(No. 106.)
"CHARLES W. ANDERSON," (S.S.)
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal investigation held at Saint George's Hall,
Liverpool, on the 21st and 22nd January 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire,
Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain H. D. GRANT, C.B., R.N., and Captain
JONES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the damage sustained by
the British steamship "CHARLES W. ANDERSON," of South Shields, in consequence of
an- explosion which occurred on board her on the 28th May last, whilst on a
voyage from Cardiff to Malta.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,-
(1.) That the explosion was due to the gas evolved from the coal in the after
hold having been allowed to accumulate until it had filled the hold, and had
thence passed into the screw tunnel, and to its having come in contact with a
light which had been incautiously left by the chief engineer near the entrance
to the tunnel.
(2.) That no means of ventilation were provided independently of the hatches
except some small ventilating bollards standing about 2 feet above the deck, and
with orifices of only about 4 inches in diameter, and which could not be kept
open when the weather was such as to compel them to close the hatches, and that
such means were wholly insufficient.
(3.) That the master was probably justified by the state of the weather in
battening down the hatches from about 4 p.m. of the 27th of May until within a
short time before the explosion, and that it would not have been prudent for him
to have opened the bollards when it was necessary to close the hatches.
(4.) That the Court is of opinion that Robert Clark, the master of the said
vessel "Charles W. Anderson," is not free from blame for having proceeded to sea
without seeing that the vessel was provided with adequate means of ventilation,
but that on discovering that there was gas in the after hold he immediately took
the proper measures for getting rid of it by removing the hatches.
(5.) That David Kerr, the chief engineer of the said ship "Charles W. Anderson,"
was guilty of great carelessness in leaving a lamp burning in the tunnel after
he had ascertained that there was gas there, and that if he had removed the
light and closed the tunnel door before the master proceeded to take off the
hatches there would probably have been no explosion at all.
(6.) That the owners were not justified in neglecting to provide better means of
ventilation for the said vessel before sending her to sea.
The Court makes no order as to costs.
Dated the 22nd day of January 1879.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)HENRY D, GRANT,
Captain, R.N.,Assessors.
"HENRY JONES,
Reasons.
The Commissioner.-The "Charles W. Anderson" is an iron screw steamship belonging
to the Port of South Shields, of 1,452 tons gross and 937 net register, and is
fitted with engines of 140 horse-power. She was built at Low Walker on the Tyne
in the year 1872, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of
this inquiry she belonged to Mr. Harry Smith Edwards, and a number of other
gentlemen, Mr. Edwards, or one of his sons being, I presume, the managing owner.
She left Penarth Docks on the 25th of May 1878 bound to Malta, and having on
board a cargo of 1,685 tons of coal, besides 246 tons of bunker coal. She had a
crew of 23 hands all told, and seems to have been well found, and in good
condition in every respect. We are told that on leaving port portions of all the
three hatches were left open for the purpose of affording ventilation to the
cargo, and that they so remained until about 4 p.m. of the 27th, when the
weather having become very stormy the whole of the hatches were closed and
battened down and so continued until immediately previous to the explosion. It
seems that between 6 and 7 o'clock p.m. of the 28th the chief engineer went into
the screw tunnel to examine the bearings; and on reaching the third bearing he
observed a blue flame playing about the lamp which he carried in his hand, and
knew therefore that there must be gas in the tunnel. He accordingly at once came
out again, leaving however the lamp inside the tunnel, some 2 or 3 feet from the
mouth. On the captain being informed of the presence of gas in the tunnel he
went down into the engine-room and on seeing the light in the tunnel called the
engineer's attention to it, saying that he considered it to be an imprudent
thing to do, but the engineer said that there was no danger. The captain then
went on deck and immediately ordered the hatches to be removed from the after
hatchway. When they had taken off the two forward hatches the captain told the
carpenter to go and open the sluice which communicated with the well at the
further end of the tunnel, so as to allow the gas in the tunnel to escape that
way. The carpenter accordingly went forward for the purpose of getting the key
of the sluice, which was in his berth, and whilst he was doing so the master and
the second mate proceeded to take off the two after hatches. They were in the
act of lifting them off when an explosion took place, which blew off the
remainder of the hatches from the after hatchway, lifted the deck abaft the
hatchway, and injured the master and the second mate about the head. Finding a
good deal of smoke coming out of the after hold the captain ordered the hose to
be brought aft and water to be poured down until they considered that they had
extinguished the fire. The damages were then repaired, as far as they could be,
the holes in the deck being covered up, and they continued their voyage to
Malta, arriving there on the 6th of June. On discharging the cargo the damages
were carefully examined, and it was then found that 26 planks in the upper deck
had been lifted, two stanchions in the between decks broken, and two or three of
the hold beams and some of the stanchions in the lower hold bent. In the
engine-room also some damage had been done, the flooring had been raised, and
the woodwork and the platform shaken, and the water service for the main shaft
bearings had been shaken out of position, besides some other damages of minor
importance. It was obvious that there had been a slight explosion of gas in the
tunnel which had done the injury in the engine-room, but that by far the most
serious explosion had occurred in the 'tween decks abaft the after hatchway.
