(No. 352.)
"GEM" (S.S.), and Sailing Ship "BOWFELL."
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
In the matter of the formal investigation held at the Civil Court, St. George's
Hall, Liverpool, on the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th days of December 1878,
before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Rear-Admiral
APLIN, R.N., and Captain JONES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending
the collision between the British steam-ship "GEM," of Liverpool, and the
British sailing ship "BOWFELL," of Liverpool, in the River Mersey, on the 26th
day of November 1878, whereby loss of life ensued.
The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the Reasons annexed-
(1.) That William Cartwright, the master of the ferry steamer "Gem," was not
justified in attempting to cross the River Mersey on the morning of the 26th
November, in so dense a fog, and with the flood tide running at the rate of
between five and six knots.
(2.) That the master of the "Gem" did not take the proper measures to avoid a
collision, seeing that after he had been told that a bell had been heard to the
southward of the lightship, but where exactly the ship was to which it belonged
was not known, his proper course under those circumstances would be to go to the
north and not to the south of the lightship.
(3.) That the "Bowfell" was not anchored in such a position as to be a cause of
danger to the ferry steamers crossing between Seacombe and Liverpool.
(4.) That the pilot of the "Bowfell" was justified in anchoring in the place in
which he did, having regard to the fact that he saw a fog setting towards him
from the S.E., which would prevent his getting up beyond the Woodside Ferry
track.
(5.) That the bell of the "Bowfell" was a good bell, and was rung with
sufficient frequency on the morning in question.
(6.) That the casualty was due partly to the neglect and default of the Wallasey
Local Board, the owners of the ferry steamer "Gem," in giving no discretionary
power either to their manager or to their captains to stop the Seacombe Ferry
boats when it was dangerous for them to run, and in compelling them to run,
however dense the fog might be; and partly to the wrongful acts and defaults of
the said William Cartwright, the master of the "Gem," in attempting to pass
between the lightship and the "Bowfell," without knowing the exact position of
the latter vessel, and with such a strong flood tide as was then running,
instead of taking a course to the north of the lightship.
(7.) That the casualty was not due to the "Bowfell" or to any neglect or default
on the part of her master, pilot, or owners.
The Court accordingly returns to the master of the "Bowfell" his certificate.
The master of the "Gem" being an uncertificated officer the Court has no power
over him.
The Court makes no order as to costs.
Dated the 14th day of December 1878.
H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above Report.
ELPHINSTONE APLIN,
Rear-Admiral,Assessor.
HENRY JONES, Assessor.
Reasons.
The Commissioner.-The object of the present inquiry is to ascertain the
circumstances under which a collision occurred on Tuesday the 26th day of
November last, in the River Mersey, between the steam ferry boat "Gem" and the
ship "Bowfell," attended, I regret to say, with very great loss of life.
The case has attracted a great deal of attention, owing partly to the fact that
the "Gem" had at the time on board as passengers from 200 to 250 professional
gentlemen going to their places of business at Liverpool; partly also to the
fact that the "Bowfell" was said to have been anchored in the track of the ferry
boats. It seems that this question of the ferry track has given rise to a great
deal of discussion between the gentlemen who reside on the Cheshire side, the
ferry boat owners, and the authorities; and the learned counsel for the Board of
Trade, in his opening address, stated that that would he one of the questions to
which the attention of the Court would have to be directed. He said that
regulations had from time to time been issued by the pilotage authorities of the
River Mersey in regard to the anchorage of ships within the ferry tracks; that
our attention would be called to those regulations; and that we should be asked
to say whether they had been infringed in this case, and, if so, why?
Accordingly, when an application was made to me on the part of the Mersey Docks
and Harbour Board, who are the pilotage authorities for this port, and by the
Birkenhead Improvement Commissioners, the owners of the Woodside Ferry, and who
have a special interest in the question of the ferry tracks, I felt that I had
no option but to allow them to appear. The result has been that we have had
before us no less than seven different parties; namely, (1) the Board of Trade;
(2), the Wallasey Local Board, the owners, and the master and officers of the
ferry steamboat "Gem;" (3), the Messrs. Brocklebank, the owners, and the master
and officers of the "Bowfell;" (4), the pilot of the "Bowfell;" (5), the next of
kin of some of the passengers who have lost their lives in the collision; (6),
the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board; (7), the Birkenhead Improvement
Commissioners.
All these parties were separately represented, either by counsel or solicitor,
and all claimed the right to cross-examine the witnesses. This -has of course
tended to lengthen the proceedings; at the same time, looking at the great
importance of the question to the inhabitants on the Cheshire shore, and, I may
say, to the inhabitants of Liverpool itself, looking also to the number of
witnesses who have been examined, I do not think that the four days during which
this case has lasted can be said to have been unprofitably spent, A less full
and less thorough investigation would certainly not have satisfied either the
public or the parties. I now come to the facts of the case.
