Wreck Report for 'Douro' and 'Yrurac Bat', 1882

(No. 1427.)

"DOURO" (S.S.) AND "YRURAC BAT." (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of July 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain KNOX, R.N., and Captain METHVEN, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship "DOURO," of London, and the loss of the lives of 20 of those on board her, through collision with the Spanish steamship "YRURAC BAT," off Cape Finisterre, on the 1st of April last.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the collision between the said two vessels appears to have been due to the "Douro" not having taken proper steps to keep out of the way of the "Yrurac Bat," as she was bound and ought to have done, when she saw the red light of the latter some 3 or 4 points on her starboard bow; but that no blame attaches to the officers and crew of the "Douro" for anything that occurred after the collision, every effort having been made by them, and successfully, during the short time which elapsed between the collision and the foundering of the vessel, to launch the boats with the view of saving the lives of those on board, and especially the lives of the passengers.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 8th day of July 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

HENRY KNOX,

 

 

 

Captain R.N.,

Assessors.

 

 

R. METHVEN,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was held at Westminster on the 6th, 7th, and 8th days of July instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones and Mr. Snagge appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Butt, Q.C., and Dr. Phillimore for the owners and second officer of the "Douro." Eighteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, and the deposition of a witness taken at Corunna having by consent been put in and read, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Butt then produced Sir Henry Becher as a witness, and having addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. Mansel Jones having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked.

The Court is placed in a position of some difficulty in this case owing to the fact that no witness has been produced from the "Yrurac Bat," and that of the officers who were on board the "Douro" at the time of the collision, the master and three of the mates went down with the vessel, the second mate, who was below at the time, being the only survivor. Dolman, too, the man at the helm, had unfortunately been sent away in one of the Company's ships before they had any knowledge that there was to be an inquiry, and we have had a statement brought in which was made by him before the British Consul at Corunna, but which is by no means so satisfactory as if he had been produced as witness before us and examined and cross-examined in open Court. So far, however, as the evidence before us enables us to form an opinion, the facts would appear to have been as follow:—

