Wreck Report for 'Albert Edward', 1882

(No. 1391.)

"ALBERT EDWARD" (S. S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Folkestone, on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of June 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains CURLING and ANDERSON, and W. EAMES, Esquire, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the material damage sustained by the steamship "ALBERT EDWARD," of London, through the bursting of her starboard cylinder, on the 18th of April last, whilst on a passage from Boulogne to Folkestone.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the abovementioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the bursting of the cylinder of the said vessel "Albert Edward" was due to the thread of the piston-rod having from some cause or other become deteriorated, so that when pressure was applied below the piston became detached from the rod, and running up it struck the top of the cylinder with such force as to burst off the cover and burst out a part of the side. The Court is, however, of opinion that no blame attaches to the master or engineer of the "Albert Edward," or to Mr. William Lawrence Earnshaw, the superintending engineer of the South Eastern Railway Company's steamers, for the casualty, as it would not be possible to see the condition of the screw of the piston-rod without raising the nut, and that engineers and surveyors have not hitherto deemed it either necessary or expedient to raise the nuts for this purpose. The Court is further of opinion that it is to be regretted that Captain James Alfred Boxer, the harbour master and the superintendent of the Company's steamers, knowing as he did that the "Albert Edward" was disabled and had a large number of passengers on board, did not, as soon as the water in Folkestone harbour would allow, send out some vessel from that harbour to her assistance, the more so as he was not aware of the nature or extent of the injuries which she had sustained.

The Court is not asked to deal with any of the officers' certificates, or to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 14th day of June 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

WILLM. CURLING, R.N.R.,

 

 

 

ABSM. ANDERSON,

Assessors.

 

 

W. EAMES, R.N., C.I.M.,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Folkestone on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of June instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Webster, Q.C., Mr. Biron, and Mr. Garth, for the South Eastern Railway Company, the owners of the "Albert Edward," and Mr. Minter for the superintending engineer of the Steam Packet Department of the said Company. Eighteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Webster then addressed the Court on behalf of the South Eastern Railway Company, and Mr. Mansel Jones having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The facts of the case are as follow:—

The "Albert Edward" is a paddle-wheel steamship, belonging to the Port of London, of 371 tons gross and 198 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 220 horse-power. She was built at Poplar in the year 1862, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of the South Eastern Railway Company, Mr. Edward Jones, of Folkestone Harbour, Kent, being the manager. She left Boulogne at about noon of the 18th of April last, with a crew of 24 hands all told, 144 passengers, and about 20 tons of vegetables and fruit, bound to Folkestone. On clearing the entrance to the harbour the engines were put on full speed ahead, and she proceeded in a N. by W. 1/2 W. direction, making 12 knots an hour, the wind at the time blowing strong from the N.N.W., with a heavy sea, and the tide, which was about one hour past high water, running to the eastward. About 20 minutes afterwards, and when at the distance of about 4 miles from the harbour, an explosion occurred in the starboard cylinder. The chief engineer, who was at the time in the engine room standing between the two cylinders, immediately shut off the steam from the port cylinder, but was not able to shut it off from the starboard cylinder owing to the rush of steam from that cylinder, which compelled him to go on deck. After a time they succeeded in shutting off the steam from the boilers by closing the stop valves on deck, and in about three minutes, on the steam clearing off, the chief engineer went down into the engine room, and found, on examining the starboard cylinder, that the cover had been blown off and a portion of the side blown out, and that the piston rod was out of position. On finding that the engines were disabled, the master hoisted the fore-topmast staysail to get the ship under command; and on learning from the chief engineer that he hoped to be able to set the engines going again in about 20 minutes, he merely hoisted the ensign union downwards, thinking that it would be seen from Boulogne; but in about 20 minutes, finding that no assistance came to them, and observing a Boulogne pilot boat in the distance, the master fired a gun, and on her bearing down to them he requested the pilot to proceed to Boulogne, and inform them of the state of the vessel, but the wind and tide being against her we are told that the pilot boat did not reach the harbour until the water had fallen so much that no vessel could get out. In the meantime the "Albert Edward" continued to drift along the coast to the eastward; the engineer, assisted by the whole of the crew, endeavouring, but in vain, to disconnect the shaft. At length, at about 1/4 after 2, finding that they had got into 14 fathoms of water, the master ordered the anchor to be dropped, and the vessel was brought up within about a mile and a-half of the shore, Andrecelles church bearing S.E. by E., distant two miles. There they lay without anything coming to their assistance until about 6 o'clock, when the steam-tug "Palmerston," from Dover, came up, and having taken hold, proceeded to tow her in the direction of Folkestone. Owing, however, to their not having been able to disconnect the engines, they could not turn the shaft sufficiently to unship the lower blades of the paddle wheels; and the result was that, although the wind and sea had by that time considerably abated, the "Palmerston" had very great difficulty in towing her; and it was not until about three o'clock of the following morning that they arrived at Folkestone.

