(No. 284.)
"CHICAGO," (S.S.)
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
In the matter of the formal investigation held at the Police Court, West
Hartlepool, on the 24th and 25th May 1878, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck
Commissioner, assisted by Rear-Admiral POWELL, R.N., and Captain N COLAS, as
Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British
steamship "CHICAGO," of West Hartlepool, on the Long Sand, on the 8th instant,
whilst on a voyage from Newcastle-on-Tyne to Boston, United States of America.
Report of Court.
The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annexed
judgment, that the stranding of the said vessel "Chicago" was due to the
wrongful acts and defaults of Michael Pennock Lund, her master, in neglecting,
after passing the Newarp light-ship, to lay her on a course which would take him
more to the eastward, although he knew, before he had reached the Dudgeon, that
she was getting to the westward of her proper course; and in not taking proper
measures to verify his position after sighting a buoy, which he erroneously
supposed to be the Inner Gabbard, but which was in fact the Shipwash.
The Court therefore suspends the certificate of the said Michael Pennock Lund
for six months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension he be
allowed a first mate's certificate.
The Court makes no order as to costs.
Dated this 25th day of May 1878.
(Signed)H. J. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)R. ASHMORE POWELL,Assessors.
"B. G. W. NICOLAS,
Judgment.
The Commissioner.—The "Chicago" was an iron screw steamship of 1,383 tons gross
measurement, and 892 tons net register, and was fitted with two direct-acting
surface condensing engines of 140 horse-power combined. She was a perfectly new
vessel, built in the present year by the eminent shipbuilders Messrs. William
Gray and Company, of West Hartlepool, and was at the time of her loss the
property of Mr. William Gray and Mr. Christopher Furness, of this town, the
latter being the managing owner.
On being prepared for sea, she was sent to Newcastle, there to take in a cargo
of coal. She arrived there at 5 p.m. on Saturday the 4th of May instant,
commenced loading at 9 p.m. on the Monday following, and having completed her
cargo, left Newcastle at 5 a.m. on the 7th, bound to Boston in the United
States. She had in all a cargo of 1,000 tons, besides bunker coal, drew 16 feet
6 inches forward and 17 feet 11 inches aft, and had a crew of 23 hands all told.
After obtaining an offing of from four to five miles, a course was laid to pass
at a distance of from five to six miles from Flamborough Head. I will speak
presently of the courses on which the vessel was laid; it is sufficient here to
say that after passing Flamborough Head, which she did at about 2.30 p.m., she
was steered for the Outer Dowsing, but instead of making that point she picked
up the Dudgeon light-ship, which she passed at about 8.45 p.m. At 11 p.m. she
made Cromer, passed between Cromer and Hasborough Sand, then left the Newarp
lightship on her starboard hand, and at 2.10 a.m. of the 8th, the course was
altered to the southward and westward. It was the chief mate's watch on that
morning from 4 to 8, and accordingly, at 4.30 a.m. the captain, who had been on
deck from the time of leaving Newcastle, went into the chart room, and lay down.
At 5 o'clock he came out again, and ordered the course to be altered half a
point to the westward, and therefore nearer the shore, and again went into the
chart room. At 7 o'clock the mate, observing what he believed to be a buoy on
the starboard beam, called the master, who on coming out examined it with his
glasses, but failed to make it out. A cast of the lead was then taken, which
gave 14 fathoms, and they thereupon concluded that it was the buoy on the Inner
Gabbard. The vessel was then put at half speed, and her head laid half a point
off the shore. At this time the weather had become rainy and foggy, so that they
could not see more than a mile or a mile and a half distant. At 8.5 or 8.10 the
captain, who had continued on deck from the time of coming out at 7 o'clock,
went below to have his breakfast, leaving the chief mate in charge, and in about
15 minutes afterwards returned on deck, when he observed broken water about
three points on the starboard bow. He thereupon ordered the helm to be
starboarded, the engines to be stopped, and a cast of the lead to be taken. The
first cast gave 10 fathoms; another cast was then taken which gave 7 fathoms.
