Wreck Report for 'Amcott, 1881

(No. 1112.)

"AMCOTT" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

In the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of September 1881, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain HIGHT and Captain METHVEN, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "AMCOTT," of West Hartlepool, on the Paternoster Rocks, in the Kattegat, on the 6th of May 1881, and into the circumstances attending the stranding of the said ship on the Lavergrund Shoal, near Faro Island, in the Baltic, on the 7th of June 1881.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualties, finds, for the reasons annexed,—

1. That the stranding of the said vessel "Amcott" on the 6th of May 1881 was due to the neglect and default of William Henry Williams, the master, and of Charles Frederick Ravenburn, the first mate; to the said William Henry Williams for having kept the vessel too long on an easterly course, going all the time at full speed, without taking any steps to ascertain the vessel's position, and for having neglected when a light was reported to him by the mate to assure himself what light it was; and to the said Charles Frederick Ravenburn for having reported to the master that it was the Hirtshals Light, which has a flash every 4 minutes, when a careful observation of it would have shewn him that it was the Hammskar Light, with a flash every minute and a half.

2. That the stranding of the said vessel on the 7th of June 1881 was due to the vessel having been allowed to get too far to the westward of her proper course, owing either to an error in the pole compass, which the master ought to have detected, or to bad steering when the mate was in charge of the deck.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court orders the certificate of the said William Henry Williams, the master, to be suspended for six months; and the master's certificate of the said Charles Frederick Ravenburn, the mate, for three months; but recommends that during the respective periods of such suspension they be allowed first mates' certificates.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 30th day of September 1881.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

EDWARD HIGHT,

Assessors.

 

 

R. METHVEN.

 

Annex to the Report.

This inquiry was held at Westminster on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of September 1881, when Mr. McConnell and Mr. Raikes appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Gainsford Bruce and Mr. Israel Davis for the master, and Mr. Dickens for the chief mate of the "Amcott." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. McConnell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. And after hearing counsel for the master, the mate, and for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked.

The object of the present inquiry is to ascertain the circumstances under which this vessel, the "Amcott," took the ground on two successive voyages, sustaining on each occasion very considerable damage; and although it is true that the same master and mate were in charge on both voyages, it will be necessary to keep the cases quite distinct.

The facts, so far as they relate to the first voyage, are as follows:—The "Amcott," which is an iron screw steamship of 1019 tons gross and 654 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 99 horse-power, was built at Hartlepool in the year 1872, and at the time of the casualties which form the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of Mr. Edward Hall Capper, of No. 5, Mount Stuart Square, Cardiff, shipowner, and several other gentlemen, Mr. Capper being the managing owner. She left Newcastle at about 6 p.m. of the 3rd of May last with a cargo of 1205 tons of coal, and a crew of 23 hands bound to Elsinore. She crossed the bar at about 8 p.m., and then proceeded at full speed, steering an E. 1/2 N. course, which was continued until mid-day of the 4th, when it was altered to E. 1/4 N. At 7.30 p.m. of the 5th, the patent log, we are told, shewed 336 miles to have been run since crossing the bar, upon which the course was altered to E. 1/2 S. to feel for the land, and that course was continued until midnight, when the patent log shewed 366 to 368 miles. At this time a cast of the lead was taken, which gave 29 fathoms, upon which the vessel was put on an east course; and after going at half speed for about ten minutes she again proceeded at full speed. At this time the captain, who had been on deck since 9 p.m., went below, leaving the chief mate in charge of the deck, with orders to keep her on an east course, and telling him at the same time that he would see the Hirtshals Light in about an hour, and that he was to call him when he did so, the captain it seems being at that time under the impression that he was about 20 miles to the westward of Hirtshals Light. At 1.20 a.m. a light was accordingly seen by the chief mate, which he at once concluded to be Hirtshals Light, and he thereupon went below and informed the captain; and although there is some discrepancy between the parties as to what then occurred, it seems clear that the mate told the captain that it was in his opinion the Hirtshals Light, and that the captain thereupon told him to put the vessel on an E. by N. course. The mate accordingly returned on deck, altered the course to E. by N., and then went into the chart room to verify the vessel's position and course. Whilst he was there the captain came up on deck, but according to his own account remained there for only half a minute, his object being, as he told us, simply to estimate the distance at which they were from the light, and he then returned to his cabin, and did not come up again until the vessel struck. After remaining in the chart room for about three to five minutes, the mate returned to the deck, and from that time the vessel was continued on an E. by N. course until about 20 minutes after 2, when she suddenly struck the ground. The helm was immediately put hard-a-starboard, and the engines being kept going, she came off without stopping. It was then ascertained that the light, instead of being the Hirtshals Light, which has a flash every four minutes, was the Hammskar Light, having a flash every minute and a half, and that the rocks on which the vessel had grounded were a part of the Paternoster Shoal, some four or five miles to the northward of the Hammskar Light. Finding that water was coming into the engine room the captain made for Marstrand, and succeeded in running her on the beach in time to save her from sinking, but with some three feet of water in the stoke hole. Having telegraphed to Gothenburg for assistance, a diver was sent down, and on examining her bottom it was found that about 14 ft. of the plates had been injured and two of them broken. Having been temporarily repaired, the vessel was taken to Gothenburg, where the cargo was discharged; and the vessel having been put into dry dock and thoroughly repaired, she took in a cargo of oats, with which she subsequently arrived in the Port of London.

