Wreck Report for 'Brest', 1879

(No. 397.)

"BREST," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the

Guildhall, Falmouth, on the 23rd and 24th of September 1879, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain WHITE, R.N., and Captain PARFITT, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "BREST," of Glasgow, near Beast Point, in the county of Cornwall, on the 6th of September 1879.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, found, for the reasons stated in the annex hereto,-

1. That the stranding and loss of the said vessel was due to her having been kept on too northerly a course having regard to the fact that when her head was laid down Channel she was already much further to the north than on previous voyages; and that no proper allowance was made for the set of the flood tide to the northward.

2. That there is no reason to suppose that her compasses were not in good order and condition, or that the master did not take proper measures to ascertain that they were accurate.

3. That a proper course was not steered after 5.40 a.m., and when her head was laid down Channel, the course steered being too northerly.

4. That proper courses were not set or steered after noon of the 6th, and that she ought to have been kept more to the southward, more especially after it had been ascertained by observation that she was even then nearly on the latitude of the Lizard; and that no proper allowance was made for the northerly set of the flood tide as they neared the Lizard.

5. That there is no excuse for the lead not having been used, if not before 8 p.m., at all events afterwards, and when they had got into so dense a fog that they could only see a few yards ahead.

6. That no measures at all were taken at 8 p.m. to ascertain the true position of the "Brest," either by taking a cast of the lead, or in any other way; but that there is no reason to suppose that a good look-out was not kept.

7. That the reason why the Lizard Lights were not seen between 7 and 8 p.m. was because when she got within range of those lights she was already to the northward of a line drawn in a W. 1/4 N. direction through the lights, and where they would be screened by the projecting promontory of Beast Point. And that the fog horn was not heard, owing to the mouth of the horn having been turned towards the wind, which was S.S.W., whereas the "Brest" was approaching from the eastward.

8. That after 8 p.m. the speed at which the vessel was going was not proper or consistent with the safety of herself and other vessels, seeing that the fog became so thick that they could not see many yards ahead, and that the master was ignorant of the position of his vessel.

9. That the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

10. That the first and second officers are not in any way to blame for the casualty, but that the whole blame thereof rests with the master.

11. That there was no evidence before the Court to show that the stranding was attended with loss of life.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court suspended the master's certificate of Captain Douglas Edwards Milne Elder, the master of the said vessel "Brest," for six months from the 24th of September 1879, but recommended that during the period of its suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate. The Court returned to Mr. Joseph Horn, the first officer, and to Mr. Thomas Fitzroy Hamlin, the second officer, their certificates, no charge having been proved against them.

No application and no order was made as to costs.

Dated the 8th day of October 1879.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

"

ED. WHITE, R.N.,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Falmouth on the 23rd and 24th of September 1879, when Mr. Jenkins appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Gray Hill for the captain, officers, and owners of the vessel "Brest." Fifteen witnesses having. been produced by the Board of Trade and examined Mr. Jenkins asked the opinion of the Court upon the following questions :-

"1. What was the cause of the stranding of the 'Brest' " at Polberro Coye on or about the 6th day of September " 1879, and was such stranding caused by or attributable to " the wrongful acts or defaults of Mr. Elder, the captain, or " of Mr. Horn or Mr. Hamlin, the first and second officers " of the vessel, or of either of them, and if so, of whom?

"2. Whether when the 'Brest' left Havre proper " measures were taken to ascertain the accuracy of the " compasses, and were they then in good order and con- " dition, and did they continue in good order and condition. " from that time until the said stranding?

"3. Whether a proper course was steered on leaving. " Havre? and whether proper measures were taken to " ascertain and verify the position of the 'Brest,' when the " master judged her to be abreast of Barfleur? and whether. " proper courses were set and steered at and after 5.40 a.m. " of the 6th of September to noon of that day?

"4. Whether all proper measures were taken to ascertain " and verify the position of the 'Brest' at noon and " whether proper courses were set and steered from noon " to 8 p.m.? and was due and proper allowance made by " the master for tide and currents?

"5. Whether the deep-sea lead was used at 7 p.m., or at " any time between 7 p.m. and the time when the 'Brest' " stranded? and if not, was the master thereby in default?

