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|  | | Unique ID: | 14204 | | Description: | Board of Trade wreck report for 'Famagusta', 1947. | | Creator: | GB Board of Trade | | Date: | 27/4/1949 | | Copyright: | Out of copyright | | Partner: | SCC Libraries | | Partner ID: | Unknown |
Transcription
THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894 REPORT OF COURT (No. 7958) m.v. "Famagusta" O.N. 181521 In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at 12/13 St.
James's Square, London, S.W.1. on the 23rd, 24th and 25th days of
March, 1949, before R. F. Hayward, Esq., K.C., assisted by Captain
C. E. Rathkins, R.D., R.N.R., Captain J. W. Grimston, James Young,
Esq., and Ivor J. Gray, Esq., into the circumstances attending the
loss of the m.v. "Famagusta" (ex L.C.T. 430) in the Bay of Biscay
on the 19th March, 1947. The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances
attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the
reasons stated iu the Annex hereto, that the loss of the
"Famagusta" was primarily due to the entry of water into her
forward compartments, due to leakage caused by the prolonged
pounding into a head sea to which she was subjected and which put
out of action the forward electric bilge and ballast pump, and the
increasingly heavy list brought her starboard propeller out of the
water and caused her port main motor to stop through lack of
lubrication. The engineer in charge, holding a permit from the
Ministry of Transport to act as such, apparently failed to
understand the piping and pumping arrangements and to operate the
engine room bilge and ballast pump to its best effect. The loss of five lives out of the ten persons who left the
"Famagusta" in the ship's port lifeboat was due to its being
capsized by a sea, and of the five persons rescued by the "Empire
Plover" one, the second engineer, died from injuries caused by
being crushed between that ship and the "Famagusta.' Dated this 27th April, 1949. R. F. Hayward, Judge We concur in the above Report. | | JAS. YOUNG | Assessors | | | C. E. RATHKINS | | | JOHN WM. GRIMSTON | | | IVOR J. GREY |
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry
of Transport are as follows:- | Q. 1. | By whom was the "Famagusta" owned at
the time of her loss, and how long had she been so owned? | | A. | William Bertram Cecil-Lowe. Since 14th
March, 1946. | | Q. 2. | When, where and by whom was the
"Famagusta" built? | | A. | 1943, at Partick, Sir William Arrol
& Company, Limited. | | Q. 3. | Was the "Famagusta" a converted
ship? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 4. | When, where and by whom was the
"Famagusta" converted into the form she was in at the time of her
loss? | | A. | 1946-47, Rochester, New Medway Steam
Packet Company, Limited. | | Q. 5. | To whose specification was the
"Famagusta" converted? | | A. | Mr. Cyril Victor John Hughes,
Consulting Naval Architect. | | Q. 6. | Was the work of conversion carried out
to the satisfaction of a Classification Society? | | A. | Yes; Lloyd's Register of Shipping,
with the exception of an alteration to the pipe-lines carried out
by Messrs. Harland & Wolff, Limited, shortly before sailing on
her final voyage. | | Q. 7. | What certificates and reports were
issued by the Classification Society in respect of the conversion
when the work was completed? | | | (a) | What pumps, and where located, were
specified in the specification for the conversion of the
"Famagusta," and what compartments and/or spaces was each of such
pumps intended to be capable of pumping out? | | | (b) | What pumps, and where located, had the "Famagusta"
when she left Southend, and what compartments and/or spaces was
each in fact capable of pumping out if working properly? | | A. | Reports on machinery and hull dated
31st December, 1946, and 12th March, 1947, respectively; a
provisional load line certificate dated 14th January, 1947, for a
voyage from the United Kingdom to Port Said; a further provisional
load line certificate dated the 14th February, 1947, valid for two
months for trading between London and Boston. Reports dated 20th
February and 13th March, 1947, were submitted by the surveyor to
Lloyd's Register of Shipping to their Committee recording
classification Al with freeboard, for service in the Eastern
Mediterranean and Red Sea, and fitness to trade between London and
Boston. Provisional certificates were issued on the 14th January,
14th February, 20th February, and 13th March, authorising voyages
from the United Kingdom to Port Said and between London and Boston,
classing her Al, with freeboard for service in Eastern
Mediterranean and Red Sea, with notation Special Survey, London,
January, 1947, record of service, January, 1947, and being A. fit
to trade between London and Boston until 14th April, 1947; in
similar terms to the last-mentioned certificate, but with the
addition, "being fit to proceed from the United Kingdom to Cyprus
via Port Said, with dry and perishable cargoes, up to April, 14th,
1947." | | | (a) | Pumps were not included in the specification, and
it was apparently assumed that the pumps originally fitted in the
vessel should be retained, namely, one 70 ton per hour pump in the
engine room on the starboard side, one 70 ton per hour pump in the
wing compartment forward, which it was specified to be resited and
which was placed in the forward storeroom on the port side and one
40 ton per hour auxiliary pump secured on the deck in front of the
bridge. The engine room pump was intended to be capable of pumping
out the bilges, and both the forward pump and the auxiliary pump to
pump the ballast tanks. | | | (b) | As specified in (a). Shortly before sailing on her
final voyage, Messrs. Harland & Wolff, Limited, London, at the
owner's request, made alterations to the suction piping so that the
engine room pump could pump out ballast tanks as well as bilges.
