| Unique ID: | 14692 | | Description: | Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Africa', 1881 | | Creator: | Board of Trade | | Date: | 1881 | | Copyright: | Out of copyright | | Partner: | SCC Libraries | | Partner ID: | Unknown |
Transcription
(No. 1187.)
"AFRICA" (S.S.)
REPORT of a Court of Inquiry held at Calicut on the 2nd November 1881, into the stranding of the s.s. "AFRICA," of Glasgow, on the Cotta Reef, north of Calicut, on the 1st October 1881.
We, the undersigned, appointed a special court of inquiry under the provisions of section 4 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act 1875, have the honour to report the conclusions at which we have arrived after investigating the causes which led to the stranding of the British India Steam Navigation Company's iron screw steamer "Africa," on the Cotta Reef, north of Calicut, on the morning of the 1st October 1881.
2. The "Africa," of Glasgow, tonnage 1,317 97/100, official number 68,108, three-masted schooner, on coasting voyage, with general cargo, after leaving Calicut, intended calling at the port of Badagara, which lies between Calicut and Tellicherry. She weighed anchor at 0.30 on the morning of the 1st October at Calicut, and commenced steaming slow ahead. At 0.40 she was in 6 3/4 fathoms, with the Calicut Light bearing E. by S. The course was then set at N. 37 W., and she went full speed—full speed, according to the engineer, being the number of revolutions ordered by the captain. In this instance the number was fixed at 40, which gives about 6 1/2 knots an hour.
3. The captain left the bridge at 1 a.m. in charge of the second officer, Thomas Crooks Cowan, who holds a Board of Trade certificate of competency as second mate (No. 02,633, renewed).
4. Before leaving the bridge the captain states that he gave the second officer verbal instructions to keep the ship in or out a little, but not beyond 9 fathoms nor inside 7 fathoms, and to keep the lead going and let kim know any alteration in the course. He was also to heave the log at 2 o'clock a.m.
5. On going into his room immediately afterwards, and looking at the chart, the captain states further that he was afraid that the instructions he had just given were not explicit enough, and that he called the second officer and ordered him to keep the ship in a quarter of a point if he got 9 fathoms, and out a point if he got 7 fathoms, to heave the log at 2 o'clock a.m., and let him know what she was going, and to keep the lead going.
6. After this the captain lay down on his sofa and slept until the "Africa" grounded on the Cotta Reef at 3.15 a.m.
7. The second officer states that the captain gave him the course N. 37 W. by the standard compass, and told him to keep the lead going, and to take care not to get into less than 7 fathoms or more than 9, and to tell him if he did. He was also to heave the log at 2 o'clock a.m. Whether he was to tell the captain the speed at which the ship was going after heaving the log at 2 o'clock a.m., he says that he does not recollect. He says the captain sent for him to his room and gave him second instructions to the effect that he might keep the ship half a point or a point out if he got into less than 7 fathoms, and vice versâ if he got into over 9 fathoms. In regard to calling the captain, he understood his instructions to be to do so only at 3 a.m. if the ship was going 7, or at 3.30 a.m. if she was going 6 1/2 knots, or whenever she had made eighteen miles.
8. Taking the captain's evidence and the captain's written instructions for the guidance of the officers of the ship, and signed by them together, we are of opinion that the second officer should have hove the logat 2 o'clock a.m. and have informed the captain of the result; that he should have been careful to keep the lead going; and that he should have reported to the captain immediately he considered it necessary to alter the course.
9. Instead of obeying these instructions, the second officer did not, as he himself admits, heave the log at 2 o'clock a.m., because it was hazy at 2 o'clock a.m., and he was afraid to leave the bridge. But he altered the course at 2 o'clock, notwithstanding the so-called haze, from N. 37 W. to about N. 32 W., and did not report it to the captain. This course was then kept, according to the second officer, until the "Africa" stranded. The man at the wheel asserts that the course was twice altered by the second officer. The course started with, by his compass, was N. 35 W.; at 2 o'clock a.m. it was changed to N. 28 W.; and at 2.30 a.m. to N. 20 W. We observe, however, from the official log, that this witness told the captain, immediately after the accident, that he kept the original course the whole way from Calicut, which was a palpable falsehood. We are not inclined to attach much weight to his statement before the Court, or indeed to the statements of any of the seaconnies then on duty.
10. Just before grounding, the second officer ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard, which he says turned the ship round one point. The seaconnie at the wheel says it turned her round 20º. Her position after the accident was N. 40 W.; Sacrifice Rock was N. 74 W., true; Cotta Point S. 77. E., true; and Red Hill N. true. Soundings gave, under stern post 23 feet, under stern 15 feet.
11. The Cotta Reef is of laterite formation, covered in some places with mud and sand. Between two and three miles south of where the "Africa" grounded, the captain found 6 fathoms of water. The "Africa" was drawing 19 feet. In her apparent course, that is, on a line with her three masts, only 3 fathoms could be found. The result of the grounding was that she was materially damaged; but the exact extent of the damage is not yet known.
12. In conclusion, we considered that neither the captain nor the third engineer on duty was to blame, and we acquitted these officers accordingly, and handed the captain back his certificate.
13. In regard to the second officer, the case was otherwise. It was a clear morning, the coast line was easily discernible all along, the sea was smooth, and there was no wind. Under these circumstances, if the second officer had only exercised ordinary diligence, the casualty would have been avoided. Instead of this, we find him grossly careless and disobedient of orders; and, after making all due allowances for him, we felt ourselves constrained, not merely to suspend, but to cancel his certificate.
14. Copy of proceedings and the second officer's certificate are herewith forwarded.
(Signed)
G. McWATTERS.
H. RICHARDSON.
D. S. GILKISON.
L 367. 957. 70.—12/81. Wt. 203. E. & S.
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