Wreck Report for 'Black Swan', 1879

(No. 343.)

"BLACK SWAN," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Moot Hall, Newcastle, on the 30th and 31st July and the 1st August 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by J. R. RAVENHILL, Esquire, C.E., and Captain PICKARD, R.N., as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the explosion of the boiler of the British steamship "BLACK SWAN," of Newcastle, on the 29th June last, by which four lives were lost.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circum- stances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,-

1. That the said explosion was due to the bursting of the lower vertical plate at the back of the port combustion chamber, owing to its excessive reduction by corrosion, to the insufficient hold on the plate of the five contiguous stays over which cup patches had been placed, and to the extreme pressure of the steam in the boiler.

2. That proper precautions were not taken from time to time by Mr. James Taylor Ridley, the superintending engineer of Messrs. Smith's vessels, to ascertain the condition and efficiency of the boiler of the "Black Swan."

3. That the said James Taylor Ridley was not justified in allowing a plate with cup patches over the ends of three of the stays to remain in the boiler.

4. That the said James Taylor Ridley was not justified in allowing two additional cup patches to be placed over the ends of two other of the stays to the said plate, if he knew of its being done; and if he did not know of it, it was his duty to have done so.

5. That the said James Taylor Ridley was not justified in allowing the safety valve of the said boiler to be weighed to the extent of 54 lbs.

6. That the said boiler was not in a safe and proper condition when the vessel arrived in the Tyne in May and June last, and that proper measures were not taken to ensure its safety and efficiency.

7. That it was not a safe and proper thing to place cup patches over the ends of stays which were leaking, except as a temporary measure and until the stays could be renewed.

There being no charge whatever against the master his certificate was returned to him.

The Court made no order as to costs.

Dated the 5th day of August 1879.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

BENJ. S. PINKARD, R.N.,

Assessors.

 

"

JOHN R. RAVENHILL,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard upon the 30th and 31st of July, and 1st of August, when Mr. de Hamel appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr Ingledew for the owners, and for the superintending engineer, Mr. James Taylor Ridley, and Mr. Roche for the captain of the "Black Swan."

On the 31st the Commissioner and the assessors made a personal inspection of the vessel's boiler, where she lay alongside the owners wharf at North Shields. Fourteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. de Hamel asked the opinion of the Court upon the following questions :-

" 1. What was the cause of the bursting of the boiler of " the British steamship ' Black Swan' on the 29th of June " last, whereby the loss of four lives was caused ?

" 2. Whether proper precautions were taken from time " to time by James Taylor Ridley, the superintending " engineer for the owners of the vessel, to ascertain the " condition and efficiency of the said boiler?

" 3. Whether the said James Taylor Ridley was justified in " allowing a plate with cupped patches over the ends of " three of the stays of the said boiler to remain therein ?

" 4. Whether the said James Taylor Ridley was justified " in subsequently allowing two additional cupped patches " to be placed over the ends of other two of the stays in " the said plate?

" 5. Whether the said James Taylor Ridley was justified " in allowing the weighting of the safety valves of the said " boiler to be continued at a pressure of 54 lbs.

" 6. Whether the said boiler was in a safe and proper " condition when the vessel arrived in the Tyne in May " and June last; and whether proper measures were taken " to ensure its safety and efficiency? and

" 7. Whether it was a safe and proper thing to prevent " the leakages of the aid boiler by placing cupped patches " over the ends of the defective stays thereof?"

Three witnesses were then produced by Mr. Ingledew to speak to Mr. Ridley's character, and Mr. Ingledew having been heard for his parties, and Mr. de Hamel in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions that had been submitted for its consideration. The circumstances of the case are as follow :-

The "Black Swan," which is an iron screw steamship of 649 tons gross and 411 tons net register, and is fit ed with two engines of 80 horse-power, was built at North Shields in the year 1864, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of this inquiry was the property of Messrs. T. and W. Smith, of North Shields, Mr. George Luckley, a partner in the firm, being the managing owner. She left Boulogne at about 5 a.m. of the 29th of June last in ballast bound to Newcastle, having on board a crew of 16 hands all told, 10 of whom were deck hands, the remaining six belonging to the engine-room department. She proceeded at her usual speed, from 8 1/2 to 9 knots an hour, the weather being fine and the sea smooth, and at about 4 p.m. was off Yarmouth when an explosion occurred in the engine-room, which kiiled one of the stokers, and so severely injured the first and second engineers, as well as a son of the chief engineer, who happened to be on board, that all three of them subsequently died; the second engineer and the son on the same evening, and the chief engineer about a fortnight afterwards. The captain, who was at the time of the explosion on the bridge, finding that the engines had been stopped by the explosion obtained the assistance of a steam tug, by which she was taken into Yarmouth Harbour, where she arrived at about 6.30 of the same evening

