Wreck Report for 'Albert Edward', 1879

(No. 346.)

"ALBERT EDWARD," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 14th and 15th August 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain H. D. GRANT, C.B., R.N., and Captain CASTLE, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of life which occurred on lowering a boat from the steamship "ALBERT EDWARD," of London, whilst on the passage from Folkestone to Boulogne, on the 22nd of July 1879.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, found, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto,-

1. That the boats with which the "Albert Edward" was provided on the 22nd of July last were such as are required by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854; but that three smaller boats would have been better than the two large boats which she had on board; that the boats were supplied with all requisites for use, and that there is nothing to show that the starboard boat was not of sufficient strength.

2. That, except that the cover of the starboard boat was very old, and that there were from 5 to 6 inches of water in the boat, and that the plug-hole was stopped up with dirt (neither of which circumstances, however, so far as appears, contributed in any way to the casualty,) the boats of the "Albert Edward" were in readiness for immediate use; but that in the opinion of the Court it would be better that the boats should be carried outboard swung in davits, instead of, as they were, inboard and resting on chocks.

3. That as regards the lowering gear of the starboard lifeboat,-

(a.) The after davit, although it may have been of sufficient strength, was not of a proper construction, having too many leads upon it.

(b.) That the blocks and falls were of proper size and construction, and that the latter were in proper working order, except that, owing to the construction of the after davit, and the number of leads upon it, the after fall could not be paid out so readily as the fore fall, and was liable to become jammed.

(c.) That Edward Jones, the superintendent of the Company's vessels at Folkestone, and the managing owner of the vessel, and John Jenkins, the master of the "Albert Edward," are to blame for having allowed the defects in the after davit and the lowering gear attached thereto to remain so long in the state in which they were, seeing that they well knew of the existence of those defects, and that they could have been easily remedied.

4. That the lowering of the starboard lifeboat was not efficiently managed by those who worked it, the fore tackle having been allowed to run out after the after tackle had become jammed, thus letting the boat down by the bows.

5. That the bending of the davit was due to the force with which the sea struck the inside of the bows of the boat, and not to any defect or weakness in the davit.

6. That,-

(1.) The said Edward Jones and John Jenkins are to blame for having allowed the defects in the davits and lowering gear to remain so long without remedy.

(2.) The said John Jenkins is also to blame for not having taken proper measures to see that the starboard boat was free from water and ready for immediate use, when he left Folkestone on the said 22nd of July.

(3.) The said John Jenkins and Percival Kilbee, the chief mate, are to blame for not Laving taken measures to insure that, whenever the boats were lowered, a man should always be stationed at each fall.

The Court, not having been asked to deal with the certificates either of the master or of the mate, ordered them to be returned to them.

No application having been made for costs, no order was made in respect thereto.

Dated the 18th day of August 1879.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

HENRY D. GRANT,

 

 

 

Captain, R.N.

Assessors.

 

"

JOHN S. CASTLE,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard on the 14th and 15th days of August 1879, when Mr. Muir Mackenzie appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Willis, Q.C., and Mr. Worsley for the South-Eastern Railway Company, the owners, and for the master and officers of the "Albert Edward."

Seventeen witnesses having been produced and examined, Mr. Muir Mackenzie, on behalf of the Board of Trade, asked the opinion of the Court upon the following questions:-

" 1. Was the 'Albert Edward' on the 22nd of July " provided with boats as required by the Merchant " Shipping Act of 1854? and were such boats duly " supplied with all requisites for use? and was the star- " board boat of sufficient strength?

" 2. Were the boats on the 'Albert Edward' on the " 22nd July kept so as to be at all times ready for im- " mediate use? and was there any neglect or default in " that respect on the part of the owners, master, officers, " or crew, or any of them?

" 3. Was the lowering gear of the starboard lifeboat " defective in any of the following particulars:

" (a.) Were the davits of sufficient strength and proper " construction?

" (b.) Were the blocks and falls of proper size and " construction? and were the fore and after falls in " proper working order?

