Wreck Report for 'Firth of Cromarty', 1882

(No. 1393.)

"FIRTH OF CROMARTY."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 16th of June 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain FORSTER and Rear-Admiral PICKARD, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the supposed loss of the sailing ship "FIRTH OF CROMARTY," of Glasgow, whilst on a voyage from Rangoon to Falmouth, with a cargo of rice.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said ship was in a good and seaworthy condition, so far as regards her hull and equipments, when she left Rangoon in April 1881; seeing, however, the way in which the cargo was stowed, and the ventilators in the cargo formed, it is quite possible that it may have shifted and caused the vessel to founder; but that there is no evidence to shew how she was lost.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 16th day of June 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

Assessors.

 

 

BENJN. J. PICKARD,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 16th of June instant, when Mr. Howard Smith appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Hollams for the owners of the "Firth of Cromarty." Two witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, and the affidavits of two witnesses taken at Rangoon, having been put in and read, Mr. Howard Smith handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Hollams then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Howard Smith having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Firth of Cromarty" was an iron barque belonging to the Port of Glasgow, of 957 tons gross and 909 tons net register. She was built at Greenock in the year 1880, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. James Spencer, of 316, Paisley-road, Glasgow, and others; Mr. James Spencer being the managing owner. She left Rangoon on the evening of the 26th of April last, with a crew of 21 hands all told, and a cargo of 1,477 tons of rice in bags, bound to Falmouth for orders. Having anchored for the night abreast of the Fairway Buoy, she weighed early on the following morning, and proceeded on her voyage. On the 7th of May following she was spoken in latitude 12° 23' north and longitude 94° 52' east by the "Haddon Hall," which sighted her again on several subsequent days, and finally parted company with her on the 16th or the 26th of June. On the 27th of that month she was also spoken by the "Nebo," of Glasgow, in latitude 19° 30' south and longitude 71° 11' east, but from that time she has not been seen or heard of; and the object of the present inquiry is to ascertain, if possible, what has become of her.

Now the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the 'Firth of Cromarty,' on leaving Rangoon on the 26th of April 1881, so far as concerns her hull and equipment, in a good and seaworthy condition?" It seems that the vessel was built under special survey, and on her completion in the year 1880, she was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's. In June of that year she sailed from Glasgow with a cargo of 1,532 tons of general goods, bound to Sydney, in New South Wales, and having there discharged her outward cargo, she took in a cargo of coals at Newcastle, in New South Wales, with which she proceeded to Rangoon, and there shipped the cargo of rice, with which she left for this country. Now, although the contract price for which the vessel was built, was undoubtedly a very low one, being only 10l. 5s. per ton on an assumed tonnage of 900 tons, we were assured both by the builder and by the owner that she was a well built ship; and looking to the class which she had at Lloyd's, it is perhaps fair to assume that she could not have been otherwise. In addition to this we have the evidence of the pilot, who took her out from Rangoon, that she then appeared to be "in very good condition, and her crew efficient." And under these circumstances we have no ground for saying that the vessel, when she left Rangoon on the 26th of April 1881, was not, so far as concerned her hull and equipments, in a good and seaworthy condition.

