Wreck Report for 'Heimdall', 1880

(No. 482.)

"HEIMDALL," (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 12th and 13th January 1880, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by J. R. RAVENHILL, Esquire, C.E., Captain HARRIS and Captain RONALDSON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the British steamship "HEIMDALL," of London, and the loss of the lives of two of her crew, on the 2nd November last, whilst on a voyage from Nicolaieff to Bremerhaven.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,-

1. That the falling over and subsequent abandonment of the vessel was due to the shifting of the cargo.

2. That the cargo was not properly secured from shifting, and that therefore in that respect there has been a violation of the 22nd section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1876; and that the blame thereof, if any, rests with the master.

3. That no blame attaches to the master for not having had the cargo trimmed and secured, either at Gibraltar or at Dover, notwithstanding the lists which she had previously shown; for that those lists were slight, and had been readily adjusted by shifting the coals in the bunkers.

4. That although the shifting of the coals from bunker to bunker after leaving Gibraltar, and the counterbalancing loading at Dover may not, as it proved, have been a sufficient precaution, the master, at the time, would have no reason to think that it would not be.

5. That the pumps were sufficient, and were properly fitted for all requirements.

6. That the vessel was navigated with proper seamanlike care and skill.

7. That the blame, if any, is attributable to the master, but that it is not in our opinion of such a nature as would justify us in dealing with his certificate.

Dated this 13th day of January 1880.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

HY. HARRIS,

 

 

"

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

"

JOHN R. RAVENHILL,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 12th and 13th of January 1880, when Mr. McConnell and Mr. Muir Mackenzie appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Clarkson and Mr. Aspinail for the owners, master, and officers of the vessel "Heimdall." Eight witnesses having been produced and examined, counsel for the Board of Trade asked for the opinion of the Court on the following questions:-

" 1. What was the cause of the falling over and subse- " quent abandonment of this vessel?

" 2. Whether the cargo was properly secured from " shifting (1) generally, and (2) as required by section 22 " of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, and if not, is blame " attributable, in the opinion of the Court, to any person, " and, if any, to whom, as responsible in the matter?

" 3. Whether it was the duty of the master at Gibraltar " and Dover to have the cargo properly trimmed and " secured, the ship having previously shown a list?

" 4. Whether the shifting of the coal from bunker to " bunker after leaving Gibraltar, or the counterbalancing " loading at Dover, was a sufficient precaution?

" 5. Whether the pumps were sufficient and properly " fitted for all requirements?

" 6. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper " seamanlike care and skill?

" 7. Whether the master, officers, or any other person " are, or either of them, is in default?"

He also stated that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with."

One witness having then been produced on behalf of the owners and examined, th Court, after hearing counsel, proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Heimdall" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of London, of 1,519 tons gross and 976 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 175 horse-power combined. She was built at Gothenburg in the year 1875, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Charles Howard, of No. 17, Philpot Lane, in the city of London, who was also her managing owner, a Mr. Richard Berridge being the mortgagee of 64 shares thereof. We are told that she was classed in the Liverpool Lloyd's, and that she had a Board of Trade certificate entitling her to carry passengers. She left this country with a cargo of coals bound to the River Bug, in the south of Russia, and having there discharged her cargo proceeded to take in a cargo of barley.

It seems that the vessel had two decks with fore and aft holds in each, the depth of the lower hold being from 14 to 15 feet, that of the 'tween decks 6 feet 10 inches. As the cargo was to consist wholly of grain in bulk, both the lower holds and the 'tween decks were fitted with shifting boards, running fore and aft, constructed of planks each 16 to 18 feet long, 1 foot wide, and 2 1/2 inches thick, which had been taken out from Liverpool for the purpose. In the lower holds the shifting boards were three deep, but in the 'tween decks they were four deep, but without as would seem any beam fillings. From plans of the stowage given in by the master, and from the evidence of the witnesses, the shifting boards appear to have been well secured, the planks overlapping, and being firmly fastened to the iron stanchions by lashings, and shored from the ship's sides. The vessel having been thus prepared, about 2,000 tons of barley in bulk were put into her, the water ballast tanks in the bottom of the ship being also filled with grain, as well as a portion being put into the lazarette aft. We are told that the loading was done by women, that the lower hatchways were left open, and that the grain was well pressed down and thrown up into the wings of the ship. Having completely loaded the vessel to above the coamings of the hatches to see how much she would carry, a portion was taken out and put into barges to enable her to cross the bar of the river, and after she had done so the portion which had been taken out was re-shipped, the grain being pressed down and tightly packed as before, and coining up we are told to the top of the coamings of the hatchways. When thus loaded she is said to have drawn 19 feet 3 inches, the load line being about 3 inches above the water line.