These then being the facts of the case, the first question on which our opinion was asked was, what was the cause of the bursting of the boiler on the occasion in question ? It seems that the engines and boiler with which this vessel was fitted had been put into her in the year 1870; the boiler, therefore, was about nine years old, which, we are told, is about the average age of a marine boiler. During all this time the vessel would seem to have been kept pretty constantly at work. The master, who has been in command of her for the last four years, said "We went backwards and forwards as fast as we could go." Of course she was occasionally laid up for an overhaul, but otherwise she was kept pretty constantly running. We might, therefore, not unnaturally expect to find that the boiler was, as one of the witnesses expressed it, "on its last legs;" and that seems to have been its condition in the opinion of all the witnesses who have been examined before us. Mr. Thompson who made it, Mr. Eltringham, who repaired it, Mr. Sampson, the Board of Trade surveyor, and Mr. Flannery, an engineer surveyor, all speak of the boiler as being nearly at the end of its existence; and Henry Myers, a stoker, a son of the chief engineer, and who had been in the vessel for the last two years and a half, told us that he had often heard his father say that she was "getting pretty weak in places,"and was" at its last."

And now as to the particular plate which burst on this occasion. It seems that the boiler had three furnaces, each with a separate combustion chamber, and it was the lower vertical plate at the back of the combustion chamber on the port side which burst. The fracture was a horizontal one, being we are told about 42 inches long by 7 1/2 inches at the widest part, and was in a line with the second row of stays from the bottom, and a little below the line of the fire bars. Originally this plate was, as we were told by Mr. Thompson, the builder, 7/16ths of an inch thick; but Mr. Eltringham told us that in about September 1875, very shortly before Mr. Ridley became superintendent of Messrs. Smith's ships, the lower part of the plate had become so corroded that it was found necessary to renew it; that he had accordingly cut out the lower portion of the plate, and in its place had put a new plate 7/16ths of an inch in thickness, and this was the plate whiah gave way. The method in which this plate had been supported was minutely described to us by some of the witnesses, and their description was confirmed by a personal inspection which we made of the boiler. It seems that the plate was connected with the back plate of the boiler by a number of stays, 13/8 inches in diameter, placed at an average distance of about 9 inches from centre to centre, and screwed through both the plates, and rivetted over, the water space between the plate and the back of the boiler being from 4 to 6 inches in width. I should add, however, that between the port and centre combustion chambers there were six stays less than in the corresponding position on the starboard side, leaving a space, not of 9, but of 18 inches between the screw stays at this part. To supply the want of these stays a vertical angle iron had been rivetted to the back plate of the boiler, but without any connection being made between it and the combustion chambers. The lowest screw stay in the port combustion chamber was also wanting, and had apparently never been fitted.

Let us now see what was the state and condition of this plate, and the stays by which it was supported at the time of the explosion. According to Mr. Thompson, the plate as produced in Court had been reduced from 7/16ths its original thickness, to between 3/16ths to 4/16ths. This evidence was confirmed by Mr. Sampson, as well as by Mr. Flannery and Mr. Eltringham; and indeed, Mr. Sampson said that near one of the stay holes he had found the thickness to be only 2/16ths. Now Mr. Eltringham told us that in his opinion if the plate had been reduced from 7/16ths to 4/16ths it would be unsafe and ought to be replaced. So that this plate, as far as regards its thickness, was, in the opinion of a very competent person, in an unsafe condition.