The engines were thereupon ordered to be put full speed astern; another cast of
the lead was taken, which gave four fathoms, and the next cast gave only three
fathoms. At this time the boatswain called out that they were shoaling, and
taking the ground astern; upon which the master ordered the engines to be put on
ahead full speed; but the vessel would not move, having taken the ground
amidships, with her head bearing about S.E. It was now about 9 a.m., and nearly
low water.
Soon after the ship had grounded, the weather cleared up, and it was then
discovered that they had grounded on the inner side of the Long Sand, about a
mile and a half from the north-east point of it. One of the boats was
immediately lowered, and soundings were taken round the ship; and, it having
been found that the water was deeper on the port side, an anchor was carried out
from the port bow. At about 11.15 another anchor was carried out from, I think,
the port quarter. At about 11.30 a smack came up and offered her services, which
were however refused; but at 12.30, the tide having then flowed for some time,
and the vessel still remaining fast, the master engaged some smacksmen to help
to lighten the vessel. At 1.30 they began to throw over the coals from both
hatchways; but at 4 o'clock they were obliged to desist, owing to the seas which
were breaking over the vessel. Two other smacks had in the meantime been engaged
to assist, one of which had been sent to Harwich for a steamer.
At 6.30 p.m. the smacksmen left her, and wished the crew to go with them, but
the crew very properly refused to do so. In the meantime the vessel had been
beating heavily upon the sand, and had in consequence begun to make water; and
accordingly at 9 o'clock the master thought it prudent to take to the boats.
'After lying off for about two hours they pulled to the Sunk light-vessel, but
returned on the following day, when they found her almost full of water. And
this fine vessel, worth as we are told 23,500l., with a cargo valued at 1,000l.,
ultimately became a total wreck.
Now there is no charge against either the master or the crew for anything which
they did after the vessel took the ground. They lowered the boats with great
expedition, and laid out the anchors in a proper and judicious manner. Nor can
we blame the master for having refused to accept the services of the smacksmen
when they were first offered; for at that time he might reasonably have expected
that the vessel would come off as the tide flowed; and in that case he would
have saved his owners the expense of having to employ the smacksmen, who are not
always very moderate in their demands. The crew too, it appears to us, behaved
extremely well in refusing to leave the vessel when invited to do so by the
smacksmen. I may add that the way in which the witnesses have given their
evidence, the captain as well as the officers and men, was very creditable to
them. They seem to be a very intelligent set of men, and it is deeply to be
regetted that so fine a vessel, with apparently so good a crew, should have been
lost so soon after leaving harbour.
The question, however, which we have to consider, is not what occurred after the
stranding, but how it came to pass that a vessel bound down Channel should have
got so far out of her course, as to have grounded on the Long Sand. Now it must
never be forgotten that the principal object of these inquiries is not so much
to apportion praise or blame to the officers of the vessel, but to ascertain how
the casualty occurred, and for this purpose it will require a most careful and
perhaps wearisome examination of the courses which this vessel steered from the
time of leaving Newcastle.
I should state that the vessel had three compasses on board, a pole compass, a
bridge compass, placed before the midship wheel, from which she was steered, and
an after compass. All these compasses, we are told, had been adjusted shortly
before the vessel left Newcastle; and the deviation card, with which the master
had been furnished, was handed in by him. Some difficulty arose from the master
and officers having always spoken of the vessel's course by the pole compass,
whereas the men naturally enough told us the course which they steered by the
bridge compass. The master, however, in answer to questions which were put to
him by the Court, told us the corresponding courses by the bridge compass; and
these substantially agreed with those given by the men, there being a.
difference of only about a quarter of a point between them. We thus know how the
pole and how the bridge compass pointed, and from this we shall have to
ascertain what were the vessel's true magnetic courses between the time of her
leaving Newcastle and the stranding.
