Wreck report for 'Sturdee Rose', 1945

Crown Copyright Reserved

No. 7947

S.S. STURDEE ROSE

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894

REPORT OF COURT

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at County Sessions House, Islington, Liverpool, on the 19th, 20th and 21st May, 1947, and at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, W.C.2, on the 21st June, 1947, before Mr. K. S. Carpmael, K.C., assisted by Lieut-Commander C. V. Groves and Dr. A. M. Robb into the circumstances attending the loss by sinking of the S.S. "Sturdee Rose" off Trevose Head, Cornwall, on the 15th November, 1945.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the sinking of the "Sturdee Rose" was due to defective riveting possibly associated with deterioration of plating, and that adequate supervision and maintenance would have led to the discovery of such defects and their repair.

Dated this 20th day of August, 1947.

KENNETH CARPMAEL, Judge.

We concur in the above Report.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry of Transport are as follows:-

Q. 1. By whom was the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" owned, and how long had she been so owned?

A. Richard Hughes & Co. (Liverpool) Limited, since 28th April, 1934.

Q. 2A. When the said vessel set sail from Garston on the 15th November, 1945, was she in good and seaworthy condition and fit to undertake the ordinary perils of a voyage from Garston to Plymouth?

A. No.

Q. 2B. Was the "Sturdee Rose" overladen, and if so did it affect her seaworthiness or affect her loss?

A. The "Sturdee Rose" was overladen by about 3¼ inches. This affected her seaworthiness and loss in that her reserve of buoyancy was diminished and her sinking slightly accelerated.

Q. 3. Was the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" fitted with wireless telegraphy?

A. No.

Q. 4A. With what compasses was the vessel fitted, and where were they situated on board?

A. One standard compass on the bridge.

Q. 4B. When were they last professionally adjusted, and were deviation cards supplied to the vessel?

A. The compass was professionally adjusted on 21st August, 1945, and a deviation card was supplied to the vessel.

Q. 5. When the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" last sailed was she properly equipped with life-saving appliances?

A. Yes.

Q. 6. What cargo was the said vessel carrying at the commencement of her last voyage.

A. About 978 tons of various kinds of coal.

Q. 7. How was the cargo stowed?

A. In bulk from a coal shoot, and it was adequately trimmed.

Q. 8. Was any cargo carried on deck?

A. No.

Q. 9. What crew did the vessel carry?

A. 11.

Q. 10. When and where did the said vessel founder?

A. About 4 miles off Trevose Head on 15th November, 1945.

Q. 11. What was the state of the weather, wind and sea at time of sailing?

A. Very fine, no material wind and a smooth sea and no swell.

Q. 12. Was there any serious deterioration of weather, wind and sea up to the time of the loss of the vessel?

A. There was no change.

Q. 13. How many members of the crew lost their lives.

A. The master and 6 members of the crew. The master went down with the ship and the remainder died in the raft on to which 10 of the crew climbed when the vessel sank.

Q. 14. What was the cause of the survivors of the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" being unable to attract attention when exposed for several days in the Irish Sea?

A. Lack of signalling equipment which had been supplied by the owners but which for some reason (see answer to question 19) was not in position on the raft at the time of the sinking.

Q. 15. How was it that no lifeboat was launched in weather conditions so favourable?

A. No attempt was made to launch the starboard lifeboat until the list to starboard was so severe that the crew found themselves unable to cast off the outer gripes and free the chocks. No attempt was made to launch the port boat but it is considered that such an attempt if made would have been unsuccessful owing to the list.

Q. 16. Did the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" continue to develop a list from the time of sailing until it reached an alarming degree just before the vessel sank?

A. The "Sturdee Rose" had a list of a degree or two to starboard on dropping the pilot at the Bar Light Vessel. This list thereafter slowly increased and shortly before the sinking the vessel took a sudden lurch. There was no reliable evidence as to the extent of the list before or after the lurch, but calculation based on description of where the water reached on the vessel indicate that the list before the lurch must have been at least 25° and after the lurch in the region of 40°.

Q. 17. If the vessel in fact did develop an alarming list which her officers and crew were unable to check or explain, was it an error of judgment not to order the lifeboats to be swung out some time before the vessel did take a fatal lurch?