The "Douro" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of London, of 2,846 tons gross and 1,803 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 500 horse power. She was built at Greenock in the year 1865, and was regularly employed by her owners—the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company—in the conveyance of passengers and mails between this country and the Brazils. She left Lisbon on the 31st of March last for Southampton with a crew of 80 hands all told, 60 passengers, and a general cargo, and at about 7.30 p.m. of the following day was off Cape Finisterre. At 10 p.m. the vessel was proceeding on her course to the northward, the engines going at full speed, the weather being clear but squally, and with a strong breeze from the S.W. accompanied by a heavy swell. It was the chief mate's watch, which consisted of himself, the 4th officer, 2 quarter masters, and 7 A.B.'s, and they were thus stationed: the chief officer was on the bridge, the fourth was on the quarter deck aft; Dolman, an A.B., was at the wheel, and Jarvis and Chenery, two other A.B.'s, were on the look-out, the former being on the bridge, the latter on the topgallant forecastle forward; the rest of the watch were about the deck. At about 10.30 Chenery saw and immediately reported the bright light of a steamer, which afterwards proved to be that of the "Yrurac Bat," from three to four points upon the starboard bow, and was answered by the chief officer, and shortly afterwards the red light of the steamer appeared. Chenery, indeed, the look-out man forward, says that he never saw anything but the bright light, but Dolman, the man at the wheel, says that he distinctly saw the red light on the starboard bow, and that the chief officer looked at it with his glasses. According also to that very intelligent little boy, William Warren Smith, who was on the quarter deck at the time, he and the fourth officer saw the red light some time before the collision. Jarvis also, the look-out man on the bridge, tells us that he saw the red light and reported it, but whether that was before or after he had left the bridge to assist in taking in the foretopsail is perhaps somewhat doubtful. It is clear, however, that the red light of the "Yrurac Bat" was burning, and that it was seen by some of the crew of the "Douro " on the starboard bow some time before the collision occurred. Nevertheless the vessel was still continued on her course, the engines all the time going full speed. In the meantime the wind had headed them, and the foretopsail being aback the chief officer sent Jarvis to order Amrath, the acting quartermaster, to take it in, and told him to lend a hand himself. Whilst they were engaged taking in the sail, the chief officer, observing that the two vessels were rapidly approaching one another, and that there was risk of a collision, ordered the helm of the "Douro" to be put hard-a-starboard. Jarvis, however, was then off the bridge assisting taking in the foresail, and Dolman, being alone at the wheel, found it impossible, the vessel still going at full speed, to get the wheel over, and he accordingly called to some of the hands to come and help him, which they did; and they had just got the wheel over when the "Yrurac Bat" came into them at right angles, striking them on the starboard side a little forward of the after hatch. The "Yrurac Bat" then rebounded and came into them a second time, damaging the two aftermost boats on the starboard side, the gig and dingy, and then passed under her stern, the "Douro" still continuing to go ahead full speed. Immediately after the collision the master of the "Douro" came on deck, and seeing that the vessel was very seriously damaged, he at once ordered the engines to be stopped, and the remaining boats to be got out. The seven uninjured boats were accordingly put into the water, and a number of the crew and passengers got into them, and in about 20 minutes from the time of the collision the "Douro" sank, carrying with her several of the passengers and crew, the "Yrurac Bat," which had sustained very considerable injury in the bows, going down a few minutes before her. In the meantime a steamer, called the "Hidalgo," had very fortunately come up, and having taken on board the survivors from the two vessels, subsequently landed them at Corunna. Of the crew of the "Douro," the master, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th mates, the purser, boatswain, two engineers and six hands, making 14 in all, were drowned, in addition to six of the passengers. How many from the "Yrurac Bat " were drowned we do not know, but we are told that there were a great many more than from the "Douro."

These being the facts of the case, the Board of Trade have asked our opinion upon the following questions :—

1. Whether the "Douro" was built in a sufficient number of watertight compartments with a view to obviate loss of life in case of collision or other damage; whether the bulkheads were properly constructed of efficient strength; and whether sluices and sluice gates at the bottom of them were properly fitted; and whether the sluices and doors, or any of them, were open at the time of the collision, and if open, whether they should have been immediately closed?

2. Whether she was sufficiently and properly manned?

3. Whether the "Douro" was properly equipped with life boats and life buoys, and whether the boats were provided with all necessary equipments, and whether those equipments were kept in their proper place in each boat, so as to be available for immediate use?

4. Whether proper measures were taken to exercise the crew in the lowering of the boats, and whether they were sufficiently and properly exercised in that practice from time to time, so that the crew knew their stations in the boats, and the position of the gear in case of emergency; and whether proper measures were taken from time to time to ascertain that the boats were in good and proper condition; and whether every possible effort was made by the company to ensure the safety of the lives of the passengers and crew carried by the Douro?"

5. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept on board the vessel, and whether a sufficient number of hands were kept on deck for the purpose of navigating the vessel; and whether, in the opinion of the Court, two men should not have been exclusively stationed at the wheel? Whether, looking to the size and speed of this ship, it would not have been a proper and necessary precaution to have fitted her with steam steering gear; and if not, whether the engines should not have been eased to enable the helm to be put hard over?

6. What was the cause of the loss of the "Douro?"

7. Whether prompt and proper measures were taken to lower the boats, and whether they were lowered in a proper and seamanlike manner, and whether every possible effort was made to save the lives of the passengers; and how was it that six passengers lost their lives?

8. Were the officers justified in allowing their boats to leave the ship without them?

9. How did it happen that the "Douro," built in seven watertight compartments, foundered about half-an-hour after she had been struck?