" (c.) Were the defects in the lowering gear, if any, due " to any neglect or default on the part of the owners, " manager, master, officers, and crew, or any of them?

" 4. Was the lowering gear efficiently worked by those " whose duty it was to work it?

" 5. Was the bending of the davit due to any neglect " or default on the part of the owners, master, officers, or " crew?

" 6. Are the owners, master, officers, crew, or any of them, to blame for the casualty?"

Mr. Willis, Q.C., having been heard for his parties, and Mr. Mackenzie for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment upon the questions which had been submitted for their consideration. The circumstances of the case are as follow.

The "Albert Edward" is a paddle wheel steamer of 364 tons gross and 221 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 220 horse-power. She was built at Poplar in the year 1862, and at the time of the casualty which forms the subject of the present inquiry was the property of the South-Eastern Railway Company, Captain Jones, of Folke, stone, the Superintendent of the Company, being the manager.

The vessel, which is one of the regular passenger boats running between Folkestone and Boulogne, left Folkestone at 1 p.m. on the 22nd of July last, having a crew of 21 hands all told and 186 passengers, there being at the time a strong swell from the westward from the gale of the previous day, with a cross sea from the N.N.W. When the vessel was about five miles from the land, the captain observed one of the passengers on the after side of the port paddle-box; and on his telling him that it was dangerous to be there, and desiring him to get down, he at once did so. Shortly afterwards he observed him ascend the fore part of the same paddle-box, then turn to the right, and saying "I must, I must," jump into the sea. It seems that the second mate, who was in the stern of the vessel, hearing that there was somebody in the water, immediately ran, took hold of one of the life buoys, which was hanging on the rail, and threw it, as he supposed, in the direction of the passenger, and he then jumped overboard. By this time, however, the vessel, which had been going at full speed, had left the man a long way astern, and any expectation that the second mate might have had of rendering him any assistance, must have been hopeless. In the meantime the captain had ordered the engines to be put full speed astern, which was instantly done, but it required some time, of course, before the way could be got off her, owing to the great speed at which she had been going. After a time, however, the vessel began to get stern-way, and the captain, perceiving that she was nearing the mate, then ordered the engines to be put on ahead to prevent running the mate down; and as soon as the stern-way had been taken off her, the engines were stopped.

In the meantime the captain had ordered the boats to be lowered, upon which the chief mate and the crew ran to the starboard lifeboat, which was the lighter of the two which she had on board, to clear it away; but on ripping off the canvas cover it was found that there were some 5 or 6 inches of water in her, owing to the plug-hole being blocked with dirt. The mate ordered one of the men to clear the plug-hole, but as time was a matter of very considerable importance, he then told him to put in the plug with the view of lowering the boat into the water. It appears that it takes about 12 or 13 men to lift these boats out of the chocks; accordingly a number of the crew ran down from the top of the saloon on to the main deck, and having got hold of the falls, they first lifted the after part and then the fore part of the boat out of the chocks. She was then swung out, and four of the men got into her, followed by the chief mate, who then gave the order to lower away. Hardly had the order been given, when it was observed that the bows of the boat were descending much more quickly than the stern. Whatever may have been the cause, whether it arose from the bending of the davit, or from the fore fall having been allowed to run out, or from the after fall having become jammed whilst the fore fall continued to be paid out, no sooner did the bows of the boat touch the water,-the boat being then at an angle of 45°, with her stern in the air,-than the sea and the wash from the paddles,-the vessel not having entirely lost her way,-rushed into the boat, breaking her in half, and washing away the fore part. All, with the exception of Weekes, one of the firemen, were, with the assistance of the rest of the crew and the passengers, got safely on board. Orders were then at once given to lower the port boat, and the mate and some hands having got into her, they pulled towards the second mate and took him in; but unfortunately Weekes and the passenger were drowned. After remaining in the neighbourhood for about a quarter of an hour, finding that there was no hope of doing any good, they proceeded on their voyage to Boulogne.

