(No. 389.)
"CLEOPAS."
The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.
IN the matter of the formal investigation held at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on the
14th and 15th of February 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck
Commissioner, assisted by Rear-Admiral POWSELL, C.B., R.N., and Captain NICOLAS,
as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the
sailing ship "CLEOPAS," of North Shields, on the Barnard Sand, in the North Sea,
on the 13th of January 1879.
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the
stranding and loss of the said vessel were due to the wrongful acts and defaults
of William Wright, the chief officer, and John Pye, the second officer:
(1.) In neglecting to call the master, William McDougall, either at midnight of
the 12th of January or at 4 a.m. of the 13th, when the watches were changed, in
accordance with the usual custom of the ship, or at 2.30 a.m., when the weather
changed and became thick and hazy.
(2.) In allowing the ship from 2.30 a.m. until she stranded to run to windward
of the course ordered by her master, which brought her on Barnard Sand.
The Court is further of opinion that no blame whatever attaches to the said
William McDougall, and recommends that his certificate, which was lost with the
ship, be renewed. Neither William Wright nor John Pye held any certificate.
The Court is further of opinion,-
(1.) That the coxswain of the "Grace and Sally" was justified in urging the crew
to leave the "Cleopas."
(2.) That the only other motive which he seems to have had in view besides the
saving the lives of himself and his boat's crew was the saving the lives of the
master and crew of the "Cleopas," which he effectually succeeded in doing.
(3.) That, having saved the master and crew of the "Cleopas," the coxswains of
the two lifeboats were justified by the regulations of the National Lifeboat
Institution in proceeding to the wreck with boats belonging to the Institution
for the purpose of salving the vessel.
The Court makes no order as to costs.
Dated the 15th day of February 1879.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur in the above report.
(Signed)R. ASHMORE POWELLAssessors.
"B. G. W. NICOLAS
Reasons.
The Commissioner.-I should state that the witnesses have, in the opinion of the
Court, given their evidence very fairly and very properly, and that there is
practically no dispute as to the facts of the case.
The "Cleopas" was a barque belonging to North Shields, of 358 tons gross and 345
net register, after deducting the crew space. She was built at Sunderland in the
year 1869, and was at the time of her loss the property of Mr. Henry Darling, of
Backworth, Northumberland, and another gentleman, Mr. Henry Darling being the
managing owner. On the 26th of December last she left Liverpool for the Tyne
laden with a cargo of 503 tons of salt, and having a crew of 10 hands, all of
whom were runners, with the exception of the captain. It seems that she had
recently arrived from Poti in the Black Sea, and having discharged her cargo,
was on her way to her port of registry in the Tyne. It had been the master's
intention on leaving Liverpool to come round south, but meeting with southerly
winds, he resolved to go north about, but the wind having shortly after come
away from the northward, the vessel was again put about, and ran south. By the
afternoon of the 12th of January they had arrived in the Downs, and having
passed between the North Sand Head Light and the North Foreland, the Kentish
Knock light ship was sighted at about 8 p.m., bearing N. by E. 1/4 E., the
vessel at the time being on a north-east by north course, and going about 3 to 3
1/2 knots an hour, with the wind moderate from about W.N.W., and the weather
clear and bright. At 8 p.m. the chief mate came on deck, and the captain, who
had been up for two days and a night continuously, then went below to get some
rest, giving the mate orders to continue the course N.E. by N. until he brought
the Kentish Knock light ship to bear west, when the course was to be altered to
N.N.E. The master also gave some other directions, and to which I shall
presently have occasion to advert. At 9 p.m. the master came on deck again, but
only for a few minutes, and told the mate to be careful to give the light ship a
wide berth, and he then went down below and turned in. The vessel passed the
Kentish Knock light vessel at about half-past 9, and her course was then altered
to N.N.E. At 11 o'clock two lights were seen on the port bow, which were
reported by Collins, the look-out man. The chief mate went forward, and on
looking at them, came to the conclusion that they were fishermen's lights. At 12
o'clock the boatswain, who was acting as second mate, took charge of the deck,
and the first mate thereupon went below, leaving orders with the boatswain to