A. Yes.

Q. 18. Was it an error of judgment to continue with the voyage with the ship's list steadily increasing when she might have put into a port of refuge?

A. Yes.

Q. 19. Can any reason be assigned for the lifesaving appliances not being in position on the life raft?

A. The probable reason was the fear of pilferage which caused their removal to a place of safety, either the master's cabin or elsewhere.

Q. 20 What boat drills, if any, had been held on board the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" on recent voyages before her loss, and was any boat drill carried out on this voyage?

A. No boat drills had been carried out on recent voyages. No boat drill was carried out on this voyage.

Q. 21. Was the loss of the s.s. "Sturdee Rose" caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the owners or her late master, or error of judgment of the master?

A. The loss of the "Sturdee Rose" was caused or contributed to by the default of the owners in carrying out inspection and maintenance of the hull. Defect in maintenance was the cause of the leakage into the hold which led to the development of a list and subsequent foundering This matter is considered in detail in the Appendix.

The loss of the "Sturdee Rose" was contributed to by the error of judgment of the master referred to in the answer to question 18.

Annex to the Report.

This Inquiry was held at the County Sessions House, Liverpool, on the 19th, 20th and 21st May, 1947, and at the Law Courts in London on the 21st June, 1947.

Mr. Vere Hunt (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the Minister of Transport: Mr. R. F. Hayward, K.C. (instructed by Ince & Co.) appeared on behalf of Richard Hughes & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd., the Owners of the "Sturdee Rose": Mr. Broadhead (of Messrs. Ingledew Brown Bennison & Garrett) appeared for the late Master and the late Chief Engineer and also for the Navigators' and Engineer Officers' Union, the latter being made parties to the Inquiry upon application: Mr. Craig (of Messrs. Dodd Ashcroft & Cook) appeared for the widow of the late Nicholas Brown, a member of the crew, and Eugene Cleary one of the survivors, both of whom were made parties upon application. Messrs. Johnstone and Messrs. Court watched the proceedings for the personal representatives of the late Hugh Graham a member of the crew, and the Solicitor of the London Midland and Scottish Railway Company who loaded the ship watched their interests.

The "Sturdee Rose", official number 145983, of the Port of Liverpool was a steel single screw transversely framed steamer of the well deck type with propelling machinery fitted aft. She had a flat keel. The frame spacing was 22 inches throughout.

The ship was built by The Hansen Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing Co. Ltd. at Bideford in 1922.

The ship was acquired by Richard Hughes & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. on 28th April, 1934, and was owned by them up to the time of the loss.

The registered dimensions were 190.0 feet × 30.15 feet × 12.5 feet.

The builders' dimensions were 190.0 feet B.P. × 30.0 feet moulded breadth × 14 feet 6 inches moulded depth to upper deck.

The tonnages were 872.67 gross, 591.66 under deck, and 442.74 register.

There were 3 steel transverse watertight bulkheads separating the following compartments:-

(1) Fore peak tank, chain locker and boatswain's store.

(2) Cargo holds, Nos. 1 and 2.

(3) Engine and boiler room, and cross bunker and after peak tank.

There was a steel transverse non-watertight bulkhead separating Nos. 1 and 2 holds. No. 1 hold was 60 feet 6 inches long and extended to the upper deck. No. 2 hold was 53 feet 2 inches long and extended to the raised quarter deck. There was no ceiling on the tank top and no sparring in the holds.

The double bottom extended from the fore-peak bulkhead to a few feet abaft the forward bulkhead of the stokehold. The tank top was level out to the ship's sides. There were 2 double bottom tanks. No. 1 was not subdivided. No. 2 was divided watertight at the centreline.

The cross bunker was 9 feet 2 inches long and two doors were fitted for coal from bunker to stokehold. These doors were about 2 feet 6 inches square and placed 7 to 8 feet each side of the centre line.

The Builder's capacities were as follows:-

Coal bunkers, including trunk = 115 tons at about 48 cubic feet per ton.

No. 1 double bottom tank = 107.5 tons, salt water (No centre line division).

No. 2 double bottom tank = 131.5 tons salt water (watertight centre line division).

The main side to side erections were as follows:-

Forecastle. 20 feet long × 7 feet 6 inches high with wing extensions 5 feet 6 inches long. Two openings in after bulkhead 4 feet 11 inches × 1 foot 9 inches closed by steel hinged doors: sills 1 foot 5 inches high.