Now, before I proceed to deal with what appear to the Court to be the causes of this disaster, I would wish to say a few words in regard to the second mate. The Court is extremely unwilling to say anything which would seem to discourage men from risking their lives in endeavouring to save the lives of others, but when a man holds a position of responsibility such as this second mate did on board this vessel, it is his duty not needlessly and without any apparent object to risk his life, but to see how best to carry out the duties which are required of him. When the second mate jumped into the water the unfortunate passenger had already been left a long way behind, and any expectation that the second mate might have had that he would be able to get to him with the life buoy must have been very shadowy. So far then from his jumping into the water with the life buoy having been of any use, I think that in all human probability it contributed very materially to the disaster, and possibly also to the loss of the passenger's life. In the first place, it must have added very greatly to the excitement and confusion on board the vessel. In the next place, the first mate, whose duty it would be to see to the lowering of this boat, was obliged to take the second mate's place in the boat, and thus the lowering of the boat was not superintended in the way in which it should have been. Thirdly, the fact of the second mate being in the water compelled the captain to stop going astern as far as the passenger, who was even then struggling in the water, lest he should run over the second mate. Had the second mate waited until the steamer had backed sufficiently close to the passenger that there might have been a chance of reaching him with a life buoy, there would then have been some use, perhaps, in his jumping overboard; but to jump overboard as and when he did, was a simple risk of his life without any adequate object. The Court is extremely sorry to have to make these remarks upon a man who undoubtedly showed much courage in throwing himself into the sea when it was blowing hard; but men in authority should know that mere courage, without presence of mind, may often lead to very fatal results. A man often shows more courage by the patient and quiet discharge of those duties which properly belong to him than by a sudden impulse without method and without any adequate object.

I now proceed to deal with the questions on which the opinion of the Court has been asked; and first, as to the boats with which the vessel was provided. It seems that she had two boats, built apparently at the same time as the ship was, in the year 1862, but which had been lengthened by the stern in the year 1872, when the vessel had been sent to Belfast to have a saloon deck put on her. The port boat, we are told, was 28 feet long, 6 feet 10 inches broad, and 2 feet 10 1/2 inches deep, and her cubical capacity was about 550 feet; the starboard boat was 24 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 2 feet 4 1/2 inches deep, and her cubical contents were 342 feet. They were both of them life boats, being fitted with cork buoys under the thwarts. Now it will be seen, on reference to the 292nd section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and the Table S. annexed, that a vessel of the size of the "Albert Edward," that is, of the registered tonnage of 221 87/100 tons, is only required to carry two boats of the respective dimensions of 14 feet long, 5 feet wide, and 2 feet 2 inches deep, and 20 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 3 feet deep, which would give cubical capacities of 152 and 360 feet respectively, and that neither of the boats is obliged to be a life boat. So far, therefore, as the number and dimensions of the boats are concerned, the provisions of the Act have been fully complied with, which is the first question on which the opinion of the Court has been asked. At the same time it should be observed that both Captain Jones and Captain Jenkins tell us that, in their opinion, it would be much better if instead of these two heavy boats they had two lighter boats, one on each quarter, and a third still smaller boat further aft, which could be lowered at a moment's notice, and in that opinion the Assessors entirely concur.

Secondly, as to the position in which these boats were carried on board. It seems that when the saloon deck was constructed in 1872, arrangements were made for carrying the boats inboard, resting on chocks on the top of the saloon, it being thought that if they were allowed to hang from the davits, there would be some risk of their damaging the roof of the saloon. I think, however, that Captain Jones, the Company's superintendent, completely disposed of that objection, when he told us that this is the only vessel belonging to the Company (with the exception of two screw vessels) which carries her boats inboard, and that there would be no difficulty in carrying them outside, and that in his opinion they ought to be so carried. He added that he had already given instructions that the necessary alterations should be made, but had delayed carrying them out pending this Inquiry. We do trust that Captain Jones will at once carry out the proposed alterations, so that the boats may be hung outside, and may thus be lowered at a moment's notice, and that they will not be allowed to remain in a position whence it requires some considerable time to launch them. Such a state of things ought not to be allowed on board one of these passenger vessels.

