Wreck Report for 'Buteshire', 1879

(No. 265.)

"BUTESHIRE," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Town Hall, Cardiff, on the 25th and 26th of April 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Commander VISCONTI, R.N., and Captain JONES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the damage caused to the steamship "BUTESHIRE," of Glasgow, through an explosion, which occurred on board the said ship on the 12th of April 1879, whereby one life was lost.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,-

(1.) That the said explosion was due to gas arising from the coal in the after hold having been allowed to accumulate in the empty spaces left in the after parts of the 'tween decks and lower hold, and to its having become ignited most probably by a live coal or spark from the funnel.

(2.) That the said accumulations of gas were due to the coal having been trimmed so close to the deck as to prevent a free current of air passing over the surface of the coal.

(3.) That no blame attaches to Alexander Aitkin, the chief mate of the "Buteshire," for not having attended to the loading of the cargo; the owners having sent Mr. Wotherspoon, their superintending engineer, to see to the proper ventilation of the vessel, and that officer having taken upon himself to direct how the cargo should be trimmed.

(4.) That no blame attaches to the owners of the "Buteshire," seeing that they sent Mr. Wotherspoon to Cardiff, and authorised him to do all that was necessary for the ventilation of the holds of the vessel.

The Court accordingly orders the certificate of the said Alexander Aitkin to be returned to him.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated the 26th day of April 1879.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

E. G. F. G. VISCONTI,

 

 

 

Retired Commander, R.N.,

Assessors.

 

 

HENRY JONES,

 

MINUTES of PROCEEDINGS taken before HENRY CADOGAN ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, and Commander VISCONTI, R.N., and Captain HENRY JONES, Assessors, at the Town Hall, Cardiff, Saturday, 26th April 1879, upon an inquiry into an explosion on board the "Buteshire."

Mr. Waldron appeared for the Board of Trade.

Mr. Vachell for the owners, and for the first and the second officers.

Mr. Waldron was heard to open the case on behalf of the Board of Trade, and called evidence.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the following questions were submitted for the opinion of the Court.

" 1. Whether Alexander Aitkin, chief mate of the "'Buteshire,' was in default in not carefully attending to " the loading of the cargo of that ship, before she left " Cardiff on the said 12th of April?

" 2. Whether the 'Buteshire' was provided by the " owners with such appliances for ventilation of her cargo " as were necessary for the safety of that vessel and her " crew?

"3. Whether the owners of the 'Buteshire' ought not " to be ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry."

Mr. Vachell was then heard to address the Court on behalf of the owners and the first mate.

Mr. Waldron was heard in reply.

Judgment.

The Commissioner.-This is an inquiry into an explosion which occurred on board the British screw steamship "Buteshire," on the 12th instant, in the Bristol Channel. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Buteshire" is an iron screw steamship of 1,355 tons gross and 871 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 140 horse-power. She was built at Port Glasgow in the year 1877, and was the property of Mr. James Turnbull, of Clunebrae House, Port Glasgow, and a number of other gentlemen, Mr. James Turnbull being the managing owner. Having discharged a cargo of Indian corn, wheat, and cotton at Rouen, she proceeded to Cardiff, where she arrived early on the morning of the 9th instant, and at about 10.30 a.m. commenced taking in a cargo of that description of coal, which is known as "colliery small." By about 10 o'clock p.m. the following day she had completed her cargo, consisting of about 1,800 tons of cargo coal, besides 250 tons of bunker coal. On the 11th the ship was got ready for sea; and at 10 a.m. of the 12th she left Cardiff in charge of a pilot, and with a crew of 23 hands all told, bound to Savona. At noon of the same day she had arrived off Nash Point, distant about 8 miles, and was proceeding at full speed down channel, the wind blowing a fresh breeze from the W.S.W. The captain was at this time in the saloon writing letters to send ashore by the pilot; the pilot was on the bridge in charge of the vessel; the chief officer was forward clearing up the decks; and the second mate and boatswain, having battened down the main hatchway, had come aft to do the same to the after hatchway, and they had just taken off two planks which were lying across it, and were going to put on the hatches, when a violent explosion occurred in the after part of the vessel, which completely wrecked the cabin, and so seriously injured the captain that he died the same evening. On discovering the extent of the damage it was deemed expedient to return at once with the vessel to Cardiff, and that was accordingly done, and we are told that she is now here undergoing the necessary repairs.