Raised quarter deck. 106 feet long × 4 feet high. Two openings in foreward bulkhead, 1 foot 9 inches × 1 foot 9 inches closed by watertight doors: sills 1 foot 1½ inches high.

Bridge on fore end of raised quarter deck. 13 feet 6 inches long × 7 feet 6 inches high. This erection extended from the port side of the ship to within 2 feet 9 inches of the starboard side forming a passageway at the starboard side.

The forward well was 43 feet 6 inches long with steel bulwarks 3 feet 6 inches high having 3 freeing ports each side. The freeing ports were 3 feet 0 inches × 1 foot 6 inches each with sills 12 inches high.

The steel bulwarks 3 feet 2½ inches high, on the raised quarter deck had 4 freeing ports each side 3 feet 0 inches × 1 foot 6 inches with 12 inch sills. It is not known which ports were fitted with shutters.

The airpipe, 4½ inches diameter, to the forepeak tank was led above the forecastle deck.

Two airpipes to the after peak tank were 2½ inches diameter and 6 inches and 30 inches high, respectively, above the raised quarter deck.

The port and starboard air pipes to No. 1 double bottom tank were 4 inches diameter and led above the forecastle deck.

The port and starboard air pipes to No. 2 double bottom tank were 2½ inches diameter and 2 feet 3 inches high above the raised quarter deck, placed close to the bulwarks.

The air pipes were fitted with wood plugs.

Sounding pipes were as follows:-

No. 1 double bottom tank, 1½ inches, near the centre line: top in the saloon in the bridge.

No. 2 double bottom tank, 2 in number, 1½ inches diameter: tops in boiler casing.

No. 1 hold, 1½ inches each side, at about 1 foot from the ship's sides. These led into wells recessed into the tank top. These wells also accommodated the suction strums for pumping out the hold. The port sounding pipe cap was in the officers' bathroom in the bridge and the starboard one was on the open raised quarter deck.

No. 2 hold, 1½ inches each side, about 2 feet from the ship's sides. These led into wells recessed into the tank top. These wells also accommodated the suction strums for pumping out the hold. The sounding pipe caps were on the raised quarter deck abaft No. 2 hatchway, about 12 feet from the centre line each side.

Ventilators:

The engine and boiler room steel casings on the raised quarter deck were 7 feet 6 inches high × 18 feet wide. There was an opening each side 4 feet 11 inches × 2 feet 0 inches, with sill 1 foot 8 inches high, in the fidley casing and a similar opening each side in the engine room casing. All four openings were fitted with steel hinged doors.

There were two main hatchways as follows:-

1. In the fore well, to No. 1 hold; 35 feet long × 18 feet wide × 2 feet 10 inches high. Steel coamings. Six steel shifting beams spaced 5 feet apart. 2½ inches white pine covers, laid fore and aft. The usual tarpaulins and battening arrangements.

2. On the raised quarter deck, to No. 2 hold similar to No. 1.

Flat steel securing bars were provided for use on top of the tarpaulins.

The hatchway on top of the bunker trunk was 9 feet above the raised quarter deck. It was 5 feet 6 inches long × 18 feet wide. 2½ inches white pine covers were laid fore and aft and secured by the normal tarpaulins and battening arrangements.

The steering gear was steam driven by an engine fitted on a platform in the casing and controlled by a rod led along the port side of the raised quarter deck from the navigating bridge. Chains were led alongside the bulwarks from the engine to the rudder quadrant on the raised quarter deck. The rudder was of the single plate type.

There were 2 cylindrical boilers, 10 feet long × 11 feet 3 inches diameter working at 180 lbs. per square inch.

The machinery was triple expansion 15 inches, 25 inches and 41 inches × 21 inches stroke. Nominal horse power was 84.3, I.H.P. 550, and original service speed was 9¾ knots.

The boilers and engines were built by the Lytham Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. at Lytham, Lancashire, in 1922.

The ship had a Class IA lifeboat each side aft stowed under radial davits. The boat platform was at the level of the casing top 7 feet 6 inches above the raised quarter deck. Particulars of the lifeboats were:-

certified for 21 persons.

certified for 23 persons.

