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Wreck Report for 'Garonne', 1878

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Unique ID:14295
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Garonne', 1878
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1878
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 293.)

"GARONNE," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal investigation held at Westminster on the 12th July

1878 before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Rear-Admiral

APLIN, R.N., and Captain BEASLEY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending

the stranding of the British steamship "GARONNE," of Liverpool, in the South Bay

of Ras Hafun, on the east coast of Africa, on the 6th ultimo. when two lives

were lost.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the

above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the

stranding of the said vessel "Garonne" was due to the negligent navigation

thereof by Rowland de Steiger, her master.

(1.) In having, at noon of the 6th June, when he found himself in longitude 51°

18' east, and therefore to the westward of Ras Hafun, laid his vessel on a N. 2°

W. course, and in having at 3.30 p.m. of the same day altered that course to N.

20° W., which would land him on the coast some 18 miles to the west of Ras

Hafun, and about 30 miles to the west of his proper course, after making all

proper allowance for the set of the current to the eastward.

(2.) In having continued his course at full speed from 6 p.m., after he had seen

high land on the port beam and bow, without taking any steps to ascertain what

that land was.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court suspends the certificate of the

said Rowland de Steiger for six months, but recommends that during the period of

such suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated the 12th day of July 1878.

       (Signed)H. C. ROTHERY.

        Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

       (Signed)ELPHINSTONE APLIN,

        Rear-Admiral,Assessors.

       "THOS. BEASLEY,

Reasons.

The Commissioner.—The "Garonne" is an iron screw steamship of 3,870 tons gross

and 2,464 tons net register, and is fitted with two engines of 550 horse-power

combined. She belongs to the Port of Liverpool, and is registered in the names

of Mr. James Anderson, of Billiter Court, in the city of London, and two other

gentlemen, Mr. Anderson being the managing owner.

She left Port Adelaide at midnight of the 14th of May last, bound to London,

with a crew of about 110 hands all told, and having on board a general cargo of

2,000 tons, and about 400 passengers. Before her departure she appears to have

been swung, and to have had her compasses carefully adjusted, and no suggestion

has been made that they were not in perfectly good order. The captain admits

that they were so, and during the voyage and prior to the casualty he had ample

opportunities of testing them. In other respects also the vessel seems to have

been well and properly equipped; she had eight boats, of which four were

lifeboats; seven pumps on deck, and six in the engine-room; and there is no

charge whatever that this vessel was not thoroughly and efficiently equipped for

the voyage.

The vessel proceeded on her voyage, and nothing particular occurred until the

6th of the following month. At noon of that day an observation was taken by the

master and officers, which placed her in latitude 8° 30' north, her longitude at

the time by chronometer being 51° 18' east. Up to that time her course by

standard compass had been north, which, as the standard compass had on that

course a deviation of 5° to the west, would make her true course north 5° west.

On finding, however, at noon that she had got so far to the west as to be in 51°

18' east, the master altered the course to N. 1/4 E, by standard compass, which,

allowing for the deviation, gave north 2° west true. That course was continued

until after 3 o'clock, when three observations were taken, for the purpose of

determining the longitude; and as it appeared that she was then in longitude 51°

31' east, the captain altered the course to north by west by the standard

compass, which was equivalent to north 20° west true, the standard compass

having on that course a deviation of 9° west. From that time the course was not

again altered until just before she took the ground, steaming ahead all the time

at the rate of 12 knots an hour.