On the 5th of October last she sailed bound to Gibraltar for orders, and meeting with bad weather in going through the Cervian Channel she got a slight list to port; this was, however, adjusted before she reached Malta by shifting some of the coals from the port of the starboard bunker. Between Malta and Gibraltar, however, she got a slight list to starboard, which was similarly adjusted by shifting coals from the starboard to the port bunker. On the 18th of October she reached Gibraltar, and some slight repairs having been done to her engines, and about 100 tons of coal taken on board, she left on the 21st of the same month with orders to proceed to Bremerhaven. In crossing the Bay of Biscay the vessel again got a list of 12 to 18 inches to starboard, which was remedied by shifting about 10 tons of coal from the starboard to the port bunker. She arrived at Dover on the 31st October, and there took in 20 tons of coal, and as she had then a slight list to starboard, 6 tons only were put into the starboard bunker and 14 into the port bunker, and the same day the ship left for Bremerhaven in charge of a North Sea pilot. On the following day the wind and sea began to increase, the wind being from N. to N.E. and the vessel heading N.E. by E. 1/2 E. At 6 a.m. of Sunday the 2nd of November, observing that there was a list of about a foot to starboard, the vessel's course was altered to N.E. 1/2 E. At noon there was still only a slight list to starboard, but as the weather looked threatening the ventilators were closed. At 2 p.m. there was a list of from 12 to 15 inches to starboard and the vessel was taking a good deal of water on deck. About 3 p.m. the captain went down to the engine-room to see if they could get more speed on her, and found the second and third engineers at work on the feed pump. At 4 p.m. the vessel had a list of about 18 inches to starboard. Shortly afterwards the third engineer came up and stated that there was some water in the stoke hole, and that owing to the listing over of the ship they could only get a rolling suck of it, and he asked the captain to help him to get it out. Upon which the captain ordered the helm to be put to starboard, so as to bring the sea on the starboard bow, but the vessel continued to list over more and more to starboard, and a heavy sea striking her at this time threw her into the trough of the sea, and she gradually listed over until she was nearly on her broadside with her starboard gunwale under water. The vessel being then unmanageable, a consultation was held, and it was decided to put out an anchor to endeavour to bring her head to wind and sea. The anchor having been let go she brought up in about 19 fathoms of water, but she still continued to lie over on her broadside and it was then determined to cut away her foremast. This having been done, but without producing any effect, it was then resolved to abandon her as she was evidently fast settling down. The two lifeboats which were on the quarter were then got out, and the mate and 13 hands got into one, and the master and 14 hands into the other. The mate's boat left the ship at about 9 p.m. and was picked up at about 3 on the following morning by the schooner "Dean of Wick," and her crew were landed in safety at Cuxhaven. The master's boat left about an hour afterwards, and was not picked up until 12.30 p.m. of the following day, before which time, however, two of the hands had died from exposure and want, the remainder were landed at Hamburg. The "Heimdall" was never seen again, and probably sank soon after they had left her.

These then being the facts of the case, the first question upon which the opinion of the Court has been asked is, "What was the cause of the falling over and subsequent abandonment of this vessel?" Now it has been contended by the learned counsel for the master and owners that the list and subsequent falling over of the vessel on her starboard side was due not to the shifting of her cargo, but to the quantity of water which got into her; but this is hardly in accordance with the opinion of the captain and the first officer; according to them the falling over was due "to stress of weather, and to the shifting of the cargo." But how stands the evidence on this point? All the witnesses agree in saying that she began to list over seriously from about 4 p.m., and that by 5 o'clock she was almost gunwale under. Now the chief engineer is the best witness as to the amount of water in the ship, for he was in the engine-room. He tells us that a little before 5 o'clock the chief officer came down to him, and asked him what water they had in the ship, and that he told him that there was no more than usual. "He then asked me," says the chief engineer, "to go into the tunnel and sound the " water in the after hold. I did so, and found about " 2 inches, and no water in the tunnel;" and he adds " I noticed that the water began to gather about 5 o'clock." After this evidence, which I may observe is entirely in accordance with that given by the other witness, it is impossible to say that the falling over of the vessel could be due to the amount of water that was in her, seeing that she had no more than the usual quantity in the engine-room, and only 2 inches in the after hold. We must therefore look elsewhere for the cause of the listing.

