"BARRASFORD," (S.S.)
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal investigation at the Board of Trade Offices, Poplar,
on the 19th and 20th January 1877, before H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner,
assisted by Commander FORSTER, R.N., and Captain BEASLEY, as Assessors, into the
circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the screw steamer
"BARRASFORD," with her cargo, while on a voyage from Libau to Schiedam, on the
19th November 1876.
Judgment.
The Commissioner. Although we have not had before us on the present inquiry
either the officer of the watch or the men who were at the wheel, and on the
look-out at the happening of the casualty, we think that the evidence that has
been produced is sufficient to enable us to form a pretty correct judgment as to
the cause of the loss of this vessel and her cargo.
The "Barrasford" was an iron screw steamship of 899 tons gross measurement and
573 tons net. She had two engines of 90 horse power, and was built in the year
1870, by Messrs. A. Leslie and Company, of Hepburn-on-Tyne, for her late owners,
of whom Mr. Edward Jordan Hough, appears to have been the principal and managing
owner.
The vessel left Libau, in Kourland, at 11 a.m. of the 18th day of November last,
bound with a cargo of rye and barley to Schiedam. She had altogether about 1,000
tons on board, and her draught of water when she left Libau was 14.9 feet
forward and 14.10 feet aft, so that she was an inch down by the stern. Her crew
consisted of 19 hands all told. The captain, John Halder, held a certificate of
competency as master. The mate, Edward Potts, also held a certificate of
competency as master, and the second officer, Arthur Webb, held a certificate of
competency, we are told, as mate. There were two engineers, and the remainder of
the crew consisted of seamen, firemen, and stokers. There is in this case no
question of the stowing or shifting of the cargo, as is so common in these grain
cargo cases; it is, as will presently be seen, a mere question of the navigation
of the vessel.
In crossing the bar at Libau the vessel touched slightly, and accordingly the
captain ordered the engines to be stopped, and the vessel to be put under sail
only on a west-north-west course, to enable the engineer to ascertain whether or
not the air pump had got any sand into it. There seems to have been some
difference between the master and the first mate as to how long the vessel was
kept on a west-north-west course. According to the master, she was kept on that
course for only three-quarters of an hour, namely, from 11 till 11.45. According
to the entry in the log-book, which was kept by the mate, she was kept for a
much longer time on that course, for how long may be a question, but with that I
will deal presently.
At a quarter to 12 o'clock, no damage having been discovered to have been done
to the engines or boilers, she was, according to the master, laid a course west
half south, and proceeded on her voyage, under steam and sail at full speed, the
wind at the time being east-south-east and freshening. At 7 o'clock we are told
that the vessel was put on a west by south course, half a point more to the
southward. At 9 o'clock the captain went below, leaving directions that a cast
of the lead should be taken at 4 a.m., and that he should then be called, for,
as he has told us, he expected that at that time she should probably be on the
Middle Bank.
It was the first mate's watch from 8 till 12 o'clock at night, and his evidence
is that the vessel continued during that time on a west by south course. At 12
o'clock the second mate came on deck, his watch being from 12 to 4. What took
place during that watch we are not informed. The second officer is absent, the
man at the wheel is absent, and the look-out man is absent. Not one of the
seamen who were in that watch has been here to tell us what took place during
that interval. But at 4 o'clock, the master tells us, that the second officer
came down to the cabin; and informed him that the patent log showed that they
had run 120 miles, and that he had taken a cast of the lead, which gave 17
fathoms. The captain said that he thereupon pricked out the vessel's course on
the chart in the presence of the second officer, and, finding that she was in
the place that he had expected to be, namely, over the Middle Bank, he ordered
the second officer to put the vessel on again at full speed, saying that he
should shortly come up on deck.