Before, however, I proceed to state the character and extent of the damage which was done by the explosion, it will be as well to give some description of this vessel's construction, and of the arrangement of the cargo on board.

It seems that she is fitted with four water-tight bulkheads, namely, a collision bulkhead forward, an after bulkhead in the stern, and a bulkhead at each end of the engine-room, which is placed amidships. Forward, and extending from the engine-room to the collision bulkhead, is a large hold, having two hatchways, a fore and a main hatchway, and abaft the engine-room is the after hold with only one hatchway, and as it was in the after hold that the explosion occurred, it will be necessary that we should explain it somewhat more in detail. The after hold, then, which we are told is about 80 feet long, and extends from the engine-room to the after bulkhead, is divided into an upper and a lower hold by a solid iron deck, and along the bottom of the lower hold runs the screw tunnel. The total depth of the hold is about 22 feet, the 'tween decks being 6 feet 10 inches, the lower hold about 15 feet. In the after part of the 'tween decks is the cabin, containing the saloon, the captain's and officers berths, and the steward's quarters. It occupies about 28 feet of the after part of the 'tween decks, and is separated from the cargo space by a wooden bulkhead. The hatchway, which is about 20 feet by 10, stands about midway between the engine-room and cabin bulkheads. A little abaft the engine-room bulkhead stands the main mast, and just forward of the cabin bulkhead is the mizen mast. On the deck, just before the mizen mast, is a deck-house, containing the engineers quarters.

The cargo, as I have already stated, consisted of about 1,800 tons of "colliery small," of which we are told that 725 tons were placed in the after holds; but as this quantity was not sufficient to fill both the holds, the coals were sloped away aft, leaving an empty space in the after part both of the lower hold and of the 'tween decks. In the lower hold the empty space thus left was, we are told, considerable, sufficient to contain about 70 tons of coal, the foot of the cargo not reaching quite up to the after bulkhead. In the 'tween decks there was a similar space, but not so large, the cargo there coming against the cabin bulkhead, in some parts rising half-way up it, in others about one third. Now it is in these empty spaces, one of which was immediately under the cabin floor and the other just forward of the wooden bulkhead in the 'tween decks, that we should naturally expect that any gas which the coal might give off would accumulate.

Let us now proceed to see what were the arrangements for ventilating the holds of this vessel. Mr. Wotherspoon, the superintending engineer of the owners, has told us that he came to Cardiff under instructions from his owners to see to the proper ventilation of this and a sister ship; and that on his arrival, finding that there was a good deal of talk amongst shipowners as to fitting coal laden vessels with iron cowls, he cummunicated with his owners, and received directions from them to do what was necessary to provide the vessels with proper ventilating appliances. It would seem that the only ventilation which the "Buteshire" had, apart from her hatches when open, were two scuttles, about 14 to 16 inches in diameter, in the forehold. In the after hold there were originally two similar scuttles, placed one on each side of the mizen mast, and just forward of the cabin bulkhead; but of these, as we shall presently see, one, that on the starboard side, had been included in a small bread tank, which had been constructed by the ship's carpenter, leaving only the scuttle on the port side for the ventilation of: the after 'tween decks. These scuttles, we are told, were fitted with close and open covers, but as they stood only about 7 inches above the deck, they would of course have to be closed in bad weather. After communicating with the Board of Trade officials at Cardiff, and learning from them what kind of ventilation they recommended, Mr. Wotherspoon placed upon each hatchway a ventilating cowl, having a diameter of about 12 inches, and standing some 5 feet above the hatchways. Confining, then, our attention to the after hold, with which we have more especially to do, it will be seen that when the vessel left Cardiff there was no special ventilation provided for the lower hold, and that for the 'tween decks there was the ventilating cowl on the hatchway, and one scuttle on the port side of the mizen mast, just forward of the cabin bulkhead.