The "Gem" was a paddle-wheel steamer of 118 tons gross, and 36 tons net
register, and was fitted with engines of 50 horse-power. She was built at Govan
in the year 1858, and at the time of the casualty was the property of the
Wallasey Local Board. A short time since she had been extensively repaired; she
had been lengthened 10 feet; two water-tight bulkheads, in addition to the five
which she already had, had been put into her, as well as new engines and
boilers. There can be no doubt that at the time of the casualty she was, as the
result has shown, a thoroughly good and substantial vessel.
At 9.30 a.m. of Tuesday the 26th of November last she left Seacombe Ferry for
Liverpool, under the command of Captain Cartwright, and having a crew of seven
hands, and one extra hand to attend to the whistle. The tide at the time was
half flood, running, we are told, from five to six knots an hour; the wind was
light from the south, and there was an intensely thick fog. As I have already
said, she had from 200 to 250 passengers on board, chiefly professional men,
going to their places of business in Liverpool. On leaving, the master and mate
were on the bridge, the mate being at the helm. There was a man named Cropper,
the extra man, at the whistle, which was on the bridge, and there were two men
forward on the lookout, one on each bow.
I should state that on the previous Sunday, the 24th, a vessel called the
"Maggie Townson" had been sunk a little to the south of a line drawn between
Seacombe Stage and the embayment of the St. George and Prince's Stages on the
Liverpool side. On the next day, Monday the 25th, a lightship had been moored a
little distance to the north of her, for the purpose of marking the place of the
wreck, and to warn vessels against running on to it, The wreck and the lightship
bore from the Seacombe Stage about S.E. and by E.; and they were, as I have
said, nearly in a direct line between the Seacombe Stage and the St, George's
Stage, Boats therefore leaving the Seacombe Stage had to elect either to pass to
the southward or to the northward of those vessels, Captain Cartwright
determined to pass to the southward of those vessels; and as the "Gem" lay
alongside the stage with her head down the river, the helm was put hard-a-port
for the purpose of turning her round with her head up stream. At the same time a
long whistle was sounded, as a signal that the vessel was about to start, and
the engines were set on half speed ahead, The practice on board these vessels
was to sound the whistle three times in quick succession, and that, we are told,
was done from the moment of leaving the stage, the three whistles being repeated
about three times-in a minute or a minute and a half.
The vessel rounded to under her port helm until her head was brought to about
south-east, when, finding from the sound of the lightship's bell that they had
passed her, the helm was ordered to be put hard-a-starboard to bring her head to
the tide, intending thus to cross the river, the vessel at the same time
drifting down with the tide, so as to fetch the St. George's Stage. In a minute
and a half or two minutes after passing the lightship, and within three or four
minutes of leaving the Seacombe Stage, at which time the vessel's head had, as
we are told, been brought to about east-north-east, the bowsprit of a vessel,
which afterwards proved to be the "Bowfell," was observed by the master just
forward of the starboard paddle-box. The master, finding that the tide was
setting him directly down on to the "Bowfell," and that, if he fell across her
stem, the vessel would probably be disabled and great loss of life ensue,
ordered the engines to be set full speed ahead, and the helm to be put
hard-a-port to cant her stern off. The result of this manouvre was to throw the
"Gem" clear off the "Bowfell's" stem. Her funnel, however, was caught by the
"Bowfell's" bowsprit, and was carried away, and her starboard quarter came into
collision with the "Bowfell's" starboard bow. The vessel herself, however,
passed clear, scraping down the "Bowfell's" starboard side. As soon as the
captain of the "Gem" perceived that he was clear of the "Bowfell's" stem he
ordered the engines to be put full speed astern, and succeeded in bringing her
up.
I n the meantime a panic had seized the passengers; some threw themselves into
the water; from 20 to 24 clambered up on board the "Bowfell;" others threw the
boat which was on the bridge into the water; and although no time seems to have
been lost by the captain or mate and seamen in endeavouring to calm the fears of
the passengers, I regret to say that during the short time that elapsed before
the vessel was brought to, four passengers had been drowned; one had sustained
such injuries from the collision that he afterwards died in hospital, and 14 are
still missing. The "Gem" was ultimately brought alongside the Wallasey Stage,
and there landed the remainder of her passengers.
Such are the facts so far as they concern the "Gem;" and now for the "Bowfell."
It seems that the "Bowfell" is a vessel of 1001 tons register, built at
Whitehaven, in the county of Cumberland, in the year 1864, and at the time of
the casualty was the property of Messrs. Brocklebank, of this town. She left
Calcutta in July last, having a crew of 28 hands, all told, and a light cargo.
At 4.30 p.m. of the 25th of November last, she was off the Middle Mouse, about
two miles to the west of Point Lynas, when she was boarded by a first-class
pilot, named Richard Williams, who took charge of her for the purpose of
piloting her up the Mersey, and into the Prince's Dock for which she was bound.