Now before we proceed to consider the unusually long list of questions upon which our opinion has been asked by the Board of Trade, there is one which we have not been asked, but on which, as it appears to me, the public will require to be satisfied, and to which, in the interests of the Company, an answer ought to be given, the more so as a good deal of evidence has been addressed to the point; and it is this, "How was it that the 'Albert Edward' came to be employed for the conveyance of the passengers from Boulogne on the day in question?" It seems that for the performance of the passenger service between Folkestone and Boulogne the company have six steamers, the "Albert Victor," the "Louise Dagmar," the "Victoria," the "Albert Edward," the "Alexandra," and the "Napoleon." Of these the two first-named, namely, the "Albert Victor" and "Louise Dagmar," are large and powerful vessels, having been built about 2 years, I think; whilst the other 4 were built in the years 1861, 1862, and 1865. For the month of April four of these vessels, namely, the "Albert Victor," the "Louise Dagmar," the "Victoria," and the "Albert Edward," were detailed for service; and as it was Easter time, when a larger number of passengers might reasonably be expected to cross, the two larger vessels, the "Albert Victor" and the "Louise Dagmar," were employed on the regular service, one crossing each way daily, the "Victoria" and "Albert Edward" being the "stand-byes," as they are called, ready to take the place of either of the two regular vessels if their services were required. On the 16th of April, in the course of their regular duty, the "Albert Victor" crossed from Folkestone to Boulogne, whilst the "Louise Dagmar" crossed from Boulogne to Folkestone. On the arrival, however, of the "Louise Dagmar" at Folkestone it was found that some trifling repairs, which would occupy a few hours, were required to be done to her machinery, and it was therefore deemed expedient to detain her, and to send in her place one of the "stand-byes" for the next trip; and the "Albert Edward" having been selected for that purpose, the crew of the "Louise Dagmar" was transferred over to her. Accordingly, on the 17th, the "Albert Edward" took the passengers over from Folkestone to Boulogne, whilst the "Albert Victor" crossed with the passengers from Boulogne to Folkestone; and in the regular course of duty the "Albert Edward" would on the 18th have brought over the passengers from Boulogne to Folkestone, whilst either the "Albert Victor" or the "Louise Dagmar," if the repairs to her machinery had been completed, would have taken the passengers from Folkestone to Boulogne. An intimation, however, had been received from the Admiralty that a steamer would be required to bring over the Duke of Edinburgh and some members of the Royal Family from Boulogne to Folkestone on the 18th, and as the repairs to the "Louise Dagmar" had been completed, she was assigned to take the passengers on that day from Folkestone to Boulogne, whilst the "Albert Victor," after her arrival from Boulogne with the passengers on the 17th, was sent back the same night to Boulogne to be ready to bring over his Royal Highness and the Royal party on the 18th. It will thus be seen that the charges that have been so freely made, that the "Albert Victor," the larger and stronger vessel, had been taken off the regular service for the use of some members of the Royal Family, and a smaller and inferior vessel had been employed in her place to bring over the passengers from Boulogne, is entirely devoid of foundation. Had there been no application for a special boat for the Royal party, both the "Albert Victor" and the "Louise Dagmar" would have been on that day at Folkestone, and the "Albert Edward" would, in her usual course of duty, have brought over the passengers from Boulogne.

