"AGNES WYLLIE."
THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS, 1854 TO 1876.
REPORT of the Court in the matter of the formal investigation held at
Middlesborough on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th February 1877, before H. C. Rothery,
Wreck Commisioner, assisted by Commander Forster, R.N., and Captain Castle as
assessors, into the circumstances attending the foundering of the steamship
"AGNES WYLLIE," of Middlesborough, about 3 miles east of the Goodwin Light-ship,
on the 1st of January 1877.
JUDGMENT.
The Commissioner.-The inquiry on which we have been engaged now for some days
past relates to the foundering of the steamship "Agnes Wyllie," of
Middlesborough, about 3 miles east of the Goodwin Light-ship, on the 1st of
January last. All hands on board, except one seaman who has appeared before us,
were lost, and under those circumstances it was quite right that an inquiry
should take place.
The circumstances of the case, as they appear from the evidence of James Hansen,
the survivor, appear to be as follow:-
It seems that the "Agnes Wyllie" was an iron screw steamship of 301 tons gross
and 189 tons net register. She was built in the year 1871, at South
Stockton-on-Tees, by Messrs. Richardson, Duck, and Company. She had two engines
of 45 horse-power, and at the period of her loss was owned by Messrs. Clifton
and Company.
She left Middlesborough on the 30th of December, at about mid-day, having taken
in a cargo of pig iron, and being bound therewith to Caen in France. At this
time she had a crew of 12 hands, consisting of a master, a mate, four able
seamen, two engineers, three firemen, and a steward. She passed the Fairway Buoy
at about 3 p.m., and continued her course southward. Nothing particular occurred
until the morning of the 1st of January, when she had arrived a little to the
eastward of the Goodwin Sands. We are told by Hansen that between 8.30 and 9
o'clock the wind had increased to a very severe gale, blowing from the west and
directly up the Channel, and I think that most of us will recollect, at all
events those who at the time were in the South of England, and to whom the 1st
of January is usually a holiday, what a violent gale was blowing on that day. At
this time the master, being unable to contend against the wind, ordered the
vessel's helm to be put to port for the purpose of running into the Downs.
Now some observations have been made as to whether the master was justified at
that time in endeavouring to run for shelter, but I am advised by the assessors
that the master was perfectly justified in so doing. They tell me that in such a
gale as was then blowing the engines would not have had power to keep the ship's
head to the wind, and that she would have had a tendency to fall off and get
into the trough of the sea. Moreover the vessel would seem to have been taking
in so much water that it was quite right to get her into smooth water. The
master accordingly in our opinion exercised a wise discretion in attempting to
run for the Downs. When it was that the cargo shifted does not very clearly
appear, whether immediately on the vessel's helm being put a port or some time
afterwards, there is nothing to show. According to the evidence of the survivor
Hansen there was a sudden throw, as he called it, about half-an-hour after he
had gone below, and on his then coming up on deck he found the top of the rail
on the starboard side level with the water. Nothing, however, turns upon whether
the cargo began at once to shift after the helm was put to port, or whether it
was some time before it shifted, for as we have already said the master was in
our opinion justified in attempting to run for the Downs and in trying to get
into a place of shelter. The master might at first not know whether the cargo
had begun to shift or not, for having the wind and the sea on his port side she
would necessarily heel over to starboard, and no one could say with certainty
when the vessel began to shift her cargo. When, however, Hansen came on deck
there can be no doubt that the cargo had then shifted; if it had shifted
slightly before that, then at any rate it had shifted so as to endanger the
safety of the ship.
There seems to be some difficulty in saying when measures were taken to meet the
difficulties of the situation. It seems from Hansen's evidence that the master
ordered the helm to be put to starboard to endeavour to bring the vessel's head
to wind. Finding that this did not succeed, he ordered the mizen to be set, in
order to bring her stern round, but that also failed. In the meantime the vessel
had gone still farther over, so much so that the water was on the deck, or
possibly over the main hatchway. Accordingly the master, the mate, and two of
the seamen went forward with a view to let the anchor go, and thus, if possible,
bring her head to wind. By the time they had got forward the vessel took another
lurch and fell over almost on her beam ends, and the water entered the engine
room through a grating which I shall presently describe, on the top of the
engine room casing.