Off the Great Orme's Head she was taken in tow by a steam tug, and at about 1.30
or 2 a.m. the following morning she was off the Rock, the tide at the time being
ebb. Richard Williams has told us that it was his intention n, if possible, to
anchor the ship between the Rock and Egremont, but owing to the number of
vessels that he found there, owing also to two wrecks, namely, the "Hercules"
and "Alice Davies," which took up a considerable portion of the anchorage
ground, he found it impossible to obtain a clear berth, and he therefore
determined to proceed up the river above the Woodside Ferry. At first he kept
rather to the Cheshire side, but afterwards went over towards the Liverpool
side; and when nearly up to the Prince's Stage he observed a bank of thick fog
coming down the river from the southeast. Fearing to be caught in this fog, he
ported the vessel's helm, and at the same time signalled to the tug to port her
helm, so as to bring his vessel more over to the Cheshire side, and cut of the
way of the small craft on the Liverpool side, and the ferry boats and tugs which
would be making for the Liverpool Stage. Observing to the south what ultimately
turned out to be the lightship, but which he took to be simply a vessel riding
at anchor, for he was quite ignorant that there was any wreck there, having been
at sea during the previous week, and seeing a clear berth, as he thought, above
the lightship, he dropped his anchor and brought up on the ebb tide, paying out
at the same time 45 fathoms of chain to the water's edge. By this time,
according to the pilot's evidence, the fog was upon them, and an anchor watch
was then set, consisting of an officer and two men, in addition to the pilot,
who remained on deck and in charge. At 8 o'clock, the weather being still
intensely foggy, the mate took it upon himself to set a sea watch, and one of
the hands was then put at the helm; another was set to ring the bell, which, I
may observe, had, according to the evidence from the "Bowfell," been rung
continually from the time when she was brought to anchor, namely, from about 20
minutes to 5 o'clock. Soon afterwards 15 more fathoms of chain were paid out, so
that the vessel then rode with 60 fathoms of chain out.
At 9.30 a.m. the pilot was walking the quarter deck, the master and chief mate
being below; there was a man at the wheel, the eldest apprentice was at the
bell, and the vessel had a slight sheer to the westward, heading, as we are
told, north half west, or north by west, on the flood tide, when a vessel, which
afterwards proved to be the "Gem" was observed crossing her bows, and at the
same time drifting rapidly down upon them. According to the pilot the greater
part of her was then on their starboard side, the funnel being just a little on
the port bow; and the "Gem" herself seemed to be heading about south-east and by
east. Before he could run forward the steamer was foul of her, their cutwater
taking her after sponson on the starboard side; and the "Gem" then scraped down
along their starboard side. No time seems to have been lost by the "Bowfell" in
lowering her boat, which was hanging from the davits, and some seven or eight
people were thereby rescued; and I am happy to say that in this case no charge
has been brought against the masters or officers of either vessel that they
neglected to take all proper measures to save the lives of the unfortunate
people who were drowning.
Such being the facts of the case, the questions on which the Board of Trade have
requested the opinion of the Court are as follows:-
1. Was the master of the "Gem" justified in attempting to cross the river on the
morning in question?
2. Did the master of the "Gem" take proper precautions to avoid a collision?
3. Was the "Bowfell" anchored in such a position as to be a cause of danger to
the ferry steamers crossing between Seacombe and Liverpool?
4. Was the pilot of the "Bowfell" justified in anchoring the "Bowfell" in the
position in which she was on the morning in question?
5. Did the "Bowfell" carry, and did her master and crew use, proper fog signals
on the morning in question?
6. Was the casualty due to any neglect or default on the part of the owners or
master of the "Gem?"
7. Was the casualty due to any neglect or default on the part of the master,
pilot, or owners of the "Bowfell?"
And, lastly, the Board of Trade say that in their opinion the certificate of the
master of the "Bowfell" should be dealt with. Mr. Mackenzie added, that had the
master of the "Gem" held a certificate a similar application would have been
made to the Court in respect to him.
Now it will be observed that in these questions the propriety or legality of
anchoring in the ferry track has not been raised, except inferentially in
questions 3 and 4. We are not asked to say whether it would be proper to
prohibit the anchoring of vessels in the river tracks, or to express any opinion
as to the propriety of the orders which have been issued by the pilotage
authorities on the subject. This arises, as I understand, rom a remark which
fell from the Court in the course of the proceedings, that the Court would most
certainly not pronounce any opinion upon so large a question without much fuller
information than was at present before it, and without having given those
parties, whose interests might be directly or indirectly attected thereby, an
opportunity of being heard thereon. It is upon this ground, I understand, that
Mr. Mackenzie has framed the questions in the form in which they now stand; and
I must say that they are a model for inquiries of this nature, as they are
calculated to elicit the opinion of the Court upon all the essential points in
this case.
The first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, was the master of
the "Gem" justified in attempting to cross the river on the morning in question?
