Wreck Report for 'Broomhaugh', 1880

(No. 732.)

"BROOMHAUGH." (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal investigation held at the Moot Hall, Newcastle-on-Tyne, on the 21st September 1880, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain FORSTER and Captain CASTLE as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "BROOMHAUGH," of Newcastle, near Ushant, on the 1st of September 1880.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed,-

1. That the stranding of the "Broomhaugh" off Ushant on the 1st of September instant was due to the neglect of the master to ascertain her true position, and to her having been kept on a course too far to the eastward after she was found to be in 56 fathoms of water.

2. That such stranding was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of William Ferguson Adams, the master, and of Thomas Cullis, the 2nd officer; viz.:-

(1.) As regards the master, in neglecting, after the warnings that he had received that she had got to the eastward of her course, to take the necessary steps to ascertain her true position, and in keeping her on a course too far to the eastward.

(2.) As regards the 2nd officer, in neglecting to call the master when he saw a thick bank of fog ahead, and in not reducing the speed of the vessel before entering it.

The Court orders the certificate of William Ferguson Adams, the master, to be suspended for six months, but recommends that during the period of the suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate. The Court does not deal with the certificate of Thomas Cullis, the 2nd officer, but warns him to be more careful in future.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 21st day of September 1880.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN S. CASTLE,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 21st of September instant, when Mr. de Hamel appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Daggett for the owners of the "Broomhaugh," and Mr. Botterell and Mr. Maples for the master and second officer respectively. Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. de Hamel asked the opinion of the Court upon the following questions:-

" 1. What was the cause of the stranding of the " steamship 'Broomhaugh' off Ushant on the 1st of " September instant?

" 2. Whether such stranding was caused by the " wrongful acts and defaults of William Ferguson " Adams, the master, and Thomas Cullis, the 2nd " officer:

" (1.) As regards the master, in neglecting, after " the warning afforded by the soundings " taken at about 2 a.m. on the said 1st of " September that he was inside of his course, " to take any steps, beyond altering his " course 2 1/4 points more northerly, to secure " the safe navigation of his vessel, or ascer- " tain whether she was clear of all danger by " verifying her position before going below:

" (2.) As regards the 2nd officer, in neglecting to call " the master as soon as the weather began to " come on thick, after passing the schooner " at about 4.15 a.m. of the said 1st of Sept- " ember; and in neglecting to at once reduce " the speed of the vessel and put her head " more to the northward or westward im- " mediately on running into dense fog " between five and ten minutes after passing " such schooner; and in neglecting to at once " call the master, in compliance with the " general rules of the ship."

Mr. de Hamel also stated that, "if the Court find " that either William Ferguson Adams, the master, or " Thomas Cullis, the 2nd officer, are in default in the " opinion of the Board of Trade, their or either of " their certificates should be dealt with."