The second question which we are asked is, "Was the load-line placed at such a distance from the deck as to give the vessel sufficient freeboard, if loaded down to it?" Mr. Spencer, the owner, told us that it was his invariable practice in fixing the load-line to allow 2 1/4 inches for every foot depth of hold, and that he did so in the case of the "Firth of Cromarty;" and as the depth, as given in the register, is 19.05 feet, that would put the load-line about 3 feet 7 inches below the line of the deck. What we are asked then is, whether, if loaded down to that point, she would have had sufficient freeboard. According to the specification the floors were "to be four inches deeper than Lloyd's rules from " stem to stern, and from bilge to bilge;" and from the midship section of the vessel, which has been brought in, they would seem to have been no less than 27 inches deep. The object, we were told by Mr. Lithgow, the builder, in having these unusually deep floor plates was not to give the vessel any additional strength, but to obtain a diminished tonnage on which dues were to be paid, the depth of the hold for tonnage purposes being measured to the ceiling amidships, which Mr. Lithgow told us would be about 2 1/2 inches above the top of the floor plates; so that the deeper the floor plates were the less the tonnage measurement. But in estimating what ought to be the freeboard we must look generally at the vessel's dimensions, and if so, we must regard her as having a greater depth of hold, and consequently a larger under deck tonnage, than that shewn by the register; and I am advised that for the purposes of freeboard we may fairly assume the depth of hold to have been 19.5 feet instead of 19.05 feet, and her under deck tonnage to be about 50 tons or more in excess of that shewn by the register, or about 920 tons instead of 864 tons. And now let us see what ought to be the minimum amount of freeboard for a vessel of these dimensions. According to the rules recently issued by the Board of Trade, a sailing vessel, built of iron or hard wood, with an under deck tonnage of 850 tons, ought to have a freeboard of 2.6 inches for every foot depth of hold, and with an under deck tonnage of 1000 tons of 2.7 inches for every foot depth of hold. This, on a depth of hold of 19.5 feet, would give in the former case a freeboard of 50.70 inches, and in the latter of 52 65 inches. From this, however, there would have to be a deduction of between 2 and 3 inches for the raised poop, which extended as far forward as the mizen mast, thus making the minimum freeboard for a vessel, with an under deck tonnage of 850 tons, of about 48 inches, or 4 feet; and for a vessel with an under deck tonnage of 1000 tons, of 50 inches, or 4 feet 2 And as we have seen that the under deck tonnage of this vessel may be taken at about 920 tons, or at a mean between the two, her minimum freeboard by the Board of Trade rules would be about 4 feet 1. Turning now to the tables recently issued by Lloyd's, or, as they are called, Mr. Martell's rules, we find that with a co-efficient of fineness of 61, which is about what this vessel would have had, and with a moulded depth of 21 feet, which I am told by the Assessors is what it would be, her minimum freeboard should be about four feet. It will thus be seen that in this instance the results arrived at by the Board of Trade and by Lloyd's rules very nearly agree, and may, therefore, be assumed to be correct. We have seen, however, that in the case of the "Firth of Cromarty," the centre of the disc was only 3 feet 7 below the upper line of the deck; if, therefore, she had been loaded down to her load-line, she would most certainly not have had a sufficient freeboard.

The third question that we are asked is, "Was she overladen?" in a letter from the captain dated the 24th of April 1881, written on the eve of his departure from Rangoon, and when, as he tells us, the loading was finished, the vessel being "choke full fore and aft," it is stated that she then drew 18 feet 4 forward and 18 feet 8 aft, giving a mean of 18 feet 6, which agrees substantially with the statements contained in the affidavit of Mr. Winter, the marine superintendent of the shippers, that her draught of water, as she lay at single anchor after being loaded, was 18 feet 3 forward and 18 feet 9 aft, giving also a mean of 18 feet 6; and Mr. Winter adds that her freeboard was 3 feet 7. It must be remembered, however, that the vessel was then in fresh water, and that there would be a rise of about 5 inches on passing into salt water, so that her freeboard when she got to sea would be about 4 feet; and as 4 feet to 4 feet 1 inch is the minimum amount of freeboard for a vessel of her dimensions, according both to the Board of Trade and to Mr. Martell's rules, we are not prepared to say that she was overladen, although undoubtedly she was very fully laden.

The next question which we are asked is, "Were the ventilators in the cargo properly formed, or were the same likely to collapse and set alive or in motion the entire cargo?" The only evidence which we have as to the manner in which the ventilators in the cargo were formed is that furnished in the affidavit of Mr. Winter, the marine superintendent of Messrs. Bullock Brothers and Co., of Rangoon, Akyab, and other places, the shippers of the cargo. The following are his remarks on the subject, under the head of ventilation:—"There " were," he says, "two sparred wooden shafts about " 16" square, the one leading from bottom up to a " deck ventilating cowl forward, and the other from " bottom up to a kennel ventilator abaft the after hatch. " Kelson tunnel fore and aft the ship each side of " kelson, the height of one bag and about 8 inches " wide, roofed over with 3" × 1 1/2" wooden battens. " One single bag tunnel on the 4th tier of bags from " bottom. One on the 9th tier, and one above the " beams on each side of midship stanchions, running " fore and aft the ship midway between side and " stanchions, and into the upright shafts at either end, " and intersected by cross tunnels abreast of each hatch. " All the tunnels were the height of one bag and " 8 inches wide, roofed over with 3" × 1 1/4" battens, and " the bags covering them stowed a-burton." It will thus be seen that the plan on which the ventilators in this vessel were constructed was what is generally known as the space or Heap's system, as distinguished from the box ventilator system. The question of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two systems was very fully considered in the case of the "Essex," which came before me on the 30th and 31st of July 1880, and on which occasion I had the assistance of Captain Forster, one of the Assessors who sits with me in this case; and having carefully perused the remarks which I then made, and which are fully set out in the report in that case, we see no reason to alter the views therein expressed. We stated in that case that the space or Heap's system was, in our opinion, very inferior to the box ventilator system, and that the ventilators in the cargo formed according to the former system were very likely to collapse and set the cargo in motion; and to that opinion we still adhere. We entered so fully into our reasons for that opinion in the report which was made in the case of the "Essex" that it will not be necessary to repeat them here.