"6. Were proper measures taken at 8 p.m. to ascertain " and verify the position of the 'Brest?' and was a. " proper alteration in the course made at 8 p.m.? and " whether then and thereafter a proper look-out was kept " for the Lizard Lights; and whether the fog signal was " listened for?

"7. How did it happen that the Lizard Lights were not " seen, or that the fog horn was not heard?

"8. Whether, having regard to the provisions of Article " 16 of the International Steering, and Sailing Rules, the " 'Brest' was going at a moderate speed? and if that Regu- " lation was not complied with, who is the person respon- " sible for such non-compliance, and is such person thereby " in default?

"9. Whether before 8 p.m. of the 6th of September, and " at 8 p.m. and thereafter until the stranding, the weather " was thick with fog? and if so, whether the master was " in any circumstances justified, at and during those " periods, in keeping his vessel at full speed or at 10 knots? " and further was he justified in not using the lead at and " during those periods?

"10. Whether the 'Brest' was navigated with proper " and seamanlike care during the whole of the period from " the time she left Havre until the stranding? and if not " by whom was she improperly navigated?

"11. Whether the master and the first and second " officers are, or is either of them, in default; and if so, " who?

"12. Was the said stranding attended with loss of life?"

Mr. Jenkins further stated that in the opinion of the Board of Trade "the certificates of the master and of the first and second officers should be dealt with."

Mr. Gray Hill having then recalled the master, and having produced Captain Inglis, the superintendent of the Cunard Company, was heard on behalf of the master, and Mr. Jenkins having replied, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Brest" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Glasgow, of 1,472 tons gross and 949 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 160 horse-power combined. She was built at Port Glasgow in the year 1874, and at the time of her loss was the property of the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited. She left Havre at midnight of the 5th September last bound to Liverpool, having a crew of 34 hands all told, 132 passengers, and about 500 tons of cargo on board. She had six boats, of which two were lifeboats, four compasses, and, as might be expected from a company like the Cunard Company, seems to have been in all respects in a good and efficient condition. It was about the top of high water when the vessel left Havre, it being their invariable practice to leave at this time of tide; the wind was light from the south, and the weather slightly hazy. After clearing the harbour the engines were put on at full speed, the vessel making from 9 to 10 knots an hour through the water, and she was laid on a N.W. course to clear Cape Barfleur. Owing to the hazy state of the weather she was kept on that course until 5.40 a.m., which was for a longer time than she would otherwise have been; and when it was considered that she was well clear of the French. Coast the course was altered to N.W. by W. 1/2 W., and that course was continued till noon, when an observation was taken, which put her in latitude 49° 56' north. The master, thinking that she was somewhat to the northward of where she ought to be, then altered the course to W.N.W., and that course was continued till 4.50 p.m., when it was altered to N.W. by W. 3/4 W., a quarter of a point more to the north, in order as the weather was hazy to get sight of something; but nothing being seen the course was at 7 p.m. altered to W. by N. 3/4 N. At 8 p.m. it began to get so hazy that the master deemed it expedient to put a second man on the topgallant forecastle; at 8.10, the fog continuing to increase in density, the ship was hauled off to W. by N.; and at 8.15 they began to blow the steam whistle. At 8.25 it was so foggy that they could only see a few yards ahead, the vessel was, however, still kept going at full speed. At this time, and almost immediately after the whistle had been sounded for the third time, one of the look-out men observed something white ahead, but before he could turn round to report it the vessel struck. The captain, thinking that it was a collision with some other vessel, immediately ran forward, but on looking over the bows could see nothing; he, therefore, called for a blue light, and on lighting it saw for the first time the rocks under the vessel's bows, but even then he could not see the land, although it was close to them. Soon afterwards, finding that the vessel was making water, he ordered the boats to be got out, and there seems to have been no time lost in lowering them, three of them having been got into the water within 10 minutes of the order being given. Some little confusion occurred amongst the passengers, but not more than might naturally be expected, seeing that the passengers were all foreigners, chiefly, if not entirely, of the lower class, whilst the master and crew were English. Some few of the passengers in their anxiety to get into the boats fell into the water, but most, if not all of them were picked up, and a boat from the neighbouring coastguard station having come up, as well as other shore boats, all the passengers and crew were landed, but the vessel became a total wreck. The place where the vessel went ashore was in a small bay called Polberro Cove, some three-quarters of a mile to the north of Beast Point, on the coast of Cornwall, and between it and Cadgwith Coastguard Station, and about 2 or 3 miles from the Lizard; and the question for us to consider is how the vessel came to get so far to the northward of the Lizard when her proper course lay well to the southward of it.