In the meantime the first officer had come up to' take his watch at 4 a.m., and
on hearing from the second officer that the vessel had run only 120 miles, and
that the depth of the water was 17 fathoms, he immediately, as he has told us,
thought that the vessel had got out of her course. He said that from the
appearance of things he felt convinced that the vessel must have gone more than
120 miles, and if so, she would by 4 a.m. have been well over the Middle Bank,
and consequently in deep water; and he thought from the soundings having given
only 17 fathoms that the vessel must be on the coast of Oland.
The second officer also informed him that a light had been reported a little on
the starboard bow, but that he himself had not seen it. Accordingly the first
officer immediately ordered the second officer to go below to call the captain,
and himself ordered the helm to be put hard astarboard, the yards to be braced
forward, and the boatswain to stand by the engine-room, in order that another
cast of the lead might be taken. He then followed the second officer down into
the cabin for the purpose of looking at the chart, and taking, what he has
called, the row of soundings on the Oland Coast. Having done so, he returned to
the deck. The vessel in the meantime, the helm having been put hard a-starboard,
came up towards the wind, and when she had got to about south-south-west she
struck. In a short time the water came into the engine-room, and the fires were
put out.
The master at the moment the vessel struck was down in his cabin, but he
immediately came up, and the first order he gave was to put the engines full
speed astern. By that time, however, it was too late. The engineer, who was
coming up the ladder, told him the fires were out in half an hour all the
compartments were full of water, the water inside and outside being on a level.
As soon as the master found that the vessel had settled down, he ordered the
first and second officers to serve out to all the men lifebelts, and directed
the boats to be prepared, but that they should not be lowered without his
orders. Flares, blue lights, and rockets were also burned for the purpose of
obtaining assistance from the shore, but it was not until daylight, at 7.30
a.m., that the first boat came alongside, and they then found for the first time
that the vessel had struck on the coast of Oland, opposite a village called
Stenasa. The master thereupon proceeded to the shore in the first boat that had
come up, and having obtained a carriage, drove across the island, and having
procured another boat, went on to Kalmar, where arrangements were made for
obtaining the assistance of steamboats, either to get the vessel off, or at all
events to save as much of the cargo as they could. The master then returned to
the ship. The first steamer arrived at 10 a.m. of the 20th, and a second at 10
a.m. on the 23rd, and by their exertions a portion of the cargo that was above
water was saved. On the 23rd the crew were discharged, and on the 4th the
engineers and officers, and on the 5th or 6th (I do not know exactly which) the
vessel broke up.
So far as relates to the conduct of the captain, officers, and men after the
casualty, there is no reason whatever to think that they did not do all that was
in their power to save the vessel and cargo. We have it on the evidence both of
the master and of the chief mate, that the men conducted' themselves with
propriety during the whole time. There was no drunkenness, no neglect of duty.
Such, then, are the facts of this case, and the only witnesses produced before
us on the preliminary inquiry were the master, the chief mate, the boatswain,
the cook, the first and second engineers, and a fireman. As I have already said,
the most important witnesses are not here. Arthur Webb, the second officer, who
I am told holds a certificate of competency, is not to be found. Now, if this
gentleman should hereafter apply to the Board of Trade for a certificate of
competency as master, it might be well that he should be asked why he has not
been present on this occasion, having been the officer of the watch at the time
of the casualty, and how it was that he has gone to sea again, as we are told he
has done, without communicating his intention to the Board of Trade. Some
explanation should be obtained from him on the subject. We have also not had
before us either of the men who were on the look-out or at the wheel.
Mr. Stewart, at the termination of the preliminary examination, seemed to
entertain some doubt whether or not he would prefer a charge against the master,
but, in our opinion, if ever there was a case in which a charge should be made,
it is this. Ultimately, however, he charged the master with negligence in the
navigation of his vessel, but he produced no further witnesses in support,
relying upon the evidence that had been already given. Mr. Howard, however, who
appeared for the master, produced the owner, Mr. Hough, to speak to the high
character which the master has always borne during the whole time he has been in
his service; and he has told us that in the event of his being acquitted of this
charge he intended to put him in command of another vessel, which he has ready
for the purpose. No doubt such evidence is entitled to every consideration, at
the same time if we should find that the master has been guilty of negligence in
the navigation of his vessel, it is our duty to say so, whatever may be the
character which he has received from his owner.
