Portcities Southampton
UK * Bristol * Hartlepool * Liverpool * London * Southampton
*
You are here: PortCities Southampton > [14416] 'Crighton', 1880
* Text only * About this site * Site Map * Feedback
*
*
*
Explore this site
Start Here
About Us
Partners And Collections
Timeline
Get Interactive!
Help
Galleries
Image galleries
Biographies
Southampton
The Docks
River Itchen
Southampton at war
Flying Boats
Titanic
Finding Out More
Southampton speaks
Street Directories
Historic Buildings Survey
Registers and Records
Lloyd's Register
Official Sources
Other Records
Finding Out More
Wrecks and Accidents
Why accidents happen
Investigations
Improving Safety at Sea
Finding Out More
Wreck Reports
Life of a Port
How a port comes to life
At work in a port
Ports at play
Trade - lifeblood of a port
Finding Out More
On the Line
Company growth and development
Shipping lines
Transatlantic travel
Preparing a liner
Finding Out More
Sea People
Life at sea
Jobs at sea
Travelling by sea
Starting a new life by sea
Women and the sea
Finding Out More
Diversity of Ships
The variety of ships
What drives the ship?
Ships of ancient times
Ships in the age of sail
Ships of the steam age
Ships of today

Wreck Report for 'Crighton', 1880

PDF file

This resource is available to view as a PDF document.

Click here to view 'Wreck Report for 'Crighton', 1880'.

You will need a PDF viewer to view this document. Tell me more...

Unique ID:14416
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Crighton', 1880
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1880
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 706.)

"CRIGHTON." (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal investigation held at Westminster, on the 18th August 1880, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain FORSTER and Captain COMYN, as Assessors. into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British Steamship "CRIGHTON," of London, on Demban Shoal, in the Baltic, on the 29th June last, whilst on a voyage from North Shields to Stockholm.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,

1. That the course steered from 4 p.m. of the 28th of June to 1 p.m. of the 29th was not an improper course, provided that it was not continued too long.

2. That the course steered after 1 p.m. of the 29th of June was not a proper course, inasmuch as it landed him on the Demban shoal.

3. That the bearings of the Hufvudskär Beacon at 1 p.m. of the 29th of June was not what the master states them to have been.

4. That the master was not justified in steering the course he did after sighting the islands, but should have kept her further away to the eastward,

5. That the stranding of the vessel was due to the master having kept her on a course too far to the westward and too near the coast.

6. That the Demban Shoal is properly marked on the Admiralty charts.

7. That all proper measures were taken after the vessel stranded, and that it would not have been proper to have attempted to get her off.

8. That the speed at which the vessel was navigated did not conduce to the accident.

9. That the lead would have been of no use to determine the vessel's position.

10. That the stranding and loss of the "Crighton" was due to the wrongful act and default of the master.

Under the circumstances the Court does not order the master's certificate to be dealt with, but warns him to be more careful in future.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 18th day of August 1880.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors

 

 

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 18th August instant, when Mr. Howard Smith appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Bucknill for the owners of the "Crighton," and Mr. Nelson for the master of that vessel. Five witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Howard Smith stated that the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court upon the following questions:-

" 1. Was the 'Crighton' kept on a proper course from " 4 p.m. of the 28th of June 1880, till 1 p.m. on the 29th " of June 1880?

" 2. Was the 'Crighton' kept on a proper course from " 1 p.m. on the 29th of June 1880 to the time she stranded?

" 3. Were the bearings of the Hufvudskär Beacon " properly taken?

" 4. Was the master justified in keeping on a N.E. " course after he had sighted the islands?

" 5. What was the cause of the stranding of the " vessel?

" 6. Is the Demban Shoal properly marked upon the " chart?

" 7. After the vessel struck, were proper (if any) " measures taken to get her off?

" 8. Was the vessel navigated at too high a rate of " speed?

" 9. Was the master justified in neglecting to use the " lead?

" 10. Having regard to the above questions, was the " stranding and loss of the 'Crighton' caused by any " wrongful act or default of her master?"

Mr. Howard Smith further stated that "the Board of " Trade is of opinion that the master's certificate should " be dealt with."