There was also a 15 feet dinghy stowed further forward at the starboard side.

The life-saving appliances were last surveyed at Cardiff on 26th May, 1944 and at that time, among other items, 2 sets of skates were provided for the lifeboats. Also, at that time, a new 14 person Horrocks Patent Raft was installed at the stern on launching skids. This is a Ministry approved type of raft. In addition to the normal buoyancy tanks there were on the raft:-

In addition to lifeboats and rafts, there were 15 approved lifejackets and 15 approved lifesaving waistcoats and lights, 8 circular lifebuoys and an approved Line-throwing appliance.

The total crew on board at the time the ship was lost was 11.

The ship had no wireless apparatus at the time of her loss.

An automatic Portable Transmitter M. 741 was installed on 21st October, 1940, but this was taken away in August, 1945.

There were 2 bilge pumps run off the main engines; an auxiliary (general service) bilge pump; and a ballast pump which could also pump from the bilges. This latter had a capacity of about 109 tons per hour.

There were port and starboard suctions to the undivided No. 1 double bottom tank. These suctions were placed about 7 feet from the centre line.

There was a single suction each to the port and starboard No. 2 double bottom tanks. These were placed only a few feet from the centre line, according to a survivor, although the plan shows them at about 7 feet from the centre line.

There were port and starboard bilge suctions to both holds placed out near the ship's sides. These suctions were fitted into drain wells recessed into the tank top. These wells were about 1 foot × 2 feet × 1 foot deep with a steel plate fitted over the top having perforations over an equal area to the size of an ordinary manhole.

A special pump was fitted in the engine room a few years ago for Admiralty purposes-dealing with fresh water carried in the fore and aft peaks. The suction pipe from this pump was led along the port side of the holds at 2 or 3 feet above the tank top.

The ship was built under Lloyd's Survey and carried Lloyd's highest class up to the time of her loss.

The last Special Survey No. 2 was made by Lloyd's Register in April-May, 1944, at Cardiff and JuneAugust, 1945, at Glasgow. Lloyd's Survey Reports Nos. 51987 and 69902 relating to these surveys are available. It is seen from the Cardiff report that a fair amount of structural repair was done. At this time Class was continued and confirmed, and Classification Certificates dated 11.9.45 for ship and machinery are available

The last Loadline Certificate was issued by Lloyd's Register on 26.5.44 and dated to expire on 31.5.48.

The last Annual Loadline Survey was made by Lloyd's Register on 22.6.45 and 14.8.45.

The "Sturdee Rose" at the time of her loss was in the course of a voyage from Garston to Plymouth laden with a full cargo of coal. She left Garston about 4.30 p.m. on 13th November, 1945. The voyage proceeded in weather conditions which were very favourable with a substantially calm sea which should not have affected the ship in any way. The evidence was somewhat conflicting as to whether or not she had a list on leaving, but it is clear that shortly after leaving a list to starboard did develop. At first it was slight but it went on steadily increasing until the morning of the 15th November, the day on which the ship sank, and about 4.0 a.m. or shortly afterwards she took a heavy lurch. At this time it became apparent that the ship was doomed and her crew assembled aft. The ship's position was about 4 miles off Trevose Head.

Up to the time of the lurch no safety precautions of any kind appear to have been taken although the list just before the lurch must have been about 25°. This angle has been deduced from descriptions of where the water had reached on the deck and at the hatch coamings. After the lurch the list must have been in the region of 40°.

It is difficult to understand what can have been in the mind of the master in continuing the voyage and in not putting into a port of refuge long before the time when the lurch occurred. The master went down with his ship, and in the circumstances his failure can only be ascribed to error of judgment.

After the lurch occurred the crew assembled aft and an attempt was made to launch the starboard lifeboat. This proved to be unsuccessful as owing to the list the outboard gripes could not be released. No attempt was made to launch the port lifeboat, probably because it was obvious that the list would have prevented this being done. The slip was knocked off the raft which did not however slide away, again probably owing to the list, and before anything further could be done the men were forced to get into the water owing to the imminence of the vessel sinking. Fortunately the raft floated off as the vessel sank and the 10 men clambered in.

The master was aft whilst attempts were being made to launch the boat and raft and was then seen to go forward after having said something with regard to flares or rockets. It is probable that he was going to fetch flares and possibly other of the raft's equipment. He was not seen again.