The next question upon which our opinion has been asked is, whether the boats of the "Albert Edward" were supplied with all requisites for use, and were in such a state and condition as to be readily available in case of need. So far as the port boat is concerned, it appears to have been in perfectly good condition, and to have been readily available when required; it was lowered at once, and without difficulty, when .the starboard boat had become useless, and there seems to be nothing to complain of in this respect. But the same cannot be said of the starboard lifeboat. In the first place we are told by Captain Jenkins that the canvas, with which it was covered, was very old and had holes in it; and that when they came to strip it off, it was found that there was so much dirt inside that the plug hole was stopped up, and there were between 5 and 6 inches of water inside, although only some six or seven days before the cover had been taken off, and the boat thoroughly cleaned inside. No doubt these 5 or 6 inches of water did not render the boat less available for use, for the plug was immediately put in, and the boat was lowered with the water in it; nor can it be supposed that the weight of the water in it could have caused the boat to break. Still this ought not to have been, and although perhaps the principal share of the blame for allowing the boat to be in this state would attach to the carpenter, whose special duty it is to attend to the boats, yet we cannot altogether acquit Captain Jenkins of neglect for not seeing that the boats were in proper condition. Knowing, as he did, the condition of the canvas covering, and the liability there was that dirt might get into the boat, he ought to have seen that it was in a proper state before he left. Captain Jenkins told us that his practice was to examine his boats every month or every five or six weeks, and in proof that this had only recently been done, he handed in a certificate, signed by himself, and which is in these terms: "July 1st. This is to certify " that the boats, with their material, belonging to the " 'Albert Edward,' under my command, have been tried " and made perfect, and are ready for immediate service, " as also fire hose, life buoys, pump gear, &c. A sufficient " supply of blue lights and rockets are on board, and the " compasses in good condition." I fear, however, that such a certificate is hardly more than a mere matter of form, for I find that there were certificates signed by Captain Jenkins on the 1st of March, the 1st of April, and the 31st of May, which are in identically the same terms. Moreover, Captain Jenkins told us that, although he did sometimes look at the boats before signing the certificate, he did not always do so, but trusted to the word of the carpenter. Captain Jenkins, therefore, is in our opinion not wholly free from blame for the state in which this starboard boat was.

The next question upon which our opinion has been asked, is whether the starboard boat was of sufficient strength. On this point we have had the evidence of Mr. Steele, one of the surveyors to the Board of Trade, who had examined these boats recently, of Captain Jones, the Superintendent of the Company's vessels, of Captain Jenkins, and of the carpenter, that it was a good strong boat; and there is nothing to set against this evidence, except the fact that the starboard boat did undoubtedly break in half. Assuming, however, that the casualty occurred in the way in which it is admitted to have done, namely, by the bows being lowered down into the water, whilst the stern was hung up on the davit, that the vessel had still some headway upon her, and that the wash from the sea and paddle-wheel came into the bows of the boat, I am advised by the Assessors that the force which would thereby be brought to bear on the inside would be so great that no boat would be able to withstand it; and we have, therefore, no reason to suppose the boat in question was not of sufficient strength.

Before, however, I proceed to speak of the arrangements for lowering the boats, it may be well to say a few words in regard to the life-buoys which this vessel had on board. It seems that she had only three, one on each side of the paddle-box, and one in the after part of the vessel. Now, in our opinion, this was not sufficient; these life-buoys are not expensive articles, and it is a matter of very considerable importance that they should be readily available in the event of anyone falling overboard. Captain Jenkins thought that he ought to have half a dozen, which certainly does not appear to be a very excessive number to have on board, considering the number of passengers which these vessels carry, and the speed at which they go. It seems that before the second mate had time to get hold of a life-buoy, and to throw it overboard, the man was already far astern, so that it was practically of no use at all; whereas if there had been several life-buoys close at hand, one might have been thrown to him, and the life of this poor creature have been saved. In the opinion of the Assessors a dozen such life-buoys, placed in different parts of the vessel, so as to be readily available in case of need, would not be too many. They also think that, independent of these life-buoys, there should be a complete set of cork jackets or belts sufficient for a boat's crew, life-buoys not being convenient in a boat; and we understood from Mr. Mackenzie at the conclusion of the case, that the vessel was furnished with a set of these cork jackets, although no evidence was given of the fact.