And now let us see what evidence there is to confirm the opinion expressed by the master and officers that it was the shifting of the cargo which caused the vessel to list over, and which ultimately led to her loss. We are told that before the day on which she was abandoned the vessel had on four several occasions during the voyage had a list; at first to port when between the Bosphorus and Malta, then to starboard when between Malta and Gibraltar, again to starboard between Gibraltar and Dover, and a fourth time after leaving Dover. We are also told that until the afternoon of the 2nd of November the list was on each occasion remedied, by shifting a few tons of coal from one bunker to the other. It is obvious then that she was in a very crank condition, as might perhaps not unnaturally be expected in a vessel with a cargo of some 2,000 tons of grain on board, or more than double the amount of her registered tonnage. At noon of the 2nd it seems that she had only a slight list to starboard, but from that time she began to pitch very heavily, the wind and sea being about 2 points on her port bow; and I am told by the Assessors that nothing is more likely to make a grain cargo settle than heavy pitching and lurching. In the present case, too, the wind and sea being on her port bow, any settlement of the cargo, which might take place would be towards the starboard side; and when between 4 and 5 an attempt was made to bring the wind and sea on to the starboard bow, she was already listed so far over to starboard, that it had no effect in righting her; and the sea then breaking over the starboard side tended to force that side still further down. All these facts seem to point to the cargo haying shifted to starboard, which prevented her righting when the sea was brought on the starboard bow. We have therefore no doubt that the opinion expressed by the master and officers of the vessel, that the falling over was due to the shifting of the cargo, is correct, and not that it was due, as has been argued by the learned counsel, to the water getting into the vessel.

This brings me to the second question, namely, "Whether " the cargo was properly secured from shifting, (1) gene- " rally, and (2) as required by section 22 of the Merchant " Shipping Act, 1876, and, if not, is blame attributable, " in the opinion of the Court, to any person, and if any, " to whom, as responsible in the matter?" We are told that the depth of the lower hold was from 14 to 15 feet, and that the shifting boards there consisted of three planks of 1 foot each deep; there was thus a depth of 3 feet of shifting boards in a hold some 14 to 15 feet deep. The shifting boards commenced from just below the deck beams, but it seems that there were no beam fittings. Mr. Aspinall contended that beam fittings were not necessary in an iron ship such as this was, as the beams are only 6 inches deep; but in that opinion we cannot concur, for assuming that 3 feet of shifting boards in a depth of 14 to 15 feet would be sufficient to prevent the cargo from shifting, but which we are not prepared to admit, there would yet be a space of 6 inches above the shifting boards and between them and the deck, through which the grain would travel freely from one side to the other. As regards indeed the 'tween decks, we are told that there was a depth of 4 feet of shifting boards in a height of 6 feet 10 inches, which may have been sufficient.

The principal defect, however, in the stowing of the cargo arose from the manner in which the lower hold was fed, as the grain settled down, as it must inevitably do it seems that the lower hatches were left off in order that, as the grain settled in the lower hold, it might be fed through the hatches by that in the 'tween decks. But let us consider for one moment what the result would be. Assume that the vessel got a slight list, say to starboard, from having the wind and sea on her port side, then the grain on the starboard side of the shifting boards would fall towards the ship's side, and that on the port side of the shifting boards would fall away from the ship's side and towards the centre of the ship. On the starboard side of the shifting boards therefore there would be an empty space, which would be immediately filled up through the open hatchways by the grain in the 'tween decks. On the other hand, on the port side of the shifting boards the grain would be full up, and there would be no grain running down from the 'tween decks to fill up the blank space on the port side of the hold. The effect then of feeding the lower hold from the 'tween decks through the hatchways, if the vessel got a slight list to the one side or the other would be merely to fill up the empty space on that side on which the list was, but to leave the empty space on the other side still empty; in other words, it would tend rather to increase than to diminish the list by causing the grain to run into and fill the side towards which the vessel was listing. What ought to have been done should have been to have fed the lower hold in the wings by taking up some few planks on each side of the lower deck; any empty space then which might be created on either side would be at once filled up by the grain from the 'tween decks, and thus the lower holds would have been kept full. It is to this, and to the want of beam fittings above the shifting boards in the lower holds, that we believe that the shifting of the cargo in this case is due, which ultimately led to the loss of the vessel. And the conclusion, therefore, to which we must come is that the arrangements on board this vessel were not well adapted to prevent the cargo from shifting, and that there has been a violation of the 22nd section of the Act of 1876.