10. Whether the "Douro" was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?

Before, however, I proceed to answer the questions which have been put to us, it may be well to make some remarks upon a practice which has recently grown up, of putting to the Court a long string of questions without much reference to the evidence that has been given, and arranged in such a way that, if answered in the order in which they are submitted, it would lead to a good deal of needless repetition. The practice seems not to be confined to this Court, but I am told by the assessors that it prevails in inquiries which take place before the magistrates in the country, and that it often leads to much inconvenience. The learned counsel for the Board of Trade stated that it arose from the wording of the new rules, but I can hardly see how this can be, for the new rules, as they are called, have been in operation since 1878, whereas the practice to which I refer is of quite recent growth, not more than a few months old. Thus, in the present case, the questions were originally 29 in number, the same as in the recent case of the "Falls of Afton;" but an objection being taken to them by Mr. Butt, they were withdrawn, and were then grouped into the present 10 questions. And although they have been thereby greatly improved, I think that it will be more convenient, instead of answering the questions in the order in whieh they have been put to us, to follow the course taken by the learned counsel for the Board of Trade, who stated that in his opinion the case might be very conveniently arranged under the four following heads:—

(1) The cause of the collision.

(2) The sufficiency of the crew.

(3) The condition of the boats.

(4) The cause of the loss of life.

To which I would add some observations on the number and efficiency of the water-tight bulkheads, the state of the steering gear, and the conduct of the master and officers of the "Douro;" and this will, I think, cover the whole ground of the inquiry.

First, then, "What was the cause of the collision?" I think that it has been clearly established that the red light of the "Yrurac Bat" was first seen a considerable time before the collision some three or four points on the starboard bow; and under these circumstances it would be the duty of the "Douro," in accordance with the terms of the 16th article of the regulations for pre. venting collisions at sea, to keep out of the way of the other vessel. Instead, however, of doing so she continued her course until the vessels had got so near to one another that a collision was almost inevitable; and then, when at the last moment the helm was ordered to be put hard-a-starboard, Jarvis, the look-out man on the bridge, and who was also required to act as stand-by at the wheel, was off the bridge assisting to haul down the fore topsail, so that Dolman, the helmsman, was not able to get the wheel over owing to the vessel still going ahead at full speed. Now whether the chief officer of the "Douro" saw the red light of the "Yrurac Bat" in time to have avoided a collision or not, he is in our opinion equally to blame. If he did not see the light until just before the helm was ordered to be put to starboard, there must have been a bad look-out on board, either on his part or on the part of those who were keeping the look-out, for others on board the "Douro" saw the red light a considerable time before the collision. If, on the other hand, it was reported to him, and he did see it, and yet continued his course in the expectation that he would cross the other vessel's course before she reached him, he is equally to blame, as it was his duty to keep out of her way. There was some question whether Jarvis saw and reported the red light before or after he had left the bridge; but it appears to us not to be a matter of any importance. It was strongly contended by the learned counsel for the "Douro" that Jarvis saw and reported the light before he was sent forward to assist in taking in the fore topsail, but if so the chief mate was to blame for sending the stand-by off the bridge at a time when, owing to the direction in which the two vessels were approaching one another, it was not unlikely that his services might be required at the wheel. It appears to us, then, that in any case, upon the evidence of her own witnesses, the "Douro" must have been to blame. It was contended, however, by Mr. Butt that the "Yrurac Bat" may, as she neared the "Douro," have been kept under a port helm with a view of passing ahead of the "Douro," and that at the last moment she may have starboarded her helm and brought herself at right angles into the "Douro;" if so, she would no doubt have been to blame, for it was her duty under the 22nd rule to keep her course. But this is pure conjecture, and it is quite clear that, if the courses of the two vessels had been originally at or nearly at right angles to one another, as they probably were, that of the "Douro" being to the northward, whilst the "Yrurac Bat" was going to the westward, there would have been a right-angled blow if the "Yrurac Bat" had kept her course, as she was bound to do. On the whole there is nothing in the evidence to show that the "Yrurac Bat" was in any way to blame.