According to the master, the vessel, on taking her departure from Souter Point,
was laid on a S.S.E. course by the pole compass, and that course was continued
until after they had passed Cromer. Now, if we looked at a chart, we shall find
that a S.S.E. course magnetic from off Souter Point would take a vessel some 5
or 6 miles clear of Flamborough Head. And the master has told us that, as his
deviation card shewed him that for a S.S.E. magnetic course he must steer by the
pole compass 1/4 S., in other words that on a S.S.E. course the pole compass had
a westerly deviation of a 1/4 of a point, he thought that he would be quite safe
in steering that course, as it would take him 1/4 of a point further from the
coast than he had any occasion to go. Before reaching Flamborough Head, however,
he observed that the vessel was drawing more to the westward than he expected,
but the measures which he took,—and what they were I will presently
say,—prevented his getting away to the westward, for as a fact he passed some 5
or 6 miles outside of Flamborough Head. After passing Flamborough Head he
continued the same course as before, S.S.E. by the ??ipole compass, which
according to his deviation card was equivalent to a S.S.E. 1/4 E. magnetic
course, and which he supposed would bring him with the Outer Dowsing bearing
right ahead. He, however, missed the Outer Dowsing, but picked up the Dudgeon
light-ship, which he passed at a distance of some 4 or 5 miles, shewing that he
must have got some 6 or 7 miles to the westward of his course from leaving
Flamborough Head. It ought therefore to have been clear to him that his pole
compass, by which he had been steering, was not to be relied upon.
Let us now see how the bridge compass was pointing during all this time.
According to the master the bridge compass was S. by E. 1/4 E., according to the
men it was S. by E. 1/2 E. Now the deviation card shews that for a S. by E.
course magnetic, we ought to steer by the bridge compass S. by E. 1/4 E.
According then to the bridge compass, the vessel's course from Souter Point was
S. by E. magnetic, which is a very different thing from S.S.E 1/4 E. the course
which the master thought that he was making according to the indications
afforded by the pole compass. How to account for this difference of 1 1/4 points
it is very difficult to say; we can hardly suppose that both officers and men
have made a mistake as to the course shewn by the bridge compass, and we must
conclude either that the master has not told us the correct course by the pole
compass at that time, or that the deviation card was in error. This, however,
ought to have excited the master's vigilance, for if the bridge compass was
correct, the vessel was being carried 1 1/4 points further to the west and
therefore nearer to the shore than the master anticipated; and he had already
had very clear proof before reaching Flamborough Head, and again before making
the Dudgeon light-ship, that he could not rely upon his pole compass, and that
he was being carried to the westward of his course.
Mr. Tilly, however, who appeared for the master, contended that the bridge
compass must have been equally at fault; for that, if the course steered from
Souter Point had really been S. by E. magnetic, as shewn by that compass, she
would have been ashore long before she reached Flamborough Head. No doubt that
is so; but we must remember that it was broad daylight at that time, and that
the land was distinctly visible; and if before reaching Flamborough Head the
master observed, as he admits he did, that the vessel was continually drawing in
to the westward, his natural and proper course would be to obviate this tendency
by slightly starboarding his helm. He tells us, that on taking his departure
from Souter Point he laid his course so as to pass from 5 to 6 miles outside
Flamborough Head, and that as he approached the Head he found that the vessel
was closing in with the land, and that he took steps to prevent it. Now what
steps could he have taken other than that of starboarding the helm?
Mr. Tilly.—Excuse me, Sir, I think we had it in evidence from the captain, and
from the other officers, and from the man at the wheel, that the ship's helm was
never altered.
The Commissioner.—I must take the evidence as it is before me. The master failed
to give any answers to the questions that I put to him. 1 asked him, if on
taking his departure from Souter Point he had laid his course so as to pass
between five and six miles outside of Flamborough Head, and he said he had. I
asked him whether he did not find before he reached Flamborough Head that he was
being drawn out of his course to the westward, and he said he did. And I then
asked him as a matter of fact, whether he had not passed within five or six
miles outside Flamborough Head, and he said he had. Now if he was being set to
the westward of his course all the way from Souter Point to Flamborough Head, I
want to know how is it possible that he could have passed at the distance from
Flamborough Head, which he said that he had intended to do when he laid his
course, unless he had starboarded his helm.
