(No. 339.)
"HELVETIA," (S.S.), and Coastguard Cruizer "FANNY."
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal investigation held at the Chancery Court, St.
George's Hall, Liverpool, on the 30th of November and the 2nd of December 1878,
before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain H. D.
Grant, C.B., R.N., and Captain PARFITT, as Assessors, into the circumstances
attending the collision between the steamship "HELVETIA," of Liverpool, and the
Coastguard Cruizer "FANNY," about three miles south-west by south of the Tuskar
Rock, on the 31st of October 1878, whereby the "FANNY" was lost and 17 of her
crew were drowned.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed:
(1.) That the "Fanny" did, on the night and morning of the collision, carry
lights of sufficient power and proper construction.
(2.) That the lights of the "Fanny" were properly and carefully managed by those
in whose charge they were at the time in question.
(3.) That there was not a proper and sufficient look-out kept on board the
"Helvetia" on the morning in question.
(4.) That it is not possible to say whether there was a good look-out kept on
board the "Fanny," shortly before the collision, both look-out men as well as
the officer of the watch having been drowned.
(5.) That all proper steps were not taken by the master of the "Helvetia" to
avoid a collision, for that, when he ordered his helm to be starboarded, he
should at the same time have ordered his engines to be reversed, in compliance
with article 16 of the regulations for preventing collisions at sea.
(6.) That the "Fanny" was no doubt steering by the Tuskar Light, not by the
compass, and that as she approached the "Helvetia" hauled up more in the wind,
instead of keeping her course as she ought to have done.
(7.) That the master of the "Helvetia," considering the I state and position of
his boats, did, after the collision, use his best endeavours to get one lowered;
but that he ought to have had two of his boats, one on each side, hanging in the
davits and swung outside, ready to lower at a moment's notice, and that there
was nothing in the state of the wind or weather to have prevented this being
done.
(8.) That the casualty was principally due to the neglect and default of the
master of the "Helvetia" in not having kept a proper look-out on board his
vessel.
(9.) That the luffing of the "Fanny" as she approached the "Helvetia" may also
have contributed to bring about the casualty.
For these his wrongful acts and defaults the Court suspends the certificate of
Archibald Thomson, the master of the "Helvetia," for six months.
The Court makes no order as to costs.
Dated the 2nd day of December 1878.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)HENRY D. GRANT,Assessors.
Captain R.N.,
"HENRY PARFITT,
Reasons.
The Commissioner.—The object of the present, inquiry is to ascertain the
circumstances under which a collision occurred early on the morning of the 31st
of October last, between the steamship "Helvetia" and the coastguard cruizer
"Fanny," off Tuskar Lightship in the Irish Channel, attended. I regret to say,
with the total loss of the "Fanny" and 17 of her crew. The circumstances are as
follows:—
The "Helvetia" is an iron steamship of 4,587 ton gross and 2,921 tons net
register, and is fitted with engines of 420 horse-power. She was built at Jarrow
in the year 1864, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the
present inquiry she was the property of the National Steamship Company, Limited.
Mr. William Boyd McAllister, of 21, Water Street, Liverpool, being the managing
owner.
She left Liverpool on the 30th of October last bound to New York, with 140
passengers, and having a crew of 85 hands all told. She seems to have been a
good and substantial vessel and well fitted in every respect, and had eight
boats, all of them lifeboats. At 1.20 p.m. she passed the rock, and at 7.12 p.m.
the Skerries, when a course was laid south-west by west a quarter west for the
Tuskar, which she passed at 3.25 a.m. of the following morning. At this time it
was blowing a moderate gale from the north-north-east, and the weather was dark
and cloudy with passing hail storms. It was the chief officer's watch on deck,
and he and the master were on the look-out bridge with an able seaman named
Hale. The third officer, Mr. Robertson, was at the standard compass conning the
ship, and one man was in the wheel-house, situated immediately below the bridge
amidships. The rest of the crew appear to have been below on the main deck. At
3.38, and when they were about three miles from the Tuskar, a red light, which
afterwards proved to be the light of the "Fanny," was observed a little on the
steamer's starboard bow, upon which an order was given by the master to
hard-a-port the helm. The helm had hardly been got over and the vessel had only
just begun to answer her helm, when it was observed that the "Fanny's" red light
had disappeared, and her green light came into view; upon which the captain
ordered the helm to be hard-a-starboarded, and the vessel's engines to be
stopped. Almost immediately afterwards the steamer struck the "Fanny" on the
starboard quarter a little abaft the beam, cutting her down to the water's edge.