continue on a N.N.E. course, and telling him also that, in his opinion, the two
lights on the port bow were the lights of fishing boats. The wind at this time
was still blowing a moderate breeze from about W.N.W., and the weather was clear
and bright. At 2.30, according to the second mate, the weather became hazy, and
the wind began to blow strong from the southward and westward; and at 3 o'clock
they lost sight of the two lights. A few minutes after 4 the chief mate came up
on deck to relieve the watch, Collins then went to the wheel, and soon found
that the vessel would not keep her course by about half a point, but was griping
to windward, and making a weatherly course. On calling the chief mate's
attention to it the latter ordered the mizen and the gaff topsail to be taken
in, and the fore-and-aft staysails to be hauled down. This was accordingly done,
and they were in the act of squaring the yards forward when the vessel struck
the ground. In the meantime, and shortly before she struck the ground, the
master, who had been below since 9 p.m., awoke, and finding that it was after 4
o'clock, asked the second mate, who had then come down into the cabin, and was
warming some coffee over the lamp, why he had not been called. Before, however,
he had had time to dress or to take a look at his charts, the vessel struck the
ground. The captain immediately rushed on deck, and at once ordered the helm to
be put hard-a-port, and the yards to be backed, but they could not move her. The
master then ordered signals of distress to be exhibited, which was done by
burning a flare-up, and according to Stratford, the steward, they were answered
in about an hour by a rocket from the shore.
It seems that the vessel had run aground upon what is called Barnard Sand, off
Kessingland, on the coast of Suffolk, and the answering rocket came from that
place. At daylight the smaller of the two lifeboats belonging to the National
Lifeboat Institution which are stationed at Kessingland put off, and after
anchoring to windward, for we are told that it was impossible to go alongside
the ship, they succeeded, by paying out cable, to get so near to the ship that
the master and crew were able to jump from the chains into the lifeboat, and
they were then taken to the shore. We are told by the master that on leaving her
there were already about four feet of water in the hold, and the vessel was
settling down in the sand; and on returning to her the same day, after the wind
and sea had somewhat gone down, he found her to be fast breaking up. That night
she was under water, and in a day or two afterwards she went to pieces.
Mr. Hamel, on behalf of the Board of Trade, submitted a number of questions on
which it desires the opinion of the Court, but before proceeding to consider
these questions it will be desirable to ascertain what was the cause of the
casualty, for that I take it is one of the principal objects of this inquiry; it
is, to use the words of the order, a formal investigation "into the
circumstances attending " the stranding of the British sailing ship 'Cleopas' on
" the Barnard Sand on the 13th January," and of course one of those
circumstances, and indeed the principal one, must lie what were the causes which
contributed to the stranding.
Now I think that we have no difficulty in saying what was the cause of the
stranding. According to the master, when the Kentish Knock light ship was
sighted it bore N. by E. 1/4 E., distant about 10 miles, the vessel at the time
steering N.E. and by N. Putting the vessel in the position stated by the master,
such a course, if made good, would take her about four miles E. of the Kentish
Knock light ship, and about midway between the Kentish Knock and Galloper Sands.
There is indeed a slight discrepancy in the evidence given by the master and the
mates as to whether the course steered was N.E. by N. or North E. by N. 1/2 N.;
but we are clearly of opinion that the master is right, when he tells us that
the course steered after sighting the Kentish Knock light was N.E. by N. In the
first place, the second mate told us that shortly before 8 p.m. he took the
bearings of the North Foreland and the North Sand Head light carefully, and that
the North Foreland bore W.S.W., and that the North Sand Head light bore S.W. by
S. 1/2 S. Now, if we put the vessel at the place indicated by these cross
bearings, a course northeast by north half north would take her inside the
Kentish Kock light ship, which it is clear the master had no intention of doing.
Again, if the North Sand head light bore S.W. by S, 1/2 S. and the vessel's
course was N.E. by N. 1/2 N., the light must have been seen directly astern, but
the second mate tells us that it was a little on the starboard quarter, which
shows that the course must have been a little more to the eastward, or, as the
master has stated, N.E. by N.