I now come to what is undoubtedly the most important part of the case, namely, to what, in our opinion, led directly to this casualty; but for this purpose it will be nesessary that I should explain in some detail the nature of the arrangements on board this vessel for lowering the boats. I have already stated that the boats were carried inboard, resting on chocks; in order, therefore, to launch them, it was necessary that they should be raised out of the chocks, swung out, and then lowered into the water. The way in which this was done was by falls and davits. The fore davit was of the usual form, with a straight shaft or stem, and bending over at the top, so as to bring the end of it directly over the boat. There was the ordinary double block at the end, and just where the davit began to bend was an iron hook to guide or lead the fall, which was fastened round a cleat on the lower part of the davit. The after davit was of a peculiar construction, and will best be understood by reference to the drawing, which was brought in at the hearing, and which is annexed to this Report. The straight part of the shaft at the lower end was comparatively very short, and it the took a wide bend outwards, returning again so as to be brought directly over the after part of the boat. In order then to guide the rope or fall round these two bends, there were, besides the ordinary double block at the end of the davit, a wheel at the bottom of the first bend, then an iron ring a little lower down, then another iron ring at the top of the upright part of the shaft, then a single block at the bottom of the davit, whence a rope was carried for a length of about 20 feet along the top of the rail to near the foot of the fore davit, where it was fastened round an iron cleat fixed on the side of the saloon. Whilst therefore on the fore davit there was but one lead for the fall between the double block at the end and the iron cleat at its base to which the fall was fastened, there were on the after davit no less than four leads between the double block and the place where the fall was fastened, and of course therefore there was much greater difficulty in lowering the after fall, owing to the number of leads, than there was in lowering the fore fall, whose action was more direct. The iron cleats, too, to which the falls were belayed, were very near together, that of the fore fall being on the lower part of the fore davit, that of the after fall being very near it on the side of the saloon; and in order to get at the falls to unfasten them, it was necessary to stand on the after part of the sponson, where it was very narrow, and where one of the witnesses, Featherbee, told us only one man could stand at a time. To raise then the boat out of the chocks, the usual plan was for a man to take the turns off the after fall first, then some 12 or 13 of the hands would haul on the rope and raise the after part of the boat, and then they would belay the fall. The fore fall would then be cast off, passed forward, and hauled upon by the crew, and when the fore part of the boat had been hauled up to the block, the fall would be belayed round the cleat. The hands would then go from the main deck on to the top of the saloon to shove the boat out and man her, and when this was done the falls would be unfastened again, leaving one turn round the cleat, and with one man at each fall the boat could be lowered into the water. It should also be observed that, owing to the restricted space where the falls were belayed, so that only one man could stand there at the same time, the usual course would be, when the boat was about to be lowered, that the same person would cast off both the falls, leaving one turn round the cleat, and whilst he retained one of the falls himself he would hand the other to another of the crew behind him to lower. If the two men who were at the falls took care to lower equally the boat would descend into the water on an even keel; but if from any cause, no matter what, one of the falls was lowered more quickly than the other, one end of the boat would descend more rapidly than the other, and the boat would come upon an uneven keel. Now, it was the usual practice for one of the seamen, named Featherbee, to go to the after fall whenever the boat was lowered, and it is admitted that he was at the after fall on the occasion in question. It seems, however, that no one was specially assigned to the fore fall, although it was as necessary, and perhaps more so, that there should be a steady hand there, and although we have examined the whole of the crew we have not been able to discover who was at this fall. One after the other has denied that he was there, and Featherbee, although he admits that he was at the after fall paying it out, says that he does not know who was at the fore fall, although it seems tolerably certain that he must have unfastened both the falls when they were about to lower the boat, and must have handed the fore fall to some one or other of the crew who was standing there. This explanation seems to be necessary in order that we should clearly understand how the casualty occurred.

