Wreck Report for 'Bath City', 1882

(No. 1247.)

"BATH CITY" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Crown Court,. Guildhall, Bristol, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of January 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains KNOX, R.N., PARFITT, and PARISH, and Mr. W. EAMES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the British steamship "BATH CITY," of Bristol, together with the loss of the lives of eleven of the hands on board, whilst on a voyage from Bristol to New York.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the loss of the said vessel "Bath City" was due to her having been too deeply laden, having regard to the nature of the cargo, the season of the year, and the construction of the vessel, which rendered her unfit to contend with the succession of violent gales which she encountered; that the rudder post, having worked loose, caused her to leak in the stern; and that the rudder head, having been carried away, the vessel became unmanageable; and that thereupon she filled and went down.

The Court further finds that the master and crew were justified in abandoning her when they did, and that no blame attaches to the master or to any of the officers of the said vessel.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 18th day of January 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

HENRY KNOX, Captain, R.N.,

 

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

 

W. EAMES,

 

 

 

ALFRED PARISH, R.N.R.,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Bristol on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of January instant, when Mr. Middleton appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Inskip for the owners of the "Bath City." Twelve witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Middleton handed in a statement of the questions on which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Inskip having stated that he had no witnesses to produce, was then heard on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Middleton having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinon had been asked.