Orders were at once given to lower the boats, and the men proceeded to the last
boat on the port side, which is described as No. 2 boat. There seems to have
been some little difficulty in lowering it, partly owing to the way in which it
was secured, as to which I shall presently have something to say, and partly to
the fact that the vessel under her starboard helm had got across the sea, and
the port side, which had before been the lee side, had consequently become the
windward side, so that before the boat could be lowered the master, as he has
told us, had to make a lee for her. In the meanwhile, and before the boat could
be lowered, seven of the "Fanny's " crew had clambered up over the steamer's
bows, but the "Fanny" herself had sunk with the remainder. On the boat being
lowered she continued to pull about for a considerable time, but without
succeeding in saving any more of the "Fanny's" crew. At 7.15 a.m. of the same
morning, and after it was certain that there was nothing more to be done, the
"Helvetia" proceeded to Queenstown, where she landed those who had been saved
from the "Fanny," and she then continued her voyage to New York.
As regards the "Fanny" we are unfortunately in this position, that 17 out of her
crew of 24 were lost, including all who held any command on board. We have
consequently the evidence of only two, who were on deck at the time, namely, a
man named Loynachan, a leading seaman, and a common seaman named Bailey. One
other man has been produced, but he was below until after the collision had
happened; and the other four who were saved were probably in the same position,
or no doubt they would have been produced. The look-out men as well as the man
who was at the wheel were all unfortunately lost. So far, however, as we have
been able to ascertain the facts, they are as follows:—
The "Fanny" was a vessel of about 153 tons, yawl-rigged, and was doing duty as a
coastguard cruizer. She left Queenstown at 1.20 p.m. of the 30th of October
bound for Kingstown with stores and other things for the different coastguard
stations on the way, and having in all 24 hands on board. She put in at Tramore,
and there landed some stores; thence she proceeded to Dunmore, and having there
also landed some more stores, a course was steered to pass outside the Saltees
Light, or, as one of the witnesses called it the Coningbeg Rock Light. After
passing the Saltees Light she was steered a course east half north, which is the
right course for the Tuskar, and at about 2.30, according to the evidence of
those saved from the revenue cutter, which seems to have differed considerably
from the time on board the "Helvetia," she was nearing the Tuskar Light. At this
time we are told the wind was blowing from the north and by east, she was under
double reefed mainsail, foresail, a third jib and small mizen, and was heading
east half north, having the Tuskar, as we are told, about a point on her port
bow, it being her intention after passing the Tuskar to put in at a place called
Courtown, on the coast of Wexford. At this time a light was observed ahead, or,
according to the evidence of the two witnesses who have been examined from the
"Fanny," on her starboard bow. Shortly afterwards the vessel was struck by a
squall, a fact which I may observe is confirmed by the evidence of the master
and mate of the "Helvetia," who tell us that about five or ten minutes before
they sighted the "Fanny's" red light a squall struck them. As soon as the squall
struck them, orders were given by the boatswain or quartermaster, who had charge
of the deck, to lower the foresail. The fore halyards were accordingly let go,
but owing to some mistake they got hold of some other rope instead of the down
haul, and some time was consequently lost before the foresail was lowered. As
soon, however, as it had been hauled down on deck, orders were given for all
hands to go and trice up the main tack. Owing to there being two reefs in the
mainsail, this was rather a heavy job for the men who had to do it, and
accordingly they had to take the end of the rope to the winch before they could
trice it up. They thereupon returned to the foresail to tie up the reefs, and
whilst they were so engaged it was observed, but by whom we do not know, that
the steamer was bearing down upon them. They all immediately got up and began to
shout, but in an instant the steamer was into them, striking the "Fanny" on her
starboard side abaft the beam. When it was that the helm of the "Fanny" was put
down we do not know, but that in was put down before the collision is clear, for
both the "Fanny's" witnesses say that the jib, which had been full just before,
was shaking in the wind at the moment of the collision. Loynachan also told us
that the "Fanny" was at that time heading to the westward of the Tuskar Light,
and this is confirmed by the evidence from the "Helvetia," who tell us that the
"Fanny's" head at the moment of the collision was pointing about north.
As might naturally be expected, seeing the disproportion between the two
vessels, and the great speed at which they were meeting, the steamer, according
to the evidence of her master and mate going 12 knots, and the "Fanny" from 4 to
6 knots, the stern of the "Fanny" was forced under water; and Loynachan tells us
that immediately after the collision he went over to the port side to endeavour
to get the boat, which was hanging in the rigging, clear, when he found that the
stern of the boat itself was already in the water. He accordingly returned to
the starboard side, clambered with others up into the starboard rigging, and as
the vessel made a lurch towards the "Helvetia," he seized hold of a stanchion
and hauled himself on board. The others who were saved appear to have got on
board something in the same manner; and almost immediately afterwards the
"Fanny" sank.
Now the questions upon which the Board of Trade have asked for the opinion of
this Court are these:—
1st. "Did the 'Fanny' carry on the night and morning " of the collision lights
of sufficient power and proper " construction?