Mr. Botterell and Mr. Maples having been heard on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. de Hamel in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Broomhaugh" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the port of Newcastle, of 1,352 tons gross and 865 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 98 horse power. She was built at North Shields in the year 1872, and at the time of her loss was the property of a great number of persons, of whom Mr. John Elliott, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, was the managing owner. She left Taganrog on the 9th, and Berdianski on the 11th August last, bound to London, and having a crew of 21 hands all told, and a cargo of 1,250 tons of wool and grain. After calling in at Gibraltar she proceeded on her voyage, and at 7.20 p.m. of the 29th of the same month Cape Finisterre bore E.S.E., distant from 4 to 6 miles. She was then put upon a N.N.E. course till 10 p.m., when, it being supposed that she had passed Cape Villano, the course was altered to N.E. 1/2 E. to clear Ushant. At 5 p.m. of the following day a thumping was heard under the stern, and it was then found that one of the blades of the propeller had gone; upon which she was put at three-quarters speed, or, according to the chief engineer, the revolutions were reduced from 58-60 to 54-56. At about 10 p.m. of the same day the mate told the master that he thought the vessel was working against her starboard helm, and was getting to the eastward of her course; and although the master seems not to have been of the same opinion, he, in order to be on the safe side, altered the course a quarter of a point to the northward, or to N.E. 1/4 E. That course was continued until 2 a.m. of the 1st of September, when the master, not seeing the Isles de Sein or Saints Island, ordered a cast of the lead to be taken, which gave them 56 fathoms. Finding therefrom that the vessel had got further to the eastward of her course than she should be, and believing that he was still some 27 miles to the south of Ushant, he altered the course to N.N.E., thinking that that would take him 10 miles clear of Ushant. At 3 a.m. the master went below, leaving the deck in charge of the chief officer, but with orders that he was to be called at 5 o'clock, or earlier if any change occurred. At this time we are told the sea was quite smooth and the weather clear overhead, but with a haze on the horizon. At 4 a.m. the 2nd officer took charge, and in about a quarter of an hour afterwards he observed a schooner becalmed a little on her port bow, and beyond her what appeared to be a thick bank of haze. After passing the schooner the mate was thinking of going down to call the master, it being the general orders on board that he was to be called in the event of a fog coming on; but before doing so he looked round, and observing something black on the port bow he took up his glasses, and on looking at it saw that it was a rock, upon which he at once ordered the engines to be stopped and reversed full speed, and then ran down to call the captain. The master immediately jumped up, and was followed by the chief mate, but before they reached the deck the vessel struck; indeed, so short was the interval between the 2nd officer seeing the rock and the vessel striking that the chief engineer told us that he had only time to stop the engines, but that he was not able to reverse them, before she struck. On finding that the vessel was filling fist the boats were at once got out, and the crew left her, but so thick was the fog that, although they were close to the shore, they could not see it, and were guided to a landing place by the voice of some person on shore. It was afterwards found that the vessel had struck on the outside of the promontory which forms the south side of the Bay of Lampaul, Creach Light bearing about three points on the port bow, and distant about 1 4/4 miles. It seems that portions of the stores and cargo were subsequently saved; the vessel herself, however, with the greater part of the cargo, was totally lost, but fortunately without any loss of life.

Such, briefly, are the facts of the case, and the first question on which our opinion has been asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding of the steamship " 'Broomhaugh' off Ushant on the 1st of September " instant?" and the answer is that the master, having assumed the position of the vessel to be much further to the westward than she really was, put her on a course which landed her on the island of Ushant.

The second question is, "Whether such stranding " was caused by the wrongful acts and defaults of " William Ferguson Adams, the master, and Thomas " Cnllis, the 2nd officer:-

"(1.) As regards the master, in neglecting, after the " warning afforded by the soundings taken at about " 2 a.m. on the said 1st of September that he was " inside of his course, to take any steps beyond altering " his course 2 1/4 points more northerly to secure the " safe navigation of his vessel, or ascertain whether he " was clear of all danger by verifying her position " before going below:

" (2.) As regards the 2nd officer, in neglecting to call " the master as soon as the weather began to come on " thick after passing the schooner at about 4.15 a.m. " of the said 1st of September, and in neglecting to at " once reduce the speed of the vessel and put her head " more to the northward or westward immediately on " running into a dense fog between 5 and 10 minutes " after passing such schooner, and in neglecting to at " once call the master, in compliance with the general " rules of the ship?"

And, first, as regards the master. He told us that when, at 2 a.m. of the 1st, he took soundings and obtained 56 fathoms, he supposed the vessel to be some 27 miles to the south of Ushant, and at a place where he found 56 fathoms marked on his chart. He told us that his vessel at full speed made only 6 3/4 miles, and at 3/4 speed only 6 1/4 miles; but in this he was not confirmed by his officers, who stated that she would make 7 to 7 1/2 knots at full speed, which would have put her further on her course, and therefore much nearer to Ushant, when the soundings were taken. We are also quite at a loss to understand why the master should have been so confident that the vessel was where he supposed her to be, seeing that there are several other places on his chart further to the eastward where the same depth of 56 fathoms is shown. The master further told us that in the then state of the weather he relied on their being able to see Creach Light at a distance of 8 miles, and long before they could have reached the land; but as a matter of fact it was not seen before they grounded at a distance of only 1 3/4 miles from the light; and I am told by the assessors that in a haze it is not possible to say at what distance objects can be seen, and that the master had no right to assume that Creach Light would become visible in the then state of the atmosphere at a distance of 8 miles. What, however, we blame the master for is that, knowing from the soundings which he had obtained that he had been set to the eastward, he took no steps to ascertain his true position. He had been warned by the chief officer that the vessel was, in his opinion, being set to the eastward; he told us that he had observed in crossing the bay that the currents were stronger than usual, and might therefore put him out of his course; he knew, when he obtained 56 fathoms, that he had got to the eastward of his position, and his instructions told him that in thick and hazy weather he ought not to be in less than 70 fathoms; and yet, notwithstanding all these warnings, he assumes his position to be much to the westward of what it really was, at the same time under-estimating the distance run, and he contents himself with merely altering his course 2 1/4 points to the northward, without taking any steps to verify his assumed position, which he might easily have done by taking a second cast of the lead. It was said by his counsel that, even if he had taken a second cast of the lead, it would not have shown his correct position, for that it would probably have given him the same depth of 56 fathoms; but that would have been sufficient to show him that he was out of his course; and it was his duty to have continued taking soundings until he had ascertained his true position. Instead, however, of doing so, he goes below and turns in, when the vessel is admittedly to the eastward of her true course, and therefore in a position of danger. The excuse that is made for him, that he had been on deck all night, cannot in the opinion of the assessors be admitted, for he had had plenty of opportunity the day before, when the sea was perfectly smooth and the weather fine, to have taken rest, so as to have prepared himself for the time when he was approaching Ushant, and when his presence was urgently needed on deck.