I may first observe that in the early part of these proceedings there appeared to be some fear that the inquiry was about to be one as to the justice of the decision to which the Court had come in the case of the "Bristol City," or as to the soundness or unsoundness of he views entertained by the majority of the Tonnage Commission in their report. It appeared to me, however, that these questions were somewhat foreign to the present case, and, thanks to the discretion and judgment of the learned gentlemen on both sides, it has been confined to its proper limits, namely, to an inquiry into the causes which have led to the loss of this vessel and her cargo, and the lives of so many of her crew. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Bath City" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of Bristol, of 1,723 tons gross and 1,121 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 180 horse power. She was built at Stockton-upon-Tees in the early part of the year 1880, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Charles Hill, of the Albion Dock, Bristol, and others, Mr. Hill being the managing owner. She left Bristol on the 10th of November last for New York with a crew of 26 hands, all told, and a cargo of 1,544 tons of general merchandise, besides 550 tons of bunker coal, and drawing 19 feet 5 inches forward and 20 feet 7 inches aft, giving a mean of 20 feet. Shortly after leaving Bristol a stowaway was discovered, which made the number of hands on board 27. On the 13th, three days after their departure, a leak was discovered in the store room, which the chief engineer was called to examine. He told us that it was at the base of the rudder trunk, and that a portion of the flange had there been broken off, but as it was about 4 feet above the floor, and about 2 feet above the level of the water outside, it was only when the stern dipped that it leaked. On the following day, however, another leak was discovered in the store room, about 2 feet below the former one, close to the stern post on the starboard side, and on examining it it was seen that, as the vessel lifted, two of the plates on each side of the stern post opened and closed again as she fell. Some of the rivets were also subsequently found to be broken, as well as two angle iron frames, one on each side of the stern post. The chief engineer told us that he made some bolts to fill up the rivet holes, but that the working of the stern post and plates prevented their being of any use. On the 15th the after tank, which was immediately beneath the store room, was found to be full of water, upon which the sluice was opened to allow it to get to the pumps. On the 16th, the leak having become worse, the man hole door in the top of the tank was shut down and secured, with the object of confining the water within the tank, it being supposed that the principal leak was there, but the water from the leak in the store room then flowed over the floor through the bulkhead which separated it from the 'tween decks, and thence into the coal bunkers, a door which opened from the after 'tween decks into the coal bunkers having, it would seem, been left open. Upon its being discovered that the water was finding its way through the bunkers into the stoke hole, bringing the coals along with it, the man hole door was again taken off to allow the water to flow into the tank. The leak at the stern post, however, increasing, and the sluice being found unable to carry off the water from the tank sufficiently quickly, the captain ordered the chief engineer to bore a hole at the end of the tunnel, so as to let the water out of the tank to the pumps. At noon of the 17th the vessel seems to have been in about latitude 50º 49' north, and longitude 28º 39' west, and at about 11.30 p.m. that night they were steaming ahead easy, with the wind blowing a hard gale from the W.N.W., when a terrific sea broke over the stern, carrying away the after wheel, wheel gratings, and compass stand, and bursting open the companion doors of the cabin. For the next few days there seems to have been a succession of gales, and, the leak increasing, more holes were bored in the end of the tunnel. At about 7 a.m. of the 21st, the wind was blowing with hurricane force, and for about an hour the vessel was quite unmanageable, heavy seas continually breaking over her. On the 22nd it was found that the ship had a slight list to port, upon which the engineers were directed to burn the coals from the port side with the view of righting her. At about 5 a.m. of the 23rd the gale recommenced with hurricane force, blew the fore and main staysails out of the gasketts, stove in the starboard lifeboat, washed away the starboard bridge ladder, and broke three panes of glass in front of the midship wheel-house. In the forenoon of that day it was observed that two of the lanyards of the fore rigging on the starboard side had gone; they were, however, at once replaced, but in the afternoon six more went, two on the port and four on the starboard side. These were also replaced, and six tackles were put up, four on the starboard and two on the port side, for the purpose of giving additional support to the mast. At about 7.00 p.m. the same day the vessel gave a heavy roll to port, and the foremast broke off about 4 feet above the deck and went over the side, carrying away the fore hatchway ventilators and tearing a portion of the tarpaulin off the main hatchway. On the 24th the vessel had still a list to port, and the second mate, with the carpenter and watch, were sent down into the fore 'tween decks to trim the cargo. On going below they found that 40 to 50 boxes of tin plates were broken, and that the plates were strewn all over the 'tween decks, as well as some bales of empty grain bags which were there. Having secured the tin plates and trimmed the cargo down from the upper deck, and the engineers having shifted a portion of the coals from the port to the starboard side, the vessel was brought upright again. At 2 p.m. that day the steamship "Propitious" passed them, but as they were then holding their course they did not require her assistance. On the 25th the leak increased, the water running from the store room along the after 'tween decks into the coal bunkers and washing the coals down into the stoke-hole. On the 26th it was blowing a hard gale, and the sea broke over the vessel, washing away the after life buoys and smashing the gig. On the 27th and 28th the weather was again very bad, the leak increasing, and on the latter day the steamship "Italy" passed them, but as they were then making about 4 or 5 knots against a head wind they did not ask her for any assistance. On the 29th the water was found to be increasing, and accordingly more holes were drilled in the end of the tunnel, and the ballast donkey-pump and the bilge injection were put on. At this time we are told that the water was coming into the store room in streams, but that the pumps were still well able to cope with it. Six hundred boxes of tin plates were, however, brought out from the after 'tween decks and thrown overboard, and this somewhat eased the vessel and reduced the leak. On the morning of the 30th the rudder head gave way, and a hawser was then paid out from the stern with a span from each quarter, and they were thus able to keep her on her course, the wind being from west to W.N.W. directly ahead. That day about 500 more boxes of tin plates were thrown overboard, and at about 11 p.m. that night a steamer was observed coming up astern of them, upon which signals for assistance were made, and in about a couple of hours the steamer, which proved to be the "Marathon," came up with them. On being asked to tow them to St. John's, the master of the "Marathon" said that he was not able to do so as he was short of coal; indeed, it would seem that the "Marathon" had during the last ten days been able to make only about 80 miles a day, and as they were then more than 200 miles from St. John's, and had only four days' coal remaining, the captain not unnaturally feared that he might run short, more especially if he had the "Bath City" in tow. A consultation then took place between the master and officers of the "Bath City" as to whether they should abandon her, but they all determined to stick to the vessel, and accordingly the "Marathon" was allowed to proceed on her course without them. The same afternoon the wind, which before had been from about W.N.W., shifted to the south, and the vessel could then no longer hold her course. At about this time it was found that the water was accumulating in the after-hold, and accordingly ten rivets were, by the captain's orders, knocked out in the tunnel to allow it to get to the pumps. By noon of the 2nd of December the wind had again increased to a gale, first from the south, afterwards veering round to W.N.W., and fifteen more rivets were knocked out. During the night the wind increased considerably, and the water gained on the pumps, although the whole of the pumps were then at work, including the deck pumps, which had been connected with the steam winches on deck. Finding that the water was gaining upon them, the master at length ordered the two remaining boats to be got out, and he and 18 hands then got into the lifeboat, whilst the chief mate and 7 hands went in the jollyboat. it was now about 9 a.m., and they estimated that they were at a distance of about 180 miles S.E. by E. of St. John's. At first the lifeboat began to tow the jollyboat, but it was found impossible to make any way against the wind and head sea, and she had to be cast off, but the two boats still kept company. About 11 a.m. the "Bath City" was seen to founder. At 1 p.m. the jollyboat was upset, and out of her crew four were drowned, but the remaining four were saved and taken into the lifeboat. On the 4th two of the hands died, and on the 5th two more; but on the 6th, most fortunately, they fell in with the vessel called the "M. J. Foley," which took them on board and brought them to Liverpool, where they were landed on the 21st, with the exception of the captain and engineer's steward, who had died on the passage. The rest, we are told, were landed in this country in a most pitiable state, having suffered terribly from cold and frostbites, and one of them, the stowaway, has, I am informed, since died in the hospital.