Mr. Wotherspoon told us also that, with a view to enable the gas to get to the ventilating cowls over the hatchways, he took a spade and cleared away the coal from under the after combings of the main hatchway, and directed one of the coal trimmers to go and do the same to all the other hatches. There is indeed evidence that in the after hatchway the coal was cleared away from below the after combings for a space of about 5 or 6 inches deep by about 3 feet long; but there is nothing to show that this opening extended for any distance under the deck; indeed there is every reason to think, not only from the evidence of the witnesses, but also from a fact to which I will presently advert, that it could have extended but a very little way under it, and that there was a solid mass of coal, some 10 or 12 feet thick, abaft the after hatchway, and between it and the after scuttle. Any gas, therefore, which might accumulate in the empty space just forward of the cabin bulkhead could not possibly get to the ventilating cowl over the hatchway; its only mode of escape would be through the after scuttle on the port side; and it will presently be seen why this alone would not be sufficient to keep this space clear. The gas, which would accumulate in the empty space in the after part of the lower hold, and immediately below the cabin floor would of course have no means of escape; for, although the hatches on the lower hatchway were no doubt off, the hatchway was full of small coal, and the coal was trimmed close up to the deck.

Such then being the arrangements on board this vessel when she left Cardiff, let us now proceed to inquire what was the position, and what the nature of the damage done by the explosion. To take first the lower hold, we find here that the part of the iron deck, which was immediately above the empty space, and which formed the floor of the cabin, was blown up, and that the upper part of the after iron bulkhead, which formed the after part of this same empty space, was forced back about 2 feet in the 'tween decks the wooden bulkhead, which separated the cabin from the empty space forward, was blown all to pieces. Whilst, too, the upper deck above the cabin was carried away, the deck forward of the mizen mast, and upon which the engineers quarters stood, was lifted. It will thus be seen that the whole of the damages were in the immediate neighbourhood of the two empty spaces of which we have spoken; and looking at the character of those injuries, namely, the forcing up of the cabin floor, the forcing back of the upper part of the iron bulkhead, the total destruction of the wooden cabin bulkhead, the carrying away of the deck above the cabin, and the lifting of the upper deck under the engineers quarters, all seems incontestably to prove that it is to the gas, which there can be little doubt was accumulated in the two empty spaces in the 'tween decks and lower hold, that we must look for the cause of the casualty.

But whilst this seems to be generally admitted, we have had various theories put forward by the witnesses as to the way in which the gas is supposed to have produced these terrible results, to all of which it seems necessary that I should advert. And first let me dispose of what I may call the absurd theories. There having been no smell of fire, and no appearance afterwards of charring or of burning, some of the witnesses came to the conclusion that the gas could not have been ignited; they thought that, owing either to the gas having been given off in large quantities, or to the admixture of the gas generated from the decomposition of her former cargo of grain coming in contact with the gas generated from the coal, a force had in some mysterious way been produced sufficient to burst up the iron deck and to do the other damages mentioned above. It is needless to say that these theories were put forward by persons having not the smallest pretence to scientific knowledge; and I notice them merely for the purpose of mentioning a fact, which was stated by Mr. Wales, the Government Inspector of Mines, that he had known many cases of explosions of coal gas, in which there had been no appearance of charring or burning, and he attributed it to the extreme rapidity with which the ignition in these cases often takes place.

Another theory, almost equally absurd, was advanced by others of the witnesses, that possibly it might have been caused by spontaneous combustion. This, I may observe, is a very favourite theory in these cases, for it seems to imply that there is no blame to anyone; being "spontaneous," it is supposed that it could be nobody's fault. But as Mr. Wales has told us, spontaneous combustion is, so far as his experience goes, unknown in the case of South Wales coal. Added to which we have this fact to get over, that spontaneous combustion is a slow process, and requires a considerable time to develop itself, some months, or at any rate some weeks; whereas in the present case the cargo was put on board on the 9th and 10th of this month, and the explosion occurred on the 12th. I think, therefore, that we may dismiss the theory of spontaneous combustion.

Let us now proceed to consider the more probable theories, which have been advanced to account for this explosion. And first it should be observed that the gas of which we are speaking is a light carburetted hydrogen, having a specific gravity of about 51, or about one half that of air, so that it will rise rapidly to the top of any compartment in which it is contained. When, too, it is mixed with from 6 to 16 parts of atmospheric air, it produces a violently explosive compound; but it must always be remembered that, in order to explode, it must be brought in contact with flame or fire. And the question which we have to consider is, in what way could any flame or fire have been brought in contact with the gas contained in the empty spaces of which we have spoken.