And, first, we are asked to say whether her compasses were in good order and condition, and what measures were taken to ascertain their accuracy. It seems that the vessel had four compasses, the standard compass on the quarter deck, another on the bridge amidships, and two in the wheel-house aft. We are told that they had been adjusted so recently as in May last, that the standard and bridge compasses nearly agreed, there being a difference of only one to half a degree between them; and that when the vessel was on a westerly course both had from 5° to 6°, or about half a point of westerly deviation. It seems also that since the compasses had been adjusted the vessel had made two complete voyages between Liverpool and Havre, the first in May last, and the other under the command of Captain Elder, and immediately before the last on which she was lost. Captain Elder also told us that he had been in command of the "Brest" for about a month, and that during that time he had taken every opportunity of testing her compasses by azimuth observation; that on the last occasion of entering and leaving Havre he had compared his compasses, and that he had always found them quite correct with the exception of the trifling deviation of which he was aware, and for which he made due allowance in laying his course. There is therefore nothing to show that the casualty was due to any error in her compasses, and we must look elsewhere for the cause of this disaster.

According to Captain Elder he had on the previous voyage passed within 5 miles of the Lizard, the weather being then quite clear; but on this occasion, owing to the hazy state of the atmosphere, he said that he intended to keep rather further off, and that accordingly in laying his course down Channel he had steered a little more to the southward. He stated that he expected to pass about 10 miles south of the Lizard; and he professed to be quite unable to understand how it was that he had got so far to the northward. To show that on the last voyage a more southerly course had been steered down Channel than on the previous occasion the ship's log-book was brought in, and on this being examined it was found to contain a record not only of the two last voyages, but likewise of the voyage between Liverpool and Havre in May last; and it may therefore be well to see whether a comparison of the courses steered on these three voyages may not give us some clue to how it was that the vessel came to get so far to the northward of her proper course.

I have already stated that accordiug to the master the vessel was kept after leaving Havre on a N.W. course from midnight till about 5.40 a.m. According to the log-book the same course appears to have been continued for some time longer, until between 6 and 7 a.m., the alteration of the vessel's course being made opposite the 7th hour. But be this as it may, the captain admits that he continued her on a N.W. course longer than he would otherwise have done, being anxious on account of the hazy state of the atmosphere to give the French Coast a wide berth. That this, too, is so appears from the courses steered on the two previous voyages. According to the log-book the vessel on the two first voyages was kept after leaving Havre on a N.W. course, for between 4 and 5 hours, whereas on the last voyage she was kept on that course for nearly 6, if not 7 hours. I may add that as the vessel always left Havre at the top of high water she would have the ebb tide with her on each occasion. We find, too, from an entry in the log-book that on the first voyage Cape Barfleur was passed at the distance of only 4 miles. At what distance Cape Barfleur was passed on the second voyage the log-book does not say, but as the weather was clear, and the vessel was kept on a N.W. course for about the same time as on the first voyage, it is probable that they passed it at about the same distance. But on the last voyage Captain Elder told us that when he altered the vessel's course and laid her head down Channel Cape Barfleur was at the distance of 20 miles from them; and on being requested by his advocate, Mr. Gray Hill, to state how far he passed from Cape Barfleur, he said after carefully examining his own chart, on which he had laid down his supposed course, and measuring off the distance, that he must have been 11 miles off when he passed it. It is clear then both from the length of time on which he continued on a N.W. course, and from the greater distance at which he passed Cape Barfleur, that when on the last voyage the course was altered, and her head was laid down Channel, the vessel must have been much further to the north than on either of the two previous occasions; it would seem in fact that her point of departure for the course down Channel must have been some 7 to 10 miles more to the north.

