Wreck report for 'Langleecrag', 1947

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894

REPORT OF COURT

(No. 7955)

S.S. "Langleecrag" O.N. 161528

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at Church House, Westminster, London, S.W.1, on the 19th and 20th days of January, 1949, before K. S. Carpmael, Esq., K.C., assisted by Captain J. P. Thomson and Captain C. E. Rathkins, into the circumstances attending the loss by stranding of the s.s. "Langleecrag", on Great Sacred Island, Belle Isle Strait, Newfoundland, on the 15th November, 1947.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding and loss of the "Langleecrag" were caused or contributed to by the wrongful acts or default of the master, Captain Thomas Orford, and of the chief officer, Cyril King, and accordingly suspends the certificate of the master for fifteen months from the date of stranding, and that of the chief officer for eighteen months from the date of stranding.

Dated this 31st day of January, 1949.

Kenneth Carpmael, Judge

We concur in the above Report.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The Court's answers to the questions submitted the Ministry of Transport are as follows:—

ANNEX TO THE REPORT

This Inquiry was held at Church House, Westminster, on the 19th and 20th days of January, 1949. There had been a formal sitting on 20th December, 1948, but owing to the illness of the chief officer the Inquiry had to be adjourned.

Mr. J. B. Hewson (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor, Ministry of Transport Branch) appeared on behalf of the Minister of Transport.

Mr. Roland Adams (instructed by Messrs. Middleton Lewis & Clarke, 53 Leadenhall Street, E.C.3) appeared on behalf of the Owners, the Medomsley Steam Shipping Company, Limited.

Mr. R. F. Hayward, K.C., and Mr. L. McDermott (instructed by Messrs. Ingledew Brown & Company, 136 Minories, E.C.3) appeared on behalf of the master, Mr. Thomas Orford.

Mr. C. Arnold Baker (instructed by Messrs. N. Maclean & Company, 18 John Street, Theobalds Road, W.C.1) appeared on behalf of the chief officer, Mr. Cyril King.

Mr. Neil Maclean (instructed by The National Union of Seamen, Maritime House, Old Town, Clapham, S.W.4) appeared on behalf of the crew.

The "Langleecrag", Official Number 161528, was a steel, single-screw transversely-framed, flush-deck steamer of the shelter deck type. The tonnage opening was closed in 1941 in connection with war emergency measures, and the vessel was classed 100 A.1 with freeboard. She was built by Messrs. Palmers Shipbuilding & Iron Company, Limited, of Hebburn-on-Tyne, in 1929, and was owned by The Medomsley Steam Shipping Company, Limited, of 2/3 Crosby Square, London, E.C.3, the registered manager being Herbert George Mann of 2/3 Crosby Square, London, E.C.3.

The registered dimensions were 416.0 feet by 55.8 feet by 25.2 feet, the over-all length being 431.5 feet. The builder's dimensions were 415.0 feet B.P. by 55 feet 6 inches, moulded breadth 28 feet 3 inches, moulded depth to second deck by 37 feet moulded depth to upper deck.

The tonnages were 4908.96 gross, 4592.92 uniderdeck, 2996.98 registered.

There were seven steel transverse watertight bulkheads extending to the upper deck in way of cargo spaces and separating the following compartments:—

After Peak. The double-bottom extended from the fore-peak bulkhead to the after-peak bulkhead and contained six water ballast tanks and one feed water tank.

The openings in the steel watertight bulkheads separating the machinery space from the cross bunker and from the shaft passage were fitted with vertical steel watertight doors.

The master and crew were accommodated under the bridge abreast of the engine-room and in the shelter deck at the stern.

The steering gear was steam driven by an engine fitted on a platform in the after end of the engineroom casings and controlled by a rod from the navigating bridge. The rudder quadrant was actuated by rods and chains from the steering engine. The rudder was of the single-plate type.

There were three Scotch cylindrical multitubular boilers, working pressure 225 lbs. per square inch.