We are then asked to say whether anyone, and if so, who, is to blame in the matter. Now, undoubtedly, if anyone is to blame it must be the captain; at the same time we are not to expect any extraordinary amount of knowledge and discernment from a person in his position. It seems that this was the first grain cargo in bulk that he had ever carried, and if he showed a reasonable amount of care and attention to the stowing of this cargo we can hardly punish him, even if the means which he adopted should afterwards prove to be insufficient. The conclusion then to which we have come is that this master did, so far as his lights enabled him, give his best attention to the stowing of this cargo; and if the means which he took for the purpose proved not to be sufficient it was owing rather to want of knowledge than to want of care.

The third question on which our opinion is asked is, " Whether it was the duty of the master at Gibraltar and " Dover to have the cargo properly trimmed and secured, " the ship having previously shown a list?" it seems that there were six ventilators just piercing the upper deck, two forward on the forecastle, two just abaft the engine-room, and two just before the break of the poop. They were placed some 3 to 5 feet from the sides of the ship, and by looking down through them the cargo in the 'tween decks could be seen. Now the captain and his chief officer have told us that they frequently examined the condition of the cargo through these ventilators, until it became necessary to close them at noon of the day on which the vessel foundered, and that on no occasion did they ever find the grain to have sunk in any one of them more than 2 1/2 to 3 inches. That this evidence is true we have no doubt, for we are very strongly of opinion that there was no considerable shifting or displacement of the cargo until the afternoon of the 2nd of November, and after the ventilators had been closed down by reason of the state of the weather. And indeed even if there had been any settlement in the lower holds at an earlier period it could hardly have been seen at the ventilators, for the feeding of the lower holds from the 'tween decks would be effected, not at the sides, but at the centre by the hatchways. There being then no apparent settlement of the cargo in the holds, even up to the time of their leaving Dover, we think that the master was not called upon to open the hatches for the purpose of re-adjusting the cargo, either at Gibraltar or at Dover. From what he could see by looking through the ventilators, he would have no reason to suppose that any settlement had taken place in the cargo. Moreover, between the Bosphorus and Gibraltar and between Gibraltar and Dover he had easily righted the ship by shifting a small quantity of coals from one bunker to the other, and he might not unreasonably expect, after having passed through the Bay of Biscay, that he might finish the short remaining portion of his voyage to Bremerhaven in safety. We cannot, therefore, blame him for not re-adjusting his cargo either at Gibraltar or at Dover, there was nothing to show him that it was either necessary or expedient.

The fourth question on which our opinion is asked is, " Whether the shifting of the coal from bunker to bunker " after leaving Gibraltar, or the counterbalancing loading " at Dover, was a sufficient precaution?" As the event has shown, it was perhaps not a sufficient precaution; but what we have to consider is, might the master reasonably expect that it would be, and in our opinion he might.

The fifth question upon which our opinion is asked is, "Whether the pumps were sufficient and properly fitted for all requirements?" After the evidence that was given by Mr. Bushby, the Board of Trade Surveyor at Liverpool, who surveyed the ship previously to her departure, and who made the declaration by which she obtained a passenger certificate, we can have no doubt on the point. He told us that he examined them carefully, and that in his opinion they were quite sufficient. We cannot, therefore, after this evidence impute any blame either to the master or to the owners for not having had pumps of a larger or different description. We are also clearly of opinion that, had it not been for the list which the vessel had to starboard, and which prevented the water getting to the roses, the pumps would have been sufficient to keep the vessel clear until she got on her beam ends.

Sixthly, we are asked, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper seamanlike care and skill." On this point I think that there can be but one opinion. We entirely concur with the learned counsel for the Board of Trade in thinking that the master showed great skill and courage in the way in which he managed his vessel, more especially in launching his boats and getting them clear of the wreck, when there was a very heavy sea running, and the vessel was on her beam ends. The two deaths, which unfortunately occurred, arose from no neglect on the part of the master, but simply from exposure during the night in the open boat. We think that the vessel was navigated with all proper care and skill under the circumstances.

Lastly, we are asked, "Whether the master, officers, or any other person are, or either of them, is in default?" and we are told that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with." The application, however, is not pressed by the counsel for the Board of Trade, and we think rightly so, for whatever blame may attach to the master for not having strictly complied with the terms of the Act of Parliament his fault is not of such a nature as would justify us in dealing with his certificate.

No application for and no order was made in regard to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

HY. HARRIS,

 

 

"

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

"

J. R. RAVENHILL,

 

L 367. 252. 100.-2/80. Wt. 47. E. & S.