Now the first fact that strikes us in this case is, that at the time when the
master believed that his vessel was 120 miles from Libau she was in fact above
140 miles from that place. She had in fact run ahead of the captain's reckoning
by something like 20 miles, and not only so, but she was between 42 and 43 miles
to the northward of the place where the master thought she as at the time. The
master has in his evidence, and in the statement which has been read by his
counsel to-day, endeavoured to account for his being so far ahead of his
reckoning, and for the deviation of 42 or 43 miles to the northward, on the
assumption (an assumption be it observed which did not occur to him at the time,
but which has since occurred to him), that when strong north-east winds blow for
a continuance the water is driven out of the gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, and
that when those winds abate, as they did in this case, the water which had been
heaped up, as it were, to the southward, flows back again towards the gulfs of
Bothnia and Finland.
That a strong north-east wind prevailing for several days might drive the water
from the northward and eastward, and that on that wind abating the water would
flow back again to the northward and eastward, may readily be admitted, but that
this would explain the deviation of the vessel from her course some 42 to 43
miles in a run of 16 hours, showing a set of the vessel to the north at the rate
of nearly three miles an hour, cannot, I am advised by my assessors, be
admitted. But however much such a current could account for the deviation of the
vessel to the northeastward, it could hardly explain her having run some 20
miles ahead of her reckoning, her course at the time being W. 1/2 S. or W. by S.
It appears to us that we must look for some more reasonable explanation of the
fact, and that this is not far to seek.
It will be observed that the way in which the master seems to have laid down his
course upon the chart was as follows: According to him the vessel was kept on a
west-north-west course from 11 to 11.45, for which he allowed two miles. From a
quarter to 12 to 7 o'clock the vessel was going full speed ahead with the wind
on the port quarter, on a west half south course, for which, assuming her to be
going 7 1/2 knots an hour, he allows 53 miles. From 7 o'clock till 4 the next
morning, or for nine hours more, she was pursuing a course west by south, for
which, at the rate of 7 1/2 knots an hour, he allows 68 miles, making in all 123
miles. He stated that 123 miles marked on the chart brought the vessel just upon
the Middle Bank, and that, therefore, when the second officer informed him that
there were 17 fathoms he thought she was in her right course. Now the entries in
the log-book show that, during the time that the master assumed her to be going
7 1/2 knots she is put down as having been going during the greater part of the
time at 8 1/2 knots, and for a short time at 8 knots. On his attention being
called to this the master stated that she could not go at that speed. It was
then pointed out to him that from previous entries in the logbook it would seem
that she had repeatedly gone at the rate of 8 1/2 knots an hour whenever the
wind was in her favour, and that it was when the wind was against her that she
only made 7 1/2 knots an hour. To this the master could give no answer, except
that it must have been a mistake.
Now if we take the estimate of the vessel's speed from the entries in the
log-book we shall find that the distance which the vessel would have run by 4
a.m. would be about 140 miles, and that corresponds very nearly with the
distance actually run. If, therefore, the captain did, as he says he did, assume
that the vessel was only going 7 1/2 knots an hour, when the log-book showed
that she was going 8 1/2 knots, and when it appears from the log-book that with
the wind aft, as it then was, she had frequently before done 8 1/2 knots an
hour, the captain was guilty of great negligence. We are told by the first mate
'that the very fact that there were only 17 fathoms of water when the soundings
were taken at 4 o'clock, showed him clearly that the vessel was in danger,
because he felt quite convinced that she must have run more than 120 miles by
that time, and that if she had run as he supposed she had, between 135 and 140
miles, she would at that time have been in deep water. And we think that the
master should not have been less slow than the mate was to anticipate danger,
when he was told that she had only run 120 miles, and that there were 17 fathoms
of water. It was the duty of the master to estimate with care the speed of his
vessel, and if he had done so he would have found that by 4 a.m., when he said
that he ordered a cast of the lead to be taken, the vessel would have been well
over the Middle Bank, and in deep water. Instead of ordering a cast of the lead
to be taken at 4 a.m. he should have ordered it to be taken at 2 a.m., when,
according to the speed shown by the log-book, she might reasonably have been
expected to be over the Middle Bank.