Having thus disposed of this preliminary question, I will now proceed to deal with those which have been submitted to us by the Board of Trade; and the first which we are asked is, "What was the nature of the accident which occurred to the 'Albert Edward' shortly after noon on the 18th April, and what was the cause?" it seems that the engines of the "Albert Edward" are very similar in construction to those of many of the best marine engines, in regard to the way in which the piston is attached to the piston rod. The base of the piston rod is in the form of the fustrum of a cone, and fits closely into a cavity made to receive it in the underside of the piston, so that, when the piston rod is in its place, the bottom of it is flush with the underside of the piston. On the piston rod, and immediately above the conical part, is the thread of a screw, and there is in the upper side of the piston a cylindrical cavity, fitted to receive a nut or hollow cylindrical piece of iron having a screw on the inner face, which exactly fits the screw on the piston rod, and when it is screwed down the nut ought nearly to fill the cylindrical cavity encircling the piston rod, the upper side being flush with the upper side of the piston. It will thus be seen that, whilst the conical form of the base of the piston rod from below keeps the piston from falling off the piston rod when the pressure of steam is from above, the nut screwed on to the thread of the piston rod prevents the piston from travelling up the rod when the pressure is from below, so that the conical form below and the screw nut above keeps the piston in its position at the end of the piston rod. Now, when the cylinder was examined, after the arrival of the vessel a Folkestone, it was found that the thread on the piston rod had become greatly deteriorated. What was the cause of that deterioration is a matter which we shall presently have to consider, but the result was that the thread of the screw having gone, and being unable to hold the piston in its position, the pressure of the steam on the underside forced the piston up the rod, an striking the top of the cylinder with great force knocked off the cover and a portion of the side; this, in our opinion, was the cause of the accident. It was said by Mr. Gibson, one of the Board of Trade Surveyors, that, in his opinion, the accident was not due to any deterioration in the screw of the piston rod, but to some foreign substance in the cylinder which struck the piston and piston rod in its downward stroke and knocked the piston out of position; and he told us that he was confirmed in that view by a mark which he found on the bottom of the piston rod at the outer edge, which he could only account for in that way. None of the other witnesses, however, were disposed to agree with Mr. Gibson in his view; they said that, if had been any such foreign matter in the cylinder the probability is that, instead of injuring the piston and piston rod, it would have knocked out the bottom of the cylinder. Mr. Sampson also, the Assistant Engineer-in-Chief to the Board of Trade, effectually disposed of Mr. Gibson's theory by telling us that he had examined the mark referred to by Mr. Gibson, and found it extending up the conical part of the piston rod, shewing that it must have been done after the piston had been detached from the piston rod, and not before. We have, therefore, no doubt whatever that the accident occurred in the way and from the cause which we have stated.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether, when the vessel left Boulogne, she was in good and seaworthy condition?" Besides the evidence of the Company's officers as to her seaworthiness, Mr. Gibson, the Board of Trade Surveyor, has told us that, ouly in February last, he made a thorough survey of the vessel and her machinery, and found them to be in a good and seaworthy condition, and in accordance with his report she thereupon received from the Board of Trade a passenger certificate, available until the 16th of August 1882, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Apart, therefore, from the condition of the screws of the piston rods, which will be dealt with in our answers to some of the other questions, we have no hesitation in saying that the "Albert Edward" was in a good and seaworthy condition when she left Boulogne, shortly after noon of the 18th of April last.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether a proper and sufficient examination of the engines was made in the year 1876, and whether a proper and sufficient examination was made from time to time thereafter by the servants of the Company?" Excluding for the moment the question of the screws on the piston rods we can have no doubt, from the evidence before us, that there was a proper and sufficient examination made of the engines as well in the year 1876, as from time to time thereafter, by the engineers of the vessel and by the Company's servants.