Mr. Nelson having addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Howard Smith having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Crighton." was an iron screw steamship of 1,254 tons gross, and 807 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 20 horse power. She was built at Sunderland in the year 1872, and was the property of the Steam Navigation Company (Nord) Limited, of No. 19, Billiter Street, in the City of London. She left the Tyne on the 24th of June last, with a crew of 21 hands all told, and a cargo of 1,430 tons of coal, bound to Stockholm. At noon of the 28th Oland South Head bore north, distant eight miles, and at 4 p.m. she was laid on a N. by E. 1/2 E. course by the steering compass, the vessel at the time being in 56° 30' north and 16° 55' east. That course was continued until 1 p.m. of the 29th, when Hufvudskär Beacon was sighted, bearing we are told N.W. by N., distant it was thought nine miles, upon which the course was altered to N.N.E. by the steering compass. At five minutes after 2 the course was again altered 1/4 of a point to the eastward, and at 2.15 she struck. On sounding round her they found 2 1/2 fathoms of water amidships, 3 fathoms forward, and 7 fathoms aft. Finding that the engine room and main hold were filling fast, the master ordered the boats to be got out, and despatched the second mate and a boat's crew to obtain assistance. During the mate's absence three shore boats came off, but they could give no assistance, and at 9.30 a.m. on the following morning the vessel broke in half amidships. Shortly afterwards a steam tug arrived, followed by two others, and with their assistance some of the effects were saved, but the vessel became a total wreck, together with the whole of the cargo. It is said that there was some doubt as to the place where the vessel had grounded, but we think that it has been clearly proved that she struck on Demban Shoal, one of the numerous shoals which guard the entrance into Stockholm, and the question is how she got there.

And first I may observe that there is no charge made in this case against the owners; the vessel appears to have been a good vessel, and to have been well and sufficiently equipped, and she had a master and two mates, all of them holding certificates of competency as masters.

Now the first question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the 'Crighton' kept on a proper course " from 4 p.m. of the 28th of June till 1 p.m. of the " 29th of June 1880?" According to the log book the course steered during this time was N. by E. 1/2 E.; this, however, was the course by the steering compass, and as on that course the steering compass had, we are told, a deviation of 11 degrees, or about one point, that would give her a N.N.B. 1/2 E. course magnetic. No doubt this course might have been safely steered, provided that the master took care to keep the vessel further away to the eastward as they neared the land, for otherwise it would seem from the Admiralty chart that it would take him ashore to the westward of Hufvudskär Beacon.

The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the 'Crighton' kept on a proper course " from 1 p.m. on the 29th of June to the time when she " stranded?" According to the log book the course steered was N.N.E. 1/4 E. by the steering compass, and there was a deviation of 19 degrees or 1 3/4 points on that course, which would give a N.E. course magnetic. The man who was at the wheel from 1 to 2 told us that the course steered during that time was N.N.E. by the steering compass, and not N.N.E. 1/4 E., and he was confirmed by the man who relieved him, and who told us that that was the course he got, and that it was then altered by the captain's orders 1/4 of a point to the eastward. But whether it be a 1/4 of a point more or less to the northward, the question is, whether the course steered was a proper one. If indeed the steering compass had on that course a deviation of 19??, which would make the course about N.E. course, and if Hufvudskär Beacon bore, as the master told us, N.W. by N. magnetic, distant 9 miles, that course would no doubt have taken her clear to the eastward of the Demban Shoal, But as the vessel ultimately got upon the Demban Shoal, it is clear either that that course was not steered, or that the steering compass had not the deviation which it is said to have had, or that the bearing of the Hufvudskär Beacon was not correctly taken; or, as the master pretends, that there must have been a current setting him away to the westward.

The third question then, on which our opinion is asked is, "Were the bearings of the Hufvudskär Beacon " properly taken." According to the master the Hufvudskär Beacon at 1 p.m. bore N.W. by N. magnetic, distant 9 miles; he was very particular in telling us that that was its magnetic bearing. The mate also told us that the beacon at that time bore N.W. by N., distant 9 miles, but without saying whether it was the magnetie bearing, or the bearing by the steering compass. When however the second mate came to be examined, it appeared that he had been in charge of the deck from 12 to 1, and that it was he who had taken the bearing of the Beacon, and according to him N.W. by N. was not its magnetic bearing, but its bearing by the steering compass. That this must have been so is confirmed by the entry in the log book, which gives the bearing of the Hufvudskär Beacon as N.W. by N., and it is admitted that the entries in the log book were not magnetic, but by the steering compass. Now a N.W. by N. bearing by the steering compass would put the vessel much further to the west, and therefore nearer to the shoals than if that bearing had been magnetic, and therefore make it necessary that she should be kept further away to the eastward to clear the outlying shoals.