The machinery was triple expansion 24 inches, 40½ inches and 70 inches by 48 inches stroke, indicated horse power 2000, and the original service speed is given as 10½ knots. Engines and boilers were built by the North Eastern Marine Engineering Company, Limited, Wallsend-on-Tyne.

The vessel was equipped with four Class 1A wood lifeboats stowed under davits. The capacities were as follows:—

These boats were fully equipped and a lifeboat wireless transmitter—type E.T. 344—and receiver—type W—were carried.

Seventy-one "Victory" lifejackets were carried, and twelve cork lifebuoys were distributed around the vessel. A type A. 6206 Schermuly pistol rocket line-throwing apparatus was also carried.

All lifesaving appliances were inspected by the Ministry Surveyor at Hull on October 31st, 1947, and found to be in good order and to comply with the regulations.

The wireless installation consisted of a Marconi ¼ K.W. transmitter "Quench Spark" type T. 28 and a Marconi receiver, type 730, with a wave range of 12-20,000 metres. The vessel was also equipped with a Marconi Direction Finder, type 76/77.

The vessel was equipped with three compasses, a magnetic standard compass on the top of the wheelhouse, a magnetic steering compass and a Brown's "B" type Gyro compass in the wheelhouse.

A Siemen's echometer showing depths of water by means of a graph recorder, one deep sea hand lead and line, and one Wigzell patent sounding appliance operated by hand from the after part of the vessel were also carried.

The ship was built under Lloyd's survey and carried Lloyd's highest class up to the time of her loss. The last special survey No. 3 was made by Lloyd's Register in January, 1944, a loadline certificate was' issued by Lloyd's Register and dated to expire on 14th January, 1949. The last annual loadline survey was made by Lloyd's Register on 4th November, 1947.

The " Langleecrag " left Hull on the 4th November, 1947, on a ballast voyage to Father Point, St. Lawrence River, for orders, manned by a crew of 43 hands all told. There is no information as to her draft at the time of sailing, but her draft at the time of her loss was stated to be 11.0 feet 5 inches forward and 15.0 feet aft. The ordinary full speed at sea was 9½ to 10 knots.

The voyage proceeded normally and without incident and the first contact with land after leaving the North Coast of Scotland was on Friday, 14th November, 1947, when a wireless bearing was obtained from the station at the southern point of Belle Isle. This bearing placed the position about 10 miles South of the dead reckoning position entered in the log at noon, but it was not marked on the working chart and, save that it was entered in the scrap log, no attention appears to have been paid to it at any time.

At 6.30 p.m. and 10.35 p.m. further wireless bearings were obtained from Belle Isle, and the course was altered 2° to the Westward to 247° (True) at 6.30 p.m. Both bearings were entered in the scrap log, but only the latter bearing was marked on the working chart.

During the afternoon the wind had been EastNorth-East strong, with a rough sea and heavy swell, that is to say well on the starboard quarter. By midnight the wind had backed North-Easterly and by 1.0 a.m. was North, thereby increasing the tendency towards a Southerly drift.

At 2.30 a.m. a further wireless bearing of Belle Isle was obtained, and at about the same time a sounding was read off the echometer and half-an-hour later another sounding was read.

There was a conflict of evidence between the master and officers as to the efficiency of the echometer. The master said that owing to inefficient batteries it was not working properly on the previous voyage, but that new batteries having been supplied it was working properly on the voyage in question. The officers on the other hand stated that it was not recording accurately, one reason given being that this was due to the vessel being in ballast condition in rough weather. It is unnecessary to arrive at a definite conclusion on this point. It is sufficient to say that from the two soundings referred to above, if they had been examined intelligently together with other information available, a clear indication could have been obtained of the approximate position of the vessel at 3.0 a.m. when the second sounding was read.

The master, however, on the very insufficient evidence of two soundings separated by the short interval of half-an-hour coupled with a wireless bearing obtained at the beginning of the period, arrived at a conclusion that the vessel was then about three miles south of Belle Isle instead of about fifteen miles to the Southward and Eastward of that position, that is to say in the vicinity of the Tooker Bank as must have been the fact.