We are told that the fog was so intense on that morning that it was not possible
to see further than half the "Gem's" length, that is to say, some 60 or 70 feet
off. We were also told that during the last 20 years so dense a fog had not been
seen more than once or twice, and that a denser fog had perhaps never been seen
before. We can then have no hesitation in saying that, under such circumstances,
a master would not be justified in attempting to cross the river, at all events
when the tide was running at the rate of from five to six knots an hour. I
adhere to what I said in a recent case, that a vessel is not at liberty in a fog
to proceed through a crowded channel at such a rate of speed; that it is not
possible for her to see an object, at anchor too, at a sufficient distance to
avoid colliding with it. We are told that at half speed the "Gem" made five
knots an hour; the tide too was running at the rate of between five and six
knots an hour. When, therefore, her head was to the south-east, or nearly up the
river, she must have been going over the ground at the rate of nearly 10 knots
an hour. What chance then would she have of escaping collision with a vessel at
anchor, if perchance she should find herself bearing down upon her?
But we are not left to our own conjectures on this point, for we have evidence
of the most unimpeachable character that it was rash and imprudent on the
morning in question, with the tide running as it was between five and six knots
an hour, to cross this river. Without going quite the length of the pilot, Mr.
Webster, who told us that, in his opinion, whenever there is a fog, professional
gentlemen should stay at home,-I do not think he said that pilots ought to do
so, or, if he did, his professions would hardly accord with his practice, for if
I rightly remember he was going as a passenger in the "Gem" for the purpose of
taking charge of a vessel as pilot,-I say, without going quite that length, we
have evidence of the great danger of running this vessel on the morning in
question from gentlemen whose testimony cannot be questioned. Captain Cartwright
indeed said that he thought he could have got safely over, if the "Bowfell's"
bell had been kept ringing. No doubt, if there had been no vessel in the way,
the "Gem" might, although the tide was running as it did, have arrived safely at
the Liverpool side. On the other hand, we have the evidence of Godfrey, the
mate, that in his opinion-and his opinion is entitled to considerable weight
from the length of time he has served in these boats-it was not prudent to cross
the river that morning. But we have the evidence of Mr. Carson, the manager of
the vessels belonging to the Wallasey Local Board, a witness who gave his
evidence in a manner to call for the approbation of the Court on account of the
clear and straightforward way in which it was given. Now what does Mr. Carson
say, after an experience, I think, of 20 years, 14 years of the period as
manager? He tells us that, in his opinion, it was not prudent to run on that
morning; that he would have preferred not to run the boat, and that, if it had
been left to his discretion, he should not have done so. According to Mr. Carson
it was not possible to run her without the greatest risk. When, then, the Court
finds the manager of these boats speaking in such strong terms of the
impropriety of running this boat on the morning in question, we can have no
doubt that to have crossed the river on that morning, with the tide running at
the rate of from five to six knots an hour, was an act of the greatest
imprudence.
We were told, however, that these boats had run for about 20 years without any
serious casualty ever having occurred to any of them, and that it would have
been a matter of extreme inconvenience to the gentlemen who were passengers by
her, had they been prevented from going to their offices that morning. It was
said that, although they might have gone to the Woodside Ferry, it would have
been by the shortest route a journey of about a mile and three quarters, with
the risk of falling into some one or other of the docks in the way; and to have
gone by the longest and safest route would have involved a journey of five
miles, a very important matter to many of the persons who wanted to cross the
river on that morning. We were told too by Mr. Kennedy that these boats were not
in the hands of private speculators, but that they were public property; that
they were run for the benefit of the ratepayers, and that it was the wish of
those gentlemen that they should not be stopped.
No doubt those gentlemen, seeing that no accident had happened before, were
ready to run the risk of crossing the river that morning, rather than incur the
certain inconvenience of either staying at home or going five miles round by
land to Woodside Ferry. As I understand Mr. Kennedy, no discretion is given
either to the manager or masters of the boats; they always have run, whatever
the state of the weather may be. It might therefore to a certain extent be said
that these gentlemen were voluntarily exposing themselves to this risk as a
lesser evil than having to stay away from their places of business or having to
go round by the Woodside Ferry. Now it appears to me that this is a different
case from that of a master in charge of a vessel who wilfully incurs a risk to
which the passengers are in no way consenting parties. Here the passengers knew
the risk before they started, and were willing to encounter it. No doubt the
master was not justified in crossing the river that morning, but then the
majority of the passengers were willing to incur the risk. What we are rather
disposed to say is, that the ratepayers, for whose convenience these boats are
run, are not justified in giving no discretion to their captains, and no
discretion even to their manager, but insisting that the vessels shall always
run, no matter what may be the state of the weather. We cannot, therefore, in
considering the conduct of the captain in this case, altogether lose sight of
the fact that no discretion was given to him, that he communicated with the
manager before leaving, and that that manager, having himself no discretion in
the matter, did not prohibit his running. The blame, therefore, if blame there
is, rests more with the ratepayers and the. Wallasey Local Board than it does
with the captain of this vessel or with the manager.