2nd. "Were the lights of the 'Fanny' properly and " carefully managed by those
in whose charge they were " on the night and morning in question?
3rd. "Was a sufficient and proper look-out kept on " board the 'Helvetia' on the
morning in question?
4th. "Was a sufficient and proper look-out kept on " board the 'Fanny' on the
morning in question?
5th. "Were proper measures taken by the master of the " 'Helvetia' to avoid a
collision?
6th. "Were proper measures taken on board the' Fanny' " to avoid a collision?
7th. "After the collision did the master and the crew of " the 'Helvetia' render
to the crew of the 'Fanny' all " such assistance as was practicable?
8th. "Was the casualty due to the neglect or default of " the master of the
'Helvetia?'"
9th. "Was the casualty due to the neglect or default of " the officer in charge
or the crew of the 'Fanny?"
And lastly, "the Board of Trade state that, in their " opinion, the certificate
of the master of the 'Helvetia' " should be dealt with."
Now Mr. Mackenzie has very truly observed that these questions may be
conveniently regarded under the four following heads; first, were the "Fanny's"
lights proper regulation lights, and such as are required by Act of Parliament;
secondly, was the look-out on board the "Helvetia" a good and efficient
look-out; thirdly, did the "Helvetia" take proper steps to avoid the collision;
and fourthly, did the luffing up of the "Fanny" bring about the collision, and
there is a fifth question with regard to the boats.
And first as to the "Fanny's" lights. It appears that the lamps with which the
"Fanny" was furnished had been supplied to her from Devonport Dockyard. They
were fitted for five wicks, each wick being about the thickness of the largest
part of a quill pen. It was, however, the practice to light only three of the
wicks at a time, and the reason which has been given to us is that, if the five
wicks were lighted at the same time they had a tendency to smoke. And I am
informed by one of the gentlemen who assist me on this occasion, and who has had
great experience of these lamps, that they do smoke when the five wicks are
lighted, owing to the fact that the quantity of atmospheric air which is
admitted is sufficient for the consumption of three wicks, but not for five
wicks. The suggestion therefore that only three wicks were lighted in order that
the men might be saved the trouble of refilling the lamps with oil, cannot in
our opinion be sustained. The evidence, too, shows that the oil, which was used
was good colza oil; primâfacie, therefore, there is no reason why these lamps
should not have burnt perfectly well, and why they should not have given a light
equal to that required by the regulations in addition to this we have the
positive testimony of Loynachan and Bailey, that they examined these lights
shortly before the collision, and that they found them to be burning brightly;
and the details which they gave in regard to them would, if we are to believe
them go far to prove that the lights at that time were burning brightly.
On the other hand, we have the evidence of the master and mate of the "Helvetia"
that the red light of the "Fanny" appeared to them, during the instant that they
saw it, to be burning very dimly. We have also the evidence of Mr. Jacobs, the
secretary to the National Lifeboat Association at Tramore, who tells us that he
saw a vessel, which he believes to have been the "Fanny," off Tramore that
night, somewhere about 8 o'clock, and that her red light was visible hut very
dim, but that her green light could not be seen at all. Assuming this to have
been the "Fanny," we should hardly be justified in saying that, because at about
8 o'clock that evening her red light was very dim, and her green light invisible
at the distance of only half a mile, they must have been in the same state at
about three the following morning. It is quite possible, as Mr. Mackenzie has
said, that when Mr. Jacobs was looking at the vessel, the lights were being
trimmed; possibly, too, the green light might have been removed for the purpose
of being cleaned. We have also this fact that, whereas according to Mr. Jacobs
the red light was bad, and the green light was not visible at all; on the other
hand, we have the evidence of the master and mate of the "Helvetia" that, when
they saw the "Fanny's" lights just before the collision the red light was dim,
but the green light was as good as any ship need have had.
It has also, in our opinion, been satisfactorily proved by the evidence of all
the "Fanny's" witnesses, that although the lamps were fixed on the rail at a
part of the vessel where it begins to narrow forward, the stanchions which held
the light boxes, as one of the witnesses called them. were so placed that the
inboard screens were parallel to the mid-line of the ship, and not to the rail.
This, as the witnesses have explained, could easily be done by putting the
foremost stanchion a little further out on the rail than the after one. Indeed,
it is hardly reasonable to expect that one of Her Majesty's revenue cruizers
should have had her lights so fixed, as that the inboard screens would converge
forwards, showing the lights across the bow from from one side to the other. It
is unreasonable to expect it, and there is not a particle of evidence to show
that it was so; on the contary, the evidence is, in our opinion, conclusive that
the screens were properly placed.