Mr. Tilly.—If you will excuse my calling your attention to the charge, he is
charged with finding, when he got to Flamborough Head, that the ship had got
nearer the land than he expected her to be; and that is a fact, because his
evidence is, that he did not expect the ship to go some five or six miles off
Flamborough Head, but that as a fact she was some five or six miles off
Flamborough Head.
The Commissioner.—I have his evidence before me, in which he says that he laid
the course "to go outside of " Flamborough Head. Q. How far outside Flamborough
" Head did you expect that to take you?—About five " or six miles." There can be
no question whatever upon the point. This gentleman knew before he reached
Flamborough Head that the vessel, when steered by the pole compass, was being
taken to the westward of her course. He knew when he made the Dudgeon light-ship
that the error was being continued, and that between Flamborough Head and the
Dudgeon light-ship she had got some six or seven miles to the westward of her
course, and therefore nearer the land. He knew, or ought to have known, that his
bridge compass showed him to be on a course much more to the west than he
supposed himself to be on, and yet he continues to navigate the vessel by his
pole compass, which he must have known to be wrong. He passed the Newarp
light-ship at 1 a.m., leaving it on the starboard hand at a distance of about
two miles, and stood away to the S.E. until about 2.10 a.m., when the course was
altered to the southward and westward. According to the master, the course
steered from 2.10 to 5 a.m. was S.S.W. 1/2 W. by the pole compass; from 5 to 7
a.m. it was half a point more to the westward, or S.W. by S., when it was
altered back again to S.S.W. 1/2 W. Now the deviation card shows the pole
compass to have had on those courses a westerly deviation of about half a point;
so that according to the pole compass the vessel's course from 2.10 to 5 a.m.
would be S.S.W. magnetic, from 5 to 7 a.m. half a point more to the west, and
after 7 a.m. S.S.W. again magnetic. Now no doubt these courses, had they been
the true magnetic courses, would have taken the vessel clear away to the east of
the Kentish Knock, but this of course is on the assumption that the pole
compass, as corrected by the deviation card, could be relied upon.
Let us now see what course the bridge compass shewed during this time. According
to the master the bridge compass from 2.10 to 5 a.m. shewed S.S.W. 1/4 W., from
5 to 7 a.m. S.S.W. 3/4 W., and after 7 a.m. S.S.W. 1/4 W., and those are very
nearly if not exactly the courses which the men say that they steered. On
looking, however, at the deviation card, we find that at every point from S.S.W.
to W. the bridge compass had an easterly deviation of one point; thus to make a
S.S.W. magnetic course they had to steer by bridge compass S. by W., to make
S.W. magnetic they must steer S.W. by S., and so on. So that according to this,
when the bridge compass pointed S.S.W. 1/4 W., the vessel was on a S.W. 3/4 S.
magnetic course; and when it shewed S.S.W. 3/4 W., the vessel was on a S.W. 1/4
S. magnetic course. We thus see that from 2.10 to 5 a.m., whilst the pole
compass seemed to shew that the vessel was on a S.S.W. magnetic course, the
bridge compass indicated her to be on a S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic course; from 5 to 7
a.m., whilst the pole compass shewed her course to be S.S.W. 1/2 W. magnetic,
the bridge compass gave it as S.W. 1/4 S. magnetic; and from 7 a.m., whilst by
the pole compass the magnetic course was S.S.W., it was by the bridge compass
S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic, a difference in each case of one point and a quarter. So
that, if the bridge compass was correct, the vessel was being carried 1 1/4
points more to the westward than the master supposed. Surely such a fact ought
to have attracted the attention of the master, more especially after the
experience of the previous part of the voyage, which must have shewn him that
the pole compass was not to be relied upon, and that the bridge compass was more
correct. I ought to add that, if the courses on which the vessel was steered
were those shewn by the bridge compass; namely, from 2.10 to 5 a.m. S.W. 3/4 S.
magnetic, and 5 to 7 o'clock S.W. 1/4 S. magnetic, that would in fact bring her
very near the Shipwash Sand, and where she no doubt was, when the buoy was
sighted; and that from there a S.W. 3/4 S. course magnetic would take her on the
Long Sand, very nearly to the point where she grounded.