The second question on which our opinion has been asked is, whether the master
of the "Gem" took proper precautions to avoid the collision? And here I must
again refer to the evidence of that very intelligent witness. Mr. Carson, to
help us on this point. Mr. Carson told us that the Seacombe boats run every day,
without interruption, from 5.30 or 6 a.m. until after midnight; and that they
have two sets of captains, night and day captains. The night captains go on duty
at 5 p.m. and remain on duty until midnight; they then come off duty and resume
again at half-past five or six in the morning, continuing until 8 a.m., when
they are relieved by the day captains, who remain on duty from that time until 5
p.m. Mr. Carson told us that it is the duty of the masters of the first boats in
the morning to look out for any obstructions that may have been placed in the
track since the boats had left off running the night before, and to report them
either to the manager or to their fellow captains. This seems to be the usual
practice on board these ferry boats.
Now on the morning in question Evans and Potter were the night captains, Maxwell
and Oxley the day captains. Mr. Carson told us that Evans and Potter, or one or
both of them, told him that morning that they had discovered a steamer, which
afterwards proved to be the "Glaucus," away to the eastward, off the embayment
of the landing stage; that they had been alongside of her and asked her captain
to keep his bell going, and to show a signal aft; that they had also told him
that to the southward of the lightship and off the Alfred Dock they had heard
another bell, but that they did not know what it was, as they had not been so
far to the southward. They had, it would seem, up to that time been running on
the ebb tide. It further appears that, when Maxwell and Oxley came on duty at 8
o'clock, Mr. Carson enquired of them what course they intended to take, the
flood tide having by that time begun to make. Oxley said that he intended to go
to the southward of everything, meaning by "everything" not only the lightship
and the wreck, but also the vessel whose bell had been heard by the captains to
the southward of the lightship. Mr. Carson objected, as it seemed to him to
involve a risk of collision with the Woodside boats; but he said that he did not
forbid that course being taken. Maxwell said that he should go to the southward
of the lightship and the wreck, and across the bows of the vessel, whose bell
had been heard by the captains, but without their knowing what it was; and Mr.
Carson thought that that was the safer course. These two captains appear to have
performed the journey to and from Liverpool in safety, but at that time the tide
was not running at its full strength.
At 9.30 Cartwright was put on with the "Gem," for the purpose of relieving the
other two captains. Mr. Carson told us that, when Cartwright was about to start,
he asked him if he had had any communication with the other captains as to what
was in the track, and he said that he had. With the view of making sure that
Cartwright was well informed as to the dangers which he was likely to meet with
on the journey, Mr. Carson asked him if he was aware that a bell had been heard
to the southward of the lightship and the wreck off the Alfred Dock, and that a
steamer had been seen to the eastward, to which Cartwright answered that he was
aware of it. When therefore Cartwright started to cross from the Seacombe to the
Liverpool side this was the position of affairs: he knew that the "Glaucus" lay
off the embayment on the Liverpool side; he knew also that a bell had been heard
to the southward of the lightship, but no one knew to what vessel that bell
belonged, nor what was her exact position. He nevertheless determined to pass
between the lightship and this vessel, although he did not know with any
certainty at what distance they were apart.
It was stated by Mr. Mackenzie that it appeared to him strange that the master
had not, knowing that there was a vessel to the southward of the lightship,
elected to pass to the northward of the lightship. To this no answer has been
given. The only suggestion that has been offered in reply is that there might
have been a risk of the ferry boat being driven by the flood tide across the
bows of the lightship. But it surely would have been easier to have avoided the
bows of the lightship, whose position was accurately known, than a vessel of
which all that was known was that she was somewhere to the south of the
lightship. That, at any rate, is the opinion of the two assessors who sit with
me, gentlemen of very great experience, and one of them now holding high rank in
Her Majesty's Navy, and having at one time been stationed in this port.
The master then having elected to pass to the southward of the lightship, and
between it and the unknown vessel, it becomes important to ascertain where the
lightship, as well as the "Bowfell," were anchored, for on this point we have
had a great deal of very contradictory evidence. The position indeed of the
lightship and the wreck have been very accurately defined for us by Captain
Hills, the Marine Surveyor of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, under whose
management the lightship was moored. He told us that the wreck, being that of an
iron ship laden with pig iron, could not certainly have shifted her position,
which he stated was immediately opposite to the south entrance to the Alfred
Dock, and about 500 yards from the Cheshire shore, and 600 from the Liverpool
shore. She was consequently nearly in mid-stream, but a little over to the
Cheshire side. He told us that the lightship was thus stationed: an anchor was
dropped 30 fathoms to the westward of the wreck, and 60 fathoms of chain having
been paid out, another anchor with 60 fathoms of chain was carried out to the
north; that the two chains were then connected with a swivel, to which the
lightship rode with two bridles; so that her position, on the ebb and flow of
the tide, would be very slightly altered, by merely the length of the vessel,
some 90 feet. Captain Hills also told us that the distance of the lightship from
the south end of the Seacombe Stage was, as nearly as possible, 450 yards; and
as she was nearly in a direct line between the Seacombe and St. George's Stages,
she would lie in a direction something like S.E. and by E. from the Seacombe
Stage.