Seeing, however, the hazy state of the atmosphere there could have been no objection to thus giving the French Coast a wide berth, provided that the master had, in laying his course down Channel, made due allowance for the more northerly position of his point of departure; and this he tells us he did, by steering a more southerly course on the last voyage than he had done on the preceding one. A careful comparison, however, of the courses steered on both occasions hardly supports the master's statement; for I find that on the previous voyage, after steering for some four hours or so on a N.W. course, she was kept for about four hours on a N.W. by W. 1/4 W. course, after that N.W. by W. 1/2 W. for one hour only, and then for 13 hours on a N.W. by W. 3/4 W. course; in other words the course steered after laying her head down Channel was for the greater part of the time N.W. by W. 3/4 W., although her point of departure was on that occasion much further to the south.' On the other hand, on the last voyage, after steering as we have seen for about six on hours a N.W. course, she is laid for about six hours more on a N.W. by W. 1/2 W., or a quarter of a point more to the north than the course generally pursued on the previous voyage; it is true that after noon she was laid on a W.N.W. course, or a quarter of a point more to the south, but at 4.50 the course was altered to N.W. by W. 3/4 W. I think, therefore, that on a comparison of the courses steered on the two voyages, it can hardly be said that the course steered on the first voyage was more northerly than on the last voyage; and it must be remembered that on the latter occasion her point of departure was some 7 to 10 miles further north; so that it is hardly to be wondered at, if when she neared the Lizard she was considerably further north than she had been on the previous occasion. I do not forget that from 7 to 8 p.m. the course steered was W. by N. 3/4 N., and afterwards W. by N., but she was then, as we shall presently see, well inside the Lizard and to the northward thereof.

But the case does not rest here. The master told us that at noon lie got an observation, which placed the vessel in latitude 49° 56' north; but as Mr. Jenkins has very properly pointed out, the Lizard is in latitude 49° 57' 40" north, and as the Instructions tell us that there are dangers for nearly half a mile outside the lights, a true west course from noon, even assuming that there was no northerly set of the tide, would hardly take him clear of the headland; and yet what does he do? he lays his vessel on a W.N.W. course by the standard compass; but a W.N.W. course by the standard compass, allowing 2 points for variation, and half a point for westerly deviation, would be equivalent to W. 1/2 S. true, so that he would be allowing only about half a point to clear the Lizard. Not, however, content with this, at 4.50 p.m. he alters the course a quarter of a point to the north; and this too with the flood tide setting him all the time strongly to the northward. We can, therefore, have no difficulty in seeing how it was that the vessel got so far to the northward of the course on which she was on the previous voyage.

It was said, however, by the master that, although this might possibly explain the deviation of the vessel from her course to the northward it would not account for her having overrun her distance. It seems that when the vessel struck the distance appearing from the log to have been run was about 193 miles, but the distance from Havre to the place where she grounded is on the chart 210 miles, and even allowing for the set of the tide down Channel the master said that he could not account for the difference.' On examining, however, the log-book I find that on the first voyage the distance shown by the log to have been run from Havre until they were abreast of the Lizard was 193 1/4 miles, and on the second voyage, when the ship was under Captain Elder's command, the distance run by the log was 193 miles. I care not whether the difference between the distances as shown by the log and the distance on the chart is due to the tide or to the log having uniformly under-estimated the distance, it is clear from the experience of the two previous voyages that when the log showed 193 miles to have been run the vessel would have about covered the distance between Havre and the Lizard.

It appears to us then that the cause of the casualty is quite clear. Owing to the hazy state of the atmosphere, the master on leaving Havre kept his vessel longer than he would otherwise have done on a N.W. course to give the French Coast a wide berth, this would place him, when he came to lay his course down Channel, much more to the north than he had been on the previous voyage, probably some 7 to 10 miles further north; he then steers a course down Channel not very unlike that which he had pursued on the former voyage; and seeing that on that occasion he passed some 5 miles to the south of the Lizard he might reasonably have expected on the last occasion to find himself to the north of the Lizard. Moreover, he had the experience of the two previous voyages that when the log showed about 193 miles to have been run the whole distance to the Lizard would have been covered. These facts are, in our opinion, quite sufficient to explain how it was that the vessel ran aground where she did. In answer then to the question whether the courses steered were proper ones we can have no doubt that they were not. In our opinion the master was not justified in steering the course he did down Channel, and more especially after noon when he had ascertained by observation the vesssel's position, and in not making due allowance for the set of the flood tide to the northward.