We think then that we have thus an explanation of the way in which this casualty
occurred. The pole compass and bridge compass, after allowing for the deviations
according to the deviation card, shewed a difference of 1 1/4 points in the
vessel's magnetic course. The master chose to rely upon his pole compass,
although he had had clear proof, first in approaching Flamborough Head, and
afterwards when he made the Dudgeon, that that compass could not be relied upon,
and that it was taking him to the westward of his course, and therefore in
shore. He chooses, although ignorant of his position, to go ahead full speed, in
weather so foggy that he is not able to see further than a mile off; and when he
sees the Shipwash buoy, he jumps to the conclusion that it is the Inner Gabbard,
and takes no steps to verify the fact, or to ascertain his true position.
Now the charges which Mr. Hamel has preferred against the master are these: "I
hereby charge you with having " caused the stranding of your vessel, the
'Chicago,' on " the Long Sand, on the 8th day of May instant, through " your
default in negligently navigating your said vessel, " between 1 a.m. on the said
8th day of May, when the " Newarp light-ship bore west, distant about two miles,
" and the time of stranding; in neglecting, when setting " your courses, to make
proper allowance for the deviation " in your standard compass, which you found
to exist, " first on sighting Flamborough Head about 2 p.m. on " the 7th May,
after you had run your course from Souter " Point, and secondly, on sighting the
Dudgeon light-ship " about 8 p.m. on the same day, when you were expecting " to
make the Outer Dowsing; in neglecting to make all " due allowance for the set of
the tides during your said " voyage; and in neglecting to verify your position
by any " further cast of the lead after the one taken at 7 a.m. on " the said
8th day of May on sighting a buoy, which you " failed to recognise and
erroneously took for the Inner " Gabbard."
In our opinion these charges have been substantially proved. The master had full
warning, before he reached the Dudgeon, that his pole compass could not be
relied upon, that he was getting to the westward of his course, and therefore
nearer to the shore than he should have been, and yet he goes on at full speed,
knowing that he was approaching a very dangerous navigation, and without taking
any steps to verify his true position. We are told that this gentleman has been
for 29 years at sea; that he has held a master's certificate of competency for
17 years, and has been in command of sailing ships for 16 years. It seems that,
although he has served as chief mate on board steamers, this is the first time
he has commanded one, and we think that in dealing with the errors of compasses,
which are so common, especially in new iron ships, he has not shown that
intelligence which might have been expected of him, and which is so essential
for officers who are placed in command of this class of vessels.
Under all the circumstances of the case, and notwithstanding the very high
character which he has received from his employers, we shall suspend his
certificate as master for six months. We shall at the same time recommend to the
Board of Trade that during the time of its suspension he be allowed a first
mate's certificate; and we trust that during those six months he will take every
opportunity to improve himself in those branches of his profession which are so
necessary to qualify him for the command of iron steam vessels.
One point which came out in the course of the evidence yet remains to be
noticed. It was said that from 6 a.m. of the Monday until 4.30 a.m. of the
Wednesday, when he turned into the chart room for a short time, the master had
had no rest, and this apparently was offered as some excuse for any deficiencies
which he might have shown. Whether it is desirable that vessels should be laden
with such rapidity as this vessel seems to have been, and that she should be
sent to sea with the master so fatigued that he was not in a condition to give
his best attention to the discharge of his duties, and with the prospect before
him of having to take his vessel through a very difficult navigation, is a
question which I think owners will do well to consider.
I do not know whether Mr. Hamel asks for any costs in this case, but on the
whole I think we should not feel disposed to condemn this man in costs.
Mr. Hamel. I certainly shall not ask for them, Sir, after that expression of
opinion.
The Commissioner. I shall not condemn the master in costs. It is not usual for
the Board of Trade to press for the payment of costs, except in cases of very
gross misconduct.
All that we shall do therefore will be to suspend the master's certificate for
six months, and at the same time to recommend that he should have a chief mate's
certificate.
H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
W. 292. 60.—6/78. Wt. 35.