Taking, then, the courses as stated by the master, the directions which he gave
were, that when they got the Kentish Knock light vessel to bear west the course
was to be altered to N.N.E., and those directions appear to have been obeyed.
Now, although that course, if made good, would not have taken them clear to the
eastward of the Newarp light ship, it was in our opinion a very proper course to
steer, for it would take them well within view of the Orfordness and Lowestoft
lights, when a course would have been laid through Hasborough Gatt. Such a
course, too, it will be seen, would take him about two miles to the eastward of
Barnard Sand, and the question which we have to consider is how she came to get
on the Sand. The reason is clear. I have said already that when the watch was
relieved at 4 a.m., Collins, who went to the helm, found that he could not keep
her on her course within half a point, she griped to the wind, and made a
windward course. How long she had been doing this we do not know, but probably
from the time when the wind came on to blow strong from the southward and
westward, which the second mate tells us was about half-past two, and as he also
tells us that she was going through the water at the rate of six and a half
knots an hour, it will be seen that an alteration of the helm of half a point to
the northward would be quite sufficient in that time and at that speed to carry
the vessel some two miles to windward of her course, and thus land her on the
Barnard Sand. This then is in our opinion the cause of the casualty; the master
laid his vessel on a N.N.E. course, which would take her some two miles to the
east of Barnard Sand, in our opinion a very proper course from the Kentish Knock
light ship, and one which would take him well in sight of the shore lights, and
at a sufficient distance from the land; unfortunately, however, the second mate,
instead of keeping that course, allowed her from about half-past two to come
half a point to windward of her course, and so caused her to run aground.
Let us next proceed to consider the questions upon which the opinion of the
Court has been asked. No charge is made against the master, but it is said that
the stranding of the vessel was due to William Wright, the chief officer, and to
John Pye, the second mate. The charge against the chief officer is that he
contributed to the stranding:
"(1.) In neglecting when giving up the watch at midnight on the 12th of January
to call the master in accordance with the usual custom of the ship, and also in
again neglecting at 4 a.m. of the 13th January to call the master in accordance
with his instructions, the weather having come on thick.
"(2.) In neglecting to take any steps after sighting Orfordness lights, which he
mistook for fishing boat lights, to verify the position of the vessel by a cast
of the lead."
And as regards John Pye, the second officer, the charge against him is that he
neglected "to call the master after " the weather came on thick between midnight
of the 12th " and 4 a.m. of the 13th of January."
Now the evidence of the master is that when he went below at 8 o'clock on the
evening of the 12th he directed the chief officer to steer north-east and by
north until the Kentish Knock light ship bore west, when he was to alter the
course to N.N.E.; to call him should the weather come on thick or hazy; and to
be sure to call him before 12 o'clock. The chief mate admitted the instructions
as to the courses to be steered, and said that the master had told him that he
was not to disturb him unless the weather became thick, but that he gave no
orders as to being called at any specified time. Now the evidence of the master
that he should be called at 12, or a little before, is confirmed by the witness
Stratford, the steward, who told us that he heard the master say to the chief
officer before he turned in, "Call me if it is thick or hazy, and " all me at 12
o'clock; do not forget." Not that the chief officer says that the master did not
order him to call him; all that he says is that he did not hear the master tell
him; indeed the man gave his evidence very fairly, and the conclusion to which
we are disposed to come is, either that the mate did not hear the order given,
or that the order to call him if it got thick or hazy made a greater impression
on his mind and that he thus failed to notice the order to call him at 12.
It must also not be forgotten that the master was the only certificated officer,
and that not only was he responsible for the navigation of the vessel, but was
the only person on board capable of navigating her. The evidence, too, is that
he is a very careful man, and that it was his custom, I may almost say his
invariable custom, to be called at the change of every watch. He knew also that
until 12 o'clock the road would be quite clear if they steered the courses
indicated, but that after that hour Orfordness lights would be in sight, and
they would be approaching the Sands and a more intricate navigation; and it is
therefore natural that he would wish to be on deck at that time. Moreover, his
expression to the second mate when he found that he had not been called and that
it was after 4 o'clock, "In the name of goodness," if that really was the
expression, "why was I not called?" shows pretty clearly that he expected to
have been called before. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we
can have no doubt whatever that the master did give the order to be called at 12
o'clock, and that it was either not heard or not acted upon by the chief mate,
and that he is to blame on that account.