Just as the sun was going down, at about 6 o'clock, land was observed on the

port side, both abeam, and some 3 or 4 points on the bow. The master seems to

have thought that it was Ras Hafun, and as it was his intention to pass some 7

or 8 knots to the eastward of it, the vessel was continued on her course north

20 west until shortly after 10 o'clock, when the master and the third mate, who

were on the bridge, observed a low black line on the sea. The master accordingly

directed the third officer to go forward and see what it was, but not liking its

appearance, he then ordered the helm to be put hard a-port, and telegraphed to

the engine-room to stop and reverse full speed. The vessel paid off about 6

points to north-east by east by the standard compass, and then struck. Every

effort seems to have been made to get her off, but without avail. On the 7th

those efforts were renewed, and a boat was sent to Aden to obtain assistance. On

the morning of the 8th the third officer and some of the men, and five or six of

the passengers, proceeded in one of the ship's boats to the shore for the

purpose of communicating with the inhabitants, and ascertaining whether they

were friendly, and whether, in the event of its being necessary to land, there

were any supplies and water to be had. They got safely to land, but

unfortunately after they had been on shore for about a couple of hours, a surf

sprang up, and in coming off the boat was capsized, and two of the passengers

were drowned. Ultimately, however, on the 9th, after having jettisoned some 150

tons of cargo, the vessel came off with the aid of her steam power, and by

hauling upon some hawsers which had been laid out, and she then proceeded to

Aden, and subsequently arrived at the Port of London in safety.

Now the place which has been pointed out by the master as that where the vessel

grounded is in the bay to the south of Ras Hafun, some 22 miles west of the most

easterly point of Ras Hafun, and as he has told us that it was his intention to

pass about 7 or 8 miles clear to the eastward of Ras Hafun, the vessel when she

took the ground must have been some 30 miles to the west of where the master had

supposed her to be. And the first question which we have to consider is, how

came she to be so far to the westward of her proper course?

I have stated that at noon of the 6th of June the vessel was by chronometer in

longitude 51° 18' east, and that she was thereupon laid a course north 2° west.

At 3.30 p.m., observations having been taken which placed her in longitude 51°

31' east, it was supposed by the master that in the 3 to 3 1/2 hours which had

intervened since noon the vessel must have drifted with the current some 13

miles to the east, or at the rate of 4 miles an hour. Accordingly, with a view

of counteracting the set of the current, he laid her on a course north 20° west.

His idea seems to have been this: "Seeing that she is going at the rate of 12

knots an " hour, and that an alteration of one point in a vessel's " course

makes a difference in her position of about one " mile in every five miles run,

20° to the west, which is " about 1 3/4 points, will, roughly speaking, carry

her at the " rate of some four miles an hour to the westward, and as " the

current is setting four miles to the east, I shall thus " make a true north

course," and which the master tells us that it was his intention to do. No doubt

the master's calculation was correct, if the current was setting at the rate of

4 miles an hour to the eastward, but if it was not, it is obvious that such a

course would carry him further to the westward than he intended.

Now let us see what the sailing instructions tells us as to the strength and

direction of the current in these parts. According to the "Gulf of Aden Pilot,"

with which the master was furnished, we learn that during the south-west

monsoon, which is generally in full force in June, July, and August, the current

on the east coast of Africa "sets " along the coast to the north-north-east at a

velocity of " 2 to 4 miles per hour, and passes through the channel " between

Socotra and the north-east point of Africa at " the rate of 1 1/2 to 2 miles an

hour." The current chart also, with which the master was provided, shows that

even at the height of the monsoon, the current, where he supposed the vessel to

be, as well as where she was at the time, runs in a N.N.E. direction at the rate

of from 2 to 3 knots an hour. Now a current running in a N.N.E. direction at the

rate of from 2 to 3 knots an hour would certainly not carry a vessel to the east

at a greater rate than 1 mile an hour. If, then, the force and direction of the

current was as shown by the sailing directions and the current chart, the vessel

was being carried to the eastward, not at the rate of 4 miles an hour, but

probably at less than 1 mile an hour; and consequently in laying his course

north 20° west, so as to counteract a set of the current at the rate of 4 miles

to the east, the master was steering much too far to the westward.