The master in arriving at that conclusion failed to take into account any of the information obtained before 2.30 a.m. He failed to take into account the fact that the bearing obtained at 9.45 a.m. placed his vessel about ten miles to the Southward of the noon dead reckoning position. He failed to make a running fix based on all the information available to him. Had this been done it should have been apparent that the vessel could not have been in the position fixed by him. On the contrary he could and should have deduced that she was passing over the Tooker Bank.

There was poor visibility at the time, and although the master fixed his position as only three miles from Belle Isle the light was not seen although its range was 15 miles. A warning contained in the St. Lawrence Pilot at p. 62 is very relevant in this connection. It is as follows:—

Had the master taken a line of soundings after fixing his position at 3.0 a.m. it would have become apparent to him, owing to the great difference between the soundings after the assumed position and those where the vessel must have been, that his assumed position was wrong.

The master, however, appears to have been satisfied, quite wrongly, with his assumed position and retired to his room without taking further soundings, and there remained until the vessel grounded.

The Court is of opinion that the master should not have been satisfied with his assumed position, and that even if he was justified in retiring to his room when he did he should have returned to the bridge when the chief officer reported (as related hereafter) that he had sighted Cape Norman. Thereafter he should have taken soundings.

The Court considers that in all these things there was a failure on the part of the master to act with due care and in a seamanlike manner.

At 3.0 a.m. after fixing his position the master had altered course 5° to the Westward after making allowance for leeway with the intention of passing six miles to the Northward of Cape Norman. These courses he placed on the chart.

The second officer had the middle watch and was instructed by the master to tell his relief at 4.0 a.m. (who was to be the chief officer) that the master was not going to bed and was in his room if there was any doubt. The second officer was duly relieved at 4.0 a.m. by the chief officer (Mr. Cyril King) and up to that time nothing had been seen of any shore lights.

Before taking over the watch, the chief officer looked at the chart and noted the 3.0 a.m. position. He did not attempt to check how this position was calculated, and the Court is of opinion that he was not called upon so to do as he was entitled to rely upon the master's working unless warned that it was unreliable.

The chief officer further worked out how long it would probably be before he might expect to pick up Cape Norman light which was the first light that should have been seen upon the assumption that the master's 3.0 a.m. position was accurate.

After going off watch the second officer went to the chartroom and remained there until 4.35 a.m. During this time he said that he had the echometer switched on, but that it was not registering satisfactorily and that no readings of the depth were obtained. It is not clear upon whose initiative the echometer was being used, but the chief officer stated that if the second officer had not done so he would have ordered him to, his reason being that it was a great asset to have continuous soundings on entering a narrow channel. The chief officer was however informed when he went to the chartroom at about 4.20 a.m. that no bottom was being obtained, but this does not appear to have caused him any surprise as he stated that he had experienced difficulty before with that type of sounder when the vessel was in light condition and the water was not smooth.

In these circumstances it is difficult to understand why immediate steps were not taken by the chief officer to bring the other sounding machine into use.

It is still more difficult to understand in view of the chief officer's story as to the sighting of a light which he took to be Cape Norman but which must, in fact, have been Cape Bauld.

He said that he had expected to pick up Cape Norman at about 4.30 a.m. but in fact saw a light at 4.20 a.m. He further stated that when he first saw the light he could not make out its characteristics because of the weather, there being heavy driving rain. It is not clear from the evidence when it was that he in fact determined that the light was closer than it should have been, but he states that he took action at once at 4.20 a.m. by altering first of all ten degrees to starboard and two minutes later another five degrees. Whether these alterations were made will be examined presently.

It is however clear that according to his account the chief officer did not arrive at a definite conclusion until 4.45 a.m. when the light was abeam, that the light was that of Cape Norman. The chief officer further stated that he had run a four point bearing which gave the distance abeam as 2¼ miles. There was thus an interval of time of 25 minutes during which he was uncertain of the characteristics of the light. He had informed the master by voice pipe at 4.20 a.m. that he had picked up Cape Norman. He did not inform the master then or any time before the stranding that he had any doubt about the light.