Such are the circumstances of the casualty into which we have been requested to
inquire.
At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Ravenhill, who appeared for the Board of
Trade, stated that they desired the opinion of the Court on the following
questions:-
"1. What was the cause of the explosion?
"2. Whether the means adopted for the ventilation of " the ship were sufficient?
"3. Whether the master was justified in battening down " the hatches of the ship
when he did, and keeping them " battened down from 4 p.m. on the 27th of May
1878?
"4. Whether the weather had not sufficiently moderated " on the 28th of May 1878
to enable him to open the " hatches of the ship, or some portion of them, and
whether " he was justified in neglecting to do so?
"5. Whether, under the circumstances, he was justified " in neglecting to open
the plates of the ventilating bol- " lards either on the 27th of May or the 28th
May?"
He also stated that the Board of Trade were "of opinion that the certificate of
Robert Clark should be dealt with."
The Court thereupon asked Mr. Ravenhill if in the observations which he was
about to make it was his intention to throw any imputations upon the conduct of
the owners, or the chief engineer, in connection with this casualty; for that if
so it would be fairer and more in accordance with our practice that they should
have some intimation of the nature of those imputations or charges, in order
that they might have an opportunity of meeting them. Mr. Ravenhill thereupon
asked to amend the questions, and he then added two more as follows:-
"6. Whether the chief engineer, David Kerr, was not " guilty of negligence in
taking a lamp to the tunnel on " the morning of the 28th of May; and they are of
opinion " that his certificate should be dealt with?
"7. Whether the owners were justified in neglecting to " provide the 'Charles W.
Anderson' with better means " of ventilation?"
Now before I proceed to examine these questions it will be proper that I should
call attention to the very great interval of time, which has elapsed between the
casualty and the inquiry. I am the more disposed to notice it, as ordinarily the
inquiry follows very quickly on the event. In the present case I am told that
the delay has been owing to the absence of some of the witnesses from this
country. But whatever may be the cause, it is much to be regretted, for it is of
the utmost importance that these inquiries should take place as soon as possible
after the events, when all the facts are fresh in the minds of the witnesses.
For instance, in the present case we should have been very glad to have seen
some of the common seamen, who might have told us whether the hatches were or
were not kept open after leaving port. Moreover, there is a practical
inconvenience, where an offence has been committed. which might endanger the
officer's certificate, in allowing him to continue in the discharge of his
duties, possibly for months, and then proceeding to an inquiry as to whether he
ought or ought not to be allowed to retain his certificate. The lessons which
these inquiries are intended to teach are best learnt when the punishment
follows quickly on the offence. The Court, however, is quite prepared to believe
that in the present instance the delay has been unavoidable.
Now the first and most important question upon which the opinion of the Court
has been asked is, what was the cause of the casualty? But in order that we may
be able to give a satisfactory answer to this question it is necessary that we
should know something of the construction of the ship, and of the nature,
amount, and disposition of the cargo on board.