I have thought it right to detail at some length the course of events from day to day, as it will shew the character of the weather that this vessel had to encounter, and the efforts made by her crew to save her. Such a succession of gales, it may fairly be said, has seldom or ever been encountered by any vessel, even on a voyage across the Atlantic.

Let us now proceed to answer the questions which have been put to us by the Board of Trade, and the first question which we are asked is, "Whether, when the vessel left Bristol, she was in good and seaworthy condition?" it seems that she was a sister ship to the "Bristol City," into the loss of which an Inquiry took place in this Court in May last, and the description then given of the "Bristol City" will, we are told, with some small exceptions, fairly apply to the present case. She was built, it seems, under special survey of Lloyd's, and on being launched was classed 100 A1, that being the highest class that could be given to her, From her 'midship section it would seem that the plates along the sheer and bilge strakes were 13/16ths of an inch thick, doubled, and treble riveted at the butts for three. fifths of her length. In April last she underwent her first annual survey in the Albion Dry Dock at Bristol, and we have the certificate of Mr. Thearle, who has been examined before us, that she was then in a good and seaworthy condition, and eligible, in his opinion, to remain on her class. We have, therefore, no reason whatever to think that the vessel, when she left Bristol in November last, was not in a good and seaworthy condition, and a thoroughly good ship in all respects, so far at least as her hull was concerned.