The next question on which our opinion has been asked is, whether the master was justified in continuing at full speed until she struck? and to this there can be but one answer. We are told that at 8 o'clock it began to get so hazy that it was found necessary to put a second man on the look-out; at 8.10 it became much thicker; at 8.15 they began to use the steam whistle; and at 8.25, when they struck, it was so thick that they could not see many yards ahead; and yet during all this time the vessel continued to go full speed ahead, making about 10 knots an hour. It is obvious that, quite apart from the Sailing and Steering Regulations, a speed of 10 knots under such circumstances would be inconsistent with the safety both of the vessel herself and those on board, as well as of other vessels. It was, therefore, an unjustifiable rate of speed.

We are next asked, whether the master was justified in not taking a cast of the lead? for it is admitted that he did not do so. Up to 8 o'clock we are told that an object could be seen at a distance of from 2 to 3 miles; and of course the powerful electrical light at the Lizard would then be seen at a much greater distance. Now before 8 o'clock the "Brest," if on her right course, would probably have come within the range of the lights, and not seeing them it is a question whether he ought 'not then to have stopped the ship and taken a cast of the lead. But whether this be so or not, it is quite clear that after 8 o'clock, when the fog had become so thick that it was not possible to see many yards ahead, and when the master was entirely ignorant of the position of his vessel, it was his bounden duty to have done so. There is nothing which is more incumbent upon a seaman, in thick weather, and when he is ignorant of the position of his vessel, than to take a cast of the lead. At page 1 of the Channel Pilot, we find the following instructions: "It should ever be borne in mind, when approach- " ing the Channel, that even under the most favourable " circumstances, the frequent use of the lead is desirable'; " but when from the state of the weather, and the con- " sequent absence of celestial observations a ship's position " is dependent on dead reckoning, the lead becomes of " primary importance, and its constant use indispensable " to safe navigation." It is quite true that those remarks refer to vessels approaching the Channel, but they apply equally to any vessel which is in the Channel, and which is ignorant of her true position. They apply, too, more especially to a case of this kind, for we are told at page 60 of the same work "In thick weather come no nearer the " Lizard than the depth of 47 fathoms, which water will be " found only 6 or 7 miles distant from it." Now had the master taken a cast of the lead at any time between 7 and the time when she went ashore he would have found that she was in less than 40 fathoms, and a second east would have shown him that he was rapidly shoaling his water. It would, therefore, have been his duty at once to have laid the ship's head off the land until he got into deeper water. There is, therefore, in our opinion no justification for the master not having taken a cast of the lead, if not before 8 o'clock, at all events after it, and when it became so thick that they were not able to see many yards ahead.

But then it is asked, how was it that the Lizard Lights were not seen nor the fog horn heard? And first as to the lights. According to the master the weather was not very hazy until about 8 o'clock; and his evidence was confirmed by the coast guardsman from Cadgwith, who told us that the reflection of the light from the Lizard was distinctly seen by them between seven and eight. The lighthouse-keepers also told us that between 7.15 and 7.40 p.m. it was tolerably clear. Under these circumstances it seems strange that the lights should not have been seen by those on board the "Brest." It appears, however, that Beast Point, which is a promontory lying to the eastward of the Lizard, stands considerably higher than the lighthouses, so that a vessel approaching it from a point to the northward of a line drawn in an E. 1/4 S. direction from the light would not see it. Now the course of the vessel by the standard compass was from 7 to 8 p.m. W. by N. 3/4 N., and from eight till she struck W. by N.; and allowing half a point westerly deviation, that would be equivalent to W. by N. 1/4 N. from 7 to 8 p.m., and W. 1/2 N. from 8 to 8.25. Laying these courses down from the place where she struck, it will be found, as the master admitted, that the Lizard Lights would be nearly, if not quite, shut out by the projecting promontory of Beast Point from soon after 7 p.m., which would account for their not having been seen by those on board the "Brest." And as to the fog horn, it seems that the practice at the lighthouse is to direct the mouth of the fog horn to windward, and as the wind was at the time from about S.S.W., and the vessel was approaching from the eastward, the horn would be turned away from them. Now we were told by the men from the coastguard station at Cadgwith, which is between 2 and 3 miles from the Lizard, that when the horn is turned from them they cannot hear it. I think, therefore, that this will account for its not having been heard from the "Brest."