It seems that the "C. W. Anderson" is constructed in five water-tight
compartments. Forward of all is the fore peak, then the fore and main holds in
one, then the engine-room amidships, after that the after hold, and last of all
the lazarette. She had also two decks, the lower or main deck was of iron, the
upper deck was of wood. The saloon and mess-room were on the main deck, quite in
the after part of the ship, forming part of the 'tween decks, and separated from
the hold forward by an iron water-tight bulkhead. The cargo, as I have said,
consisted of 1,685 tons of coal, of which about 1,000 tons were stowed in the
fore and main holds, and between 600 and 700 tons in the after hold. There was
hardly any coal we are told in the fore and main 'tween decks, but the lower
holds were quite full; and in the after hold, in addition to the lower hold
being quite full, there were 160 to 170 tons in the 'tween decks. These latter
had been shot down through the hatchway, but without being trimmed, and formed a
cone under the hatchway, thus leaving large empty spaces both fore and aft, and
more especially abaft the hatchway. The coal was the ordinary South Wales steam
coal, supplied by the Ocean Steam Coal Colliery, from the Park, Maindy, Dare,
and Eastern pits. We are told that the practice at this colliery, as at all the
collieries in the neighbourhoed, is to despatch the coal from the colliery
ordinarily on the same day on which it is worked; indeed, Mr. Riches, the
managing partner of the Ocean Steam Coal Colliery, told us that they could not
carry on their business on any other terms, and that in fact shippers required
that their coal should be fresh worked Now Mr. Riches has brought in a
statement, the accuracy of which is not disputed, and which shows the days on
which the coal had been despatched from the colliery, and the days on which it
was shipped. From this statement it appears that the whole of the coal was
despatched from the colliery on the 23rd and 24th days of May, with the
exception of six waggon loads, which were despatched on the 25th. All the coal
despatched on the 23rd was shipped on the same day, except six waggons, which
were shipped on the 24th. All the coal despatched on the 24th was shipped on
that day, except 12 waggon loads, which were shipped on the 25th, together with
the six waggon loads which had been despatched on the 25th.
The coal then on board this ship being all, as we have seen, freshly worked, it
was in a condition, as Mr. Riches has told us, to give off laree quantities of
gas of a very volatile nature, having about half the specific gravity of air,
and which when mixed in certain proportions with common atmospheric air becomes
of a highly explosive character. Let us see then what means there were on board
this vessel for the purpose of getting rid of this gas. It seems that over the
fore hold, and about 10 feet from the forward bulkhead, were four ventilating
bollards, standing some 2 feet above the deck, and about the height of the
combings of the hatches, having orifices of about 4 inches in diameter with
brass screws, by which they could be closed and opened at pleasure. There were
also four similar bollards over the after hold about 10 feet from the after
bulkhead. But except these ventilating bollards, there were no means whatever of
ventilating the holds except through the hatches. And it appears also that
whenever the hatches could not by reason of the weather be kept open it was
necessary also to close the ventilating bollards.
There is some reason to doubt from facts disclosed by the log-book, and to which
I shall presently have occasion to advert, whether the hatches were not securely
battened down from very shortly after leaving Penarth. It is admitted, however,
that from 4 p.m. of the 27th to about 7 p.m. of the 28th, or for 27 hours, they
were all closed and tightly battened down. Now we have been told by Mr. Riches
that South Wales Steam Coal, in the condition in which this coal was, would in
those 27 hours evolve a sufficient quantity of gas to fill the after hold. Mr.
Riches could speak with authority on this point, not only from his long
experience of this coal, but from knowing when the coal had been worked. We were
also told by Mr. Riches that after the gas had filled the whole of the upper
part of the hold, and more especially the empty spaces of which I have spoken in
the 'tween decks, it would gradually work its way down, filling up the remainder
of the hold, and would ultimately pass into the screw tunnel, which ran along
the bottom of the hold, and which the chief engineer told us was not only not
gas proof, but not even water proof. This, according to the evidence of all the
witnesses is, the way in which the gas would get into the tunnel; the after hold
would first become quite filled, and hen the gas would flow over into the
tunnel.