These are the facts relating to the first voyage; and before we proceed to consider the circumstances of the second voyage, it may be well to reply to the questions upon which our opinion has been asked, so far as they relate to the former voyage.

Now the first question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel on the 6th of May last?" and to that we shall have no difficulty in replying. It seems that from about 8 p.m. of the 3rd until the vessel struck, at about 2.20 a.m. of the 6th, or for a period of about 54 hours, the vessel had been kept upon an east, or nearly east course, going almost all the time at full speed, and, as the master has told us that the full speed of the vessel with a light and favourable wind, such as it then was, was about 8 1/2 knots an hour, she would, in the 54, hours, have covered about 459 miles; and, as the captain told us that the distance from the Tyne Bar to the place where she grounded was from 450 to 460 miles, the cause of her stranding where she did is obvious.

The second question which we are asked is, "Was the master justified in trusting to the report of the mate that the light seen at 1.30 a.m. was the Hirtshall Light, and on going on deck should he not have taken more care to identify the light?" The reason which the master gave for thinking that the light which was reported to him by the mate was the Hirtshals Light was, because the mate informed him, in answer to his inquiry on the subject, that it had a flash every 4 minutes. It must be remembered, however, that when the master went below, at about 20 minutes after midnight, he told the mate that he would see the Hirtshals Light in about an hour, and the reason which he gave was, because the patent log then registered 366 to 368 miles, and that he thought would bring him within the range of Hirtshals Light, allowing 20 miles over and above the dead reckoning for the favorable wind that they had had, Hirtshals Light being, as he supposed, some 400 miles from the Tyne Bar. A moment's reflection, however, should have shewn him that at midnight, seeing that he had then been running for 52 hours from the Tyne Bar, going all the time at full speed, and making 8 1/2 knots an hour, she would have covered about 442 miles, and must, therefore, have got a long way beyond Hirtshals Light, which is only about 410 to 415 miles from the Tyne Bar. He had, therefore, no right to tell the chief mate that he would see Hirtshals Light in about an hour, and still less was he justified in not going on deck when the light was reported to him, for the purpose of ascertaining what light it was. Had he done so, and had he carefully timed the flashes with his watch, as he should have done, he would have seen that, instead of having a flash ever four minutes, as the Hirtshals Light has, it flashed every minute and a half; and he would then have known that it was the Hammskar, and not the Hirtshals Light, and that an E. by N. course, if continued, must soon take him ashore.