The second and third questions I will take together; they are, "Whether the doors in front of the alleyways were strong and sufficient, when closed, to keep out weather and sea?" and "Whether the doors in the after ends of the alleyways were strong and sufficient, when closed, to keep out weather and sea?" In the case of the "Bristol City" it appears that there were strong substantial iron doors at the fore ends of the alleyways, but that at the after ends there were only portable wooden slides, which could be put on in case of bad weather. Subsequently, however, to the inquiry in the case of the "Bristol City," strong substantial iron doors were put at the after ends of the alleyways of the "Bath City," and I believe of Messrs. Hill's other vessels. And there seems no reason to doubt that the doors both at the fore and at the after ends of the alleyways of the "Bath City," when she left Bristol in November last, were strong and sufficient to keep out weather and sea, and that they added greatly to her safety.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether the scuppers and the relieving ports were, in themselves, large enough, and so constructed as to free the exposed decks from water when required?" It seems that this vessel, like the "Bristol City," had a short poop and forecastle, and a deck house 65 feet long amidships. Between the deck erections the upper deck was exposed, having bulwarks 4 feet 6 inches high at the sides, thus forming what the seamen, in this case, have called a fore and an aft well, a term to which exception has been taken, but, I confess, I do not see with what reason; for it seems to me to be a very convenient term to convey what is meant by it. Of course it is not meant to say that it is a well such as we see on land, and out of which we draw water, but it is a compartment enclosed on the four sides, and capable of holding and retaining water. In the fore well, which, we were told, was about 75 feet long, there were four ports on each side; and in the after well, which was 60 to 61 feet long, there were three ports on each side. The ports were, all of them, 3 feet by 18 inches, except the third from forward, which was 3 feet 6 inches by 2 feet 6. There were also six scuppers on each side, 9 inches by 3 inches. In answer then to the question whether the scuppers and relieving ports were in themselves large enough, and so constructed as to free the exposed parts of the deck from water when required, or, in other words, the wells, the assessors are of opinion that, generally, they would be, but that in a heavy sea, with the vessel deeply laden, and the ports, on the one side or the other, as they would be, pretty constantly under water, they would not act readily to keep the wells free. And that this is so is clear from the evidence of the seamen who have been examined before us, and who have told us that, although the fore well freed itself pretty readily, the after well did not, and the reason is obvious. It seems that when the vessel left Bristol, she was 1 foot 2 inches by the stern, and that depth would necessarily be increased When she began to make water aft; the result would be that the after well, having its ports much nearer the water, would not be able to free itself readily from the seas which were constantly breaking over her, whilst the fore well, whose ports were higher out of the water, would much more readily throw off any water that might come into it. In the opinion, therefore, of the assessors the ports and scuppers were quite sufficient to free the vessel when she was well out of the water, but not when she was very deep.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Would rails and netting be a preferable arrangement to close bulwarks and relieving ports." Most certainly not. With the exposed portions of the upper deck, on which the hatchways and winches were placed, so near to the water, it would have been highly improper to have had merely rails and open netting. With rails and open netting the water would, no doubt, have run off more readily; but, on the other hand, it would have come on deck more easily, and, with the hatchways and winches exposed to the full force of the waves, it would have been a source of great danger to the vessel. In the large passenger steamships, with a very high freeboard, rails and netting are, no doubt, an advantage, but not so with vessels the exposed parts of whose decks are brought so near to the water as they were in the case of the "Bath City."

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel as loaded had sufficient stability for the voyage she was about to undertake?" There is nothing to show us that this vessel had not sufficient stability; on the contrary, we should be more disposed to think that she might have had too much, rather than too little stability; for Mr. Evan Evans, the ship's husband, told us that he found these vessels so stable that, whereas he had been in the habit of putting one-third or 10/30ths of the cargo in the 'tween decks, he now found it more expedient to put about 12/30ths. There is nothing therefore to shew us that there was any want of stability.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether she was overladen, and whether she had sufficient freeboard?" This I need hardly observe is the most important question with which we have to deal in this case. And first as regards the freeboard, it seems from the official log book that this vessel's load line was placed at a distance below the deck of 3 feet 10 inches, and as we are told that the lower limb of the disc was clear of the water when she left Bristol, that would have given her a freeboard of at least 4 feet 4 inches. And this agrees with the evidence of Mr. Spence, who told us that her measured height at the side was 23 feet 7 inches, and adding 9 inches for the depth of the keel, that would give a total height of 24 feet 4 inches, or with an inch additional, which Mr. Spence claims for the thickness of the stringer plate, it would make it 24 feet 5 inches, so that if she drew 20 feet mean on leaving Bristol, she would then have had a freeboard of from 4 feet to 4 feet 5 inches. Mr. Spence said that she would rise 6 inches on getting into salt water, but the assessors think that 5 inches would be nearer the mark; her freeboard therefore on getting into salt water would be 4 feet 10 to 4 feet 11 inches, and as her depth of hold was 22.5 feet, that would give her a freeboard of 2.6 inches for every foot depth of hold. Now if we take Mr. Martell's rule for estimating freeboard, we shall find that a vessel with her dimensions would have a co-efficient of fineness of .79, and therefore according to his tables she ought with a depth of hold of 22.5 feet to have had a freeboard of something more than 5 feet 10 inches, that being the freeboard, which according to Mr. Martell a flush decked vessel should have, with the same depth of hold, and with a co-efficient of fineness of .78. Mr. Spence, however, has stated, and with truth, that some allowance should be made for the camber of her deck for the sheer fore-and-aft, and for her deck erections; whether, however, these would be sufficient to compensate for the difference between her actual freeboard of 4 feet 10 or 4 feet 11 inches, and what according to Mr. Martell's tables she ought to have had, may be a question.