The deviation of 42 or 43 miles in 16 hours to the northward is not so easy to
explain. No doubt, as I have said, the current might have done something towards
it, but if so, it was the duty of the master to have taken precautions to guard
against it. But this theory of an unknown current, which is a favourite theory
with masters when they find that they have deviated from their course, is wholly
insufficient to explain the great deviation of 42 or 43 miles to the northward
in 16 hours. There must be some other explanation, either there must have been
some error in the original course, or some mistake in the steering. We are
certainly struck with the fact that the entries in the log-book not only, as I
have shown, as regards the speed, but also as regards the courses steered, do
not agree with the evidence given by the master. The master stated that they
kept a W.N.W. course only from 11 to 11.45, and that during that time they made
only two miles; the log-book states that they kept a W.N.W. course from 12 to 1
p.m., and that during that time the ship went eight miles. We are also struck
with the fact that the entry of the "west half south" course seems to have been
made subsequently, and that originally the entries in the logbook seem to show
that the W.N.W. course had been kept down to 7 p.m. Is it possible that this was
so? and that the vessel when she left Libau was put upon a W.N.W. course, and so
kept until it was altered to W. by S. at 7? If so, the explanation of the
deviation is clear, if she was continued from the time of her leaving Libau
until 7 p.m. on a west-north-west course, we can well understand how it was that
she had got so far to the northward, and at 4 a.m. found herself on the coast of
Oland. We do not indeed charge the master directly with altering the logbook
intentionally to suit his purpose, but the alteration is a fact, which the Court
thinks it its duty to point out.
Another circumstance that strikes us, too, is that the compasses of this vessel
are stated to have been last adjusted in February 1875, the deviation card by
which this vessel was being steered bearing date 11th February 1875. The owner,
indeed, was under the impression that her compasses had been adjusted, and she
had been swung subsequently to that date, and perhaps not unreasonably so,
seeing that she had had some repairs done to her in 1876. 1 say the owner was
under the impression, but the master declared most positively that she had not
been swung, nor her compasses re-adjusted since February 1875. But then the
question arises, whether they ought not to have been after her repairs in 1876?
We have it also in evidence that this vessel on the voyage previous to her loss
had carried a general cargo, and amongst it was some machinery and ironwork. Now
we all know how liable compasses are to be affected by the presence of iron
goods on board a ship. I do not say, for we have no evidence at all upon the
point, that the compasses were affected by the nature of the cargo, but I merely
throw that out as a possible explanation of the deviation of 42 or 43 miles in
16 hours.
There is also another fact which must not be passed over, and that is, the
statement made this morning by Blundell, the boatswain, namely, that when he
came up on deck at 4 o'clock he found the after binnacle light out. How long it
had been out there is no evidence at all to show. He said that he was preparing
to relight it when he was ordered by the chief mate to stand by the engine-room
skylight. Now the captain has told us that the after compass was the standard
compass. Is it possible that that binnicle light was out during the whole of the
second officer's watch? We have no evidence upon the point, and we know nothing
about it, for neither the officer, nor any of the men of the watch have been
produced before us.
Taking all these circumstances into consideration there is perhaps sufficient
here to account for the deviation of the vessel even to the extent of 42 or 43
miles to the northward. But however this may be, even so large a deviation could
not have caused the loss of the vessel if the captain had not made that great
error of estimating the vessel's speed at 7 1/2 knots an hour, when he might, by
looking at the log-book, have seen that her speed was nearer 8 1/2 knots. If he
had done so, the report that there was only 17 fathoms of water would have been
a clear indication to him of the great danger in which the vessel was.