The two first questions, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative, namely,
that the lights carried by the "Fanny" were "of sufficient power and proper
construction," and that they were" properly and carefully " managed by those in
whose charge they were on the " night and morning of the collision." I will add
that in our opinion they were at the moment of the collision burning brightly.
The third, and in our opinion by far the most important question in the case is,
"Was a sufficient and proper look" " out kept on board the 'Helvetia' on the
morning in " question?" Now we quite concur with Mr. Mackenzie in opinion that
it would be no answer on the part of the "Helvetia" to say that the "Fanny's"
lights were bad if she had no good look-out. It, therefore, becomes our duty to
inquire, quite independently of whether the "Fanny's" lights were or were not
good, whether the "Helvetia" had or had not a proper look-out on board. One
fact, indeed, is quite clear in this case, namely, that the only persons who
were in a position to look-out, or who it is even pretended were keeping a
look-out, were the master, the mate, and a seaman named Hale, and these three
were on the bridge, which, we are told, is about 130 feet from the ship's bows.
The third officer was at the standard compass conning the ship, but he could not
see ahead at all; and there was a man in the wheel-house, who likewise could not
see ahead. The rest of the watch, which, we are told, consisted of two officers,
two quartermasters, and 10 men, appear to have been below on the main deck. Of
the three men who were on the bridge keeping a look-out, the master and mate
were, we are told, when the "Fanny's" red light was first seen, some 8 or 9 feet
on the starboard side of the centre of the bridge; Hale was at the further end
of the bridge on the port side.
Now it is important to observe that at the time when this collision occurred the
vessel had arrived at a place where usually her course would be altered from
S.W. by W. 1/4 W. to W. 1/2 S. According to the master, he had only a minute
before he saw the light been taking the bearings of the Tuskar Light, no doubt
with the view of seeing whether he had got sufficiently far to make it advisable
for him to alter his course. That the mate should have been assisting him to
take the bearings of the Tuskar Light at that time may, as Dr. Deane has stated,
not unreasonably be inferred. It was but natural that at this time the master
and the first mate should have been discussing the question whether the vessel's
course should or should not be changed, and if so, what more reasonable than
that he should be assisting the master to take the bearings. But in order to
take bearings of the Tuskar Light it was necessary for them to look aft, or at
any rate, over the starboard quarter of the vessel. If then the master and mate
were, immediately before the "Fanny's" red light was seen, taking bearings of
the Tuskar Light, and we know from the master's admission that he at any rate
was doing so, how stands the question of the lookout? Hale, who was at the end
of the bridge on the port side, has told us that he never saw the "Fanny's" red
light at all, that he did not see the light when he heard the captain order the
helm to be put hard-a-port, and that the only light that he ever saw was the
green light, and only after the vessel's head had begun to pay off, when he saw
it just clear of the bowsprit, and on the port side. On being asked, too,
whether there was anything that would have prevented his seeing the "Fanny's"
red light on the starboard bow, he said that he might have had the foremast in
his way; it is possible also that some portion of the rigging might have been in
the way. That Hale, too, would probably not observe a light on the starboard bow
is reasonable from what we are told was the practice on board this vessel,
namely, that only one man was stationed with the officer of the watch on the
bridge, and that whilst this man was looking out on one side, it would be the
duty of the officer of the watch to look out on the other. It would seem then
that when the "Fanny's" red light was first seen, although there may have been a
good lookout being kept on the port bow, probably there was no look-out at all
on the starboard bow; and in this way we can understand how it came to pass that
the "Fanny's" red light was not seen until they were close upon her.
And now let us inquire what was the speed of this vessel when the "Fanny's"
light first came in view. The captain has told us, and it is in accordance with
the entry in the log, that she passed the Skerries at 7.12 p.m. of the 30th, and
was off the Tuskar at 3.25 a.m. of the following morning. She consequently did
the distance between the Skerries and the Tuskar, which, as the master has told
us is 95 miles, in 8 hours and 13 minutes. But during the greater part of that
time, namely, for about six hours, she had had the stream against her, and we
all know what the stream in the Irish Channel is. It is clear, therefore, that
her speed, which would seem to have been nearly 12 miles an hour over the
ground, must have been considerably more than that through the water. The mate
also has told us that the weather was dark and cloudy, and that during the hail
storms you could see but a very little distance off. But if vessels will go at
this great rate of speed, and in such weather, the only condition upon which
they can be allowed to do so is that they shall take every possible precaution
to avoid running down other vessels, and the first and most obvious precaution
is that they shall have a good look-out. Now can it be said that the look-out
which I have described, Hale being on the port side of the bridge looking out
ahead on that side, and the master and the mate looking out on the other side,
and at the same time having to attend to all the other duties of the ship, the
bearings of the different lights, her course, and an infinity of other matters,
can it, I say, be said that there was such a look-out on board this vessel as
there should have been? We think not. We think that there should at all events
have been a look-out at each end of the bridge, and that it was a most improper
thing for the officer of the watch to have been converted into a look-out man,
No doubt it is his duty to look out on all sides, but to make him the look-out
on one bow of the ship, whilst a common seaman was set to look-out on the other,
is not a duty which should be assigned to an officer of a large ship like this.