Let us now, however, see what was the cargo which she had on board. The total weight of the cargo, it seems, was 1,544 tons, besides 550 tons of bunker coal, less, considerably, than twice her registered tonnage, which a great many vessels now-a-days carry. So far, therefore, as the mere weight of cargo is concerned, there is nothing to shew that she had too much in her for an ordinary voyage; but when we come to inquire of what it consisted, we find that of the 1,544 tons, there were no less than 749 tons of tin, and 495 tons of steel blooms, making a total of 1,244 tons of dead weight out of a total of 1,544 tons, the remainder being made up of 150 tons of wire, and about 50 tons of light goods. I may here observe that in the case of the "Bristol City," which was that of a vessel homeward bound with a cargo of grain, Captain Weiss. who had commanded this very vessel. the "Bath City," told us that it was not so much in coining home as in going out that these vessels were liable to roll and strain themselves; he said that they all rolled more going out than coming home, and that this was due to the heavy dead weight cargoes, consisting chiefly of iron goods which they generally took out. Taking all these things into consideration, the very heavy nature of the cargo which she had on board, the season of the year, and the fact that she would be very liable in heavy weather to take in and retain large quantities of water in her wells, and especially in the after well, the assessors are of opinion that this vessel should, when she left Bristol, have had 6 inches more freeboard. They do not wish to lay down any hard and fast rule as to the proportion between the freeboard and the depth of hold; but what they do say is, that, having regard to her construction, to the nature of her cargo, and to the season of the year, she was too deeply laden. If this were only my own opinion it would be entitled to no weight whatever, but it is the unanimous opinion of all the assessors, of whom we have, on this occasion, four, one a gentleman belonging to the Royal Navy, another an engineer assessor, and the other two, merchant captains of very great experience, and in their opinion this vessel ought to have had more freeboard by about 6 inches, and consequently less cargo to that extent.