It was then a question only of a few minutes. The two seamen who had accompanied
the master and mate forward returned aft, climbing, as Hansen has described, on
the outside of the bulwarks. At this time the port lifeboat had been lowered
into the water; an attempt had been previously made to lower the starboard boat,
but it was stove in doing it. All the crew, with the exception of the master and
the mate, who were forward, and of Hansen, who was standing on the rail with a
lifebuoy in his hand, got into the port lifeboat, when the vessel suddenly sank.
Hansen having freed himself from the sinking vessel, swam toward the boat, which
had been upset as the vessel went down, and which was then floating bottom
upwards with a fireman sitting on the top of it.
Before he reached it the sea had again righted the lifeboat, and he and the
engineer and the fireman got into her. They then picked up a ladder and fastened
it across the boat to steady her, and then let her drift just where the wind and
waves could carry her. For two hours after this (the vessel had gone down at
about 12.30) the engineer died, and before dusk the fireman died also. Hansen
was then the only survivor, and on the following morning a Flushing pilot fell
in with him, took him out, and landed him on the Saturday following at Flushing.
Such, briefly, are the facts of this case.
After the evidence of Hansen had been given, Mr. Ravenhill, on behalf of the
Board of Trade, stated that he had no charge to make against the master, the
owners, or the builders of the vessel, nor indeed had he any charge to make at
that time against the stevedore, Fancourt; but he proposed then to produce the
builder of the vessel, and several other skilled witnesses, for the purpose of
proving the nature of the stowage of the cargo and the construction of the
vessel, in order to ascertain, if possible, how the vessel had been lost. To
this Mr. Belk, who appeared for the owners of the vessel and for Mr. Fancourt
the stevedore, raised no objection, saying that his clients desired a thorough
investigation of the case; and in taking that course, and raising no objection
to the further investigation of the case, I think that they have acted quite
rightly.
Mr. Ravenhill then produced for examination Mr. Spence, a partner in the firm of
Messrs. Richardson, Duck, and Company, the builders of the "Agnes Wyllie." Mr.
Reed, formerly mate of the "Agnes Wyllie," and who gave his evidence I must say
in a most satisfactory manner; Mr. Gimblett, formerly a surveyor for the Board
of Trade at Middlesborough, but now at Deal; Mr. Storm, the harbour master at
Middlesborough; then Mr. Fancourt the stevedore, and one of the men who had
assisted him in stowing the cargo; then Captain Sandeman, a gentleman resident
at this port, and who has been I am informed for 25 years in the Bengal pilot
service, and a gentleman of a very high character and great experience, and
to-day there has been produced before us Mr. Jarvis, a shipwright surveyor of
the Board of Trade in Middlesborough.
Now I do not propose to go through the whole of the evidence of those gentlemen,
but to state simply what impression their evidence has left upon our minds. And
first as to the vessel's construction-
It seems that she was as I have stated 301 tons gross and 189 tons net register;
she was 140 feet in length, 20 feet wide, and had a hold 12 feet deep. The
engines and the boilers were in the after part of the vessel, and forward of
these was the hold, which was about 72 feet long. Forward of this I gather from
the plans which have been put before us was a chain locker, then a fresh-water
tank, and forward of that the fore peak. At the bottom of the hold and running
the whole length of it or nearly so was a water tank, which according to the
evidence of Mr. Spence stood 3 feet above the keel and rested upon girders
standing upon the floor plates. The top of the tank formed a level floor for the
hold and was covered with wood. The sides of the hold were straight up and down
the width at top and bottom for about 48 feet forward, of the boiler space was
about 20 feet, forward of that the space gradually narrowed to about 8 feet. The
sides of the hold were cased with cargo battens. Running down the hold there
were originally iron stanchions at distances of 10 feet apart resting upon the
top of the tank; but on the recommendation of the surveyor to Lloyd's, who
thought that the pressure of the stanchions might possibly injure the tank, the
lower ends of the stanchions were shifted so as to rest on the bilge of the
vessel. There were two hatchways to the hold, the main hatchway was 16 feet
forward of the boiler bulkhead and was 32 feet long, so that the forward
combings of the main hatchway were just about square with the part of the hold
where it began to diminish in size. The hatchway was 12 feet wide. Forward of
the main hatchway was another hatchway 7 feet by 7. The combings of the
hatchways were raised some 2 feet above the main deck. Over the engines and
boilers was what is called the engine room casing, it was 32 feet long by about
7 feet wide, and stood 2 feet 6 inches above the quarter deck, which was itself
raised 4 feet above the main deck. The casing was of iron and was riveted down
to the quarter deck beams. Forward on the top of the casing was an open grating
7 feet long by 2 feet wide to give ventilation to the engine room, and we have
been told by Mr. Spence that there was a cover for this grating which could be
riveted down to the grating, so as in case of very bad weather to prevent the
sea from coming in.