Again, we think that the second mate was to blame for not having called the
master, when the weather became, according to some of the witnesses, so thick
that you could not see the length of the ship. The second mate's excuse was that
it was not what he called thick and foggy, it was only hazy. But there had been
a change of weather, the wind was blowing much stronger, and if not so thick as
some of the witnesses say, it was certainly thicker than it had been.
The chief mate, too, when he relieved the watch at 4 a.m., says that the
weather, which at midnight was bright and clear, was then very thick and hazy;
and yet he does not call the captain, but proceeds to take in the canvas,
telling us that he intended to call him after he had squared the yards; but,
unfortunately, the vessel struck before this had been done.
Whilst, however, we blame the chief mate for not having called the master at 12
and again at 4, when he came on deck and found the weather thick and hazy, and
the second mate also for not having called him when the weather changed, we
cannot help thinking that both these men were prompted to do so by feelings of
kindness and consideration towards the master. They knew that he had been up and
on deck continuously for two days and a night, and they seem to have been
anxious to give him the opportunity of getting a little more rest, if there was
no necessity, and there no doubt appeared to them to be no necessity, for
disturbing him. It is unfortunate that they should have come to that conclusion,
but the feeling does them credit, and shows that there must have been a kindly
feeling between him and the mates, and that he must have succeeded in obtaining
their respect and esteem. Nothing, perhaps, could show this more clearly than
the account which the second mate gives of what occurred when he was relieved.
He thus describes it:-"I said to the mate, " I will go down and see if the
captain is awake. I went " down and looked into his berth, and spoke twice very
" softly, but got no answer; and I then went up to the " mate and said that the
captain was asleep, and that " he was to call him as he thought proper."
Everything shows that these rough men were influenced by kindly feelings towards
the master in not awaking him, however misjudged, and however unfortunate their
conduct may have been, and no one seems to have regretted it more that the chief
mate. Without doubt, however, the stranding of the vessel was due in great part
to their omission to call the master, and so far they are to blame.
The other charge against the first officer is that he neglected "to take any
steps after sighting Orfordness " lights, which he mistook for fishing boat
lights, to " verify the position of the vessel by a cast of the lead." No doubt
the chief mate was to blame for having mistaken the two lights which he saw
before he went below for fishermen's lights, and which he now tells us he has no
doubt were the Orfordness lights. It is true that at that time they were
distant, and would probably be indistinct, but it is strange that he did not
observe his mistake before he went below at 12, the lights having then been in
sight about an hour. But if it is strange that he did not discover his mistake,
it certainly does surprise us that John Pye, the second officer, who must have
seen them for some three hours, should during all that time have mistaken them
for fishing boat lights; no doubt he was misled by the remark of the chief
officer, but he certainly ought to have discovered his mistake before they
disappeared. On the other hand, we can hardly blame the chief officer for not
having taken a cast of the lead. A cast of the lead is most important when you
cannot see any lights or landmarks and are in doubt as to your true position,
but when he went below at 12 o'clock he was in the fair way, with the weather
bright and clear, and a moderate breeze blowing, and we can see no reason why he
should have taken a cast of the lead. We cannot, therefore, blame him for not
having so done.
I now come to the case of the lifeboats; and the questions on which our opinion
is asked are these:-
"(1.) Whether the coxswain of the 'Grace and Sally' was justified in urging the
crew to leave the 'Cleopas.'"
"(2.) Whether he had any other motive in view than the safety of the lives of
himself and crew."
"(3.) Whether the coxswains of the two lifeboats were justified in proceeding to
the wreck with boats belonging to the National Lifeboat Institution when their
object was to serve the interests of themselves and their crews alone."