Before leaving this part of the case, however, it may be well to refer to some views which Mr. Spence has expressed on the subject of spare buoyancy; I will not call them new, for this is not the first occasion on which I have had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Spence; but they are, to say the least, somewhat of a startling character. The grounds on which Mr. Spence considers that the vessel had sufficient spare buoyancy are as follow:—He says that she drew a mean of 20 feet on her departure from Bristol, that she would rise 6 inches on getting into salt water, and that by the 17th, when, according to him she met with her first difficulties, she would have consumed 130 tons of coal, which would raise her 6 inches more, so that on that day she would have had a draught of only 19 feet. And he then went on to say, that, seeing that her total displacement was 4,900 tons, and her displacement at 19 feet draught only 3,461 tons, being a difference of 1,439 tons, that would give her a spare buoyancy of about 41 per cent. Now the first mistake which I would wish to point out in Mr. Spence's reasoning, is in taking the supposed draught of the vessel on the 17th, seeing that, according to the chief engineer, she had sprung a leak as early as the 13th. Moreover, she might have met with very bad weather immediately on getting to sea; in considering therefore whether she had sufficient freeboard when she left Bristol, we must take her draught, not on the 17th, nor even on the 13th, but on the day on which she left, and it was then, occording to Mr. Spence, 19 feet 6 inches; but secondly, we have to take exception to Mr. Spence's mode of estimating the spare buoyancy; he tells us that, even assuming that we are to take her draught at 19 feet 6, she would still at that draught have a displacement of 3,565 tons, leaving a balance of 1,335 tons, which he tells us gives 37 to 38 per cent. of spare buoyancy, but Mr. Spence obtains this high per centage by taking the proportion which the unimmersed portion of the vessel bears to the immersed portion of the vessel, instead of its proportion to the total displacement, so that according to Mr. Spence's mode of calculation, if half the vessel was immersed and half unimmersed, the vessel would have a spare buoyancy of 100 per cent., and if two thirds were unimmersed and one third immersed, she would have a spare buoyancy of 200 per cent. Mr. Spence told us that that was the way in which Mr. White and other high authorities estimated spare buoyancy, but I confess that I am somewhat surprised to hear it, and I should require better authority than that of Mr. Spence for the fact. No doubt in one sense it comes to the same thing, whether the proportion be taken between the unimmersed portion and the immersed portion, or between the unimmersed portion and the total displacement, but when we talk of the per centage of spare buoyancy and of submerged buoyancy, we do not mean the relation which they bear to one another, but the relation which each bears to the whole, to talk of a vessel having 200 per cent. of spare buoyancy, or twice the total buoyancy is absurd. Estimating then the percentage of spare buoyancy in the way in which I venture to think it should be calculated, we find that on a draught of 19 feet 6, when the vessel's displacement would be 3,565 tons, the spare buoyancy would be 27 to 28 per cent., and not as Mr. Spence would have it, 37 to 38; but apart altogether from these considerations, the assessors are clearly of opinion, looking at the nature of her cargo, the season of the year, and her liability to take in large bodies of water, more especially into the after well, that the vessel had not sufficient spare buoyancy when she left Bristol, sufficient to enable her to rise and free herself from the heavy seas which were continually breaking over her and filling her after well, and which were sufficient to smash two of the boats which were stowed some 4 or 5 feet above the top of the deck-house.

The 8th question which we are asked is, "Whether her cargo was properly stowed and distributed so as to make the ship as easy as possible in a seaway, and whether the cargo was properly secured?" It seems that there were in the lower hold 1,254 tons 10 cwt., and in the 'tween decks 839 tons 10 cwt.; in other words, about 60 per cent. in the lower hold, and about 40 per cent. in the 'tween decks. At the time of the inquiry into the loss of the "Bristol City" we were told that their practice at that time was to put about a third of the cargo in the 'tween decks and two-thirds in the lower hold; but Mr. Evan Evans told us that since then he has gained experience, and that he now puts, as nearly as he can, 12/30ths in the 'tween decks and 16/30ths in the lower hold; and that seems to have been as nearly as possible the proportions in which the cargo was stowed on board this vessel, and in the opinion of the assessors that seems to have been a proper distribution of the weights.

As regards the stowage of the cargo, it seems that some 40 or 50 boxes of tin plates were broken, and their contents scattered about the hold, as well as some bales of empty bags. But 40 or 50 boxes of tin plates would only weigh about 2 or 3 tons, and the weight of the bales of bags did not exceed 4 tons 10 cwt., so that the displacement of the cargo was not a matter of much importance, and there is nothing to shew that the cargo was not in all other respects well secured.