It seems, however, that on the occasion on which this casualty occurred the
cover was not put on, for some reason which we do not know, and thus when the
vessel heeled over the water got into the engine room and was the immediate
cause of her sinking. Aft of this grating was the engine room skylight.
Such generally is a description of the construction of this vessel. And I will
now proceed to state the nature of the cargo, and the mode in which it was
stowed.
The cargo it seems consisted of about 300 tons of pig iron.
The pigs are as I understand all intended to be of one uniform size, namely 3
1/2 feet long by something like from 3 1/2 to 4 inches broad, the bottom is
flat, the sides are flat, but the top is rounded and one of the ends is bevelled
off. They, however, vary somewhat in size and thickness, and some of them are
occasionally broken.
The way in which the cargo seems to have been stowed on board the "Agnes
Wyllie," so far as it appears from the evidence of Fancourt and the man who
assisted him, was as follows:-
It was built in two lifts, each lift being constructed in the following
manner:-In the lower lift there were 11 tiers of pigs, but the upper lift
consisted of one tier less, the ends of it being withdrawn half a tier, so as to
form a step from the lower to the upper lift. The first tier on the lower lift
was thus constructed:-A row of pigs was laid upon the floor of the hold, running
fore and aft close together, or as it is called laid solid across them; athwart
the ship were laid two lines of pigs, one across each end, these are called
cross-bars, above the cross-bars pigs were again laid fore and aft solid, above
that cross-bars, above that solid, and above that cross-bars, and so on, until
they had reached a height of 3 feet 6 inches. The second tier was thus
constructed:-In the wings two pairs of pigs were laid on the floor, one pair at
such a distance from the other that they would carry the ends of two cross-bars
placed upon them, above the cross-bars were two more pairs of pigs, laid fore
and aft; and above that cross-bars, above that two pairs, and so on, until it
reached the height of the first tier. This is what is technically called double
chequered.
If instead of the pigs being laid in pairs they are laid single, like the
cross-bars, it is called single chequered.
The space between the two wings was constructed in the same way as the first
tier was, namely, first a row of pigs laid solid, and then cross-bars again upon
these pigs laid solid, then cross-bars, and so on, until it reached the height
of the first tier. The third, fourth, and the other rows were all laid in the
same way, chequered in the wings solid, and cross-bars in the centre, down to
the two last tiers, which were all chequered. The first lift having been thus
completed to a height of 3 1/2 feet the construction of the second lift
commenced; this was constructed as follows:-
The fore end of the second lift terminated just half way across the first tier
of the lower lift, as the after end terminated half way across the last tier of
the lower lift, there being 10 tiers in the upper lift and 11 in the lower. The
first tier of the upper lift was constructed in the same way as the second,
third, and fourth of the lower lift, that is to say, chequered in the wings, and
solid and cross-bars in the centre. So it continued until the last; I forget
whether the last was chequered throughout, or whether it was chequered only in
the wings.
Mr. Ravenhill. It was chequered throughout, I think?
The Commissioner. I think so. The total height of the two lifts was consequently
seven feet. One fact must not be omitted, and it is this, that in putting in the
cross bars and in constructing the chequers each pig had of course to be handled
separately; but in forming that part which is called "laid solid," they lowered
down into the hold from one to two and a half tons at a time in slings, dropped
them down, and then levelled them in the hold. When, nowever, they had come to
within about three or four of the last layers or thicknesses in the centre, the
pigs were dropped in so that the fore ends of one row overlapped the after ends
of the next row, one end of the pigs being above the chequer work in the wings,
but the other end being below it. That was, so far as appears from the evidence,
the way in which the cargo of the "Agnes Wyllie" was stowed.
Now we have the evidence of Mr. Sandeman, who has paid a great deal of attention
to the stowage of cargoes of pig iron during the time that he has been at
Middlesborough, that if the cargo of the "Agnes Wyllie" was constructed in this
way, double chequered in the wings, and solid and cross bars in the centre, and
if the centre did not project, as he says he has so often seen, above the wings,
except only the ends of the centre bars, as I have described, if that was the
mode in which the "Agnes Wyllie's" cargo was stowed, it is the best form of
construction that he has seen in this port. That it was so constructed is proved
from the evidence of Fancourt and the man who assisted him in stowing it, and
there is not a particle of evidence to show that it was not stowed in that way.