We are also of opinion that the master was guilty of negligence in going below
at 9 o'clock at night, and staying down until after 4 o'clock the next morning,
during a time when the navigation was, to say the least of it, difficult.
According to his own account, the currents were so dangerous, that during the
month of November no less than 23 or 27 vessels had been wrecked off the coast
of Oland; it was therefore his duty to have been more careful, and not to have
remained below for so long a time as from 9 o'clock till 4 a.m.
On the whole, we have come to the conclusion that the master was negligent in
the navigation .of his vessel. Mr. Howard was right in saying that the Court is
loth to punish a man for a mere error of judgment, but it is a different thing
when the Court finds him guilty of negligence. The Court has also given due
weight to the high character which the captain has received from the owner, in
whose employment he has been for so long a time. Under all the circumstances of
the case, the Court, although it cannot altogether overlook the offence of which
this man has been guilty, it is disposed to pass upon him as lenient a sentence
as it well can. The Court will order his certificate as a master to be suspended
for six months; but as we think that it is neither wise, nor was it the
intention of the Legislature, to deprive a man of the means of earning his
livelihood, nor do we think that compulsory idleness on shore would tend to make
him a good seaman, we shall at the same time recommend to the Board of Trade
that during the time of the suspension of his certificate as master he shall be
allowed a certificate as first mate. It is the least punishment which we can
inflict upon him for the great negligence of which he has been guilty on this
occasion.
I ought not to conclude my observations in this case without referring to the
evidence of Mr. Hough on the value of the vessel, and the amount for which she
was insured. He told us that her value to her owners was 17,500l and that she
was insured for 13,500l. On being further examined, Mr. Hough admitted that the
17,500l. represented the whole original cost of the vessel, including extras and
everything; and, on being further asked whether he supposed that that could
possibly be her value at the present time, after six years wear and tear, he
admitted that she would certainly be liable to depreciation. I should add that a
steam vessel, owing to her boilers, is more liable to depreciation than a
sailing vessel; and assuming in this case that there was a depreciation of only
5 per cent per annum, that would represent something like 5,000l. Mr. Hough has
admitted that, of course, a vessel would not be of the same value after six
years wear and tear as she was originally, and that inasmuch as he would be paid
the whole of his insurance, 13,500l., he would not be a loser by the stranding
of this vessel.
In making these observations we have no intention whatever of implying that Mr.
Hough or the owners in any way wished or sought to lose this vessel, but we have
thought it our duty to mention it rather as an answer to the inference which was
sought to be drawn that Mr. Hough would he a loser by the event. The owners seem
to have had no interest in the cargo.
With respect to Arthur Webb, the second officer, as he has a certificate, I
doubt not that he will some day or other be heard of; at any rate, I think it
will be the duty of the Board of Trade, with whom will rest the continuance of
his certificate, to inquire what has become of him, and why he has avoided this
inquiry.
There will, of course, be no costs. The inquiry was a very proper one. The chief
mate will have his certificate returned to him, but I shall send the certificate
of the master to the Board of Trade, with a recommendation that he should have a
certificate of mate during the suspension of his master's certificate.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
Finding.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annexed
judgment, that the loss of the said ship and her cargo on the occasion in
question was due to the negligent navigation of the said ship by the master in
having got ahead of his reckoning nearly 20 miles, and deviated from his course
between 42 and 43 miles in a run of only 16 hours.
The Court accordingly ordered the certificate of the master to be suspended for
six months from this day, but at the same time recommended that he should be
allowed a mate's certificate during the period of the suspension of his master's
certificate.
This Court is also of opinion that there should be no order as to costs.
Dated this 20th day of January 1377.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)GEORGE H. FORSTER,Assessors.
"THOS. BEASLEY,
W. 858.