This being so, the next question which we have to consider is, how it was that
the gas came to be ignited? for the place might be quite full of gas, but it
would never explode until it had been brought in contact with a light. I have
already stated that the chief engineer on coming out of the tunnel left the
light some 2 or 3 feet inside the tunnel's mouth; and when the captain left the
engine-room to go and take off the after hatches, the engineer, without removing
the lamp, went and set the donkey engine at work to pump the foul air and gas
out of the well at the further end of the tunnel. And the evidence is that the
donkey engine had been at work for two or three minutes, and some of the hatches
had been taken off the after hatchway when the explosion occurred. Now whether
the pressure of air in the hold on the hatches being taken off caused the gas to
flow more freely into the tunnel, or whether the action of the donkey pump
disturbed the gas at the end of the tunnel, certain it is that from one or other
of these causes, perhaps from both, the gas was made to flow along the tunnel
towards its mouth, and coming in contact with the light which had been left
inside the tunnel, at a distance of some 2 or 3 feet from the mouth, it ignited.
The small quantity of gas in the tunnel would first explode; this would ignite
the gas in the hold itself, and on its reaching the large body of gas which was
accumulated in the 'tween decks, and which would from the admission of air
through the hatches be in a very explosive state, the more violent explosion
would necessarily take place. This appears to us to be the true explanation of
the casualty; it would account for the trifling injury in the engine-room caused
by the explosion of the small quantity of gas in the tunnel, and the much more
serious explosion in the 'tween decks, where the large portion of the gas was
accumulated. This appears to be the cause of the casualty.
The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, whether the means
adopted for the ventilation of this ship were sufficient? I have already stated
that, except the ventilating bollards and the hatches, there were no means
whatever of ventilating either of the holds of this ship. I have also stated
that when the state of the weather required that the hatches should be closed it
was necessary to close the ventilating bollards also, and that there was then no
ventilation whatever to the holds. That such a condition of things is in the
highest degree unsatisfactory, seeing the dangerous character of this gas, and
the absolute necessity at times to have the hatches tightly closed down, can
admit of no doubt; nor should I have thought it necessary to refer to it at any
length were it not that the owner, Mr. Edwards, has strongly contended that they
have had no other ventilation for their vessels, and that according to their
experience they require no other.
Let us see then what the Royal Commissioners appointed in 1876 to inquire into
the spontaneous combustion of coal in ships, and who in-the course of their
inquiries touched also upon the question of the explosion of coal gas, say about
it. In the recommendations appended to their report, which is dated 18th July
1876, they say: " That with a view to guard against explosion free and "
continuous egress to the open air, independently of the " hatchways, should be
provided for the explosive gases, " by means of a system of surface ventilation,
which would " be effective in all circumstances of weather." Again, the Ocean
Steam Coal Collieries Company, the shippers of this cargo, in a pamphlet issued
by them to their customers so long since as 1872, after observing upon the
dangerous character of this gas, say: "No possible danger can arise " from the
gas referred to if proper means be taken to " allow a free current of air to
pass over the coals." And they then go on as follows: "It is very desirable that
in " every vessel two pipes about 8 or 10 inches in diameter " just passing
through the deck, about 5 feet high; with " moveable cowl heads, should be
placed, one forward, the " other aft; then if a free space fore and aft be left
in the " coal sufficient ventilation would be given to obviate all " danger from
the gas." This is the arrangement proposed by the company so long since as 1872
for the purpose of getting rid of this gas, and it is an arrangement which Mr.