In the earlier part of the inquiry a suggestion was made that possibly there might have been some leakage from the after hold into the tunnel, and that the gas having got into the tunnel, and become ignited by a light taken into it, or by the fire in the engine-room, may thus have caused the explosion. It seems, however, that there was a 4-inch pipe passing up from the after part of the tunnel through the deck to above the top of the deck-house, and which would, no doubt, have carried off any gas that might have found its way into the tunnel. The chief engineer also told us that the third engineer went into the tunnel with a light at about 10 o'clock to oil the bearings, but that he had remained there for only about five or ten minutes; and that he himself had some 20 minutes before the explosion occurred looked in at the door of the tunnel, but only for a minute; but that, except on these two occasions, nobody had been into the tunnel with a light after they left Cardiff. But, perhaps, the strongest proof that the explosion could not have originated in the tunnel or the engine-room is afforded by the fact that the chief engineer, although he was in the engine-room at the time, did not hear and knew nothing at all about the explosion until they came to tell him of it. 1 think, therefore, that we may dismiss from our minds any suggestion that it could have been caused by an escape of gas into the tunnel.

There remain then two theories, one of which has the support of Mr. Wales, the Government Inspector of Mines for this district, the other that of the Board of Trade surveyors. The first of these is that the gas, as it issued from the after scuttle, somehow or other came in contact with some flame or fire. How it could have done so Mr. Wales did not tell us; and at first sight it seemed not very easy to understand how, with a strong breeze from the W.S.W., nearly dead ahead, there could have been any flame or fire on the deck of the vessel; the. second mate and the boatswain, who were the only two men anywhere near the spot, having expressly sworn that there was none and that they themselves were not smoking at the time. But a suggestion has been made this day by Mr. Vachell that, with the wind nearly dead ahead, it is very possible that a live coal or spark may have fallen on or near the scuttle, and coming in contact with the gas, as it issued from the scuttle in a highly explosive condition, may have ignited it, whence of course it would readily spread to the reservoirs of gas in the empty spaces in the 'tween decks and after hold; and we are very far from saying that this may not have been so. The other theory is that the gas may have leaked into the cabin, and become ignited by coming in contact with some light or fire burning there. In answer to this it was said that there was no way in which the gas could have leaked into the cabin; and that even if it had, there was no light and no fire burning in the cabin to ignite it. Seeing, however, that the two empty spaces, which were filled with gas, were one immediately under the cabin floor, and the other against the cabin bulkhead, it is certainly very difficult to say that so volatile a gas as this might not have found its way through some crevice into the cabin. It is true that the floor was of iron, and that the bulkhead as originally constructed may have been close and air-tight; but as I have already stated there was a small bread tank, which had been constructed by the ship's carpenter out of some rough planks, and which stood just forward of the cabin bulkhead, on the starboard side of the mizen mast, immediately under one of the two scuttles, and which had a door opening into the cabin. And as this bread tank stood out into the empty space in the 'tween decks where the gas was, it is quite possible that the gas may have found its way between the planks into the bread tank, and thence through the door into the cabin. As to the steward's statement that there was no flame and no fire in the cabin at the time, it appears to us that this man was anxious to prove a little too much., He told us that, although the fire had been lighted that morning, he was quite certain that it was out when the explosion occurred. He was also quite certain that the captain used never to seal his letters. He was quite certain that the captain never had any lucifer or safety matches in his cabin; he would not, however, swear that the officers had not any, for he had been in Court during their examinations, and must have heard them say that they had lucifer matches in their berths, and that a good many lucifer matches were found amongst the wreck. Whilst, however, it appears to us not impossible that the gas may, as the Board of Trade surveyors seem to think, have found its way into the cabin, and become there ignited, in which case, as Mr. Wales has told us, it would no doubt have spread to the gas below the decks; we are on the whole disposed to think that Mr. Vachell's suggestion is the more probable, namely, that the gas became ignited as it issued from the after scuttle, by a live coal or spark from the funnel, and that thus the explosion occurred.