I now propose to take the next two questions together; they are (4), "Whether, in 1876, the chief engineer then made a proper examination of the piston rods?" and (5), "Whether the thread of the nut of the piston rod was then damaged, and whether he called the attention of the Company's superintending engineer to that fact?" And first I should observe that it was not "the thread of the nut of the piston rod" which was said to have been deteriorated, but the thread on the piston rod. I shall therefore, in answering these questions, assume that they apply to the thread of the piston rod, and not to that of the nut of the piton rod. Now we were told by Mr. Wintle, who was the chief engineer of the "Albert Edward," I think, for about 13 years, to 1880, when he was transferred to the "Louise Dagmar," that in August 1876 he was overhauling the engines of the "Albert Edward," when finding the nut in the starboard cylinder to be slack he unscrewed it, and that he then observed that 8 or 9 inches of one of the threads, or about half a round, was off; that he accordingly sent for Mr. Earnshaw, the Company's superintending engineer, and shewed it to him. In that statement he was confirmed by John Nichols, a stoker, who told us that he had gone and fetched Mr. Earnshaw on the occasion; and by William Baker, another stoker, who was at the time working on board the "Albert Edward." All these mitnesses swore positively and without the smallest hesitation that they saw the nut in the starboard cylinder raised, that they observed the defective state of the thread of the piston rod, and that its condition was pointed out to Mr. Earnshaw. On the other hand Mr. Earnshaw has told us, at first, indeed, not very positively, but afterwards more positively, that the defective state of the thread of that piston rod had never been shewn to him, and that he never saw the nut in the starboard cylinder raised on any occasion. We have thus a direct issue between Mr. Wintle and the two stokers on the one side and Mr. Earnshaw on the other, and the question which we have to decide is, to which the greater credence ought to be given? Now it was said by Mr. Webster that there was a great conflict of testimony between the three witnesses who had spoken to the fact; that they were not agreed either as to the time when the alleged inspection took place, or as to the nature of the damage to the thread. Mr. Wintle had stated that the inspection took place in August 1876, whereas James Nichols and William Baker both said that it was about four years ago, although the latter afterwards corrected himself, and said that he thought it was six years ago. Again, Mr. Wintle had told us that only about eight or nine inches of the thread, or about half a round, and about three threads down from the top, had been broken off, whereas Nichols said that three threads about the middle had been broken off, and William Baker stated that it was eaten away in several places; in some places close into the rod, in others for about an inch. Now, are these discrepancies such that we are at liberty to disbelieve their testimony and to say that these three men have been guilty, not only of wilful and deliberate perjury, but of a conspiracy against Mr. Earnshaw? It appears to us that the discrepancies are only such as might naturally be expected to occur between honest witnesses when giving their evidence as to facts which occurred some six years ago. But are we then to conclude that Mr. Earnshaw has been guilty of deliberate perjury when he says that the defective condition of that screw was never shewn to him, and that he never on any occasion saw that nut raised? By no means. It must be remembered that Mr. Earnshaw had six vessels to look after, whereas Wintle and the two stokers had only one, and it is therefore much more likely that the circumstance would have impressed itself more strongly on their minds than on his. Mr. Earnshaw, with a view of discrediting Wintle, stated that he had had frequent occasion to complain of him for neglect of duty; not that he had made any formal written complaint, but that he had complained of him to Captain Boxer, the superintendent. On the other hand. we have the fact before us that about two years ago Wintle was transferred from the "Albert Edward" to the new and powerful ship the "Louise Dagmar," and that he still holds that appointment. The company, therefore, could hardly have thought badly of Mr. Wintle, nor, indeed, is it probable that they appointed him without consulting Mr. Earnshaw. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that on the day after the casualty Mr. Earnshaw was suspended from the performance of his duties, and that he has not since resumed them; and although we are told that he was suspended for matters unconnected with this casualty the coincidence is remarkable, and. at all events, Mr. Earnshaw, for some reason or other, does not appear to stand so high in the opinion of his employers as does Mr. Wintle, who has not been suspended at all. On the whole, we are disposed to rely upon the recollection (I will not say the word) of Mr. Wintle and the two stokers, Nichols and Baker, rather than on that of Mr. Earnshaw, and to hold that in August 1876 the nut of the starboard piston rod was raised, the thread examined and found damaged, and that the attention of Mr. Earnshaw was called to the fact.