Riches and Mr. Jenkins, the mining engineer, told us would, in their opinion, be
amply sufficient for the purpose. We think, too, that Mr. Jenkins was not quite
fairly treated when he was challenged to say whether he had ever seen a vessel
fitted with two ventilating cowls in the manner suggested. Mr. Jenkins said that
he knew nothing about ships, he spoke as a mining engineer, and he was prepared
to say from his large experience that if you had two ventilating shafts fitted
in the way suggested, and with the cowls properly adjusted, the one would always
become an upcast and the other a downcast, and that if one was placed over the
fore part and the other over the after part of the hold you would always thereby
secure a current of air over the surface of the coal, which is all that is
required to carry off the surface gases. He told us that in every mine in which
there are two shafts, provided the workings and levels were not of any very
great length, one of the shafts would always become the upcast and the other the
downcast, even without any artificial means to produce ventilation, such as a
fan or a furnace, and that consequently, in his opinion, in the hold of a ship
with the two ventilating tubes placed as we have stated one would always become
an upcast and the other a downcast.
But we are not left entirely to conjecture on this point even in the case of
ships, for the Court is assisted on this occasion by two nautical gentlemen of
large experience, the one in the Royal Navy and the other in the Merchant
Service, and they tell me that from their experience the ventilating tubes would
be quite effectual for the purpose, that they have constantly used them on board
ships of which they have been in command, when they have had a number of
passengers on board, and when proper ventilation has been a first necessity, and
have found them amply sufficient. In answer, too, to the objections that
possibly the draft from the sails would convert what would otherwise be an
upcast into a downcast, they tell me that if this were so it would be only
necessary so to arrange the cowls that that which had before been a downcast
would be converted into an upcast, and thus the current kept up. It stands to
reason that if you force air down one tube, no matter by what means, it must
necessarily find its way up the other tube.
But an objection was taken by Mr. Goldney, that possibly the furnaces in the
engine-room might have the effect of converting both the tubes into downcasts,
and by drawing the air down through the coal not only prevent the es ape of gas,
but actually draw it down through the tunnel into the engine-room, and thereby
cause an explosion, as it is suggested that it may have done in the present case
this he said was a danger which was to be apprehended from having two
ventilating tubes fixed in the manner proposed. But in that case the air would
be drawn down through the whole body of the cargo, and it would surely be much
easier for the furnaces to obtain it from the openings into the engine-room, the
skylights, the gratings, the companions, and other places. Moreover, if there
was any danger that the air would be drawn down from the ventilating tubes
through the cargo into the screw tunnel and thence into the engine-room, all
that it would be necessary to do would be to make the tunnel air tight, as I am
told is generally done. We do not think therefore that this can be regarded as
an objection to the employment of these ventilating tubes.
But then we are told by Mr. James Henry Edwards, a partner in the firm of
Messrs. Henry S. Edwards and Company, the owners of the "Charles W. Anderson,"
and who has been examined as a witness before us, that his firm has never had
any other mode of ventilating the holds of their coal-carrying vessels excepting
the ventilating bollards and the hatches; and that they have always found them
quite sufficient. He told us that they had been about 40 years in business, that
they have now six steamers engaged in the coal carrying trade, and that they
have carried coals of all kinds and to all parts of the world, and that they
have never had any explosion before. If this be so we can only say that Messrs.
Edwards have been extremely fortunate, for it is impossible to shut our eyes to
the fact that explosions on board coal ships are and have been very frequent;
and if Messrs. Edwards have escaped without having taken any precautions to
avoid an explosion we can only suppose that it must have been the result of good
fortune rather than of good management.
But we shall be told that they have taken some precautions, they have ordered
their captains to see that the hatches are opened at all convenient
opportunities. No doubt if the hatches can be kept open, so as to afford plenty
of ventilation, that would be sufficient, but a time may come, as it did in this
case, when the hatches must be closed; and what then is to prevent the gas from
accumulating in the hold? And if there is no escape for it, and it should
unfortunately come in contact with a flame, an explosion must necessarily
follow. Mr. Edwards did not tell us how such a difficulty could be avoided if
the only ventilation was through the hatches.