Considering, too, that the wind was almost dead aft, and that this vessel stood,
we are told, from 16 to 18 feet out of the water, there was not the slightest
reason why the look-out might not have been stationed forward. But without
pronouncing any positive opinion whether it was better on such a night to
station the look-out forward or on the bridge, we are most clearly of opinion
that if placed on the bridge there should have been two, one at each end of the
bridge, leaving the officer free to attend to the general duties of the ship.
The conclusion then to which we have come on this the third question on which
our opinion has been asked, is that quite apart from whether the "Fanny's"
lights were good and burning brightly, the look-out on board the "Helvetia" was
wholly insufficient, and that this may, and in our opinion does, account for the
"Fanny's" lights not having been seen sooner.
And here it may be proper, as hearing on the question of the efficiency of the
look-out, to inquire what time probably elapsed between the "Fanny's" red light
being seen from the "Helvetia" and the collision. The master has told us that
the first thing he did, as soon as he saw the red light, was to order the helm
to be put hard-a-port, and that the mate ran to what is called the auxiliary
wheel on the bridge and put it hard-a-port, at the same time conveying an order
down to the man in the wheel-house through a tube. The vessel I should say was
steered by steam, and we are told that to get the helm hard over would take only
from 8 to 12 seconds. No sooner, however, had the vessel's helm been got to port
than the green light appeared, and thereupon an order was given to
hard-a-starboard the helm. The helm was put hard-a-starboard, and then an order
was given to stop the engines, and almost instantly after the engines were
stopped the collision occurred. It was said by the master that there was an
interval of three or four minutes between the time of first seeing the "Fanny's"
lights and the collision, but we are not accustomed to place very much reliance
upon a seaman's estimate of time, however good that seaman may be in other
respects. The excitement at such a time is so great that any estimate of the
minutes or seconds which have elapsed must be very fallacious. I prefer to see
what was actually done during the time. Briefly then, according to the master
and mate, no sooner had the helm been got hard-a-port than the green light
appeared, the helm was thereupon starboarded and the engines were stopped and
immediately the collision occurred. But we were told that owing to the vessel
being steered by steam the helm could be put hard over to port or starboard in
from 8 to 12 seconds, and the engineer, too, told us that he could stop the
engines in about the same time. If then the events occurred in the order in
which it is stated, and as rapidly as the master and mate say they were done, it
seems probable that instead of three or four minutes having elapsed between the
"Fanny's" red light being first seen and the collision, probably not more than
one minute elapsed. This, too, is strongly confirmed by the other evidence from
the "Helvetia." Hale tells us that a very short time elapsed between the order
to port the helm and the collision. Mr. Robertson, the third officer, who was at
the conn, tells us that the first thing he observed was the vessel's head paying
off to starboard, that would be when the helm was hard-a-ported, that he then
heard the telegraph bell ring, and thinking that there was something wrong he
rushed forward, but had not got off the conn before the collision occurred. We
have also the evidence of the three seamen, Hanning, Lawler, and Whellen, who
were on the main deck, and who said that they heard the wheel going backwards
and forwards, then the order to stop, and that they then rushed up the ladder,
but before they could get on deck the collision had occurred. It is abundantly
clear to us that this collision occurred within an extremely short space of time
after the red light was seen, and that the short interval between seeing the red
light and the collision was due to there having been no efficient look-out on
the "Helvetia."
Before I leave this part of the case it may be well to advert to two facts,
which, in my opinion, go far to prove that a very short interval of time must
have elapsed between the "Fanny's" red light being first seen and the collision.
In the first place, we find it stated in the ship's log-book that the red light
was first seen at 3.38 a.m., but in the engineer's log-book the same time
exactly, 3.38 a.m., is given for the order to stop the engines, and as it is an
admitted fact in the case that the order to stop the engines immediately
preceded the collision, the seeing the red light was almost contemporaneous with
the happening of the collision. The agreement between the ship's and the
engineer's log-books as to the time is certainly remarkable, and tends strongly
to prove that a very short interval of time must have elapsed between the seeing
the red light and the collision, indeed that they were almost simultaneous.