The raft was short of practically all its equipment. There was only one self-igniting flare. There was no food. There were three cans of water but unfortunately two of these were lost The raft drifted about for eight days. It capsized on one occasion and 6 of the men died from exposure. Several ships were sighted but their attention could not be attracted owing to the lack of signalling equipment. Finally the raft with 4 survivors was picked up about 35 miles off Waterford by the steamship "Tecumseh Park".

This tragic story of the sinking of an apparently well found ship in fine weather involving the loss of 7 of her crew naturally called for a close investigation of the causes.

There were a number of disquieting features about the case.

In the first place the "Sturdee Rose" was overladen on sailing by about 3¼ inches and had also been overladen on several previous voyages. This obviously should not have occurred; but it was not in fact a serious contributing factor to the disaster as in the events that happened it can only have slightly accelerated the sinking. The master was primarily responsible for overloading, but had there been proper supervision this could have been prevented. In this connection it is pointed out that the registered manager, Mr. T. J. Tierney, had no knowledge of a progressive reduction in carrying capacity due to age, and there was little or no check on behalf of the Owners against overloading.

In the next place it is clear that neither the lifeboats nor the rafts had their proper equipment in place on sailing. The probable reason was fear of pilferage while in port. It is clear that the equipment had been supplied and it is probable that the master had removed it to a place of safety, either his own cabin, or elsewhere. While it is proper to take such precautions when the vessel is in port, there is no doubt that the equipment should be in place when the vessel is at sea. In this connection it is clear that no boat drills had been carried out for a considerable period. Had the drills been carried out at sea the absence of equipment would or ought to have been made clear, and the equipment replaced. Here again adequate supervision could have ensured that the equipment was in place when the ship went to sea. It is considered that warning should be given generally of the necessity for maintaining life-saving equipment in position and in good condition when at sea, and for carrying out periodical boat drills.

But the most disquieting feature arises after considering what must have been the cause of the list as described above. Apart from overloading, the Court is satisfied that the cargo was properly loaded and stowed, and it is clear that the increasing list was not due to a shift of cargo.

The only other possible cause was entry of sea water to the holds; entry to the double bottom tanks could not have caused such a list as would explain the disaster.

One explanation of leakage into the holds, which was investigated at the instance of the Court, was a possibility that the bilge might have caught on the quay wall during the course of loading cargo at the tip. Having considered the drawings of the wall and other evidence, the Court is of the opinion that this possibility can be rejected.

It is clear that the list had begun by the time the pilot left the vessel at the Bar Lightship. There was no evidence of any mishap on the way down-river. The conclusion is plain that the list was being caused by the entry of sea water through shell plating above the inner bottom. The slowness of development of the list shows that the leakage cannot have been large and was probably due to defect in riveting, possibly associated with deterioration of plating due to age. That defects were present in the vessel was apparent from evidence of cement patches on the tank top and side plating, and of a hole in the collision bulkhead, discovered in Belfast on the previous voyage, round which a cement box had been built. None of these weaknesses had been revealed during the "off survey" of the vessel in August, 1945, on the vessel being handed back to the owners from the Admiralty. The assistant superintendent of the owners was not present at the survey owing to illness, and the Court is left with the impression that so far at any rate as the holds and bulkheads were concerned the examination was perfunctory.

In addition it has to be recorded that the Chief Superintendent of the owners, Mr. C. C. Dales, who lives at Penarth, did not think fit to inspect the vessel when she was at Swansea and Port Talbot on a number of occasions between August and October, 1945. This is especially a matter for comment in view of the following facts:-

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Court has no doubt that sea water entered the vessel through a wasted plate or plates or rivets due to her age, and that adequate supervision and maintenance would have led to the discovery of the wastage and its repair. In coming to this conclusion the Court has borne in mind the fact that to some extent the owners and their chief superintendent were entitled to rely upon the assistant superintendent whose illness very likely contributed to the lack of proper supervision.

The Court is of the opinion that supervision and inspection of coasting vessels should be especially stringent having regard to the increased possibilities of minor damage being incurred on such trades.

KENNETH CARPMAEL, Judge.

Issued by the Minister of Transport in London, October, 1947.

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