I will take the 9th and 10th questions together; they are, "Whether the stern post, stern frame and rudder post were properly constructed, and whether the plates were properly rivetted?" and "What was the cause of the vessel springing a leak at the stern post, and whether every possible effort was made to stop it?" There is nothing in the evidence from which we can say that either the stern post, the stern frame, or the rudder post were not properly constructed, or that the plates were not properly rivetted. The fact, however, remains that, within three days after her departure from Bristol and before she had encountered the very bad weather which she afterwards met with, a leak was discovered at the lower part of the rudder trunk, and on the following day a leak lower down at the side of the rudder post. How those leaks were caused it is impossible for us to say, but it may perhaps fairly be assumed that there was some weakness there, not probably apparent when she left, but which caused the rudder and rudder post to work, and thus loosen the plates on each side. That every possible effort was made to stop it we have no doubt, but in such a place it would be impossible to do anything to remedy it whilst they were still at sea, and with the weather as bad as it was.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the leak increasing, and whether proper measures were taken to stop it and subsequently to keep the water under; and whether the pumps were sufficient and in good order?" The cause of the leak increasing was no doubt the tempestuous state of the weather and the rolling and straining of the vessel from the weight and nature of the cargo which she had in her. No doubt every possible effort was made to stop it and to keep the water under, but all their efforts were in vain. No doubt also the pumps were in good order, and it was not until the last day, when, according to one of the witnesses, the water was coming in in a stream as big as his body, that they were not able to keep it under.

The twelfth question is, "Did the water from the leak make its way through the 'tween deck space into the after hold and stoke hole, and, if so, what was the cause of its so doing?" That it did so seems to be admitted, and the cause of it is also admitted. It seems that there was an ordinary wooden bulkhead separating the store room from the 'tween decks, not water tight, and through which water would readily pass from the store room into the 'tween decks. Then in the fore part of the after 'tween decks were stowed coals for the return voyage, and to enable them to pass them easily into the coal bunkers when the latter were empty the do r which had been cut in the upper part of the after engine room bulkhead was left open, thus destroying altogether the object of having a water-tight bulkhead there; for it is obvious that if the lower after hatchways were closed, as they apparently were at first, any water flowing into the 'tween decks would rise till it passed through the open door in the bulkhead, and it would thus find its way through the coal bunkers into the stoke hole; and this is what seems to have occurred on the 16th, when the lid was put on the tank. We were told that afterwards, when the second lot of tin plates were thrown overboard, some of the lower hatches were taken off, and then the water would find its way into the after lower hold; and that on the day before the crew left, the whole of the lower hatches were taken off the after hold with the object of getting up some of the cargo from that place and throwing it overboard, and then of course the water which got into the after 'tween decks would naturally flow down into the lower hold. Now it is clear that if instead of a wooden bulkhead between the store room and after 'tween decks there had been a solid water-tight iron bulkhead, or, in other words, if the water-tight iron bulkhead forming the fore side of the tank had, instead of stopping at the 'tween decks, been carried up to the upper deck, it would have confined the water from the leak to the store room and the tank beneath it, and there would then have been no necessity to open the sluice or to cut holes in the tunnel to let the water get to the pumps. As it was, however, if they had not opened the sluice and cut holes in the tunnel, the water would have found its way through the after 'tween decks and coal bunkers into the stoke hole, carrying the coals with it, and probably have choked the pumps, and caused the ship to founder much sooner than she did. And it certainly does appear to be a matter deserving the consideration of these gentlemen, whether they would not do wisely to carry up this after water-tight bulkhead to the upper deck, for had the "Bath City" been thus fitted, it is probable that this casualty would have been avoided, and the vessel have been got safely into port; it is an addition that could be made at comparatively little expense, and which would render the after part of the vessel water-tight, which it cannot be said to be now. With regard to the door from the after 'tween decks through the water-tight bulkhead into the coal bunker, it certainly does seem to be an extraordinary thing that it should have been left open, merely to save them the trouble of clearing away the coal from the after side of the door, to get the door open, after their arrival at New York.