But there is another circumstance to which our attention was called by the
Admiralty advocate, and which strongly confirms this view. It seems that on the
arrival of the vessel at Queenstown the master went on shore and made and signed
a statement before the Receiver of Wreck. In that statement it is said that the
order to stop the engines was given before the order to port. N .w, on referring
to the entry in the ship's log, we find that, as it stood originally, it was in
identically the same words as the statement made before the Receiver of Wreck at
Queenstown. There appears, however, certain alterations therein which the
captain tells us were made some three or four days afterwards on his reading the
entry, and detecting the mistakes that had been made. The alterations were
striking out the words "Stopped engines," which stood before it was said that
the helm had been put hard-a-port, inserting the words "nearly ahead"
immediately after the words "observed green light," and then interlining "and
stopped the engines," after it is said that the order had been given to
hard-a-starboard the helm. Dr. Deane made no charge against the master of
wishing to tamper with the log-book, nor do we, but we think that it affords
very strong evidence that in the opinion of these gentlemen the whole thing
passed so quickly that they could hardly say at the time whether the order to
stop the engines had been given before or after the order to port, and in making
the statement at Queenstown as well as in first entering up the log-book the
stopping the engines was put first, although on subsequent reflection they came
to the conclusion that it had been done afterwards, and accordingly altered the
log-book. I merely mention this to show, as Dr. Deane has contended, that a very
short time must have elapsed between sighting the red light and the collision.
But although we make no charge against the master for having made these
alterations in the ship's log-book, there is a fact which has come to our
knowledge in the course of these proceedings, in connection with the official
log book, which it would not be right to pass over in silence. Now the entry of
the circumstances attending the collision is made in the official log-book under
date of the 31st day of October last, the day on which the casualty occurred,
and so far as would appear the entry was made on the same day. The master,
however, has told us that it was not made until some four or five days
afterwards. Now I find in the directions, which are printed at the head of the
official log-book, the following words, which are copied from the 281st section
of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, "Every entry in every official log-book
shall be made " as soon as possible after the occurrence to which it re- "
lates, and if not made on the same day as the occurrence " to which it relates,
it shall be made and dated so as to " show the date of the occurrence and of the
entry respect- " ing it." Here then the-master has clearly violated a provision
of the Act, which was passed in order to ensure the accuracy and authenticity of
the entries in the official log-book, and which is specially brought to his
notice in the directions printed at the beginning of the book. He enters the
statement as though it had been made on the day on which the casualty occurred,
whereas it was not made until four or five days after.
I now proceed to deal with the fourth question on which our opinion has been
asked, namely, whether there was a sufficient and proper look-out kept on board
the "Fanny" on the morning in question? It is of course very difficult, seeing
that both the look-out men have perished, to answer this question positively.
If, however, we are to believe the evidence of Loynachan and Bailey, that there
were two men stationed forward on the look-out, one on each how, near the light
boxes as he called them, and that the light of the "Helvetia" was seen some 25
minutes or half an hour before the collision, and we see no reason why we should
not do so, there is a strong probability that there was a good look-out being
kept on board the "Fanny." We are told it is true that when the foresail was
hauled down, it was lying over to leeward, that is on the starboard bow, where
one of the look-out men was stationed, and that the result was that that man was
unable to keep his position, and was in fact helping to tie the reefs in the
foresail. This, perhaps, may account for the near approach of the steamer not
having been observed until she was close upon them, for the "Fanny" had by that
time, as will presently be seen, luffed up very much nearer to the wind than
when the steamer's light was first observed, and consequently the steamer might
then have been nearly if not quite on the "Fanny's" starboard bow. But however
this may be, we cannot carry it any further, no doubt the steamer's light was
seen at a considerable distance off in the first instance, but whether it was
afterwards watched as it should have been is perhaps more open to doubt.
The fifth question on which our opinion is asked is, whether proper measures
were taken by the captain of the "Helvetia" to avoid the collision? The captain
told us that, as soon as he saw the red light, he ordered the helm to be put
hard-a-port, but that he did not order the engines to be stopped; and the reason
he gave for not ordering the engines to be stopped was that he had a left-handed
screw, and that it he had ordered the engines to be stopped or reversed the
screw would have acted against the helm, and prevented the vessel's helm from
going off to starboard as rapidly as she otherwise would have done. But he
admitted that if the screw, being a left-handed one, would act against the helm
when it was put hard-a-port, it would, when the helm was put hard-a-starboard,
act with the helm, and consequently if the object was to get the ship's head
round to port the best course when the helm was put to starboard would have been
not only to have stopped but to have reversed his engines. Now what excuse does
he give for not having ordered the engines to be reversed after he had ordered
the helm to be put a-starboard? He has given two reasons, which appear to us to
be somewhat inconsistent in the first place, he told us that when he first saw
the "Fanny's" green light he thought that by merely starboarding his helm he
should be able to clear her. He afterwards told us that when he first saw the
green light he felt that a collision was inevitable, and that consequently lie
would not reverse his engines, lest he should thereby back away from the place
of the collision, and would lose the chance of saving life. The two reasons are
inconsistent. I ought also to observe that the last reason offered appears to us
to be a somewhat curious one. The vessel it seems was going at the rate of at
least 12 knots an hour, and one would have thought that the best mode of saving
life would have been to have brought her to rest as quickly as possible at the
spot where the collision had occurred. Instead of that what the captain did was
to let her carry her way on, so that by the time she would come to rest she
would necessarily have gone a considerable distance beyond the place where the
collision had occurred, and where the "Fanny's" men were drowning. We do not,
however, desire to press this fact too strongly against the master, seeing the
very short time he had for making up his mind as to what was best to be done. At
the same time we think that, when the master starboarded his helm, it would have
been a proper thing to have ordered the engines not only to be stopped, but to
be stopped and reversed in accordance with the 16th article of the regulations
for preventing collisions at sea. It would probably have made the vessel's head
pay off more quickly to port, and, even if it had not saved the collision, it
would at any rate have prevented the vessel running so far ahead as she must
have done before she was brought to rest.