Any charge then against Fancourt that the cargo was not properly stowed must
after this evidence fail, and accordingly Mr. Ravenhill has in our opinion very
properly not made any charge against him. At the same time the evidence shows
that the cargo of this vessel did shift, and the question that we have to
consider is how it came to pass that a cargo which, according to the evidence of
the witnesses, was stowed as well as, if not better, than any cargo that has
ever left the port, came to shift when it was found necessary to bear away for a
place of shelter, and whether therefore it might not be necessary to adopt some
better precautions to prevent the cargo from shifting when the vessel made bad
weather; for if the cargo of the "Agnes Wyllie" had shifted what chance would
there be for the many other vessels whose cargoes were not so well stowed.
This then is the question which we have been called upon to consider, and after
hearing the arguments which have been addressed to us by Mr. Belk and by Mr.
Ravenhill on the subject, I have consulted with the two experienced gentlemen by
whom I am assisted on this occasion, and I now propose to state the advice which
they have given me. In the first place they say that, assuming the vessel to
have had 340 tons on board, which seems to be admitted, that is to say 300 tons
of cargo and about 40 tons of coal, they think that that was not too large a
cargo considering the. voyage on which she was engaged. It would undoubtedly
have been too large a cargo if her voyage had been much longer; but for a voyage
from here to Caen, with the chances of running into a port, with a port always
under her lee, they think it was not too great a cargo for her to carry. They
think also that as she had 12 inches of free board when she left this place,
which when she got into salt water would probably be from 14 to 15 inches, and
which would gradually increase as she consumed her coals, she was not improperly
deep in the water, although no doubt it was a full cargo. We have therefore no
reason to charge the owner or the shippers of the cargo with having laden her
too deeply.
The next question upon which I thought it proper to consult the assessors was
with respect to the mode of stowing this cargo, and they tell me that, assuming
that it was, as has been described, constructed with double chequers in the
wings and solid and cross bars in the centre, and that the top was level with
the wings, it was a form of construction which would undoubtedly under ordinary
circumstances be all that could be desired. Single chequering, on the other
hand, they think would be attended with very considerable danger, and they
desire me to state that they trust that the observations which may fall from the
Court upon this occasion will induce those whose business it is to see to the
loading of these cargoes to consider the importance of always loading their
vessels with double chequers, and not with single chequers. The way in which the
assessors think this vessel came to be lost was this, they think that when she
came broadside to the wind and sea, she heeled over so much that probably the
whole body of the cargo fell to leeward, and if so nothing could have saved her.
The question, then, which we have considered is, seeing that this vessel was
stowed as well if not better than any vessel leaving the port, what measures in
our opinion should be adopted in order to make these cargoes more secure and to
prevent their falling over to leeward, and the conclusion to which we have come,
and it seems also to be the opinion of all who have been examined before us, is
that nothing will make these cargoes perfectly secure except some system of
shifting boards.
It is possible that owners may not be disposed to go to the expense of
constructing what I may call shifting shutters such as have been recommended by
Mr. Jarvis, if, indeed, they would be the best mode of construction, seeing that
if one of the wings gave way bodily they would hardly prevent the centre from
falling over to leeward; but we think that shifting boards could, without much
difficulty or expense, be built up from the bottom, and that this would be a
much more secure and a much better mode of securing these cargoes than any at
present in use. We think that such shifting boards could be constructed as the
cargo was being built up. And without giving any very positive opinion as to
what kind of shifting boards is the best, we think that some mode of thus
securing the cargoes is desirable, and we trust that it is a matter which will
engage the serious attention of those gentlemen whose business it is to send
veseels to sea with large cargoes of pig iron. When once either of the wings
breaks down, nothing would prevent the solid centre from going to leeward, if
the vessel heels over at all, except solid shifting boards separating the centre
from the two compartments on each side.
Something was said about the expediency of shoring the cargo above, but the
assessors by whom I am assisted, think that that mode is open to many
objections. In the first place it adds to the weight, already very great, of the
cargo upon the lower tiers, and in the next place if the cargo settles in the
least the shores become useless, they must fall down. We therefore do not
advocate at all the use of shores from above. Shifting boards seem to us to be
the safest mode, and in fact the only mode, and that appears to be the opinion
generally of those who have given evidence before us, and who are most competent
to pronounce an opinion upon the subject.
One question yet remains to be mentioned. In the course of his examination Mr.