The next question which we are asked is, "Whether proper measures were then and thereafter taken by the master and the mate to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel?" All that the master seems to have done was to go on deck for half a minute, take a look at the light to see how far it was off, and then immediately return to his cabin, but he took no steps whatever either to verify that light or to ascertain the true position of the vessel. As to the mate, he seems to have jumped to the conclusion, as soon as he saw the light, that it was the Hirtshals Light, and neither then nor subsequently, although the light remained in sight until the vessel struck, did he take the trouble to estimate the duration of the flashes, although he had, it seems, a watch to which he might have referred, and which would have given him with certainty the intervals between the flashes.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?" And, first, as regards the master. Tracing the course of the vessel backwards, we find that she must have passed very close to the Skaw Light, according to the master, within a mile, but at any rate not more than three miles from it. If then the master did not see it, as he says he did not, he being on deck at the time, either he must have been keeping a very bad look-out, or the weather must have been very foggy, and in that case he had no right to be going at the speed at which he was, ignorant as he was of his true position. As to the mate, we can hardly suppose that he could have been keeping a good look-out, for if so, he could hardly have failed to see that the light was flashing, not every 4 minutes, but every minute and a half, and that, therefore, it could not have been the Hirtshals Light, which he knew had a flash every 4 minutes.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether the lead was used with sufficient frequency?" The only cast of the lead which seems to have been taken was at midnight, when they got 29 fathoms, but in the opinion of the Assessors this was not sufficient. What the master should have done was this: when he had ascertained, which he could easily have done, not by the patent log only, but by inquiries as to the vessel's speed from the mate and other officers who had served in her on previous voyages, that the vessel had run some 350 or 360 miles, and which should have brought him near the coast of Jutland, he should have taken soundings for the purpose of ascertaining his true position; and having thus got hold of the land, he might have run down the coast, making first the Hantsholm Light, then the Hirtshals Light, and, lastly, the Skaw Light, which would have taken him safely into the Kattegat; but he did nothing of the kind; all that he did was to take one cast of the lead at midnight after he was some distance beyond the Skaw, and, finding that he got 29 fathoms, he thought that he was at a safe distance from the shore, whereas, as a matter of fact, he was in the entrance of the Kattegat, where the water is deep. In the opinion of the Assessors the lead was not used either soon enough or often enough.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether the master was on deck at a time when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision?" In o??r opinion he was not. He should have remained on deck when approaching the coast of Jutland until he had satisfied himself of his true position; and, above all, he should have come on deck as soon as the light was reported to him by the mate, and have remained there until he had made it out and had laid the vessel on a safe course. In our opinion he was not on deck when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care and skill?" in the opinion of the Assessors she was navigated in a most negligent and improper manner; a grosser case of negligence has they say, seldom come under their attention. They tell me that what the master should have done was to have got hold of the coast of Jutland by sounding, and having made the Hantsholm Light to have run up the coast, picking up the Hirtshals and Skaw lights successively, and have thus got safely into the Kattegat. In the opinion of the Assessors he failed to take the usual and ordinary precautions which every master ought to do when navigating his vessel.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and mate are, or either of them is, in default?" In our opinion both are to blame, the master for having continued his course to the eastward, going all the time full speed, although he was ignorant of his true position and had taken no measures to ascertain it, either by estimating the distance run or in any other way, and in not having come on deck when the light was reported to him by the mate, and remained there until he had ascertained what light it was. The mate also is in our opinion to blame for having informed the master that it was the Hirtshals Light, and that it had a flash every four minutes, and for not having taken the trouble during the hour or so that he was on deck before the vessel struck, with the light in sight all the time, to mark the intervals between the flashes with his watch, a duty which was the more incumbent upon him, seeing that, so far as he was aware, the master had not come on deck at all after the light had been reported to him, and consequently the whole responsibility of identifying the light rested with him.