The sixth question on which our opinion is asked is, whether proper precautions
were taken on board the "Fanny" to avoid the collision? As I stated before, the
evidence from the "Fanny" is of course extremely meagre. According to Loynachan,
the steamer's red light, when first seen some 25 minutes before the collision,
was on the "Fanny's" starboard bow. According to Bailey also the light was first
seen on the starboard bow, but he said that it was the white light. Both these
witnesses said that she continued her course without altering it at all until
just before the collision, when she threw herself up into the wind. Now there is
one thing on which we are all quite agreed, the counsel as well as the Court,
namely, that the course of the "Fanny" being E. 1/2 N., and that of the
"Helvetia" S.W. by W. 1/4 W., it was quite impossible for the crew of the
"Fanny" to have seen the red light, or indeed any light of the "Helvetia" on
their starboard bow, some 25 or 30 minutes before the collision, as they say
they did. Five and twenty minutes before the collision the "Helvetia" had not
yet reached the Tuskar, she was still to the northward of it; the "Fanny," too,
was approaching the Tuskar from the west. Now the two witnesses from the
"Fanny," Loynachan and Bailey, say that at this time Tuskar Light was on their
port bow, how then could the "Helvetia's" light have been seen on their
starboard bow? The thing is simply impossible. Not that we charge them with
having wilfully deposed falsely on this point, but they have evidently made a
mistake. No doubt they saw the "Helvetia's" light on their starboard bow just
before the collision, when they were suddenly aroused by the steamer's near
approach, that probably made a very strong impression on their minds, and they
have erroneously supposed that they had always seen the light on that bow.
Moreover, I have frequently observed that very little reliance can be placed
upon common seamen when speaking of what is not their own special duty at the
time. It is not Loynachan's duty to look out, nor was it Bailey's duty to do so;
we cannot therefore, place that reliance on their evidence as to the direction
in which the steamer's lights were first seen, as we should have been disposed
to do had they been specially appointed to look-out. For the 20 or 25 minutes
that elapsed after seeing the lights and before the collision these men were
engaged in lowering the foresail, in tricing up the main tack, and in tying up
the reefs in the foresail. Their attention was therefore engaged otherwise than
in looking after the steamer's lights and how they bore. The same remarks apply
to what they say as to the "Fanny" not having altered her course, and not having
luffed up from the time of the steamer's lights having been seen until
immediately before the collision. They were not at the wheel, and it was no part
of their duty to see on what course the vessel was, and provided that she did
not come so close to the wind that her sails would shake, they would not be
likely to observe whether she got closer to the wind or not. But what is it that
they do say on this point? Bailey tells us, and I think Loynachan also, that he
knew that she had not a tered her course, because he observed Tuskar Light one
point on their port bow, and that it continued all the time to be about a point
on the port bow. But as they neared the Tuskar, if they continued on the same
course, Tuskar Light should have become broader on the bow; the fact that they
always kept it one point on the port bow shows that as they neared the Tuskar
they must have got closer and closer to the wind. In fact they were steering,
not by the compass, but by the Tuskar Light. That she could, too, come up closer
to the wind is clear, for with the wind from N. by E. and her course from the
Saltees E. 1/2 N. she would, we are told, be two points free, as she could sail
within four points and a half of the wind. It can, therefore, very easily be
understood how the "Fanny" might come up two points, or to N.E. by E. 1/2 E.,
without the men, who were engaged in lowering the foresail and tricing up the
main tack, knowing anything about it. And that is no doubt what occurred. The
"Fanny's" steering by Tuskar Light would, as she approached the light, come up
more and more to the wind, till she got to about N.E. and by E. 1/2 E. At this
time the course of the steamer would be S.W. and by W. 1/4 W., so that they
would then be within a quarter of a point of being end on to one another. The
steamer, however, had now got so close, that probably nothing that the "Fanny"
could have done would have avoided the collision, and then the officer of the
watch gave the order, as we are told he did, to put the helm hard down, with
what object it is difficult to see, but possibly under the impression that it
was the only chance of escaping from being run down. For what a man may under
such circumstances do at the last moment it is of course impossible to blame
him.