But then Mr. Edwards said that shipowners generally objected to ventilation. On
being pressed, however, on the subject, it turned out that Mr. Edwards was not
very clear as to what was the kind of ventilation to which they objected,
whether it was surface ventilation or through ventilation. If the objection of
shipowners is to through ventilation the Court goes entirely with them. It seems
to be now pretty well established that through ventilation can do no good
whatever in the case either of spontaneous combustion or of an explosion of gas.
In the former case all that through ventilation does is to introduce oxygen into
the heated body of the coal, or in other words to bring to the fire the fuel
which that fire requires; whereas if the oxygen is prevented from getting into
the body of the coal, even though spontaneous combustion may have been set up, a
much longer time would be required before the flame would burst out. Nor would
through ventilation be of any use to prevent an explosion of gas, all that it
would do would be to carry off the gas more readily from the centre to the
surface of the coal. So long as the gas remains in the centre of the body of the
coal no harm can happen, for no light can get to it there, and unless a light is
brought in contact with the gas an explosion cannot take place. What you want is
to carry off the gas from the surface, and that through ventilation will not do
for you. It is on this ground that we think that Mr. Edwards has made a great
mistake in regard to the ventilating tube which he has put into the vessel since
the explosion occurred. That ventlating tube, as I understand, has been passed
through the hole where there was formerly a mizen mast, and has been carried
down to within about 10 inches of the top of the tunnel, the only effect of
which would be to facilitate the access of the oxygen to the interior of the
coal which, as has been already stated, is not at all a desirable thing to do.
All that is wanted is simply to carry the tubes just below the deck, a clear
space being left between the top of the coal and the underside of the deck, so
that a current of air may be made to pass from one end to the other of the hold,
sufficient to carry off all the noxious gases from the surface.
Mr. Edwards, however, has told us that he has another objection to these
ventilating cowls. He tells us that where self-acting safeguards are provided
people are rather apt to neglect the ordinary precautions, and that he is afraid
that if these ventilating cowls are provided the officers will become less
careful about taking off the hatches whenever the weather would allow of its
being done. But Mr. Edwards seems to have forgotten that if ventilating cowls
were provided it would probably be quite unnecessary to open the hatches at all,
and that if they then neglected to open them no harm would result: whereas if
there were no cowls and no other means of ventilation, and the hatches are kept
closed, there is great risk of an explosion. But when Mr. Edwards tells us that
he objects to self-acting safeguards because they are rather apt to make people
neglect the ordinary precautions, does he mean to say that he would carry out
that principle to its full extent, and that he would for instance object to the
use of safety valves on boilers? I put the question to him, and he admitted that
he would not carry his principle quite to that extent, but why a self-acting
safeguard, which is intended to prevent the explosion of a steam boiler, is not
to be applied to prevent an explosion in the hold of a ship which is filled with
gas, having many times the explosive power of steam, I cannot conceive. Mr.
Edwards, no doubt, thought that the line must be drawn somewhere, and he is
disposed to draw it at ventilating cowls.
Now Mr. Edwards has told us that his firm are dock owners in South Shields, and
that they have something like 300 ships coming annually into their docks, and he
has made this startling announcement, that in most of the large steamers that
come into their docks and which are chiefly engaged in the coal carrying trade,
ventilation is chiefly conspicuous by its absence. If this be so, all that I can
say is that it is marvellous, not that we have so many, but that we have so few
cases of explosion.
Again, Mr. Edwards told us that amongst the reasons for not having adopted any
system of ventilation for the holds of their vessels was this, that they had not
received any directions from the Board of Trade as to how they were to do it.
But surely this is not the province of the Board of Trade. Nor indeed was Mr.