This alteration was not notified to Lloyd's Register of Shipping
nor surveyed by one of their surveyors. According to the evidence
this modification would have needed special consideration by the
Committee, which disfavours the arrangement of bilge and ballast
lines being common. | | Q. 8. | Was the "Famagusta" surveyed in
respect of lifesaving appliances by a Ministry of Transport
Surveyor, and was such survey based on a total crew complement of
twelve? | | A. | Yes. Yes; but in addition she carried
a Carley float and buoyant apparatus. | | Q. 9. | How many persons were in fact on board
the "Famagusta" when she sailed on her last voyage? | | A. | Sixteen. | | Q. 10. | Did the "Famagusta" load at Dagenham,
take on board oil bunkers at Purfleet, adjust compasses off
Southend, and finally sail from Southend at 11.50 a.m. on the 14th
March, 1947, for Cyprus? | | A. | Yes | | Q. 11. | What cargo did the "Famagusta" take on
board at Dagenham, and where was it stowed? | | A. | Eight lorries (one on after hatch) and
two furniture containers. | | Q. 12. | What amount of oil bunkers did the
"Famagusta" take on board at Purfleet, and where was it
stowed? | | A. | About 52 tons were aboard on sailing.
It was stowed in the cross bunkers and side tanks. | | Q. 13. | What were the drafts of the
"Famagusta" when she had finished bunkering at Purfleet? | | A. | About 3 feet 6 inches forward, and 6
feet aft. | | Q. 14. | Was the "Famagusta" seaworthy, and was
she upright when she left Southend on the 14th March, 1947? | | A. | As regards construction, yes; but
after grounding on three occasions, i.e., twice at Boston on the
16th February, and in the Thames on the 13th March, she had not
been surveyed for bottom damage nor were her tanks tested. She was
upright on sailing. | | Q. 15. | What were the conditions of wind, sea
and weather when the "Famagusta" sailed from Southend? | | A. | Normal. | | Q. 16. | Was Ushant sighted from the
"Famagusta" about noon on 16th March, 1947? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 17. | Had the voyage been a normal one up to
noon on the 16th March, 1947, and what were the conditions of wind,
sea and weather at that time? | | A. | Yes. At this time the wind was fresh
to strong, south-westerly, the sea rough. | | Q. 18. | (a) | When did the "Famagusta" first develop a
list? | | | (b) | Was it port or starboard list? | | | (c) | Serious or slight? | | | (d) | What action was taken, if any? | | | (e) | What was the initial list attributed to? | | A. | (a) | (e) A slight list to port attributed to the wind
on the starboard side was noticed about 8 a.m. on the 17th March.