The fifth question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Was it prudent to stow all the tiers of bags, except those over the tunnels, as longers, or should not all, or some, and which, have been stowed a-burton?" It is stated in Mr. Winter's affidavit that "the whole of " the cargo was in bags, and all stowed in longers, " except the bags covering the tunnels." This, it seems, was the way in which they were stowed in the "Essex," in our opinion a very improper mode of stowing them, seeing that they were all tight, not loose bags, and that they would therefore be very liable to shift by the rolling of the vessel. We stated in the case of the "Essex," that there could "be no doubt " that it would be better that the bags should be stowed " a-burton, which is the mode recommended by the " authorities in the North American ports, as that " which long experience has shewn them to be most " conducive to the safety of life and property;" and to that opinion we adhere.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Were the shifting boards of sufficient thickness and of sufficient strength to prevent the cargo shifting in the event of the ventilators collapsing." According to Mr. Winter's report, there were "shifting boards from " bottom to deck lashed each side of the midship " stanchions opposite each other, and about four inches " apart, of 8" × 1 1/4" planks." This would give a total thickness of 2 1/2 inches; whereas three inches no doubt would have been better. Whilst therefore we are not prepared to say that the shifting boards were not of sufficient thickness to prevent the cargo shifting, if the ventilators had collapsed, we think that they were only barely sufficient.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Generally, was her cargo properly stowed?" In our opinion it was not; that is the opinion, which we formed in the case of the "Essex," and we see no reason to alter it. Now it is stated in the charter party that the master is "to afford all facilities to charterers or " their agents to survey the vessel at all times, and to " allow free access to the hold during the loading and " discharging for the purpose of inspecting the " dunnage and ventilators, the latter of which must be " attended to as directed by the charterers or their " agents. Charterers to provide necessary planks and " nails for ship to make ventilators." It will thus be seen that the arrangements for the stowage and ventilation of the cargo was, by the terms of the charter party, taken out of the hands of the owners and transferred to those of the charterers and their agents. Now the charterers in this case as in that of the "Essex," were Messrs. Bullock Brothers and Co., of Rangoon, &c., and the persons, under whose directions the cargo, both in this case and in that of the "Essex," was stowed and ventilated, were Messrs. Bullock's agents at Rangoon. Messrs. Bullock were present at the trial of the case of the "Essex," and were no doubt fully cognisant of the remarks made by the Court in regard to the mode of stowage and ventilation adopted in that case. Either then they did not agree with those remarks, or they have shewn a lamentable want of consideration for the lives of those, who have to navigate these rice vessels, for it seems that they still continue the same system, although the only advantages of the space or Heap's system are, as it would seem, that it costs somewhat less than the box ventilator system, and that it takes up a little less room in the hold; but these are considerations which ought not, as we stated in the case of the "Essex," to be weighed for one moment against the safety of life. What measures have been taken to make the report in the "Essex" known at Rangoon and the other rice ports, the Court has not been told; but we are told that several other vessels fitted with ventilators on the space or Heap's system, and stowed as the "Essex" was, have since been despatched from Rangoon, and have not reached their distination in safety. It certainly does seem to be advisable that some measures should be taken to bring these facts to the knowledge of those who are reponsible for the loading of rice vessels at Rangoon and the other rice ports, so that the remarks which the Court found it to be its duty to make in the case of the "Essex," may not fall, as they seem to have done, entirely unheeded; for there are few more dangerous cargoes than these rice cargoes.

The last question upon which our opinion is asked is, "What, in the opinion of the Court, was the cause of the vessel not having been heard of since she was last seen in the month of June 1881?" It is, of course, impossible for us to say what has become of this vessel. All that we can say is, that her cargo was stowed in such a way that it is quite possible that the tunnels may have collapsed and the cargo have shifted if she encountered bad weather. But whether this was the cause of her loss, or whether she has been lost from some of the other accidents of the sea, it is impossible for us, with the materials before us, to say.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

Assessors.

 

 

BENJN. J. PICKARD,

 

L 367. 1164. 150.—6/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.