Having thus ascertained with certainty the position of the lightship and wreck,
let us now endeayour to fix, as far as we can, the position of the "Bowfell."
According to the crew of the "Bowfell" they were anchored directly astern of the
lightship, and at such a distance from it that, on the flood tide, the stern of
their vessel was off the south bridge of the Wallasey landing stage. On the
other hand the people belonging to the "Gem" place her very much nearer to the
wreck,-in fact so close that, as I understand it, it must have been dangerous to
pass between the wreck and the "Bowfell." But if the "Bowfell" was so close to
the wreck that it was dangerous to pass between them, what right had the "Gem"
to attempt to cross the "Bowfell's" bows, with a flood tide running at the rate
of between five and six knots? It may, however, be said that Captain Cartwright
did not know at the time how close she was; but he did know that a vessel's bell
had been heard to the southward of the lightship, and not knowing exactly where
the vessel was to which that bell belonged, it behoved him to exercise more than
ordinary caution, lest he should come into collision with her.
But, as a matter of fact, I think that it will be found that the "Bowfell" was
not anchored so close to the wreck as the "Gem's" people would wish us to
believe. But how stands the evidence? First, then, we have the evidence of the
men from the lightship. Now I am ready to admit that Wills, the seaman from the
lightship, was anxious to give a fair statement as far as he could; but, to use
Captain Hills' words, he had a very hazy idea of distance, and was undoubtedly
very much confused, using the words to define the points of the compass in a
certain conventional way, which, to say the least, is unusual, and which misled
not only the learned counsel engaged in the case, but the Court also. If a
witness will say that a certain object was north of his vessel, and at the same
time south and west of it, he must expect that we shall have some difficulty in
understanding him. On the other hand, Steele, who also came from the lightship,
gave his evidence very clearly; he told us that, on the flood tide, the
"Bowfell" was anchored in a line directly astern of the lightship, and that they
could see her from either gangway. Steele also told us that, when both vessels
were riding on the ebb, she was 130 fathoms from the lightship. On the flood,
then, we should have to add twice the length of the "Bowfell's" cable, that is
to say, 120 fathoms, and her length, which would be 35 fathoms more. This gives
us from 270 to 280 fathoms, or something like 550 yards, as the distance between
the lightship and the bows of the "Bowfell." Now if we measure off 550 yards
from the place where the lightship was moored as laid down on the chart by
Captain Hills, it will bring us about opposite to the south bridge of the
Wallasey landing stage, which is where the crew of the "Bowfell" say that they
were on the flood tide, and when also the collision occurred.
But this is not the only evidence on the point. According to Mr. Carson, what he
required to be kept clear of vessels at anchor as a track for the ferry boats
was 500 yards on either side of a line drawn from Seacombe landing stage to the
centre of the embayment of the Liverpool landing stage, which, as we have seen,
would pass through the lightship. Now Mr. Carson has admitted that the "Bowfell"
on the flood tide was anchored beyond what he had claimed for the Ferry track,
that is to say, beyond 500 yards from a line from the Seacombe landing stage
through the lightship. The "Bowfell" consequently on the flood tide must have
been more than 500 yards to the southward of the lightship, which would agree
with the evidence of those both from the "Bowfell" and from the lightship, and
would place her opposite the Wallasey landing stage.
A question, however, arises, how was it, if the "Bowfell" was at this distance
from the lightship and the wreck, that the "Gem" came into collision with her?
and the answer appears to us to be very clear. When the "Gem" rounded with her
head to the south-east she was going, we are told, half speed, which was five
knots an hour; the tide also was taking her at from five to six knots an hour;
she would therefore, until she had got her head round to meet the tide, be going
something like 10 knots an hour over the ground. Now 10 knots an hour give one
mile in six minutes, so that in two minutes the vessel would go a third of a
mile or 580 to 590 yards. We are told, however, that the collision occurred in
from three to four minutes from the time of leaving the landing stage, and in a
minute and a half or two minutes from passing the lightship. But if it took the
"Gem" only about two minutes to get under weigh, and to bring her head round,
and to traverse the 450 yards between the stage and the lightship, is it very
unreasonable to suppose that in the next minute and a half or two minutes she
would traverse the intervening space between the lightship and the "Bowfell?"
For it must be remembered that, when she passed the light ship her head would be
about S.E., and that she would be going at her greatest speed; and as she had
not got sufficiently far across the river to avoid coming in contact with the
"Bowfell," which was anchored directly astern of the lightship, it is evident
that her helm could not have been put to starboard to make her head across the
river very long before the collision actually occurred.