I will now proceed to deal with the facts of the second voyage. Having discharged her cargo in London, the vessel proceeded to Middlesbrough, there took in a cargo of 1225 tons of iron, and on the 2nd of June left for Cronstadt. Nothing particular occurred until the evening of the 6th, when the master, who had laid his course from Sandhammer Lighthouse to make the southern point of Gottland, finding himself out in his reckoning, put the vessel's head more to the westward to make the land. At about 11.30 p.m. of that day they sighted the Ostergarns Lighthouse about one point on the starboard bow, bearing N.N.E. 1/4 E., and distant from 4 to 5 miles, upon which the course of the vessel was altered to E.N.E. so as to pass outside of it. Soon after midnight the chief mate came up, and the master, who had been on deck during the previous watch, directed him to go into the chart room and see what was the course laid down on the chart from the place where they then were. The mate went down, and on his return stated that the course laid down on the chart was N.N.E. 1/2 E., upon which the captain said that they would keep her on a N.E. by N. course, or half a point more off the land than the course shewed. At 12.20 the captain went below, leaving directions with the mate to keep heron a N.E. by N. course, and at 3.20 the vessel struck the ground, when it was found that she had grounded upon the Lavergrund, a sunken shoal off the east coast of Faro Island. After throwing over a portion of her cargo the vessel floated, but the hawser having become entangled with the propeller, she again took the ground. A tug, however. having subsequently come up, a portion of the cargo was transferred to her, and the vessel was at length got of and taken into Faro Sound; there she was temporarily repaired, and was afterwards taken to Stockholm and there thoroughly repaired. Such are the facts of the second stranding.

Now the first question which we are asked in regard to this voyage is, "What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel on the 7th of June last?" it is obvious that the stranding of the vessel on the Lavergrund must have been due to her having from some cause or other been kept too far to the westward of her proper course after passing Ostergarns Lighthouse. According to the master, this was owing either to bad steering or to an unusually strong current; according to the mate, it was owing to a wrong course having been laid, no allowance having been made for the error in the pole compass.

This then brings us to the next question, which is, "Whether proper courses were set and steered at and after midnight of the 6th of June, and whether due and proper allowance was made for tide and current?" And first, as to the effect which any current might be supposed to have had on the vessel. The captain told us that in his experience he had found that there was very frequently a southerly current setting down the east side of Gottland, and that it was this current he thought which must have set him away to the eastward when he steered for the southern point of Gottland, and which obliged him to alter his course to the westward to make the island. Assuming however the existence of such a southerly current, its effect could hardly have been to set him to the westward; his course being N.E. by N., it would rather have set him to the eastward, and therefore off the land. We must therefore dismiss the current as having been the cause of the casualty, and must endeavour to discover what was the course actually set and steered after passing Ostergarns. It seems that the courses were always set by the pole compass, and both the master and mate have stated that the course set and steered from the Ostergarns Light was N.E. by N. by the pole compass. According to the master, the pole compass was correct or nearly so on all courses, and consequently a N.E. by N. course by the pole compass would be equivalent to a N.E. by N. course magnetic, and there can be no doubt that if that course had been made good from a point 4 to 5 miles to the eastward of Ostergarns Lighthouse it would have taken the vessel well clear of the Lavergrund. The mate however told us that when they had passed Sandhammer and the two lights were in one, he observed that they bore N. by W. 1/2 W. by the pole compass, and not N.N.W. as they should have done, shewing an error of half a point in the pole compass. At that time however the vessel was on an E.N.E. course, but whether there was any such error in the compass when she was on a N.E. by N. course the mate was not able to say, if so, it might be sufficient to account for the vessel having got on the Lavergrund; at all events, if we are to believe the mate's evidence as to the error in the pole compass when they were passing Sandhammer, it shews that the master's statement that the pole compass was very nearly correct on every course is not to be relied on. And here we must refer to the evidence of a man named John Brown, who was at the helm from 2 a.m. until the vessel grounded, and which goes far to support the mate's evidence that there must have been an error in the pole compass. Brown told us that the course which he received from the boatswain whom he relieved was N. by E. 1/2 E. by the bridge compass, and that he steered that course throughout. Now, the deviation card for the bridge compass shows a N. by E. 1/2 E. course by that compass to be equivalent to N.N.E. magnetic, and if that course was steered it would fully account for the vessel having grounded on the Lavergrund; unfortunately, however, the boatswain has not been produced, so that there is no confirmation of Brown's evidence; if there had been, it would have gone far to shew that there had been such an error in the pole compass, that, whilst it pointed N.E. by N., the course made was N.N.E. magnetic. The case seems to rest between the master and the mate. Either the vessel was allowed to get to the westward of her course from bad steering or from an error in the pole compass, which the master failed to detect.