But however this may be, it is clear that there could have been no explosion if proper means had been taken to prevent the accumulation of gas in these two empty spaces, in the after part of the lower hold and in the 'tween decks, and to carry it off as soon as it was emitted; and the question which we have now to consider is, how this can best be done. According to the Board of Trade surveyors it is necessary, in the case of two-decked vessels such as the "Buteshire," to ventilate not only the 'tween decks but also the lower holds; and with this view they would carry the ventilating tubes down to the under sides of the lower, as well as of the upper decks. On the other hand, Mr. Wales was of opinion that mere tubes, however placed, would be insufficient to produce a current of air, without which as he truly said you could not have perfect ventilation. He thought that on board steam vessels there should be a small steam engine kept expressly to pump air into the hold, and thus produce a current which would carry off the gases as soon as they were emitted. On board sailing ships he thought that the same object could be attained by a system of fans turned by a wheel, which would revolve when the vessel was in motion, and which might be turned by hand when she was at rest. No doubt the means proposed by Mr. Wales would be effectual for the purpose, but we must be careful, whilst seeing that all due precautions are taken to insure the safety of those on board, that we do not lay upon shipowners and ship masters a burden too heavy for them to bear. All indeed that is required is that the gas shall be carried off as soon as it is emitted, and the simpler the means for attaining that object the better.

At page XXIV. of the Report of the Commissioners on Spontaneous Combustion of coal in ships it will be seen that what they recommend is that "Every coal laden ship " should be fitted with shafts or ventilators, piercing the " upper deck, but not carried down on to or through the " coal with cowls always trimmed so as to form a down- " cast and upcast for a current of air, which would then," they observe, "pass continually in all weathers over the " surface of the coal, carrying with it any explosive gas as " fast as it is evolved." The Commissioners then seem to have thought that what was needed were, not shafts. carried down on to or through the coal to the lower deck, nor engines or fans to pump air into the hold, but ventilating shafts, merely "piercing the upper deck." They thought also that the shafts should be fitted with cowls " trimmed so as to form a downcast and an upcast for a " current of air which would pass continuously over the " surface of the coal." To obtain however a downcast and an upcast, and thus create a continuous current of air over the surface of the coal it is obvious that we must have the shafts at the opposite ends of the hold or compartment, and a clear space between the coal and the deck above it; for if either the two shafts are close together, or the coal is trimmed close up to the deck above it, you could not have a current of air passing over the "surface of the coal." What then the Commissioners seem to recommend is, that there should be a ventilator in the fore part of the compartment, and a ventilator in the after part of it, and that there should be a clear space above the coal, so as to allow a current of air to pass freely over the surface from the one ventilator to the other. This is what the Commissioners appear to recommend, and in the opinion of the assessors it is all that is required. They tell me that ventilating tubes placed at each end of a compartment and fitted with cowls, which can be trimmed according to the wind, are quite sufficient to ventilate it; and in fact one of them informs me that during the Abyssinian War he had on several occasions as many as 300 camels on board his vessel at the same time, and that the holds were kept perfectly ventilated even in the Red Sea, by shafts placed at each end of the hold fitted with ventilating cowls. Mr. Wales very fairly admitted that his opinion, as to the insufficiency of mere tubes to afford adequate ventilation, was founded upon his experiencein mines; and in applying the same considerations to steamers as well as to sailing vessels, Mr. Wales we think has not made due allowance for the fact that they are moving through the air at rates varying from 5 to 15 miles an hour; and that it would at all times be easy by properly setting the cowls to produce an upcast and a downcast through the shafts, and consequently a current of air over the surface of the coal.

But Mr. Wales said that the present case was, in his opinion, a proof of the insufficiency of mere tubes or shafts to ventilate a hold, for that here there was a ventilating cowl on the after hatch and an open scuttle aft, and yet the gas had accumulated and a violent explosion had occurred. Mr. Wales, however, seems to have forgotten that one of the necessary conditions is that there shall be a clear space above the coal so as to allow the air to pass freely over the surface, whereas in this case there was nothing of the kind. I have already stated that, although the coal had been cleared away from under the after combings of the after hatchway for a space of about 5 or 6 inches deep by about 3 feet long, that opening had not extended far under the deck, and that the coals had been trimmed close up to the deck abaft as well as before the hatchway, so that there was probably a solid mass of coal, and of small coal too, some 10 or 12 feet thick, between the hatchway and the empty space aft. That this was so is clear, not only from the evidence of the witnesses, but from the fact that there was no explosion in the hatchway, where the second mate and boatswain were. Had there been a clear space above the coal between the hatchway and the place where the explosion occurred, it is clear that some portion of the explosive force would have found its way out through the hatchway; and I think that we may fairly conclude that the reason why it did not, was that it was prevented doing so by the intervening mass of coal. Obviously, both the ventilating cowl on the hatchway and the scuttle aft could only ventilate, and that imperfectly, the space immediately beneath them. No doubt the scuttle would carry off a portion of the gas from the empty space forward of the cabin bulkhead, but not sufficiently quickly to prevent its becoming explosive. Had the coal been trimmed so as to leave a clear space from the hatchway right aft to the scuttle we are disposed to think that a current of air would have been established which would have carried off the gas as fast as it was evolved, and that no explosion would have occurred. It would no doubt have been better if there had been a ventilating shaft placed at each end of the hold, and a clear space over the coal from end to end; but we are not prepared to say that the means adopted might not have been sufficient, if only there had been a clear space over the coal between the hatchway and the after scuttle. As it was, there being no current of air, and the gas not being able to escape sufficiently fast from the scuttle, it accumulated in the empty space forward of the bulkhead, until it became so explosive that on a light being brought in contact with it it would at once explode.

