 7.25 p.m.

The mate reminded the skipper that he was due to go off watch at 8.30 p.m., and the skipper instructed the mate to let him know when he (the mate) went off watch. At 8.30 p.m. the watch was relieved, the new watch on deck consisting of two deck hands- Yates and Maul. The instructions as to calling the skipper were in substance passed on, except that Yates was told to call the skipper when the log read 39, and not 40. The mate had a reading taken of the log about 8.45 p.m., and it was ascertained that eleven and a half miles had been covered in the last hour and twenty minutes. The mate told Yates that he estimated that the log would be reading 39 some-where about 11.30 p.m. The mate told the skipper that the watch had been changed, and the skipper told him to go below and said that he would be coming up in a few minutes. Before going off watch, the mate had twice taken a sounding by echometer and on each occasion got a depth of slightly over seventy fathoms.

The mate turned in about 9.10 p.m., but the skipper did not come on to the bridge and the vessel was left in charge of two deckhands. The mate stated in evidence that when he reported to the skipper the latter was seated on the settee in his berth reading a book. Shortly after 9.30 p.m. the skipper shouted up to the wheelhouse and asked what the weather was like and was told it was clear. Yates also reported that he had seen a ship on the port bow. He stated in evidence that he had also seen a vessel on the starboard quarter. According to Yates the course of North by East half East was steered and the only other incident of note during the earlier part of the watch was an attempt by Yates to take an echometer sounding. Yates stated in evidence that he switched on the echometer and got no reading. He was not perturbed by this as he thought that the echometer had been put on charge.

The evidence seems to negative the echometer having been put on charge, and whether the instrument really failed seems to the Court to be a matter of doubt. We accept the evidence that the echometer had worked well up to 8.30 p.m. that night.

About 10.45 p.m. the two deckhands got a glimpse of a light about 21/2 points on the starboard bow, but were unable to ascertain whether it was a ship's light, a buoy light, or a shore light. The visibility was restricted. There were snow showers at times, and the light was not reported at the time because the deckhands did not know what it was. About 11.35 p.m. the log reading was 39 and this was reported to the skipper who came on the bridge very shortly afterwards.

Upon the arrival of the skipper on the bridge he was told about the light on the starboard bow, and the skipper endeavoured to locate it with the aid of glasses but apparently without success. About 11.50 p.m. the "Epine" struck the rocks a little to the westward of Malariff Light without anyone on board of her realising that she was in dangerous proximity to the land.

At the time of the stranding the wind was a moderate gale with a rough sea and the vessel pounded heavily and took a heavy list to starboard. Water began to enter the vessel in large quantities and in less than ten minutes after she struck the water in the engine room reached the dynamo and extinguished the lights. The crew came out on deck and with one exception were wearing their life-jackets. The skipper gave this man his own life-jacket. Seas were sweeping the deck and the lifeboat was found to be stove in. In the opinion of the Court it is almost certain that had it been possible to launch the lifeboat it would immediately have been dashed to pieces on the rocks, and no attempt at rescue from seaward was feasible. Some of the crew were washed overboard but others managed to climb into the rigging after firing six distress rockets, and lighting one fire on top of the wheelhouse and another on the whaleback. The wireless operator who seems to have stuck to his post and done his duty with commendable fortitude got into touch by radio telephone with the steam trawler "Spurs", and also sent out a distress message. Shortly after the ship struck, Malariff Light was seen at times about on the starboard beam. The place where the vessel stranded was rocky with high cliffs but with a small beach at their foot. After some time a light was seen ashore first on the top of the cliffs and later on the beach. Attempts to establish communication with the shore by Morse lamp were unsuccessful and it seems that those on board the "Epine" decided that the best thing to do was to await daylight. Meantime, the wind increased to about Force 9 with a corresponding increase in the sea and some of those in the rigging of the trawler were overcome by exhaustion. Shortly after day-light the Icelandic rescue party ashore succeeded in getting a rocket with line attached on to the wreck which was finally secured by those on board the trawler and four members of the crew were taken ashore in the breeches buoy. One other member of the crew of the "Epine" got ashore by jumping overboard and swimming or being washed ashore, but the remaining 14 hands had already perished either by drowning or exposure.

The evidence establishes that the whole of the navigation of the "Epine" was in the hands of her skipper and that he alone had access to the charts/carried by the vessel. In these circumstances no one other than the skipper was normally able to say where the vessel was, and as the skipper unfortunately lost his life the Court is unable to find where the vessel was when the course of N. by E. half E. was set. This attitude on the part of the skipper, which it is feared is far too frequent in trawlers, is one which the Court feels is to be deprecated and cannot be too strongly condemned. However many certificated officers a trawler may carry, and however competent and attentive to their duties they may be, they cannot be in a position properly to undertake the navigation of a vessel during their watch unless they are provided with the necessary information and facilities.

The practice of leaving the watch in charge of a deck hand is one which has already incurred the strongest disapprobation of a Court of Inquiry, and in the opinion of this Court is a serious breach of duty. It is high time that the fishing community recognised the serious jeopardy in which lives and property are placed in consequence of the continuance of this practice. This case is an unfortunate instance which only too clearly emphasises the necessity for a qualified officer provided with full information and facilities being in charge of the navigation.

The skipper was unfortunately one of those who lost their lives as a result of the casualty and the Court is naturally loath to impute blame to him when he has had no opportunity either of giving evidence as to the facts or offering any explanations in his own defence. We are, however, reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the cause of the stranding was an error in the navigation of the vessel for which the skipper was alone responsible, and that this error was most probably in the fixing of his point of departure.

The area around the place of the stranding is one in which it is well-known that there may be abnormal magnetic disturbance. How far, if at all, the compasses of the "Epine" were affected the Court is unable to say, but the known possibility of this magnetic disturbance made it even more necessary that navigatiou should not be left to a deckhand even had be been instructed as to his position and supplied with a chart.

The "Epine" was supplied with a pair of glasses of the type usually supplied to trawlers and often to merchant vessels. It was pressed by Mr. Terrell that the vessel ought to have been supplied with a pair of prismatic might glasses, and that the failure to do so was negligence on the part of the owners. He also submitted that the provision of such night glasses might have avoided the casualty. The glasses supplied were for day and night work and, in the opinion of the Court though no doubt night glasses are better suited for night work it cannot be said that it was negligent not to provide them. Moreover, in the opinion of the Court the visibility was much less than those on the "Epine" realised, and the use of night glasses would not have aboided this casualty. In the opinion of the Court the "Epine" was well found in every respect and the failure of one member of the crew to appear on deck without a life-jacket was not due to a shortage. There were on board more life-jackets than crew.

This was another stranding of a British vessel where yeoman service was rendered by an Icelandic rescue party. The Court also feels that it is proper to say that all the witnesses as to the facts of the stranding gave their evidence well, and that that evidence established that the conduct of not only the skipper and wireless operator but of all members of the crew was in accord with the high traditions of their calling.

J.V. NAISBY, Judge.

 JOHN WM. GRIMSTON) 
 CHARLES V. GROVESAssessors
 G. H. NICHOLSON 

(Issued by the Ministry of Transport

in London, in November,
1948)

Crown Copyright Reserved

LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses:

York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh, 2;

39-41 King Street, Manchester, 2; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;

Tower Lane, Bristol, 1; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast

OR THROUGH ANY BOOKSELLER

1948

Price 4d. net

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