Soundings were taken. About six inches of water was found in the
tank on the port side under the forward storeroom, which was pumped
out by the forward pump. | | Q. 19. | What were the conditions of wind, sea
and weather on the morning of the 17th March, 1947? | | A. | Wind south-westerly, a moderate gale,
with a heavy sea. | | Q. 20. | On the 17th March, 1947, was the
"Famagusta" pounding heavily and shipping water? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 21. | (a) | Did defects develop in the structure of the
"Famagusta"? | | | (b) | What defects were discovered and when? | | A. | (a) | Yes. | | | (b) | Fractures on the foredeck, hatch coamings and
companionway. These were discovered on the afternoon of the 18th
March. | | Q. 22. | Did the list of the "Famagusta"
increase? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 23. | What pumps were used to counteract the
list? | | A. | The forward pump was used for a
considerable period until it became shortcircuited by water which
had entered the compartment. There was some evidence that the
engine room pump was applied also, but according to the chief
engineer, whose evidence was very unreliable, this pump was not
connected to the forward compartment. An attempt was also made to
use the 40 ton pump on deck, but its operation was prevented by the
bad weather and seas breaking on board. | | Q. 24. | (a) | Was there any failure of the pumps? | | | (b) | What was the cause of such failure? | | A. | See answer to 23. | | Q. 25. | What was the estimated list of the
"Famagusta" at 6 p.m. on the 18th March, 1947? | | A. | At about this time the port list was
estimated to be about 15 degrees. | | Q. 26. | When was the first S.O.S. sent out on
"Famagusta's" transmitter, and from what position? | | A. | At about 7 p.m. on the 18th March from
a position about 110 miles to the northward and eastward of Corunna
an urgent (XXX) signal was sent out. | | Q. 27. | Was the S.O.S. answered, and by
whom? | | A. | Yes-by the s.s. "Empire Plover" | | Q. 28. | Was there any shift of cargo? | | A. | Not so far as is known. | | Q. 29. | Was any difficulty experienced with
hatch covers or ventilator covers? | | A. | No. | | Q. 30. | At what time on what day did the ship
which answered the "Famagusta's" S.O.S. reach the "Famagusta," and
was that ship the s.s. "Empire Plover." | | A. | The "Empire Plover" reached the
"Famagusta" at about 3.30 a.m. on the 19th March. | | Q. 31. | From the time the "Famagusta" sent out
her S.O.S., what was the nearest port the "Famagusta" could make,
and how far away was that port? | | A. | Corunna, about 110 miles. | | Q. 32. | What was the wind, sea and weather
when the "Empire Plover" first reached the "Famagusta," and what
was the sailing trim of the "Famagusta" at that time? | | A. | The evidence was conflicting, but the
wind appears to have been about west-southwesterly, force 6 to 7,
with squalls. The sea was very rough. At this time the "Famagusta"
had a very heavy list to port of about 19 degrees. | | Q. 33. | Did the "Empire Plover" stand by the
"Famagusta" from about 3 a.m. on the 19th March, 1947, and did she
attempt to get a towing line aboard the "Famagusta" at about 1.30
p.m. on the same day? | | A. | Yes. Yes. | | Q. 34. | When the master of the "Famagusta"
failed to take inboard "Empire Plover's" towing line did he put out
his port lifeboat and embark the four supernumeraries, second
engineer, radio officer, two able seamen, a greaser, and the cook,
with the intention of putting the supernumeraries, radio officer,
greaser and cook on board the "Empire Plover"? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 35. | How did it come about that the second
engineer left the "Famagusta" in the port lifeboat instead of the
second officer? | | A. | The evidence was conflicting, but it
was probably due to the fact that at the time in question the
second officer was endeavouring to signal to the "Empire
Plover." | | Q. 36. | Who was at the tiller of the
lifeboat? | | A. | The owner, Mr. Cecil-Lowe. | | Q. 37. | (a) Was the lifeboat upset before
reaching the "Empire Plover"? | | | (b) With what loss of life? | | A. | (a) Yes. | | | (b) Five of the occupants were
drowned; the second engineer, who was subsequently rescued, died as
a result of his injuries. | | Q. 38. | Was the capsizing of the lifeboat
attributable to the absence of the second officer to take
command? | | A. | There is no evidence on which this
question can be satisfactorily answered. | | Q. 39. | (a) | Who was in command of the lifeboat? | | | (b) | Were all persons in the lifeboat wearing
life-jackets? | | A. | (a) | Mr. Cecil-Lowe was at the tiller. | | | (b) | Yes. | | Q. 40. | (a) | Had "Famagusta's" master succeeded in making known
to master of "Empire Plover" his intention to send lifeboat
party? | | | (b) | What visibility was obtaining at the time? | | A. | (a) | No. | | | (b) | Good. | | Q. 41. | (a) | About the time the lifeboat capsized did "Empire
Plover" bear down on "Famagusta"? | | | (b) | Was there actual contact and did one member of the
"Famagusta's" crew board the "Empire Plover" at the moment of
contact? | | A. | (a) | Yes. | | | (b) | Yes. At about this time the "Famagusta's" second
mate jumped on board the "Empire Plover." | | Q. 42. | Did the remaining members of
"Famagusta's" crew take to the water on a Carley float and on a
buoyant apparatus, and were they all picked up by a lifeboat from
the "Empire Plover"? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 43. | What was the position where
"Famagusta" was abandoned, and at what time on the 19th March,
1947, was she abandoned? | | A. | About 60 to 70 miles north of
Corunna. | | Q. 44. | Did seaman Kelly of the "Empire
Plover" enter the water in very heavy weather and make two rescues
and give his life in attempting further rescues? | | A. | Yes. | | Q. 45. | What was the cause of the m.v.