Edwards very consistent, for in another part of his evidence he complained of
the interference of the Board of Trade, he said, "we " see too much of the Board
of Trade, we should like to " see less of them." Mr. Edwards also said that they
had received no intimation from the underwriters as to the way in which the
holds of their vessels should be ventilated; possibly not, underwriters may
perhaps think that this is a duty which more properly belongs to shipowners than
to themselves. At the same time, if underwriters were to say that they would not
pay the insurance if the damage arose from an explosion of coal gas, owing to
there being no ventilation other than through the hatches, I think that we
should find that Mr. Edwards, and other shipowners would very speedily alter the
construction of their vessels. Mr. Edwards has told us that he has not read the
report of the Royal Commissioners on Spontaneous Combustion in Ships. I confess
that it struck me with very great surprise that a gentleman so largely engaged
in the coal carrying trade should not have thought it worth his while to read
through a document containing so much information upon a subject of such vital
importance to himself and his partners, and that they should have continued
during more than two years since that report has been issued to send ships to
sea year after year without having troubled themselves to inquire whether or not
all reasonable precautions had been taken to ensure the safety of the crews on
board those vessels. I trust that Mr. Edwards will now see fit to read that
report, and that he will profit by the valuable suggestions it contains. And if
other shipowners will do likewise, we shall probably hear less of those dreadful
explosions of gas on board ships.
The third and fourth questions relate to the battening down of the hatches, and
the time during which they remained battened down, and whether the weather had
not sufficiently moderated before the explosion occurred to have allowed them to
be opened sooner. And in dealing with this part of the case it will be necessary
that I should refer to some of the entries appearing in the log-book, as having
perhaps an important bearing on this case. According to the evidence of the
captain, some of the hatches were left off each hatchway, from the time the ship
left Penarth on the 25th May, down to about 4 p.m. of the 27th, when they were
obliged to be put on owing to the state of the weather, and that they so
remained battened down from that time until just before the explosion, at about
7 p.m. of the 28th. Or looking, however, at the log-book, I find that there are
a number of entries relating to the hatches in a different coloured ink, and
which certainly appear to myself and the assessors to have been inserted
subsequently to the body of those entries having been made. The first
undoubtedly genuine entry in the log-book with reference to these hatches is
under date of the afternoon of the 25th May, and is in these words: " 3. Pilot
left the ship off the Nash all hands clear decks; secure hatches fore and aft
and both bower anchors." And the next undoubtedly genuine entry is under date of
the afternoon of the 28th of the same month, and is in these words: "4. Weather
moderating. 7 p.m. took two " of the after hatches off of the fore part, while
in the " act of taking the two after hatches off an explosion " occurred." These
are the only two entries respecting the hatches, as to the genuiness of which
there can be no doubt, and if these were the only entries in the log-book we
should be disposed to conclude that the hatches had been put on at 3 p.m. of the
25th, and that they had not been taken off from that time until about 7 p.m. of
the 28th. But then there are numbers of other entries which seem to show that
the hatches were not closed until about 4 p.m. of the 27th, these, however, will
require to be very narrowly examined. The first of these is under date of 1 p.m.
of the 25th, and is as follows, "All hatches off," but these words are in a
darker ink, and have evidently been inserted subsequently; the fact does not
admit of a doubt. The next entry is under date of the morning of the 26th, and
is as follows, "Hatches off as prudent." This, too, appears to us to have been
written at a different time and with a different pen, and just fills up a blank
space which had been left at the end of a line. The same afternoon I find
another entry in these words, "Fore and main single batches off." The last
words, "hatches off," have clearly been inserted subsequently, and I am also
inclined to believe that the first part, "Fore and main single," was written at
the same time; for it will be seen that they fill up the remainder of a line at
the head of which stands, "N.W. sea," and after "sea" are two horizontal lines
drawn thus (-- --), apparently to show that the sentence originally terminated
at the word "sea," and that the words "Fore and main single" had been inserted
afterwards. On the same afternoon there is an entry, "Hatches attended for
ventilation," but which is written on one of three blank lines, which had been
left between the preceding and succeeding entries. Lastly, we have an entry
written under date of the 27th in these words, "4 p.m. All hatches on, heavy sea
breaking on board;" and as this entry is written in the margin it is obvious
that it must have been made subsequently to the main body of the entry of that
afternoon, but whether immediately after or not there is nothing to show. No
doubt, if we were satisfied that all these entries were genuine and made at the
time, we should be disposed to think that the hatches were not battened down
until about 4 p.m. of the 27th; but the case is not altogether without
suspicion. Indeed from the entries which we find in the log-book under date of
the 26th of May, "Heavy sea, ship labouring, and washing heavy," and "Ship
rolling very heavy;" and again on the 27th, "Rain in torients at times, ship
labour- " ing and washing heavy, the wind blowing a hurricane " for a few
minutes," we should not have been much surprised if the master had told us that
he had been obliged by the state of the weather to closely batten down his
hatches fro n very soon after leaving Penarth; but this be has not done, on the
contrary he tells us that they were not battened down until 4 p.m. of the 27th.