The explanation of the case is simply this: The master, instead of doing, as in
the opinion of my assessors he should have done, that is to say, gone to the
north of the lightship and the wreck clear of all obstructions, elected to turn
his ship between the lightship and the Cheshire shore. This necessarily brought
him with his head up the river, and with the flood tide running at the rate of
five to six knots an hour in his favour. To retain command over his ship he had
to keep her at half speed, which, we are told, is five knots an hour; he would
therefore be going 10 knots over the ground, and might easily traverse the
distance between the lightship and the head of the "Bowfell" before he had made
sufficient way across the river to clear the bows of the latter ship. We think
that the master was to blame for having attempted to cross the river with a
flood tide running at a rate of between five and six knots an hour, and with the
knowledge that there was a vessel somewhere to the southward of the lightship,
but where exactly he did not know. When, however, he sighted the vessel, we
think that the measures which he took were proper and such as a prudent captain
would take. In our opinion he showed a great deal of skill and presence of mind
in ordering the engines to be put on full speed ahead, and in putting the helm
hard-a-port, so as to cant the ship's stern out from the "Bowfell," and thus
diminish as far as possible the consequences of the collision.
The third question on which our opinion has been asked is, whether the "Bowfell"
was anchored in such a position as to be a cause of danger to ferry steamers
crossing between Seacombe and Liverpool? Now it is clear, in our opinion, that
there was a distance of some 550 to 560 yards between the lightship and the
"Bowfell" for vessels going from Seacombe to St. George's Stage; and if that
distance is not sufficient to enable a ferry boat to cross the river, I can only
say that there would be very little space in the River Mersey for any vessels to
anchor in. Assuming that Mr. Carson is right in saying that a space of 500 yards
on either side of a line drawn from Seacombe to the St. George's Stage is
required to be kept clear for the ferry track, it appears to the Court that,
even on this assumption, the "Bowfell" was not in a place to be a cause of
danger to the ferry boats, provided that the captains exercised due care and
caution.
The fourth question on which our opinion is asked is, whether the pilot of the
"Bowfell" was justified in anchoring her in the position in which she was on the
morning in question. Now our attention has been called to certain orders which
have been issued by the pilotage authorities, beginning in the year 1859, and
issued from that time successively in the years 1860, 1864, 1866, 1869, 1870,
1871, 1872, 1873, and lastly on the 31st October 1878, and in which pilots are
recommended not to anchor in the ferry tracks. In most of these notices the
recommendation is that they shall not anchor in the tracks of the Seacombe as
well as the Woodside Ferry boats; but in the last notice, dated the 31st October
in the present year, the Woodside Ferry track is alone mentioned. It has been
pointed out that these notices are not orders, but only recommendations; and it
is abundantly clear from the evidence of the pilots that they are so regarded by
them. Now I am not going to say whether the pilotage authorities ought or ought
not to have issued more stringent orders on the subject, for we have not the
materials before us to decide so large a quest ion; and moreover our opinion has
not been asked upon the point. All that I need say is that according to the
evidence of the pilots they do avoid anchoring in the ferry tracks, if they can
conveniently do so; at the same time, from the fact that the Seacombe Ferry had
been omitted from the last notice, they seem to consider that it is not so
incumbent upon them to attend to the Seacombe Ferry track as to the Woodside
Ferry track. It is clear, however, that the previous recommendations of the
pilotage authorities as to the Seacombe Ferry track have not been cancelled.
But apart from these recommendations or notices, how stand the facts? The pilot
of the "Bowfell," it seems, had been at sea from some time in the previous week,
and therefore before the "Maggie Townson" had been sunk. He knew indeed that
there had been a wreck, but not where it was exactly. In coming up the river he
intended to anchor between the Rock and Egremont; and we have not only his own
evidence, but the evidence of the mate of the "Bowfell," that the crew were
standing by to let go the anchor during the whole time they were coining up the
river; and that the vessel was on one occasion stopped for something like half
an hour, for the purpose of taking up a berth, but they had to proceed on again,
as it was thought that there was not sufficient room to swing clear. Under these
circumstances the pilot, in our opinion most properly determined to go further
up, with the intention of anchoring above Woodside Ferry. Before, however, he
had arrived at the Woodside Ferry track, and when nearing the Prince's Stage, he
saw a fog coming up from the southward and eastward; and in our opinion, not
only was he fully justified, but it was his bounden duty to anchor the ship at
once. Had he gone on further he would probably have found himself in the track
of the Woodside Ferry,-a more serious matter, I may observe, than anchoring in
the Seacombe Ferry track. And so cautious did this man seem to have been, that,
instead of anchoring in the Seacombe Ferry track, he steered his vessel across
to the westward so as to get into the triangle formed by the Seacombe and the
Woodside Ferry tracks. Seeing then the lights of the lightship, though not
knowing that she was over a wreck (although, had he known it, I do not think it
would make any difference), and that there was a clear berth to the southward of
her, he let go his anchor. Now it must be observed that a pilot is not to go on
up to the last moment, until he has actually got into a fog, before he anchors
his vessel, for then it might be very difficult for him to give her a clear
berth. It is his duty to anchor her in sufficient time, so as to be quite sure
that he has not given her a foul berth. The pilot of the "Bowfell" seems to have
done all that could be required of him, and to have taken every precaution, not
only to avoid the ferry tracks, but to place his vessel in such a position that
she would ride with safety to herself and to others.