"Famagusta" making so much water and listing so badly that she had
to be abandoned? | | A. | There was no direct evidence
justifying an answer to this question, but in the opinion of the
Court it was probably due to the starting of the rivets and plates
and possibly fracture of plates and weldings due to the severe
pounding to which she had been subjected. | | Q. 46. | Was the "Famagusta" a fit and proper
type of ship to face the ordinary perils of the voyage she was
making when she was abandoned, at that time of the year? | | A. | Yes, provided she was not subjected to
severe pounding in heavy seas. | | Q. 47. | Was the casualty caused or contributed
to by the wrongful act or default of the owner, the late Mr.
William Bertram Cecil-Lowe? | | A. | The Court is of opinion that the late
owner ought to have notified Lloyd's Register of Shipping of the
groundings above referred to and of the alterations to the pumping
arrangements. Whether these omissions caused or contributed to the
casualty there is insufficient evidence to show. | | Q. 48. | Was the casualty caused or contributed
to by the wrongful act or default of the master, Captain Frank
Douglas Gardner? | | A. | No. | | Q. 49. | Was the casualty caused or contributed
to by the wrongful act or default of any other person, and if so,
whom? | | A. | Yes. The chief engineer was a most
unsatisfactory witness. He gave the impression to all members of
the Court that he was not fully conversant with the pumping
arrangements in the ship and also that he did not use them to the
best advantage. | | Q. 50. | Was the abandonment of the "Famagusta"
delayed too long? | | A. | No. | | Q. 51. | Was the loss of life resulting from
this casualty caused or contributed to by an error of judgment on
the part of the master of the m.v. "Famagusta"? | | A. | No. | | Q. 52. | Was the conduct of the master of the
m.v. "Famagusta" affected by the presence on board of the
owner? | | A. | No. |
ANNEX TO THE REPORT. The "Famagusta" was built as an L.C.T. (3) in 1943 by Sir
William Arrol & Company, Limited., Partick, Glasgow. She was
built in five sections which were connected together by butt
straps. In the early months of 1946 she was acquired by William
Bertram Cecil-Lowe, and specifications for her conversion to a
cargo vessel were prepared by Mr. Cyril Victor John Hughes, a
qualified naval architect. These specifications were submitted to
Lloyd's Register of Shipping, and, after modifications, were
finally approved by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The conversion of
the ship was carried out by the New Medway Steam Packet Company at
Rochester, Kent. She was a steel, single-deck, twin-screw motor
cargo vessel, 175 feet long between perpendiculars and 30 feet in
beam, with a moulded depth of 8 feet, 9½ inches. She was 454.2 tons
gross and 292.67 tons net register. She had two oiltight and four
watertight bulkheads separating the forepeak, the forward store and
the forward hold from the fresh water tank and water ballast tank
at the sides. In the after hold were the oil fuel tanks and water
ballast tanks at the sides. Further aft were the oil fuel
cross-bunker, machinery space, crew's mess and steering gear. The
bulkhead between the forward store and the forward hold was not
watertight in the duct keel. She had double-bottom tanks under the
fore-peak, the forward store, the forward hold and the after hold.