This then brings us to the sixth question, which is, "Whether, if the Company's superintending engineer's attention was called to the damaged piston-rod, he ordered the nut to be replaced as it was, and whether he was justified in so doing?" If Mr. Earnshaw's attention was called to the damaged state of the thread of the starboard piston-rod, as we have held it was, then it is clear that he must have ordered the nut to be replaced, for it is not pretended that the thread was in any way renewed, and the question then arises whether he was justified in so doing. Now I think that we are bound to accept the evidence of a skilled witness like Mr. Wintle, rather than that of Nichols or Baker, as to the extent of the damage to the thread of the screw. According to the former all that was defective with the screw was that about eight or nine inches, or about half a round of the thread was gone some three threads below the top. Now, if this was the only defect, and we have no evidence that there was any other defect in the thread, I am advised by Mr. Eames, the engineer assessor, whose assistance I have on this occasion, that there would be no objection whatever to the nut being replaced. We were told by one of the witnesses that if only one third of the screw remained there would be a factor of safety of between 6 and 7; and if this be so, the loss of only half a round, assuming the thread to have been in other respects in good condition, would, in Mr. Eames' opinion. be a matter of no importance, and might perhaps account for Mr. Earnshaw having forgotten all about it.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether the damaged thread was at any time thereafter examined?" Wintle remained as chief engineer of the "Albert Edward" down to the middle of 1880, when the two new boats were purchased, and from which time the "Albert Edward" seems to have been used as a stand-bye, and to have been employed only when either of the other vessels required repairs. Now Wintle told us that the nut was not raised, and that consequently the damaged thread was never examined, except on that one occasion to which he spoke, in August 1876.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether the condition of the thread of the piston rod was at any time communicated to the surveyors of the Board of Trade?" It is not pretended that any such communication was ever made to any of the surveyors to the Board of Trade.

The ninth question is in these words, "Whether the Company's superintending engineer was justified in omitting to have the nut removed with the view of examining the thread of the screw of the piston rod from time to time, and what was the cause of the thread becoming corroded; how did it happen that this corrosion was not discovered; and whether the several engineers who had had charge of the engines since 1876 made a proper and sufficient examination of the engines, cylinders, and piston rods, and whether they were justified in omitting to remove the nut in order to examine the thread of the screw?" Part of this question has been already answered, and we have now only to consider, first, whether Mr. Earnshaw, the Company's superintending engineer, and the engineers of the vessel were justified in not having the nut removed from time to time in order to examine the thread of the screw on the piston rod; and, secondly, what is the cause of the deterioration of the thread? It seems that immediately after the accident the Company ordered that the nuts on the piston rods of the four vessels which had been built in 1861, 1862, and 1865, namely, the "Victoria," "Alexandra," Albert Edward," and "Napoleon" should be raised, and the condition of the screws carefully examined, and that was accordingly done. The result was that in two of them, the "Victoria" and "Albert Edward," it was found that the threads on both the piston rods were defective and required to be renewed, and that in the "Alexandra" and "Napoleon" one of the threads in each was found defective, the other being good. We were also told by Mr. Nevins, the gentleman who is at present performing Mr. Earnshaw's duties, and under whose superintendence these defective screws have been renewed, that except in two instances the nuts were found to be slack so that they could be removed; that in those two instances they had to break away the nuts, and that in one case the screw under it was found to be good, in the other defective. The fact, therefore, that the nut was tight was no proof that the screw which it covered was in good condition. But although the result of this examination has shewn that out of eight screws six were defective and required to be renewed, we must, in judging of the conduct of Mr. Earnshaw and the engineers who have from time to time had charge of these vessels, be guided, not by our knowledge after the event, but by what were the views generally entertained and received amongst engineers on the subject; we must not expect greater knowledge and foresight on the part of these officers than would be possessed by persons holding similar positions. Now, we have had a number of engineers and engineering surveyors produced before us, and they have one and all told us that the facts revealed by this case have taken them completely by surprise; that they have never before known of any screw under similar conditions deteriorating to the extent to which it would seem that these screws have done. They have told us that all that it has hitherto been thought necessary to do with regard to these nuts was to see if they were slack; and, if so, to tighten them up, and that to raise them for the purpose of examining the condition of the thread was never thought of. How far it may now be necessary to do so may be a question. It was said that there are objections to disturbing what is intended to be a close joint; but the facts disclosed by this case, that out of eight screws six were found to be defective and required to be renewed, and that the fact of the nut being tight is no proof that the screw under it was in good condition seems to point to the desirability of a periodical examination of these screws; for if these screws are defective the safety of the vessel is, as we have seen, imperilled.