Let us now take the courses steered from noon of the 6th, and assuming the

current to have been setting her all the time at the rate of one mile an hour to

the east, as shown by the sailing directions and the current chart, and let us

see where we might reasonably expect to find the vessel by soon after 10 p.m.,

when she took the ground. In the 10 hours between noon and the time of

grounding, assuming the set of the current to have been at the rate of 1 mile to

the east, she would have been carried some 10 miles to the east. On the other

hand, a course 2° to the west of north for the first three hours and a half, and

20° to the west of north for the last six hours and a half, would have taken the

vessel some 28 miles to the west. Deducting, then, the 10 miles, which the

current would have set her to the east, there remains 18 miles as the distance

which we might reasonably expect that the vessel would have been carried to the

west during this time. And this in fact is what really happened, for we are told

that at noon she was in longitude 51° 18' east, and the place where she took the

ground, as shown by the master, is on the meridian of 51°, or about 18 miles

more or less to the westward. We think, therefore, that we have here a

sufficient explanation of how the vessel came to run ashore where she did.

Now what excuse does the master offer for having taken the course he did? First

he says that, finding that he was in longitude 51° 18' cast at noon, and 3 1/2

hours afterwards in 51° 31' he assumed that he had drifted 13 miles to the

eastward during that time, or at the rate of four miles an hour. But if he had

looked at his sailing directions and his current chart he would have seen that,

even at the height of the monsoon, the current in those parts only runs at the

rate of from 2 to 3 knots an hour in a N.N.E. direction; and yet in opposition

to his sailing directions and his current chart, he jumps to the conclusion that

from some unexplained cause the current had turned to the east, and was running

in that direction at the rate of 4 miles an hour. But then he said that on his

previous voyage he had found that he was being set much further to the east than

he expected, and that this led him to believe in the existence of this current.

It turned out, however, on inquiry, that when he felt the force of this easterly

current on the previous voyage he was much further to the southward and

eastward; and I think we can have no difficulty in explaining how it was that in

that position he would feel the full force of an easterly current. At page 13 of

the "Gulf of Aden Pilot" we find the following passage: "To the south of Socotra

at a distance of " 150 miles is a great whirl of current caused possibly by "

the interposition of the island, or it may be that shoal " water exists at that

spot. it commences about the " parallel of Ras Hafun, when the current strikes

off to " the eastward to the 55th meridian, then to the southward " to the 5th

parallel, when it again curves up to the north- " eastward, forming a complete

whirl." The whirl is very clearly defined on his current chart, with which the

master was furnished, and no doubt when on the previous voyage he found himself

being set away to the eastward he had got into the northern part of this whirl;

but then he was in a very different part from where he was when lie laid his

course north 20° west. It seems to us that this master had no right, from the

supposed difference in his longitude between noon and half-past three, and from

the fact of his having been carried away to the eastward on a previous voyage

when he was in another part of the ocean, to have jumped to the conclusion that

there was a current setting him to the eastward at the rate of 4 miles an hour;

and without any further inquiry to have laid the vessel on a course, which, if

there had been no such current, must inevitably take him ashore.

It was said by Mr. Crofton, who appeared for the master, that he had been very

attentive to his duties, and had shown, by the frequent observations which he

took, an evident desire to discharge them to the best of his ability. It may be

so, at the same time he has shown either great negligence or a great want of

intelligence in dealing with the facts before him. As regards the current he had

no right to suppose that it was setting him at the rate of 4 miles to the east,

when his charts and sailing directions showed him that it would be running in a

N.N.E. direction at the rate of from 2 to 3 knots an hour, and that consequently

it would hardly carry him more than a knot an hour to the eastward at the

outside. Again, when at noon of the 6th he found that he was in longitude 51°

18', he might have seen by looking at a chart that he was already inside of and

to the westward of Ras Hafun; he ought therefore at that time not to have laid

the vessel 2° to the west of north, when it was his duty, as he tells us it was

his intention, to pass some 7 or 8 miles to the east of the easternmost point of

Ras Hafun. Again, when at 3.30 he finds from observations that he is in

longitude 51° 31' he was not justified, even if there had been a set of the

current to the eastward at the rate of 4 knots an hour, in laying her on a

course 20° west of north; for such a course would have had the effect of about

counteracting the set of the current, so that the vessel would have made a true

north course. which is what the master says he intended to do. But the meridian

of 50° 31' bearly clears, if indeed it does clear Ras Hafun, so that if he had

made a north course on that meridian he would have gone dangerously near to, if

indeed he would not have struck upon Ras Hafun.