The 13th question which we are asked is, "Was it proper and necessary to cut holes in the forward side of the after tank and in the screw tunnel for the purpose of letting the water into the tunnel?" Most certainly it was; if the leak had been in the lower tank only, it would have been proper to have screwed the man hole door down, and confined the water to the tank, but seeing that there was a leak also in the store room, it was absolutely necessary to let it run down into the tank to prevent its getting into the after 'tween decks, and when the sluice was not capable of carrying off the whole of the water from the tank, the only method left was to cut holes from the tunnel into the tank, and thus let the water get to the pumps.

The fourteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the carrying away of the rudder head on the 30th of November, and whether every possible effort was made thereafter to secure the rudder and make it available?" No doubt the extreme violence of the gale, added to the rolling of the vessel with the heavy cargo which she had on board, and the rudder post working, by bringing a great strain on the rudder head, caused it to give way. We have also no doubt that every possible effort was made afterwards to secure the rudder, and we are told that one of the men nearly lost his life in the attempt. It seems also that the vessel was originally fitted with rudder chains, but that one of these having come off on a previous voyage, the master had ordered the other to be taken off. This is much to be regretted, for they would undoubtedly have been of use to keep the vessel's head to the wind, and it is exactly for such an emergency as this that the rudder chains are required.

The fifteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the 'Bath City' was prematurely abandoned?" The crew left her at 9 a.m., and at 11 a.m. she foundered; there can therefore be no doubt that she was not prematurely abandoned. A more gallant struggle to keep this vessel afloat has perhaps never been made; they allowed two vessels, the "Propitious" and the "Italy," to pass after the foremast had gone, and even when the rudder head was gone, and the "Marathon" was ready to take them off, they preferred to stick to their vessel so long as there was any hope of getting her into port.

The sixteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the lifeboat was sufficient to hold all the crew, and whether the chief officer was justified in taking eight hands with him into the jolly boat?" We have no reason to doubt that the master and chief officer exercised a wise discretion in distributing the crew between the two boats, or that if the lifeboat could have carried them all safely, they would not all have got into her.

The seventeenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the jolly boat capsizing, and whether every possible effort was made to save life?" No doubt it was the violence of the weather that caused the jolly boat to capsize, and we have equally no doubt that every possible effort was made to save the lives of her crew.

The eighteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" To have navigated the vessel in such frightful weather for several days without a rudder required the greatest possible skill and care. It might perhaps be a question whether the master would not have done wisely, either on the 13th, when there was a leak discovered at the bottom of the rudder trunk, or, at all events, on the 14th, when another leak showed itself by the side of the stern post, to have turned back and run for some port. At the same time we know well the very great disinclination which every seaman has to put back, and no doubt they had not expected to meet with such frightful weather. Seeing, however, that the injury was in one of the most vital parts of the vessel, it is perhaps to be regretted that the master did not do so.

We have learnt in the course of this inquiry that since the case of the "Bristol City" came before the Court, the owners and their servants have adjusted the cargo more properly between the 'tween decks and the lower hold so as to prevent their vessels from rolling so much as they used to do on the outward voyage, and that they have fitted strong iron doors at the after ends of the alley ways, which they had not done till then, and which has no doubt added greatly to the safety of their vessels. Mr. Spence has also told us that since that inquiry the designs of certain vessels which he was then building with the object of giving them an appearance of more freeboard, but which he told us he thought would be "quite unseaworthy," have been altered. If the inquiry in the "Bath City" should prove to be as fruitful of good results by inducing owners to carry up the after watertight bulkhead to the upper deck instead of stopping short, as they now generally do, at the 'tween decks, our labours will not have been in vain.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

HENRY KNOX, Captain, R.N.,

 

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

Assessors.

 

 

W. EAMES,

 

 

 

ALFRED PARISH, R.N.R.,

 

L 367. 1017. 150.—1/82. Wt. 203. E. & S.