But, secondly, what was the cause of the thread deteriorating to the extent which it seems to have done. We are told that it may have arisen from corrosion or from galvanic action; and it is suggested that there are three ways in which this might have taken place. Either water may have got to the screw and corroded the thread; or the grease or fatty matter with which the machinery is lubricated might have been chemically affected; or galvanic action may have been set up by the contact of two metals of different characters—the steel of the piston rod and the wrought iron of the nut. What may be the effect of bringing steel and wrought iron into contact is at present, we are told, but imperfectly known; it is thought, however, that the steel would be more readily affected than the wrought iron, and that this may account for the thread on the steel piston rod having in every instance gone, whilst the thread on the wrought iron nut remained good. It has also been suggested to me by Mr. Eames that possibly galvanic action may have been set up by a cause, which has not been adverted to by any of the witnesses; he says that the friction of the brasses at the top of the piston rods may possibly have detached small particles of brass which would find their way through the cylinders to the screws, and thus a galvanic action might have been set up, which would in time have caused the destruction of the thread of the screw. The matter is, however, at present in too much doubt and obscurity for us to offer any decided opinion on the point, or as to the causes of the deterioration.

The tenth and eleventh questions we will take together; they are as follow:—(10), "Whether, when the vessel left Boulogne, she carried the boats required by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and whether they were fitted with all necessary equipments," and (11) "Whether she carried the life buoys and signals required by the Act?" We were told that she had three boats of the required dimensions and fitted with all the necessary equipments, and that she had the proper signals and life buoys, which is all that the Act of 1854 requires her to carry.

This then brings us to the twelfth question, namely, "Whether, in the opinion of the Court, having regard to the number of passengers, the 'Albert Edward,' and other steamers in the service of the South Eastern Railway Company, are in the habit of carrying from Folkestone to Boulogne, the boat accommodation and life-saving apparatus on board their vessels is sufficient?" We were told by Admiral Maxse that the three boats, with which this vessel was fitted, were not in his opinion sufficient, for that they would together only hold some 60 or 70 persons; and that in default of her being provided with folding boats, or other lifesaving apparatus, he thought that she ought to have had four boats. Seeing, however, that the vessel is licensed to carry 364 passengers, I fear that 4 boats would not have been of much use to save the passengers, had she had her full complement on board. It must, however, not be forgotten that the voyages on which these vessels are bound, are of very short duration, and that they are not out of sight of the port which they have left before they are in sight of the port to which they are bound; and that there are generally a good many steam tugs and other vessels about ready to render assistance to vessels in distress. To provide boats capable of containing all the passengers which these vessels may at any time have on board, would in our opinion be impracticable. We are, therefore, not prepared to say that the boat accommodation and lifesaving apparatus, which they have, are not sufficient.

I will follow Mr. Mansel Jones' example, and leave questions 13 and 14 for the present, and will proceed to answer question 15, which is as follows:—"Whether upon the chief and second engineers taking charge upon the morning of the 15th of April, they made a proper and sufficient examination of the engines; and if not, whether they were justified in neglecting to do so?" The evidence is that they did make a proper and sufficient examination of the engines. Of course, they did not take off the covers of the cylinders, and unscrew the nuts on the piston rods, and unless they had done so, they could not have seen the defective threads; but they seem to have examined the machinery and engines in the usual way, and to have ascertained, so far as it was possible for them to do, that they were in good working condition.

The sixteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the engineers being unable to disconnect the engines?" We are told that to prevent the crank shaft from moving they tried to secure the paddle wheels with ropes and chains, but, owing to the sea that was on, they were not able to do so; the result, the chief engineer told us, was that they were never able, with the tools which they had on board, to get "a fair blow" at the crank pin, so as to drive it out. That they did their best, we have the evidence not of themselves only, but of some of the passengers; and I am told by Mr. Eames that, considering the state of the weather, and the position of the piston rod, and the appliances which they would naturally have on board, he is not surprised that they were not able to drive the pin out.

The seventeenth question which we are asked is, "What are the circumstances in which guns were not fired until some time after the accident; and whether the master was justified in neglecting to make this distress signal immediately, or as soon as possible after the casualty?" The master has told us that immediately on the accident occurring he hoisted the ensign union downward, expecting that it would be seen from Boulogne. He told us that he was informed by the chief engineer that he thought they would within 20 minutes be able to disconnect the engines, and would then be able to work the port engine, and that that was why he did not fire a gun then. Again, when he was anchored off Cape Grisnez, his signal, he said, could be distinctly seen by those on shore, and they could have had no doubt that he was in want of assistance, so that the firing of a gun was then unnecessary. And on the whole we think that the master did exercise a wise discretion in not firing guns for assistance, as it would have been of no use, and would no doubt have greatly alarmed the passengers.

The eighteenth question which we are asked is, "What are the circumstances in which no assistance was rendered to the vessel from Calais or Boulogne?" We are told that the condition of the vessel was not known either at Calais or at Boulogne, until the tide had fallen, so as to make it impossible for any vessel to go to her assistance, and before the next tide had made sufficiently for that purpose she was in tow of the "Palmerston," and was proceeding towards Folkestone.

Following then the example of the learned counsel for the Board of Trade I will take questions 13, 14, and 19 together; they are as follow:—(13) "Whether the South-Eastern Railway Company kept a sufficient and proper look-out for the arrival of the 'Albert Edward' on the night of the 18th of April?" (14) "What arrangements are made by the Company for the purpose of supplying the place of, or to render assistance to any vessel which may be temporarily disabled; and whether, in the opinion of the Court, these arrangements are sufficient?" and (19) "Whether prompt and proper measures were taken to render assistance to the vessel, when it was known that she had broken down?" It seems that Captain Boxer, who is the harbour master at Folkestone, as well as the chief superintendent of the South-Eastern Company's boats, was on board the "Albert Victor" when she left Boulogne with the Duke of Edinburgh and his suite on board. He told us that they got clear of the harbour some 10 minutes before the "Albert Edward" and having a speed of about 16 1/2 knots an hour, whilst the "Albert Edward" had a speed of only 12 knots, they were soon far ahead of her. He said that going, as they were, head to wind, their smoke would, in a great measure, obscure the "Albert Edward" from their view, and that, as a matter of fact, he did not see her until about 1 p.m., and that then she was hull down, and that he did not see her after that. He told us that they arrived in Folkestone at 1.33, doing the distance in about one hour and a half; that he then went to attend to his duties, leaving word with his deputy, Mr. Hammond, to look after the "Albert Edward," which he expected to arrive at about 1/4 after 2. At that hour he was informed that she was not in sight, and he accordingly directed steam to be got up on board the "Albert Victor," but unfortunately the fires had been drawn, and before they could be lighted again and steam got up she had taken the ground astern. In the meantime he had telegraphed to Dover for the steam tug "Palmerston" to go out in search of the "Albert Edward," and he tells us that between half-past 3 and 4 he saw the "Palmerston" go out for that purpose. He telegraphed also to their agents at Calais and Boulogne to enquire about the "Albert Edward," but, owing to the submarine telegraph cable being temporarily out of order, no reply was received until about half-past 5 o'clock. The next telegram which he received was at 6.40 p.m. from Cape Grisnez, telling him that the "Albert Edward" was in tow, and that they were proceeding in a N.W. direction. That night, it seems, they had a cargo boat going from Folkestone to Boulogne, and which left the harbour as soon as there was water enough for her, namely, between 9 and 10 p.m., and he directed the captain to keep well to the westward, so as to be able to render assistance to the "Albert Edward" in case they should fall in with her and she should require it. He also telegraphed to Boulogne that the same directions should be given to the cargo boat which was leaving that port. Both these vessels performed their voyages across, but without seeing anything of the "Albert Edward." We are told also by Captain Boxer that the Company had another steamer in the harbour, called the "Princess Clementine," and that he ordered steam to be got up on board of her, but she did not leave the harbour. At about half-past 12 they thought they saw the vessel approaching the harbour, but it turned out not to be so, and, as has been already said, the "Albert Edward" did not reach Folkestone until about 3. These are, so far as we understand, the only measures which were taken to render assistance to the "Albert Edward."