We were told also that at the time of the explosion there were upon this plate five cup patches, and it will be well to see where they were, and for what purpose they had been put there. All the five patches it seems were over stay heads, two being in the line of fracture and three over stays in the line immediately below. All five stays were contiguous. Now it is admitted that the only object of putting on these cup patches was to stop the leaking at the stay heads. The fact, however that there was leaking at the stay head would show that the hold of that stay on the plate had been loosened. Either the plate had been corroded around the stay head, or the thread of the screw had been eaten away, so as to allow the water to pass through; at all events, the stay had ceased to have that hold in the plate which it had had originally. That this also was so in the present case is proved by the evidence of all the witnesses; and Mr. Thompson, after carefully examining the plate, said that the holding of these stays was very bad. It is also to be observed that all that the cup patches could do would be to prevent the escape of the water from the boiler; according to Mr. Thompson, Mr. Sampson, and Mr. Eltringham, they would not stop the corrosion which would go on as before; and although Mr. Flannery was of opinion that the corrosion would not go on quite so quickly as before, they all agreed that the cup pa ches would give no additional strength or support to the plate whatever. Here then we have five contiguous stays, whose hold upon the plate in question was so relaxed that it had been found necessary to cover the heads with cup patches so as to prevent the escape of the water from the boiler; there was thus a large extent of its surface almost wholly unsupported, or at any rate with very insufficient support. In the instructions issued by the Board of Trade to the surveyors of ships in 1878, at section 62, we have the formula given for calculating the pressure proper to be allowed for plates forming flat surfaces. On looking at this formula it will be seen that, where the stays are fitted with nuts, the constant in the equation is highest, varying from 54 up to as much as 100, according to circumstances; but that, where the ends are merely rivetted over, as they were in this case, the constant varies from 36 to 60; so that the manner in which the stays were fitted in this case was not the best or strongest. But it is to the last paragraph of section 62 that we would wish specially to call attention, and which is in these words: "When the rivetted ends of screw stays are " much worn, or when the nuts are burned, the constants " should be reduced, but the surveyor must act according " to the circumstances that present themselves at the time " of the survey; and it is expected that in cases were the " revetted ends of seraw stays in combustion boxes and " furnaces are found in this state, it will be often found " necessary to reduce the constant 60 to about 36." When then we find the ends of five contiguous stays leaking so much as to require cup patches to be put over them, we can well understand in what an unsale condition the plate must have been, quite apart from the reduct on in thickness. And we were told by Henry Myers, the stoker, that it was in that plate, more than at any other part, that they expected the boiler to go.

Now what was the pressure to which this plate was exposed ? Mr. Thompson told us that the boiler was originally tested for a pressure of 120 lbs. to the square inch, the working pressure being 60 lbs., and that the safety valve was loaded to that extent. I find, however, in the engineer's log-book under date of the 25th of April last that they had on that day "Overhauled the safety valve, and had shifted the weight 1 inch in towards " the spindle." That would seam to have been done by direction of Mr. Ridley, who told us that he had reduced the pressure from 60 lbs. to 54 lbs.; he could not tell us when he had done this, bat it was probably at this time the shifting of the weight 1 inch in towards the spindle corresponding, we are told, to about that difference in the pressure. Now what does Mr. Sampson say ought to have been the proper working pressure for this boiler ? He tells us that assuming the plate to have been at its original thickness of 7/16ths, the proper pressure according to the Board of Trade rules should have been 22 lbs. With the plate, however, reduced as it was to between 3/16ths and 4/16ths, the pressure should only have been 13 lbs.; and if he had known that the ends of five of the stays had so slight a hold as they seem to have had upon this plate, the pressure, in his opinion, should have been nil. And yet we find this boiler allowed to be worked at a pressure of 50 lbs.; for that that was so is clear from the evidence of Henry Myers, who told us that between a quarter of an hour and 20 miautes before the explosion he looked at the index, and saw that there was a pressure of 50 lbs. in the boiler. Moreover, we were told by Mr. Sampson that after the explosion he examined the safety valve and found it weighted to between 53 and 54 lbs.

The causes then of the bursting of this plate is clear. It was due, first, to the excessive thinning of the plate, its thickness having been reduced from 7/16ths to between 3/16ths and 4/16ths, rendering it, in the opinion of competent witnesses, dangerously weak; secondly, to the insecure hold upon the plate of five contiguous stays, over the ends of which were placed the cup patches; and thirdly, to the excessive pressure of steam in the boiler, a pressure which, having regard to the form and construction of the boiler, was in excess of that to which it should have been exposed even when new.