Except in the fore-peak, these compartments were divided
longitudinally. There were two main cargo hatchways, with steel coamings, 2 feet
high. They were covered by the usual transverse steel beams and
wooden hatch covers, with the usual arrangement of tarpaulins,
battens, wedges and lashings. In addition, there was a small
hatchway over the forward store with 2 feet high steel coamings
similarly covered. The forward store was reached by a steel
companionway, enclosed by steel doors with sills 2 feet 6 inches
above the deck. A similar companionway aft led to the machinery
space. There were ten ventilators which on the voyage were plugged
and covered. The vessel was fitted with two 12 cylinder four-stroke
Diesel engines, each driving a propeller, and her speed was about
eight knots. The "Famagusta" had twin rudders which were linked
together and worked by screw steering gear. These rudders in March,
1947, were lengthened without reference to Lloyd's Register of
Shipping. This was done as a result of experience gained on voyages
hereinafter referred to. The "Famagusta" was fitted with two 70 ton
per hour electrically-driven pumps: one of these was in the engine
room and the other one was situated in the forward store, and could
be operated and attended to only by a person entering that store.
An auxiliary 40 ton per hour Diesel-driven pump was secured on deck
between the after hatch and the bridge. When the ship was
converted, a 3½ inches bilge main was carried along the outside of
the trunk and connected to the three pumps. Suctions were led to
all compartments, including each doublebottom water ballast tank
and side water ballast tank. Ballast pipelines were also carried
along the outside of the trunkway. Although this layout was
approved by the Classification Society, the Court is of opinion
that it is open to certain objections, namely (1) possibility of
the piping receiving weather damage; (2) extra suction head
entailed; (3) inability to fill the tanks by gravity; and (4)
remoteness of the forward pump from the engine room and its
vulnerability. The ship was converted on the basis of having a crew of twelve
hands and no passengers, but two 16 feet lifeboats were stowed
under radial davits on each side of the bridge deck and one 14 feet
lifeboat was stowed on the raised deck forward, and there was
evidence that there was also a dinghy on top of it. In addition, on
the fatal voyage, the ship carried a Carley float and floating
apparatus. The ship also carried 15 standard kapok life-jackets and
eight standard lifebuoys. There was also a linethrowing apparatus
with four rockets and lines. The life-saving apparatus above
detailed was inspected and passed on the 10th December, 1946, but
for the carriage of sixteen people in the ship it would have been
necessary to obtain special consideration by the authority
concerned. In due course, provisional seaworthy certificates were
obtained. The conversion was completed in January, 1947. The "
Famagusta" then made one trading voyage to Lowestoft and another to
Boston, where, in the very severe weather conditions then
prevailing, she was caught in the ice and received damage to her
propellers which were subsequently renewed. She also grounded on
two occasions at Boston, and, on a later occasion, in the Thames.
None of these groundings appear to have been reported to the
Classification Society, nor was the ship specially surveyed in
connection with them. In early March, 1947, Messrs. Harland &
Wolff's London Yard, at the request of her owner, varied the
pipelines in order to make it possible for the engine room pump to
pump not only the bilges but also the ballast tanks. Thereafter,
all three pumps were in a position to pump either bilges or ballast
tanks. Shortly after the alteration was completed the ship sailed
on her last voyage, and the alteration was not notified to the
Classification Society. In the opinion of the Court, it is not
advisable to have common lines for the pumping of the bilges and
the ballast compartments. Before her final voyage, the ship, carrying twelve hands and
four supernumeraries, loaded a cargo of eight lorries and two
furniture containers and, having bunkered at Purfleet, sailed from
Southend, after adjusting her compasses, at about noon on the 14th
March, 1947. The voyage was without incident until after passing Ushant, when
a gale developed from the south-west to west-south-west, and the
"Famagusta," continuing on her south-westerly course at full speed,
pounded heavily. A slight list attributed to wind on the starboard
bow was observed on the morning of 17th March, but soundings were
taken and about six inches of water was found in the tank on the
port side under the forward storeroom. This was, as far as
possible, pumped out by the forward pump. During the evening the
list increased and was about 9 degrees on the morning of the 18th
March and although the forward pump was working until it was
short-circuited by water entering the forward store, the list
continued to increase. So far as could be observed, water was
coming in through the forward companionway and the fore-deck hatch
coamings, apparently due to cracks in the plating or weldings. The
Court, however, is of opinion that, in addition, there must have
been considerable leakage caused by started rivets and seams in the
ship's bottom forward due to the heavy pounding. The after pump was
put to work and an attempt was made to bring into operation the
auxiliary pump on deck. This could not be done due to the weather
then prevailing. On the evening of 18th March, water also came into the crew's
quarters on the port side and instructions were given for these to
be baled out. Water also made its way into the engine space,
through the engine room skylight. With the increasing list, the
starboard propeller was being lifted clear of the water and so
losing its effect. The list steadily increased, and by 1 p.m. on
the 19th March, the port engine failed, due, it was thought, to the
lubrication system failing on account of the list. At about 7 p.m.