The fourth question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the master justified in keeping on a " N.E. course after he had sighted the islands?" No doubt if the vessel had been where the master says that he thought she was, Hufvudskär Beacon bearing N.W. by N. magnetic, distant 9 miles, a N.E. course would have been a proper course. It seems, however, that the master had already made four voyages to Stockholm as master of this vessel, and that on all those occasions he had made the entrance to Stockholm by taking his departure from Gottska Sands; but on this occasion, for some reason which is not very intelligible, he says that he determined to make Hufvudskär Beacon. If, as he says, he was induced to do this by the hazy state of the weather, one would have been disposed to think that this would rather have been a reason for taking the Gottska Sands route, with which he was already familiar, and keeping clear of these dangerous shoals and waters with which he was not acquainted. We are however disposed to think that the state of the atmosphere was not the cause of his having taken the course he did, for he tells us that he could see the Hufvudskär Beacon at a distance of 9 miles, so that the weather could not have been very thick. But however this may be, it is clear that when the master sighted, as he admits he did, the islands to the westward, and knew or ought to have known that there were a number of sunken shoals and rocks lying outside them, he ought to have given them a wide berth, more particularly as the place was new to him.

The fifth question upon which our opinion is asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The master told us that the stranding of the vessel was in his opinion due to a current which was setting the vessel at the rate of two knots an hour in a W.N.W direction. In this, however, he is not confirmed by any of the crew, who told us that the current was setting ahead of the vessel, and therefore to the No. & Ed. In our opinion there is no evidence that there was any such current as the master states. We think that the cause of the stranding was the mistake of the master in keeping the vessel on a course too far to the westward, whether owing to the deviation of the compass not being so much as he says it was, it is impossible to say and to his continuing that course after sighting the land, and when he was approaching dangerous waters with which he was not at all acquainted.

The next question is, "Is the Demban Shoal properly " marked upon the chart?" The answer that we must give to this question is that on both the Admiralty charts which are before us the Demban Shoal is clearly marked, and that on one of them it is actually named.

The next question is, "After the vessel struck, were " proper (if any) measures taken to get her off?" We think that the master exercised a very wise discretion in not attempting to get the vessel off after she had struck. It is clear that from the fact of the main hold and engine room filling so fast that her bottom was pierced, and had she come off she would inevitably have sunk in deep water. In our opinion no advantage would have resulted from an attempt to get her off.

The next question is, "Was she navigated at two high " a rate of speed?" Of course if the master was ignorant of his position, and if, as he says, the weather was foggy, he had no right to be going at full speed through waters with which he was not acquainted, and with land in sight, outside of which his chart would have shewn him that there were numerous submerged shoals. We do not, however, think that the casualty was due so much to the speed at which the vessel was going, as to the mistake in the course which he was steering.

The ninth question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the master justified in neglecting to " use the lead?" In our opinion the lead would have been of no use to him. The charts shew that there was deep water inside as well as outside the shoal on which she struck, so that the lead would not have shewn him his true position.

The tenth question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Having regard to the above questions, was " the stranding and loss of the 'Crighton' caused by " any wrongful act or default of her master?" in our opinion it was caused by the wrongful act or default of the master in keeping his vessel too far to the westward, and too near the coast, when it was his duty to have given these dangerous shoals a wider berth.

Lastly, we are told that in the opinion of the Board of Trade the master's certificate should be dealt with. Now, although the master has in our opinion been guilty of a wrongful act or default, for which we should be justified in dealing with his certificate, the fault of which we have found him guilty is one rather of too much self reliance, and not one of negligence or incompetency. He shewed himself during his examination more skilful than we find masters usually are in dealing with charts and in laying down his course upon them; and under all the circumstances of the case we shall not suspend his certificate, but shall warn him to be more careful in future.

There will be no order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors

 

 

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

 

L 367. 476. 200.-8/80. Wt. 47. E. & S.

*
Search

Advanced Search
*
*
*
Southampton City Council New Opportunities Fund Lloyd's Register London Metropolitan Archives National Maritime Museum World Ship Society  
Legal & Copyright * Partner sites: Bristol * Hartlepool * Liverpool * London * Southampton * Text only * About this site * Feedback