Having then come to the conclusion that the explosion was due more to the improper stowing of the cargo than to the want of proper ventilating appliances, we can have little difficulty in answering the questions on which our opinion has been asked.

Now the first question which we are asked is, whether Mr. Alexander Aitkin, the chief mate of the "Buteshire," is to blame for not carefully attending to the loading of the cargo before the vessel left Cardiff? That the explosion was due in great part to the improper way in which the cargo was trimmed admits, in our opinion, of no doubt; and the question is, whether Mr. Aitkin is responsible for this. In the course of his examination Mr. Aitkin stated that he considered that he had nothing to do with the stowing of the cargo; and we were told by Mr. Waldron that if it had not been for that remark he should probably not have made any charge against the chief mate it certainly does surprise one to hear a chief mate say that the stowing of the cargo is no part of his duty; at the same time we cannot overlook the fact that in this case the owners had sent their superintending engineer, Mr. Wotherspoon, to Cardiff to see to the proper ventilation of this and of a sister ship; and Mr. Wotherspoon told us that he had taken upon himself to superintend the stowing of the cargo it certainly is greatly to be regretted that Mr. Wotherspoon did not, when he was instructing the men as to how they were to trim the cargo, order them to leave a clear space above the coal from the hatchway to the after scuttle, so that the air might have had a free passage over the surface, as in that case there would probably not have been any explosion. The fact, however, that Mr. Wotherspoon took upon himself to direct how the ventilation of the vessel and the trimming of the cargo should be carried out, does in our opinion relieve the chief mate in a great measure from the responsibilty which would otherwise attach to him, of seeing that the cargo was properly trimmed and ventilated. We should, therefore, have had some hesitation in touching this gentleman's certificate had we been asked to do so, but we are not; at the same time, we cannot but regret that Mr. Aitkin should have thought that he had nothing to do with the stowage of the cargo.

We are also asked to say that the owners are to blame for having neglected to provide the vessel with such appliances for the ventilation of the cargo as were necessary for the safety of the vessel and her crew, and that they ought, therefore, to be condemned to pay the costs of this inquiry. Now, although no doubt the insufficient ventilation of the cargo has led to the casualty in this case, it is in our opinion clear that this insufficiency is due, not so much to the neglect to provide the proper appliances, as to the improper trimming of the cargo. It seems to us that the owners, when they sent their superintending engineer, Mr. Wotherspoon, to Cardiff to see to the ventilation and stowage of this vessel, and authorised him to do what was necessary, did all that could be reasonably required of them; and they seem to have shown a very proper desire that every precaution should be taken for the safety of those on board. It is true that Mr. Wotherspoon did not take the best or the most effective way for ventilating the holds of this vessel, but this was not the owners fault, for they had given him full authority to do all that was necessary. If blame attaches anywhere, it is Mr. Wotherspoon for not seeing that the cargo was properly trimmed and a clear space left for the air to pass over the surface of the coal. At the outside, however, it can hardly be regarded as more than an error of judgment on the part of one of their servants; and we see no reason why we should on that account condemn them in the costs of these proceedings. Looking at all the facts of the case we shall not make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

E. G. F. G. VISCONTI,

 

 

 

Retired Commander, R.N.,

Assessors.

 

"

HENRY JONES,

 

L 367. 34. 70.-5/79. Wt. B 47. E. & S.