In ordinary circumstances there could of course have been no difficulty in distinguishing the light that had been sighted. Cape Bauld is Group flashing (2) every 15 seconds, while Cape Norman is Group flashing (3) every 30 seconds. If in fact the chief officer experienced difficulty in distinguishing what the light was his obvious duty was to call the master on the bridge at once. He could also have enlisted the help of the second officer. Moreover, he should have taken steps to obtain accurate soundings. No satisfactory explanation was forthcoming from the chief officer as to why these things were not done. Moreover, the Court is satisfied that the characteristics of the light could have been distinguished had the chief officer been paying proper attention.

After getting the light abeam at a distance of, as he says, 2¼ miles, the chief officer stated that he continued on the course of 270° (True) to which he said he had altered. Upon a reconstruction of events it is quite clear that the light which was seen was Cape Bauld. The vessel stranded on the East side of Sacred Island which is about six miles to the Westward of Cape Bauld. Had the vessel been 2¼ miles off Cape Bauld when abeam she ought on a course of 270° (True) to have passed about 2½ miles North of the place of stranding. She grounded at about 5.30 a.m. and in order to get ashore there must have been an inshore set of the rate of three-and-one-third knots, which the Court thinks is unlikely in the extreme.

The alternatives are either that he did not alter course to 270° as he says or else he must have been very much closer to Cape Bauld, a fact which should have been apparent in view of the fact that the height of the light is 187 feet.

Whatever the facts be, the chief officer failed in his duty either in not making a drastic alteration away from the land or in failing to appreciate what should have been obvious.

The vessel continued on at full speed and the first thing that was known of anything wrong was that the chief officer saw what he took to be a huge sea piling up and the ship immediately afterwards struck. A few minutes later the vessel broke in two, forward of the funnel.

One point on which the Court is left in doubt is as to the efficacy of the wireless direction finder. The Court did not have the advantage of seeing the wireless operator who was a Canadian and had remained in Canada after the casualty. There was, however, evidence from the master and the second officer that the wireless operator was having difficulty with the instrument. Neither the master nor the officers appear to have had more than a nodding acquaintance with the direction finder, which was unfortunate. There was evidence that at the material time the wireless fog signal of Cape Bauld was in operation. Had the direction finder of the "Langleecrag" worked efficiently, most valuable cross bearings could have been obtained for use in conjunction with the bearings of Belle Isle.

Having set out a melancholy story of failure which caused the stranding of the "Langleecrag", it is pleasant to record the fact that after the stranding the master showed good qualities of decision and competence. The Court also desires to say that the loss of life by two men in getting ashore was in no way due to any failure on the part of the master.

The Court has given anxious consideration to the question as to what penalties should be inflicted and has come to the conclusion, with the concurrence of both the assessors, that it would be impossible to overlook the failure of both the master and the chief officer. The chief officer, as stated above, was entitled to rely in the beginning upon the position fixed by the master, and the Court considers that he was seriously misled in this respect and that the master's failures clearly contributed to the stranding. On the other hand, the direct cause of the stranding was the failure of the chief officer. In arriving at its decision to suspend the certificates of both the master and the chief officer for the periods stated, the Court has borne in mind as regard the master his conduct after the stranding and, as regards the chief officer, the fact that he had six months employment there-after.

All the survivors of the "Langleecrag" except the wireless operator, arrived back in this country about 12th December, 1947. It was clear that an Inquiry of this kind must be held. It was not of a kind which necessitated any lengthy or detailed investigation, and it is considered that all the witnesses should have been interviewed and statements taken shortly after their arrival in this country. This, however, was not done and the task of the Court has in consequence been made harder by reason of faded recollections.

In conclusion, the Court considers that it is appropriate to include in this Report the following extract from the deposition of the master of the "Langleecrag":—

Kenneth Carpmael, Judge

We concur in the above Report.

(Issued by the Ministry of Transport in Lonon, in APRIL, 1949).

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