Secondly, "Was the vessel sufficiently and properly " manned?" It appears that originally this vessel had a master, 5 mates, 10 petty officers, 20 able seamen, and 8 ordinary seamen, 6 engineers, 27 firemen, and about 48 other persons, or a total of 124 to 130 hands all told. But upon her last voyage she had a master, 4 mates, 6 petty officers, 14 able seamen, 2 ordinary seamen, 4 engineers, 21 firemen, and 28 other persons, making a total of only 80 hands all told. It seems, however, that since the vessel has been running alterations have been made in her which have effected a great saving of labour, so that a very much smaller crew than formerly was required. In the first place, we are told that she was altered from a brig to a schooner; then, instead of only two steam winches with which she was formerly fitted for working the sails, she had four steam winches, besides a steam capstan. Again, in 1S79 the engines were compounded, thus effecting a very great saving in the consumption of fuel, and consequently diminishing the work in the engine-room department. All this would certainly shew that a smaller crew than formerly would be sufficient; but the question is, whether the crew which she actually had on board at the time was so? It seems that with the crew which she had she was able to furnish for each watch 2 officers, 2 quarter masters, and 7 able seamen. Of these, one officer would be on the bridge, the other on the quarter deck aft; there would be one seaman forward on the look-out, another at the wheel, and another on the bridge on the look-out, who would at the same time act as a stand-by to the man at the wheel, leaving six hands available for any duties that might be required of them about the deck or aloft. As a proof, however, that the watch on deck was not sufficient for the proper working of the ship, it was said that if it had been, Jarvis, the lookout man on the bridge, and who was also required to act as stand-by to the wheel in case of need, would not have been sent off the bridge to assist in furling the fore topsail; and in connection therewith we were asked, Whether, in the opinion of the Court, two men ought not to have been exclusively stationed at the wheel? Whether it is or is not necessary that there should in such a vessel be always two men at the wheel, one at it, and the other standing by, and without any other duties to perform, is a point on which the assessors are not entirely agreed; but of this they are quite satisfied, that if there was any such necessity, one out of the six extra hands in the watch might have been assigned to perform that duty. The assessors think that it was a mistake on the part of the chief officer to send Jarvis off the bridge at a time when there was every probability that his services might be required to lend a hand at the wheel; but that it is no proof that there were not sufficient hands on deck to work the ship properly. They say that it ought never to be forgotten that the sails are but a very subordinate part of the propelling power of these large and powerful steam vessels, and that even had the fore topsail been aback there was no reason for taking it in until after the "Yrurac Bat" had passed them, and there was no danger of a collision with her. On the whole the assessors are of opinion that there is nothing to shew that the vessel was not sufficiently manned.

This then brings us to the question, "Whether it would not have been a proper and necessary precaution in a vessel of this description that she should have been fitted with steam steering gear?" Most large ships are now fitted with steam steering gear, and like all complicated machinery it has its dangers and difficulties, and requires to be handled with due care and caution; but it would hardly have come into such general use unless experience had shewn how useful it is on board these large vessels. And certainly in the present instance, if this vessel had been fitted with it, one man could have worked it, and would have been able to put the helm hard-a-starboard as soon as the order was given; so that the absence of the stand-by would in that case have been a matter of no consequence. Not being fitted with it, however, and seeing that there was but one man at the wheel, and that the stand-by had gone forward to assist in taking in the foretopsail, it was clearly the duty of the chief officer to have eased the engines when he ordered the helm to be starboarded.