The nest question which we are asked is, "Whether the mate took prompt and proper measures, when he found the water becoming shallow, to ensure the safety of the vessel?" It seems that the mate discovered that he was getting into shoal water only about a minute before she struck, and that he at once put the helm hard-a-port, but too late. We are told that when the vessel struck, it was daylight, that the ship's lights had been taken in, and the look-out man withdrawn, and under these circumstances, we fail to see that the mate was to blame for not having sooner discovered the shoal water, or that he could have done anything but what he did.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether the lead was used with sufficient frequency?" So far as the master is concerned, it seems that, in attempting to make for the south point of Gottland, he had found himself set to the eastward of his course; accordingly, at about 6 p.m., he took a cast of the lead, which gave him 19 fathoms; at 8 p.m. he took another cast, which gave him 29 fathoms; and at 11.30 he took a third cast, which gave him 15 fathoms; and he then sighted Ostergarns Light. He seems therefore to have used his lead sufficiently to bring him back into his proper course; and if he had then laid her from the Ostergarns Lighthouse on a safe course to pass well clear of Holmudden Point at the N.E. extremity of Faro Island, I am not prepared to say that he could have been charged with not having used the lead with sufficient frequency. If, however, his object was to shave Holmudden Point, then there was no excuse for his not having, when he went below, directed the mate to take soundings; but he did nothing of the kind. As regards the mate, we cannot see that he is to blame for not having taken a cast of the lead, for he had had no orders to do so; and he would hardly have been justified without the master's orders in bringing the ship to for the purpose.

The next question which we are asked is, "Whether a good and proper look-out was kept?" We see no reason to blame either of the officers on this account. The master, during his watch, having got to the eastward of his course, took soundings, until he had found the Ostergarns Light, and then altered the vessel's course to get outside of it. As to the mate, we are not aware that any amount of vigilance on his part would have prevented the ship from striking on this sunken shoal; he seems to have seen it as soon as he could, and to have at once ported his helm. There was a haze, we are told, on the land, whilst it was clear to seaward, which might have prevented his seeing that he was so close to the shore, and he was ordered to keep the vessel on a certain course without any warning that there were dangerous shoals ahead.

The next question which we are asked is, "Whether the ship was navigated with proper and seamanlike care and skill?" and in our opinion she was not. The vessel had on board a cargo of iron, and there was therefore a likelihood that her compasses might be affected; and yet the master seems to have taken no steps whatever to ascertain whether they were so or not. The mate has told us that he discovered an error of half a point in the pole compass when they were passing Sandhammer Point, and that on the following morning he told the master of it. The master denies that the mate ever mentioned it to him. But there is an entry in the log book that, when Sandhammer Lights were in one, they bore N. by W. 1/2 W.; and even if the mate had not mentioned the circumstance to him, the fact of this entry in the log book should have excited the master's attention; and yet it does not appear that he took any steps to ascertain whether the pole compass was or was not correct. So far as he is concerned, the pole compass might have had a deviation of a point, so that, when put on a N.E. by N. course by that compass, she would be making a N.N.E. course magnetic.

The last question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and mate are, or either of them is, in default" In our opinion the master is chiefly responsible for this casualty. We are disposed to think that the evidence of the helmsman John Brown is to be believed, namely, that the vessel was steered on a N. by E. E. course by the bridge compass, and that that course was equivalent to a N.N.E. course magnetic; and we are not satisfied that there was not such a deviation on the pole compass that a N.E. by N. course by that compass may not have been a N.N.E. course magnetic. This would account for the stranding of the vessel on the Lavergrund without its being necessary to impute perjury to any of the witnesses. But be this as it may, the Assessors are of opinion that the careless way in which this vessel was navigated, and the neglect of the master to look carefully after the deviation of his compasses when he had so large a quantity of iron on board, undoubtedly led to the casualty.