The question, however, although it was one which the Court could not altogether
pass over without notice, is not essential to the decision of this case, for
according to Mr. Riches there was ample time, in the condition in which this
coal was, for it to have evolved a sufficient quantity of gas to cause the
explosion.
Whether, too, the captain ought not to have opened his hatches sooner than he
did on the 28th may possibly be a question. It seems from the log book that at 4
p.m. on that day the weather had been moderating; but it had undoubtedly been
very bad before, and it is probable, as the master has told us, that there was
still a heavy sea on. Nor can we blame him for not having opened his ventilating
bollards, which forms the subject of the fifth question, seeing that if the
ventilating bollards could have been kept open the hatches could also; and as
the orifices of the bollards had only a diameter of 4 inches, it is clear that
the hatches would have been more effectual for affording ventilation.
Practically, in fact, the only ventilation was through the hatches, and this it
is of which we so strongly complain.
It remains then for us to consider whether anyone, and if so who, is to blame
for this casualty, and whether the circumstances are such as to induce us to
comply with the application of the Board of Trade, that the certificates of
Robert Clark, the master, and David Kerr, the chief engineer, should be dealt
with. Now there can be no doubt that this vessel was not fitted with sufficient
means for ventilating the holds; and to a certain extent the master is
responsible for having left with her in this state, for a master is bound to see
that the condition of his ship is such that the lives of those on board shall
not be exposed to danger. On the other hand, it has not been shown that he
neglected to avail himself of such means as he had on board for ventilating the
vessel's hold; and the instant he was informed by the chief engineer of the
presence of gas in the screw tunnel he proceeded to take off the after hatches,
a very proper proceeding, and one which would speedily have got rid of the gas
without injury to anyone on board had not the chief engineer unfortunately left
the door of the tunnel open and a light some 2 or 3 feet inside of it. We do not
say that he is altogether free from blame, but it is not such misconduct as
would in our opinion induce us to touch his certificate; the more so as the
offence was committed so long since as the 28th of May last, and he has ever
since been allowed to continue in command of this vessel. Whilst, however, we
think that the master is not wholly free from blame, we think that much greater
blame attaches to the owners. I have already, in reviewing Mr. Edwards'
evidence, stated what view the Court takes of the conduct of the owners in this
case; and I will only here say that it was their duty before they sent this
vessel to sea to have obtained all the information in their power as to the best
means of ventilating the holds, and that they neglected to do so.
As regards the chief engineer, David Kerr, no doubt it was an act of great
carelessness on his part to leave the light inside the tunnel door after he had
ascertained that there was gas there; the more so as the master called his
attention to the fact and pointed out to him the danger of doing so. Why indeed
he did not remove the light and close the tunnel door until by the opening of
the after hatch the gas had had time to escape we cannot conceive. Had he done
so no explosion would have taken place. We think, however, as his advocate has
contended, he has been guilty rather of an error of judgment than of an offence
for which we should be disposed to take away his certificate. Under these
circumstances I do not suppose that anyone asks for costs, unless it is Mr.
Ravenhill.
Mr. Ravenhill.-I do not ask for costs, sir. It might perhaps have been a matter
of doubt whether it was not my duty to ask for costs as against the owners, but
I think that in this case I shall not do so.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
(Signed)HENRY D. GRANT,
Captain, R.N.,Assessors.
"HENRY JONES,
I 101. 173. 70.-2/79. Wt. B 612. E. & S. A