As regards the 2nd officer, it is admitted that he knew the standing orders on board the vessel, that the master was to be called if they were approaching a fleet of vessels, or if they were entering a fog, or if the weather altered considerably. It seems also that he saw that they were approaching a fog bank before they reached the schooner, and on being asked why he did not then call the master, he said that he did not like to leave the deck until he had passed her; but that seems to be no reason why he should not have told the off-hand, who was knocking about on deck, to go and fell the master that they were nearing a fog bank. So far, then, he is in our opinion to blame. What he should have done was to have called the master at once when he saw that they were approaching a fog bank and to have eased the speed of the vessel; but instead of that he continues his course until he has got into the fog, and does not stop her until he actually sees the rocks on his port bow, and when they are so close that it is too late to avoid them. The charge against him, that he did not put the vessel's "head more to the " northward or westward immediately on running into " the fog," is in our opinion not established; for to have put her head more to the northward or westward would only have been to bring her sooner on the rocks and the only chance of saving her would perhaps have been to have put her head off to the eastward. The 2nd officer in our opinion acted quite rightly in not altering the vessel's head, seeing rocks on his port bow, and not knowing what there was on his starboard bow; he trusted, as he said, if he could have stopped her before she struck, to back her out on the course on which she had gone in. We cannot therefore blame him for not altering the vessel's helm.

Lastly, it is said that if the Court should find that either the master or the 2nd officer is in default, his certificate ought, in the opinion of the Board of Trade, to be dealt with. An attempt was made by the master's counsel to show that the chief blame for the casualty rested with the 2nd officer, for that, had he called the master, as he ought to have done, as soon as the fog became thicker, the casualty would probably not have occurred. But the assessors are of opinion that the chief blame rests with the master; he had had several warnings that the vessel was being set to the eastward of her course, he had not seen the Saints Islands, and he knew when he got 56 fathoms that he was then in a position of danger, and yet, instead of verifying his position, he merely altered his course 2 1/4 points to the northward, and then went below and turned in. He told us that he had been by Ushant a great number of times, no less than 10 times in the last 9 months; that he knew the navigation well, and was thoroughly confident of his position. Here, then, are a vessel and cargo, worth, we are told, about 43,000l., which have been lost through the over confidence of this master, and from his not thinking it worth while to take the trouble to verify his position. There is no charge against him but that of over confidence and a neglect to take the proper precautions to ascertain his true position when he knew that he was out of his course. Seeing, however, the very great number of vessels which are annually lost from the same cause in these waters, the assessors think that he ought not to go unpunished, but that his certificate should be suspended for six months. At the same time they think that, during the period of the suspension of his master's certificate, he should be allowed a chief mate's certificate.

As regards the 2nd officer, the assessors are of opinion that he showed a want of promptness in not calling the master when he saw that they were approaching the fog bank. Seeing, however, that he had been on deck only a short time; that it was hazy when he took charge from the chief officer, and that he received orders to keep her on her course; that he seems to have entered the fog very suddenly, and that he took the proper course when he discovered the rocks in ordering the engines to be stopped and reversed full speed, and in not altering the vessel's course; the assessors are of opinion that his certificate should not be dealt with, but that he should be warned to be more careful in future.

Mr. de Hamel having stated that the Board of Trade did not ask for costs, there will be no order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN S. CASTLE,

 

L 367. 502. 200.-10/80. Wt. 47. E. & S.