The Board of Trade have accordingly asked that the certificate of the master and of the mate should be dealt with. Looking at the very negligent way in which the master navigated his vessel on the first voyage, to the fact of his having kept the vessel going at full speed on her course until she ran on the Paternoster Rocks on the coast of Sweden, without taking any steps to ascertain his true position, and to his not going on deck to verify the light when it was reported to him by the mate, all which materially contributed to the casualty, the Assessors are of opinion that his certificate should be dealt with, and in that opinion I entirely concur. We think also that the mate was guilty of great negligence in not examining the light more carefully, and in not satisfying himself as to the duration of the intervals between the flashes, which would have shewn him at once that it was not the Hirtshals Light; and as this negligence also materially contributed to the casualty, we think that his certificate should be dealt with.

As regards the second voyage, although the Assessors are of opinion that the master conducted the navigation of his vessel in a very negligent manner, it has not been clearly proved that that negligence caused the casualty, for it may have arisen from the vessel having been allowed to get to the westward of her proper course by bad steering, and for which the mate would be responsible.

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we shall, for the neglects and defaults committed during the first voyage, which in our opinion contributed to the casualty, suspend the master's certificate for six months, and the mate's for three months. At the same time we shall recommend to the Board of Trade that, in lieu of the masters' certificates which they hold they be allowed chief mates' certificates. The Assessors desire me to add that in their opinion the sentences are extremely lenient.

No application, and therefore no order was made as to costs.

After judgment had been given, two objections of a very technical description were raised by the counsel for the master and for the mate, on which it may be well to say a few words.

The first of these objections was as follows:—After the witnesses had been examined, counsel for the Board of Trade gave in a statement of the questions on which they desired the opinion of the Court. They were fifteen in number; the first eight relating to the first voyage, the last seven to the second voyage; and at the conclusion were these words—"The Board of Trade are " of opinion that the certificates of the master and mate " should be dealt with." It was said that these words, following as they did immediately after the questions relating to the second voyage, must be taken to apply to that voyage only; and that, if it had been wished to make them apply to the first voyage, they should have been repeated immediately after the first eight questions, which alone referred to that voyage. And as the Court had held that it could not deal with the certificates of either of these officers for what had occurred on the second voyage, their certificates must be returned to them, the Court having in a previous case held that, if the Board of Trade does not ask that the certificate of the officer should be dealt with, the Court will not take upon itself to suspend the certificate, seeing that the officer would not have had that notice which the Act requires that he should have before his certificate can be dealt with. Seeing, however, that the questions, although applying to both casualties, have been numbered consecutively from 1 to 15, and that the application that the certificates should be dealt with follows at the end of all of them, I shall hold that it applies to the conduct of the officers on both voyages; and as there is in our opinion sufficient to warrant the suspension of their certificates for what they did or omitted to do on the first voyage, although perhaps not on the second voyage, I shall overrule this objection.

The second objection is perhaps a more important one, although it too is of a somewhat technical character. It was said that the Board of Trade had no right to include two casualties, occurring on two different voyages, in one and the same Inquiry, and that there ought to have been a separate Inquiry for each voyage. It was said also that it was contrary to the spirit and wording of the Rules, the 16th Article of which spoke of "casualty" and not "casualties." If appeared to me, however, that so to limit the meaning of the Article would be attended with the greatest inconvenience. Suppose, for instance, that by the neglect or default of the master a vessel had struck the ground, and done herself considerable damage; that she had been got off, and shortly afterwards, but on the same voyage, by another act of misconduct, she had been run aground again, and again seriously damaged; here would be two separate and distinct casualties. Is it contended that they could not form the subject of one and the same Inquiry? And if they could, why not two casualties, occurring on consecutive voyages, and in which the conduct of the same persons is at stake? If I saw any injustice likely to arise from taking that course I could understand the objection, but it is not pretended that any injustice will be done to the parties by having the two casualties included under one Order and one Inquiry; on the contrary, it will be a considerable saving of expense to all parties concerned. I offered, if the parties wished to produce further evidence, to adjourn the case for that purpose, but on the usual understanding that it should be subject to costs in the event of the adjournment proving to be unnecessary. The offer, however, was not accepted

On the whole it appears to me that neither of the objections are well founded, and consequently the certificates of the master and of the mate must be suspended to the extent already stated.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

EDWARD HIGHT,

Assessors.

 

 

R. METHVEN,

 

L 367. 882.150.—10/81. Wt. 203. E. & S.