Now there are two ways in which it is suggested that the accident might have happened. It was said first that the weight of the boat, with the men and water in it, caused the fore davit to bend down so that it came on a level with the ship's rail, and thus let the bows of the boat go down into the water. The other suggestion is that the fore fall was allowed to run out or was paid out, whilst the after fall from some cause or other was held on, and that thus the bows of the boat went down. There is no question as to the davit having been bent down to the level of the rail, but the question is whether the bending was due to some flaw in the davit itself, or to the great strain brought to bear upon it when the water broke into the bows of the boat, and which the Assessors inform me would be quite sufficient to bend the davit down to the rail.

If we accept the evidence of Featherbee, who was at the after fall, and who would he standing with the fore davit immediately before him, there can be no doubt that the davit did bend before the bows of the boat reached the water; for he told us that he saw it bend down just before him, until it came on a level with the rail, and that it was by the bending of the davit and not by the paying out of the fore fall that the boat's bows came to the water. In this too he is supported by some of the other men, who told us that the davit began to bend before the boat reached the water, and before the wash from the paddle and the sea broke over the bows. Captain Jenkins also seems to have been under the impression that the davit bent before the bows of the boat touched the water; but as regards him it must be observed that from the position in which he was, on the bridge, he could not see the boat after it had been lowered below the roof of the saloon; and it must therefore be mere conjecture on his part whether the davit bent before or after the bows of the boat had touched the water. On the other hand, the evidence of Featherbee and the other men is open to very grave suspicion. I have already stated that Featherbee was at the after fall; it was he, no doubt, who unfastened both the falls when they were about to lower the boat; he probably handed the fore fall to some one of the seamen, whom he is unwilling to name; and that man, whoever he was, will not confess to having hold of the fore fall, thinking no doubt that he might be liable to some punishment or censure if it could be shown that the accident was due to any carelessness on his part in letting out the fall. I say therefore that the evidence of Featherbee and the other men as to the bending of the davit before the boat reached the water, must be looked on with great suspicion, as they would no doubt be desirous of showing that the casualty arose not from any carelessness in the letting out of the fore fall, but from some defect in the davit, for which they could not be in any way responsible.

And now what evidence is there on the other side? In the first place we have the fact that after the casualty this davit was carefully examined, and except that it was bent, there was no flaw or defect whatever in it; it has been straightened, and is now, we are told, being used on board the vessel as before. In the next place we have the evidence of Mr. Kempe, who was a passenger on board, and who, although he seems to have confused the forward and the after davits, spoke in a way and with a caution which certainly impressed the Court. He told us that he was standing on the paddle-box above the sponson, and he would, therefore, have the fore davit immediately before him; and he swore distinctly that the davit did not begin to bend until after the boat had touched the water, and until the sea had broke over the bows. But the case does not rest here. All the witnesses agree that, when the accident occurred, only some 2 to 4 feet of the after fall had been paid out, whereas a very considerable scope of the fore fall had gone out. The account which Featherbee gives is, that after he had paid out about 5 or 6 feet of the after fall, it stuck all of a sudden, and that he was putting his fall along the top of the rail, when he found the bows of the boat coming down before him. He attributes the lowering of the bows of the boat to the bending of the davit, but the same effect would have been produced, if when the after fall got jammed or stuck, the fore fall had continued to run out. Now that the fore fall did continue to run out after the after fall had ceased to do so, is, as Mr. Willis has contended, proved by the exclamation of the mate "to hold on to the fore tackle"; clearly, therefore, he saw that the fore tackle was being paid out whilst the after tackle had from some cause or other stopped. That Featherbee should, after he had paid out some 5 or 6 feet of the after fall, have suddenly, and without any cause, stopped lowering, appears to us to be incredible; it is much more reasonable to suppose, looking at the number of leads on the after davit, that after paying out some 5 or 6 feet, the rope suddenly stuck, as he says it did. Mr. Steele, the Board of Trade surveyor, did indeed say that he did not think it was possible for the after fall to kink or get jammed; he did not see how it could be; possibly Mr. Steele thought that some degree of blame might attach to him for having passed davits and falls which were so liable to get out of order. But certainly it appeared to us that Mr. Steele was trifling with the Court, when he said that a fall which passes through no less than four leads, and has a run from the lowest lead of something like 20 feet to the cleat on which it is belayed, would not be liable to kink or get jammed in one of those leads. On the other hand I am told by the Assessors that nothing would be more probable, and that when a rope has been coiled up and is being paid out, it requires great care to see that there is not a kink in it; for that, if not seen until it reaches one of the leads, it would be almost sure to jam. Mr. Steele's evidence too was the more remarkable, seeing that he told us that he had in one of his inspections called the attention of Mr. Earnshaw, the Superintending Engineer of the Company, to the awkward arrangement of the after lead; but unless he had thought that it was likely to get jammed, we can hardly understand why he called Mr. Earnshaw's attention to it.