It remains then for us to say with whom the blame of this casualty rests. It seems that Mr. James Taylor Ridley is the superintending engineer in the Tyne of Messrs. T. and W. Smith's vessels. It is his duty, when any of their vessels arrive in port, to ascertain whether anything, and if so what, is required to be done to the machinery and boilers, and to see that the necessary works are carried out. At the time of the explosion Mr. Ridley had only seven ships to look after; and during the whole time he has been in Messrs. Smith's service, for the last 3 years and 10 months, he has never had at the same time more than nine vessels under him. He had nothing else to do than to look after Messrs. Smith's vessels, and it can therefore. hardly be said that he had more than he could properly attend to. Let us see then how Mr. Ridley seems to have performed his duties, more especially in regard to this vessel, the "Black Swan."

It was about the time, or very shortly before he entered Messrs. Smith's service, that it had been found necessary to renew the lower part of the vertical plate at the back of the port combustion chamber; for Mr. Eltringham has told us that he received that plate about September 1875, and Mr. Ridley said that he has been in Messrs. Smith's service for the last 3 years and 10 months. Various suggestions have been made as to why that plate should have corroded so rapidly, for it was below the level of the fire bars, and consequently below the place where the greatest intensity of the fire from the furnace could strike. It seems, however, that the main feed and donkey feed cocks were attached to this part of the back of the boiler, and that the internal delivery pipes were of copper; so that this back plate of the combustion chamber would be subjected to any deleterious action which might arise not only from the action of the feed water itself, but likewise from these copper pipes. According to Mr. Flannery there were three causes which contributed more or less to the excessive corrosion of this plate; namely, first, the position of the feed pipes for supplying the boiler with water; secondly, a slight buckling of the plate owing to its being insufficiently supported, by which exfoliation of the surface would take place; and thirdly, by a too careful cleaning of the combustion chamber, thus continually exposing a fresh surface to the action of the fire. All these causes, combined with the fact that the plate in question was "exposed to the impact of heat or flame, with water in contact" with it, would render it much more liable to corrosion than the plates forming the back of the boiler, which, whilst having water in contact with steam, were "not exp??d to the impact of heat or flame." Be this however as it may and in whatever way we are to account for the rapid corrosion of this plate, Mr. Ridley knew or ought to have known that the lower part of the vertical plate at the back of the port combustion chamber had been renewed either just before or just after he entered Messrs. Smith's service. He knew or ought to have known that after only about five years use it had become so reduced in thickness that it had to he replaced. It was to this place then that Mr. Ridley's attention should have been specially directed; from some cause or other the plate in this part had corroded more rapidly than elsewhere, nearly four years had elapsed since it had been renewed, and here, if anywhere, danger was to be apprehended. According to Henry Myers, the stoker, " we feared that plate more than any other part of the " boiler."

And now as to the cup patches. Strange as it may appear, Mr. Ridley was quite unable to tell us when any of these patches had been put on. Mr. Eltringham told us that two of them had been put on by his workmen under instructions from the chief engineer of the vessel on the 23rd of June last, on the last occasion of the vessel being in the Tyne before the explosion occurred, but when the three other patches had been put on he was quite unable to say, although he had no doubt that it had been done by his men, but he had no entry in his books to show. The account which Mr. Ridley gave us of what occurred on the occasion of the two patches being put on, as stated by Mr. Eltringham, in June last, is as follows: "The chief " engineer," he says, "told me that he was having some- " thing done in the back end. I offered to go in and see " it, but he told me that he had a man at work, and he " was satisfied that it was all right, and that I need not " go. I asked him if it was anything serious, and he said " no, he was only attending to one of the patches." Now that Mr. Ridley should, with the knowledge which he had, or ought to have had, of the state of this plate, have been content to take the chief engineer's statement that there was nothing seriously the matter, and should not have gone to see for himself.?? appears to us to be a most extra- ordinary proceeding. He tells us that he knew nothing of these two last patches being put on, but at all events he must have known of the three others being there, for he tells us that he personally inspected the boiler in April last, when she was laid up for a short time for repairs, and most certainly those three patches must have been there then, or must then have been put on. If there is one point upon which all the witnesses are agreed, it is that these cup patches should never be used except as a temporary measure; it can give no additional strength to the plate, no additional hold to the stay. If the hold of the stay on the plate has become so loosened either by the corrosion of the plate at that place or by the eating away of the screw, the cup patch will not remedy the defect. According to Mr. Flannery, it may to a certain extent stop the further progress of corrosion, although Mr. Sampson, Mr. Thompson, and Mr. Eltringham are inclined to doubt whether it would do so, but it would give no additional support whatever to the plate. Mr. Ridley had, therefore, no right whatever to have left these cup patches on this plate, not even the three, of whose existence he must or ought to have known so long ago as in April last. What he should have done should have been to have put new stays with patches if the plate had been worn away in the neighbourhood of the stay holes, with the stays passing through the patches, and either fastened with nuts or rivetted over; or if the plate in those paris was still good, he might have put new stays, reboring the stay holes. Either way would have given the stays a firm hold on the plate; the cup patches gave no hold whatever.