Now we have not the smallest doubt that the coxswain of the "Grace and Sally"
was fully justified in urging the crew to leave the "Cleopas." If the vessel had
not been strongly built she would have gone to pieces on that tide, and then a
serious responsibility would have been incurred by him for not having induced
the crew to leave their vessel. Seeing, too, that the "Grace and Sally" could
not with safety be brought alongside the "Cleopas," it would have been
impossible for them to have put any additional hands on board her; and even had
they done so, they could not have prevented the vessel from bumping on the sand
as the tide rose. Whether the coxswain of the "Grace and Sally" had any other
motive in view than the safety of the lives of himself and crew, all that we
need say is that he seems certainly to have had another motive in view, and that
was the laudable motive of saving the lives of those on board the "Cleopas," and
in that object he seems to have been entirely successful. It certainly was the
duty of the coxswain of the lifeboat to see that the lives on board his boat
were not exposed to unnecessary danger, and that we think they would have been
had he taken her alongside the ship with a view of putting hands on board to
assist in saving her. We think that in all he did he acted with judgment and
discretion.
The third question on which our opinion is asked is, " Whether the coxswains of
the two lifeboats were justified " in proceeding to the wreck with boats
belonging to the " National Lifeboat Institution when their object was to "
serve the interests of themselves and their crews alone." It seems that about
three-quarters of an hour after the crew of the "Cleopas" had been landed, the
vessel appeared to those on shore to float, and immediately both the lifeboats
put to sea with the view, if possible, of salving her. The larger of the two
boats, it seems, got alongside the ship and managed to put some hands on board,
but the smaller boat, which had already rescued the master and crew of the
"Cleopas," did not, although the wind and sea had then gone down considerably,
venture to go alongside. Neither of the boats, it seems, succeeded in saving
anything from the vessel, and, as I have already said, she went to pieces
shortly afterwards. Now questions have been asked why the large of the two
lifeboats was not launched in the first instance; but it was satisfactorily
proved that there was a bank or ridge outside the larger boat which prevented
their launching it until the tide had risen. The small lifeboat, too, it seems,
was the weather-most of the two, that is to say, further to windward, and could
therefore reach the vessel with greater ease, although it was at a greater
distance from Kessingland than the larger boat. We think, therefore, that they
did right to launch the smaller lifetboat in the first instance. As to whether
they were justified in launching the boats a second time to go and save the
ship, we are told, and there is no denial of the fact, that the National
Lifeboat Institution, although it prohibits, and very properly so, the crews
when they go out to save life from taking out anchors, it does not forbid them,
when they have saved the crew of a ship, from afterwards assisting to save the
property. Moreover, we are told that the National Lifeboat Institution expressly
sanctions the rendering of salvage services by its boats by claiming its share
of the salvage, if any salvage is recovered; we are told that in those cases the
Institution takes two shares out of 21 when the services are rendered by the
larger lifeboat, and two out of 19 when they are rendered by the smaller boat;
so that the crews of the lifeboats were quite justified in attempting to save
the "Cleopas," having already saved the crew. We, therefore, entirely acquit the
coxswains of the two lifeboats of any charge of misconduct in respect of this
vessel or her crew.
Although, then, we acquit the captain of all blame, we think that it is a case
in which an inquiry was necessary, seeing that the stranding of the vessel was
due to two of the officers on board her, and we shall therefore not give any
costs.
(To Mr. Roche.)-I suppose you do not ask for any?
Mr. Roche.-No, Sir. I apprehend that the Board of Trade will pay the captain as
a witness?
Mr. de Hamel.-The captain will be paid as a matter of course.
The Commissioner (to Mr. de Hamel).-You do not ask for costs?
Mr. de Hamel.-No, Sir.
Mr. Roche.-As the captain has lost his certificate, might I suggest to the Court
that another certificate should be granted to him?
The Commissioner.-Certainly. Nothing could have been better than the conduct of
the captain throughout. The mates do not hold any certificates; we have
therefore no power to punish them for their acts or defaults, even if we wished
to do so.
(Signed)H. C. ROTHERY,
Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
(Signed)R. ASHMORE POWELL,Assessors.
B. G. W. NICOLAS,
I 101. 196. 70.-2/79. Wt. B 612. E. & S.