We are also asked to say whether the casualty was attended with loss of life. I have already stated that some confusion occurred amongst the passengers, as might naturally be expected, all the passengers being foreigners, whilst the master and crew were English. It seems that in their anxiety to get into the boats some few fell into the water, three or four were picked up, and there is nothing to show that any were drowned. It is true that about a fortnight afterwards the body of a man was picked up from under the vessel, but it was so disfigured that it could not be identified as one of the passengers. Since then also we are told that the body of a child has been found in the cove, but whether or not it is that of one of the passengers there is nothing to show. We have, therefore, no direct evidence that the casualty was attended with any loss of life; nor for the purposes of the present inquiry does it seem to be a matter of much consequence, for even assuming that any lives had been lost, it is not pretended that it arose from any default or misconduct on the part of the master or any of the officers; it could not therefore in any way affect the decision to which we must come.

Lastly, our opinion is asked whether the master and the first and second officers are, or whether either, and which of them, is to blame for this casualty? and whether in our opinion the certificates of all or of either of them should be dealt with? So far as the first and second officers are concerned we can see nothing for which they can be held to blame; the master was on deck and in command of the vessel at the time, and they merely carried out his orders; if blame attaches anywhere, it is to the master, who directed the course and speed of the vessel up to the time she grounded. It was very strongly contended by Mr. Gray Hill that the master had been guilty of a mere error of judgment, but that is not the opinion either of the assessors or of myself; on the contrary, we think that the loss of this valuable ship and her cargo was due to gross negligence and to great recklessness on his part. He had no right when he had gone so far to the north to avoid the French Coast, to have kept so northerly a course as he did in steaming down Channel. He had no right, when his log showed him that he had nearly run his distance to the Lizard, and yet did not see the lights, to have continued his course at full speed without taking a cast of the lead or adopting any other seeps to ascertain the position of the vessel. And he had no right when the fog had become so dense that they could not see more than a few yards ahead to continue going ahead full speed to the manifest danger not only of his own vessel and all on board but of other vessels. It is not very difficult to see the motives by which the master seems to have been actuated. He had been in the service of the Cunard Company for about 8 years, first as third mate, afterwards as second and then as first mate, and had been for about a month promoted to the command of the "Brest." No doubt he was very anxious to make a quick passage; and that this was so may perhaps not unreasonably be inferred from something which fell from the first engineer in the course of his examination; he said that soon after noon he had had a conversation with the captain as to when they would arrive at Liverpool, and that the latter had stated that, if everything went on as it was they would be able to save his tide at Liverpool. No doubt then the master was trying to save his tide, and with that view he laid his course nearer to the Lizard than it was either safe or proper to do, trusting that he would see the light in sufficient time to avoid running ashore. But a master has no right thus to risk the safety of a valuable ship and cargo, and the lives of some 160 persons, with the object of merely saving a tide. It was his duty, not knowing his position, and not seeing the Lizard Lights, to have stopped his ship and taken a cast of the lead, which would have at once shown him that he was out of his course, and was running on the rocks. We could see no justification whatever for the master's conduct, and we therefore suspend his certificate for six months. At the same time he seems from the evidence of Captain Inglis, the superintendent of the company, to have been a careful and attentive officer, whilst serving in a subordinate capacity as a mate on board the company's vessels, and we accordingly consented at his request to recommend that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should have a first mate's certificate given to him.

No charge having been established against either the first or second officers their certificates were returned to them.

No application was made by either party for costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

"

ED. WHITE, R.N.,

 

(No. 429.)

L 367. 168. 100.-10/79. Wt. 47. E. & S.