on the 18th March, an urgent message for assistance was broadcast
to any ship to stand by. To this the steamship "Empire Plover"
replied. That vessel arrived on the scene at about 3.30 a.m. on the
19th March. After her arrival, at about 1 p.m. on the 19th March,
the master of the "Famagusta" asked her to take his ship in tow
with a view to making Corunna, but the rocket line between the
vessels parted and the master of the "Famagusta" decided to
transfer his supernumeraries to the other ship. For this purpose he
gave orders to lower the port lifeboat, which was done, but owing
to some slight confusion the second engineer got into the boat
instead of the second officer, and she cast off, carrying the
second engineer, two able seamen, the wireless officer, the cook
and steward, a greaser, and the four supernumeraries, including the
registered owner and his wife, who were drowned. Unfortunately, the
lifeboat capsized when a short distance from the " Empire Plover,"
which was closing the "Famagusta" apparently with a view to making
another attempt to get her in tow. A very gallant rescue was made
by a sailor called Kelly, who dived overboard from the "Empire
Plover" and, after rescuing two persons, lost his life in an
attempt to rescue a third. The second engineer sustained injuries
from which he afterwards died. Unfortunately, the "Empire Plover"
closed the "Famagusta" and collided with her, and there is some
evidence that some of the persons in the water were crushed between
the ships. The second officer of the "Famagusta" jumped on board
the "Empire Plover" and the remaining five men on the "Famagusta,"
after taking to the Carley float and the floating apparatus, were
saved. The "Famagusta" remained afloat for some time after the
rescue, and there is no evidence as to the time she sank, as she
must have done. The Court finds that the ship as converted was seaworthy for the
purpose for which she was intended, but it would appear that she
was insufficiently strong to withstand a continued and heavy
pounding by heavy head seas. It may well be that at the time when
she was subjected to such a trial, she had some strained or leaky
rivets due to herpreviousgroundings. According to the evidence, after leaving Ushant, no more weather
reports from the B.B.C. could be received on the wireless receiver
of the ship, and she was not fitted with a radio telephone. A question arises as to the seamanship displayed by the master.
He had to keep his engines working at their full speed in order to
keep her heading more or less in to the wind. He considered whether
it would not be advisable to turn and heave to with the wind on the
quarter, but he feared that, in the heavy seas running, in so doing
the ship would very likely be pooped. Even though it would have
been advisable to heave to with the wind on the quarter, as to
which the Court makes no finding, the failure to do so can amount,
in the opinion of the Court, to no more than an error of judgment
by a competent shipmaster placed in a very difficult position. The
Court is satisfied that the loss of this ship and of the lives of
those who lost them was not caused by the fault or default of the
owner or of the master. It is, however, of the opinion that the
chief engineer, who was a most unsatisfactory witness, was lacking
in knowledge of his pumping arrangements and that he failed to use
them to the best effect. R. F. HAYWARD, Judge | | JAS. YOUNG | Assessors | | | C. E. RATHKINS | | | JOHN WM. GRIMSTON | | | IVOR J. GREY |
(Issued by the Ministry of Transport in
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