It seems also to have been well known to Captain Jones, to Captain Jenkins, and to the crew of the "Albert Edward," and indeed to Mr. Steele himself, that there was always a difficulty in paying out the after fall; and that this difficulty rose not from the size of the rope, which was 3 1/4 inch in circumference, or from the size of the swallows, which were 1 3/8 inch in diameter, but from the number of leads upon the after davit. This would not only greatly increase the friction of the rope, but would undoubtedly make it more liable to become jammed. Now, what occurred, appears to be this: when the order was given to lower away, Featherbee at the after fall, and the man who had hold of the fore fall, began to pay out; after paying out some 5 or 6 feet the after fall jammed, or, as Featherbee says, stuck suddenly; the man at the fore fall from the position in which he was, behind Featherbee, and standing probably in the gangway under the upper deck, not observing, in the hurry and excitement that prevailed, that the after fall had stuck, continued to pay out, and thus the bows of the boat would go down, whilst the stern would remain suspended in the air. No sooner did the bows touch the water, than the sea would rush in, and as the steamer had still some headway on her, this in the opinion of the Assessors would be quite sufficient to break the boat in two. This seems to be a more reasonable explanation than that the fore davit bent, owing simply to the small additional weight of water in the boat; the more so, as we have no evidence whatever that there was any defect in the davit; and we were told that the same davit has been straightened, that no flaw or defect has been found in it, and that it is still in use on board the ship.

This being so, the question remains, with whom the blame of this casualty rests. No doubt Captain Jenkins is to blame for having allowed the starboard boat to remain with 5 or 6 inches of water in her, and the plughole stopped up with dirt; but so far as we can see, that did not in any way contribute to the casualty. But it was the defective construction of the after davit, and the arrangement of the after fall, of which both Captain Jones and Captain Jenkins had for a long time been fully aware, which mainly contributed to the accident, and for this, therefore, they are both to blame. We were told by Captain Jones that by a re-arrangement of the davits, the defects could easily be remedied, and yet they wait until an accident happens before they take any steps to remedy them. Captain Jenkins and the mate are also, in our opinion, to blame for not seeing that the duty of attending to the fore-fall was assigned, as the after-fall seems to have been, to some one seaman. We do not forget that the second mate had jumped into the water, so that the chief mate had to take his place in the boat, and could not, therefore give his undivided attention to the lowering of it. Had he been in a position to do so, it is possible that this accident would not have happened, for he would no doubt have seen that there was a man at each fall, and that they lowered the boat evenly. On the whole we were of opinion that although the officers were to blame, it was not a case in which we could deal with their certificates.

No application and therefore no order was made as to the costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C, ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

HENRY D. GRANT,

 

 

 

Captain, R.N,

Assessors.

 

"

JOHN S. CASTLE,

 

(No. 455.)

L 367. 118. 70.-8/79. Wt. 47. E. & S.