Our attention, however, was called by Mr. Ingledew to some entries in the engineer's log-book, in which it is stated that "the engines and boilers are satisfactory," and that Mr. Ridley might well have been misled by those entries as to the real condition of the boiler. But on looking more closely at the log-book we find under the date of 17th April an entry in these words: "Boiler leaking a little back of the furnaces ;" again on the 29th May we find this entry: "Boiler leaking from the back of middle furnace;" and again on the 19th June: "Boiler leaking a little at the back of the furnace." There are no entries in this log-book after the 21st of June, so that we do not know what the entry should have been on her return from Boulogne on the 23rd of June, but if Mr. Ridley had only done his duty and examined the chief engineer's log-book on every occasion of her return to the Tyne, he would have seen that there were repeated entries of leaking going on at the backs of the furnaces, the very place where danger was to be apprehended, and where in fact the explosion ultimately took place.

With these preliminary remarks we can have no difficulty in answering the questions which have been put to us on behalf of the Board of Trade. And we have no hesitation in saying that, in our opinion, proper precautions were not "taken from time to time by James Taylor Ridley, " the superintending engineer for the owners, to ascertain " the condition and efficiency of the said boiler;" that Mr. Ridley was not "justified in allowing a plate with cup " patches over the ends of three of the stays of the said " boiler to remain therein;" that he was not justified, if he knew of it, "in subsequently allowing two additional " cup patches to be placed over the ends of other two of " the stays in the said plate;" and if he did not know of those two additional cup patches being placed there he should have done so; that he was not "justified in allowing " the weighting of the safety valve of the said boiler to " be continued at a pressure of 54 lbs.;" that the said boiler was not "in a safe and proper condition when the vessel arrived in the Tyne in May and June last;" that proper measures were not "taken to ensure its safety and efficiency;" and that it is not a safe and proper thing to place cup patches over the ends of defective stays, except as a temporary measure, and until the stays themselves can be renewed.

On the whole, notwithstanding the very high character for sobriety, attention, and intelligence that Mr. Ridley has received from the owner, Mr. Luckley, and from two other gentlemen, we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that the blame of this casualty rests with him. An attempt was made by Mr. Ingledew to throw the blame partly upon the chief engineer of the vessel, and partly upon Mr. Eltringham, or rather on Mr. Eltringham's men. No doubt the chief engineer, who has unfortunately lost his life by the occurrence, was to blame for not calling Mr. Ridley's attention more particularly to the state of the boiler; for it is clear, from the evidence of his son Henry Myers, the stoker, that he knew that it was "pretty weak in places," and that danger was to be apprehended in this particular plate. As regards Mr. Eltringham, however, we cannot see in what respect he has been to blame; he was asked to send some men to do repairs to the boiler, and he did so. Mr. Eltringham said "our practice is to obey orders, and we did so." The chief engineer had as good an opportunity of seeing the thickness of the plate as Mr. Eltringham's men, an I?? as he was satisfied with it we can hardly see why they should not be. But if Mr. Ridley is to wait for some intimation, either from the engineer of the vessel, or from the workmen employed on the vessel, before ordering any repairs to be done, and even before going to see whether any repairs are necessary, I am somewhat at a loss to understand what the use of the superintending engineer is. It was Mr. Ridley's duty to see that this boiler was in a safe and proper condition, and he neglected to do so, and the chief blame, therefore, for this casualty rests with him. There was no charge whatever against the master, and his certificate was therefore returned to him.

At the conclusion of the proceedings Mr. de Hamel asked for costs against Mr. Ridley, but on the application being opposed by Mr. Ingledew Mr. de Hamel stated that he should not press it; and accordingly no order was made as to the costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

BENJ. S. PICKARD, R.N.,

Assessors.

 

"

JOHS R. RAVENHILL,

 

(No. 446")

L 367. 114, 70.-8/79. Wt. 47. E. & S.