This, then, brings us to the last question, in which we are asked, "Whether the master and engineers are, or either of them is, in default, and whether blame attaches to the Company's superintending engineer or to Captain Boxer?" No blame in our opinion attaches either to the master or to the engineers, nor indeed does it appear to us that blame attaches to Mr. Earnshaw, the superintending engineer, for not examining the screws on the piston rods, as he seems to have acted in accordance with the usual and acknowledged practice of the most experienced engineers in this respect. But as regards Captain Boxer the case is different; he knew at 1/4 after 2 in the afternoon, when the vessel should have arrived in port, that she was not then in sight, and that consequently some accident must have happened to her; and subsequently he learnt that she had broken down, and was anchored off the French coast. He did not know what was the nature or the extent of the injuries which she had sustained; for all he knew she might have been leaking badly, and been in urgent need of assistance. Knowing this, and that she had a large number of passengers on board, it was Captain Boxer's duty to have sent assistance to her with the least possible delay. We understood Captain Boxer, when he was giving his evidence, to say that steam had been got up on board the "Princess Clementine" by about 1/4 to 12, but we are told by counsel that this was a mistake, and that the steam was not got up on board that vessel until 2 a.m. On this it occurred to us to ask why it was that steam had not been got up sooner; and we were then told that the "Princess Clementine" would not float before 2. But I confess that I have some difficulty in understanding how this could be. According to the Admiralty tide tables it was high water in Folkestone Harbour that night at 11.25 p.m.; and if the "Princess Clementine" was not afloat at that hour, it is difficult to see how she could have been afloat at 2 a.m., some two hours and a half afterwards. And as Captain Boxer, we are told, thinks that an injustice has been done him by our decision, it may be well to examine the question a little more closely. Now, how stand the facts? It was high water that day at Folkestone at 11 a.m.; at 1.33 p.m., or two hours and a half afterwards, the "Albert Victor" entered the harbour; at 2.15, or more than three hours after high water, Captain Boxer ordered steam to be got up on board the "Albert Victor," with the view of sending her out to look for the "Albert Edward," so that it may fairly be assumed that she was then afloat, and it was only after steam had been got up—but when that was we are not told—that she was found to have taken the ground, and then only by the stern. If, then, the "Albert Victor" was afloat more than three hours after high water in the middle of the day, it is inconceivable that she should not have been afloat at all events by 9 p.m., when it wanted only two hours and a half of the next high water. It seems to us that, apart from the cargo boat, which, we are told, left the harbour between 9 and 10 p.m., either the "Albert Victor" or the "Princess Clementine" might have been got ready to go out by 9 p.m., at any rate had the orders to get up steam on board them been given in time; and that the reason why this was not done was because Captain Boxer was not fully alive to the gravity of the case, to the great inconvenience to which the passengers were exposed, and to the possible danger to the lives of all on board had bad weather set in. And it is much to be regretted that some one or other of the many steam vessels which were available was not sent out to their assistance. Being, as we are told it was, a clear night, she would have had no difficulty in picking them up, and it would at least have been some satisfaction to the passengers to feel that they had another steamer at hand, in addition to the tug-boat "Palmerston," to receive them in case of further disaster, besides expediting their arrival in Folkestone Harbour, which they seem to have reached only just in time to save the tide.

The Court was not asked to deal with the certificates of any of the officers, or to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

WILLM. CURLING, R.N.R.,

 

 

 

ABSM. ANDERSON,

Assessors.

 

 

W. EAMES, R.N., C.I.M.,

 

L 367. 1162. 150.—6/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.