Lastly, we think that the master is to blame for having continued his course as

he did from 6 o'clock to half-past 10 at a speed of 12 knots an hour, after he

had discovered land abeam and on the port bow. If he believed it to be Ras

Hafun, did it never strike him as strange that after running 50 miles that land

should still be seen in the same direction, namely, forward of the port beam,

and from 3 to 4 points on the port bow? If indeed he thought that the land which

they saw at 6 o'clock was Ras Hafun, they would have passed it long before 10

o'clock. And if he thought that it was some other land he ought to have

ascertained what it was. He should have asked himself, " What land was it? Am I

on my proper course? is it " not possible that I am out of my course? Ras Hafun

" projects into the sea; may I not be too close to the high " land south of Ras

Hafun?" These and other like questions ought to have occurred to him, and should

have induced him to exercise greater caution. Having at the time the lives of

some 500 to 600 people under his charge, it was the master's duty to have

exercised the greatest caution in the navigation of this vessel and for not

having done so we think that he is greatly to blame, and that it is to his

neglect and mismanagement that this casualty is due.

Mr. Bowen, in his opening address, stated that possibly some questions might

arise whether the presence of a lighthouse on Ras Hafun might not have prevented

this casualty. The master, however, has offered no such excuse for his conduct;

and as a matter of fact, long before he could have sighted Ras Hafun, she was so

far inside and to the westward of it that a light on its eastern side would

hardly have been visible to him. Whether, then, a light on Ras Hafun would in

general be useful to ships approaching the Gulf of Aden, it would have been of

very little use to this vessel on the present occasion.

The question, then, remains whether we ought, or indeed whether we have the

power to deal with this master's certificate. Now the 242nd section of the

Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, as amended by subsequent Acts, empowers us to

cancel or suspend the certificate of an officer in the event of "serious damage"

to the ship, or loss of life caused by his wrongful act or default. As regards

the loss of life, which unhappily occurred on this occasion, we are not disposed

to blame the master for it; it was, we think, a very proper precaution to

endeavour to ascertain the disposition of the natives, and whether there was a

reasonable prospect of obtaining supplies and water, when it was still uncertain

whether the vessel would ever come off, and whether they might not have to land.

And although, no doubt, the stranding of the vessel was due to the wrongful act

and default of the master, we can hardly say that in the present case the loss

of life was the direct result thereof; the connection between the two is too

remote to justify us in dealing with this gentleman's certificate on that

ground.

It remains then to consider whether we can do so on the ground that the damage

which the vessel sustained by getting on shore was "serious damage" within the

meaning of the Act. It seems that when the vessel arrived in London she was put

into dry dock, when it was found that the lower after garboarb plates on each

side had been very much shaken, so that it was necessary to take out the plate

on the starboard side in order to refasten the plate on the port side, and then

to replace and refasten the plate on the starboard side. It seems also that the

rudder had been much shaken, and was buckled in the centre, that two of the

steam winches had been damaged, that two bower anchors and some chain had been

lost, that several warps had been damaged, and that two boats also had been

lost; altogether, we are told, the repairs will cost from 500l. to 600l. Now I

certainly was a good deal surprised to hear the marine superintendent say that

this had only been a trifling damage; I should have thought that it was a very

serious damage; and no doubt the shareholders of the company (for we are told

the vessel belongs to a company), who will have to pay for these repairs, will

think it a very serious damage, and one with which they will not by any means be

pleased. We can have no doubt whatever that it was a "serious damage" within the

meaning of the Act, sufficiently to justify us in dealing with this gentleman's

certificate.

Looking at all the circumstances of the case, we think that we cannot do less

than suspend this master's certificate for six months, but we shall at the same

time recommend to the Board of Trade that during the period of its suspension he

be allowed a first mate's certificate.

       (Signed)H. C. ROTHERY,

        Wreck Commissioner.

W. 328. 60.—7/78. Wt. 35.

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