The fifth question upon which our opinion has been asked is, whether the
"Bowfell" carried, and whether her master and crew used, proper fog signals on
the morning in question? The tenth article of the Regulations says " that
vessels, when at anchor, shall sound the bell at " least every five minutes."
Now, although the Regulations do not say that the bell shall be sounded more
often when the weather is very thick, I think it may be admitted that a prudent
and careful captain would order the bell to be sounded more frequently in such
weather, and when an object could not be seen until it was quite close, than at
other times. It is quite possible too that, if this vessel's bell had only been
sounded once in five minutes, it might not have been sounded between the time of
the "Gem" leaving the Seacombe Stage and the collision, which we are told was
only from three to four minutes.
But, as a matter of fact, there is very strong evidence that the bell was
sounded, and frequently too. In the first place, there is the evidence of the
"Bowfell's" people. We are not quite disposed to think that that very energetic
young apprentice was continually ringing the bell in the way in which he did it
in court, for I should hardly think that he could have kept it up in that way
for more than two or three minutes; probably he did what I am told they usually
do on board vessels, ring it two or three times, then pause, and then ring it
again. But that the "Bowfell's" beli was rung is to us clear, for apart from the
evidence of her own crew, we have that of the pilot of the "Glaucus," which
vessel was anchored between her and the Liverpool Stage; and we have also
evidence that the captains of the Seacombe boats heard a bell to the southward
of the lightship, and there can lie no doubt that this was the "Bowfell's" bell.
Those on board the lightship seem to have been very energetic in sounding their
bell, which might probably be expected, as they were stationed there to warn
ships from going on the wreck, and as the "Bowfell's" bell was not sounded quite
so frequently, they may have thought that it was not sounded sufficiently often.
But, so far as we can see, e en they did not place the intervals at which the
bell was sounded at more than from two or three minutes from one another. We
have also the evidence of Mr. Bully, who was a passenger in the "Gem," and in
whom we place great reliance, and who told us that he heard the bell of the
"Bowfell" sounded when they were passing the lightship, and then again just
immediately before the collision. The bell itself too, I am told by my
assessors, is a very good bell, just such a bell as a vessel of this kind would
carry. No doubt its tone was not very musical, but it has a note which, I am
told, would probably be heard at a very considerable distance, if properly rung.
I think, therefore, that we may conclude that the truth lies between the two
stories; probably the bell was not rung with the energy with which it was rung
in this court, nor indeed was that necessary; but it was probably rung at
intervals of some two minutes or less, sufficient to warn, not vessels that were
approaching at the rate of 10 knots an hour, but vessels going at a moderate
rate of speed. We must therefore hold that the "Bowfell" did carry, and that her
master did use proper fog signals on the morning in question.
The sixth question on which our opinion is asked is, whether the casualty was
due to any neglect or default on the part of the owners or master of the "Gem?"
We have already in effect answered this question. We think that the casualty was
due partly to the default and neglect of the owners, and partly to the default
or neglect of the master; to the owners for not giving any discretion to their
manager, or to their captains, as to running when the log was so intensely thick
that it was impossible to see more than 20 yards to the captain for taking the
imprudent course of passing between the lightship and the Cheshire shore, with
his head to the southward, going at the rate of about 10 knots an hour, instead
of passing, as he should have done, to the northward of the lightship clear of
all obstructions, when he was told that there was a ship lying somewhere to the
southward of the lightship, but where exactly was not known.
The seventh question on which our opinion has been asked is, whether the
casualty was due to any neglect or default on the part of the master, pilot, or
owners of the "Bowfell?" This question also has been already answered. In our
opinion it was not due to any default on the part of any of them. We think that
the pilot, in anchoring the vessel where he did, took a wise and prudent course
in placing her as far as he could out of the way of other vessels. We think also
that no blame is imputable to the master or to any of the officers of the
"Bowfell," and we shall, therefore, return to the master his certificate.
(Mr. Barnes.) I do not know, Sir, whether the Court would consider that the
pilot of this vessel ought or ought not to have a portion of his costs.
(The Commissioner.) Against whom do you ask for them?
(Mr. Barnes.) I suppose that will depend upon the judgment of the Court; but I
think I should suggest against the clients of my learned friend Mr. Kennedy.
(The Commissioner.) Do you ask for costs against Mr. Kennedy's parties?
(Mr. Barnes.) I will not press it, Sir.
(The Commissioner.) If you do not ask for them, I have, of course, nothing to
decide. (To Mr. Mackenzie.) Do you ask for costs?
(Mr. Mackenzie.) No, Sir.
H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
ELPHINSTONE APLIN,
Rear-Admiral,Assessor.
HENRY JONES, Assessor.
I 101. 116. 70.-179. Wt. B 612.