Sandeman was very anxious to state, that although the mode of stowing the cargo
of the "Agnes Wyllie" was good, there were other vessels which left this port
whose stowage was open to very great objection. Mr. Belk thereupon objected, and
in my opinion very properly, to evidence being given as to the practice in other
vessels and at other wharves, on the ground that the inquiry upon which we were
engaged, and which he was prepared to meet, simply related to the stowage of the
cargo of the "Agnes Wyllie." It seemed to me that to travel into a general
inquiry as to what the stowage was at other wharves in this port was, if not
beyond our province, at all events unfair towards those persons whose conduct
would be called in question. Mr. Belk, however, informed us that he was
instructed to say that it is the wish of the shipowners, of the wharfingers, of
the stevedores, and in fact the wish of all persons interested in these vessels,
that there should, if it were thought necessary, be a full and thorough inquiry
into the mode of stowing cargoes generally throughout the port; but that in that
case due notice should be given in order that those who were attacked might have
an opportunity of coming forward to defend themselves. In the present inquiry
they would have no such opportunity. Whether such an inquiry is or is not
necessary must rest with the Board of Trade. I understand from Mr. Belk that the
shipowners of this port are at present in communication with the Board of Trade
on the subject; what may be the result I know not. Our opinion has been founded
simply upon the evidence that has been laid before us, and relates simply to the
stowage of the cargo of the "Agnes Wyllie." What might come out upon a fuller
inquiry as to the stowage of other vessels, and whether any other and better
mode of stowing these vessels could then be discovered, is a matter upon which
we should not venture at the present moment to offer any opinion.
The result, then, of our finding is that the "Agnes Wyllie" sank from the
shifting of her cargo, and that no blame is attributable, either to the officers
who were on board her, or to the owners, or to the builders, or to the shippers
of the cargo, or to the stevedores. At the same time we think that it is
deserving of the serious attention of those interested in this subject, whether
greater security might not be given to these cargoes by the use of some form of
shifting boards.
It may perhaps not be out of place to state here that possibly some advantage
has already resulted from the present inquiry. Mr. Sandeman told us that since
this Court has been sitting he had examined one cargo in which boards had been
placed between the upper and lower lifts, so as to give it more stability, and
that he had never before seen such a thing done in this port. He thought that it
might be useful, but not so good as shifting boards. Of course there will be no
costs in this case. I do not know whether there is any point that I have
omitted.
Mr. Ravenhill. No, sir, I think not.
Am I to understand that the Court wish me to recommend to the Board of Trade
that there should be such an inquiry as has been suggested?
The Commissioner. No. My judgment will be submitted to the Board of Trade, and
the Board of Trade will then form their own opinion upon it. We leave it to the
shipowners to communicate further with the Board of Trade, if they wish to do
so, and of course the Board of Trade will take what action they please on it.
Should the Board of Trade ask me to hold such an inquiry I shall be quite ready
to do so. But the shipowners and the Board of Trade may, after this, think that
it is not necessary to hold such an inquiry; they may think that some form of
shifting boards would be the proper mode of dealing with this difficulty.
I ought to add that we think that a water tank at the bottom of the vessel, such
as this vessel had, would, in the case of vessels laden with heavy cargoes of
iron, be an element of danger. If once the vessel got over it would help to keep
her down. We think that the safer plan where such heavy cargoes as pig iron are
carried, would he not to have an empty water space or water tank at the bottom
of the ship, but to build up a floor from the bottom of some more solid
material.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
FINDING.
The Court having carefully inquired into the circnmstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the annexed
judgment:
(1.) That the loss of the said steamship and the lives of those on board was due
to the shifting of her cargo.
(2.) That no blame attaches to the master in the then state of the wind and
weather for having attempted to run for a place of shelter.
(3.) That it was proved in evidence that the stowing of the said cargo was done
with more care than is usually bestowed upon the stowage of cargoes of pig iron
in the port of Middlesborough.
(4.) That the system adopted in the case of the "Agnes Wyllie," of stowing the
cargo with double chequers in the wings, is much better than that sometimes
adopted of having only single chequers.
(5.) That the pigs in the centre ought to be on a level with those in the wings.
(6.) That it may be a matter for consideration with those interested in the
loading of cargoes of iron, whether some system of shifting boards might not be
adopted with advantage.
The Court is also of opinion that there should be no costs of this investigation
to anyone.
Dated this 5th day of February 1877.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)GEORGE H. FORSTER, Assessor.
"JOHN S. CASTLE, Assessor.
(No. 8.)
W. 878.