The seventh question on which our opinion is asked is, whether, after the
collision, the master and crew of the "Helvetia" rendered to the crew of the
"Fanny" all such assistance as was practicable. Now we can hardly blame the
"Helvetia's" people for going, as they appear to have done in the first
instance, to the port quarter boat, because the port side was at that time the
lee side. When, however, the vessel's head, under the influence of her starboard
helm had been brought to the southward and eastward, so that she was across the
sea, the port side would become the windward side, and undoubtedly it would then
have been better had they gone at once to one of the boats on the starboard
side. Had they done so, they would probably have been able to lower it in a much
shorter time, and some more lives might perhaps have been saved.
But the point to which I will now refer, and to which our attention has been
more specially directed by Mr. Mackenzie is, whether this vessel should have
gone to sea with her boats housed as it seems they were? According to the
master, all the boats were inboard on chocks, the chocks standing on iron
stanchions or pivots rising about 2 1/2 feet above the deck, and they were
covered up with sail cloth and fastened down with gripes to ring bolts. It must
consequently have taken some time to clear them even under the most favourable
circumstances, Now we can see no reason why this vessel should not have carried,
at any rate, two of her boats hanging over the side in davits out beyond the
rail. If it would take so short a time as we have been told to take the boats
off the chocks, and to move them outside the rail, it would take an equally
short time, when they were outside, to have swung them in, in case the weather
had come on very bad. The evidence, too, is that the "Fanny" had two boats
hanging in the rigging outside, and if a small vessel like the "Fanny" could do
so, surely a large vessel like the "Helvetia" standing some 16 or 18 feet out of
the water, and running nearly before the wind, could have done the same. If she
had had two of her boats, one on each side, hanging in the davits and swung out,
there can be little doubt that one or other of them, whichever happened to be on
the lee side, could have been lowered instantly, and probably the lives of some
of the men who were lost, would have been saved. We think that the master of
this vessel was not justified in putting to sea with all his boats inboard
fastened down as he has described them. There is always the possibility of a man
falling overboard, or of a collision. or something of this kind occurring, which
may necessitate the instant lowering of a boat, and it is right that the master
should be prepared for such an event. Whilst, however, we are of opinion that
the master should have had his boats in a greater state of readiness, we think
that he did all that he reasonably could have done under the circumstances. and
with his boats as they were, and we entirely acquit him of any wilful act or
neglect conducing to the lamentable loss of life which occurred on this
occasion. The two last questions are, was the casualty due to the neglect or
default of the master of the "Helvetia," or was it due to the neglect or default
of the officer in charge, or of the crew of the "Fanny?" From what has been
said, it will be seen that in our opinion the casualty was due chiefly to the
master of the "Helvetia" in not having had a proper look-out placed on board
this vessel, which would have enabled him to see her in sufficient time to have
avoided her. As regards the "Fanny" herself, no doubt she did, as she approached
the Tuskar, gradually haul up to the wind until she had come nearly end on to
the steamer. To a certain extent that may have conduced to the collision,
because had she continued on her original course of E. 1/2 N. she would no doubt
have passed at a considerable distance to leeward of where she was at the moment
of the collision. But the chief blame, in our opinion, rests with the
"Helvetia;" she ought to have seen the "Fanny" long before she did, and to have
ported her helm in sufficient time, in which case she would never have come near
her.
Now the master holds a certificate of competency, which dates from the year
1855, and we have been told that during all that time he has been in only two
services as a master, a strong testimony in his favour. It appears also from a
note on his certificate that he has been presented with a gold watch for
services rendered in the saving of life. No doubt he is a good officer, at the
same time we cannot allow a case of this kind to go unpunished. These vessels
have no right whatever to traverse the ocean at the speed at which they do, with
one man looking out on one side, and no one looking out on the other. To leave
it to the officer of the watch to keep the look-out on one side is, as I have
said, altogether wrong, he has other duties to perform. We think that the
offence of which the master has been guilty in this case is a most serious one,
resulting, too, in the loss of 17 lives, and that we should not be doing our
duty unless we marked the sense that we entertain of the master's neglect by
suspending his certificate for six months.
(To Mr. Mackenzie.)—You do not ask for any costs.
Mr. Mackenzie.—No, sir.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
(Signed)HENRY D. GRANT,Assessors.
Captain R.N.,
"HENRY PARFITT,
I 101. 96. 70.—12/78. Wt. B 612. E. & S.