The next question relates to the boats and their equipments, and whether they were sufficient and were properly equipped. It seems that the vessel had 9 boats in all. 4 life boats, two on each side forward, then 2 cutters, one on each side, then on the starboard side a gig and a dingy, and on the port side the mail boat. The gig and the dingy were both smashed in the collision, but the remaining 7 boats were safely lowered and manned, and notwithstanding the heavy sea that was running, succeeded in reaching the "Hidalgo." It is admitted that these 7 boats would have been amply sufficient to have contained the whole of the passengers and crew, but it was said that they were not in a state of efficiency, that they were leaking, and that there was some confusion among the men owing to their not being acquainted with their duties. It appears to us, however, that the alleged leaking of the boats most probably arose from the plugs in the bottoms of the boats being out when they were lowered into the water, for as soon as the plugs were closed the leaking seems to have stopped. Again it was said that the oars were lying in the bottoms of the boats under the seats, and could not readily be got at, but it is not easy to see where else they should have been. Lastly, it is said that the rowlocks were all tied together in bundles, and had to be untied and distributed before the oars could be put into their places and used; and we were told that a passenger named Jell lost his life in consequence. It seems that Jell was getting down into one of the boats by the falls, when the boat was swept from under him, and that he remained there hanging and was ultimately drowned, the boat being unable co get back to him owing to the oars and rowlocks not being in their places. There can be no doubt that it would have been better had the rowlocks been fastened each by a lanyard close to the place where it was to be shipped; but when we remember that all the boats had to be uncovered, swung out, lowered, and the passengers and crew put into them, and that only about 20 minutes elapsed between the collision and the foundering, it cannot be said that much time was lost. It would seem also that the boats' crews, unless anything special occurred to prevent it, were practised every week in lowering the boats, and as a proof that they must have been pretty well acquainted with their duties, we have the fact that all the men who were examined before us found their way to and got off in the boats to which they respectively belonged. It appears to us therefore that there was nothing to find fault with, either in the boats, or in the equipments, or in the manner in which they were lowered into the water.

The next question on which our opinion is asked is, "Whether the officers were justified in allowing the boats to leave the ship without them, and what was the cause of the loss of life?" As regards the officers it is impossible for any men to have behaved better than they did after the collision; they sacrificed their lives in their efforts to save the passengers and the rest of the crew. It is suggested that they ought not to have allowed the boats to leave the ship without them, but the question is, did they do so voluntarily. I am told that it was their duty to remain on board the vessel until they had seen the passengers and the crew all safely into the boats, and then, and then only, to have got into them; but unfortunately before this could be done the vessel had gone down under them, carrying with it the master and the first, third, and fourth mates. As to the second mate he appears to have been saved by a pure accident, for just before the vessel went down, and when all the boats had left the ship's side, seeing the cook in the water he got into the broken dingy which was hanging over the ship's side, to throw to him a life buoy as he passed, and as he did so the after davit gave way and the boat fell into the water, and was washed away with him and the assistant baker in her. She filled immediately up to the thwarts, and they continued drifting about for 19 hours until they were fortunately picked up by a passing vessel. All the officers appear to us to have behaved in the most exemplary manner; and it is to their conduct chiefly that there was so small a loss of life, 54 out of the 60 passengers who were on board, and 66 out of a crew of 80, having been saved. I should add that of the six passengers who were drowned one was Mr. Jell, of whom we have already spoken, another was a maid of Lady Becher, who was a passenger on board, and we were told by Sir Henry Becher that she had had as good an opportunity of being saved as he and his wife had, but that she refused to get into the boat when they did, and was consequently left on board. As regards the 14 belonging to the crew who were drowned we find, after deducting the master and three mates, the first and second engineers, the purser, and the boatswain, that there were only six men who perished, a clear proof that the officers must have done their duty to the last.

It remains only to say a few words in regard to the water-tight compartments into which this vessel was divided. It seems that she had eight water-tight bulkheads in all. First, there was the collision bulkhead, which terminated at the lower deck and was plated over forward. Between that and the boiler compartment were two bulkheads, the former of which went up to the main deck, the latter only to the lower deck. At each end of the boiler room was another water-tight bulkhead going up to the main deck, and between that and the engine-room was a coal bunker, with a bulkhead at the after side, terminating at the lower deck; then, at the after end of the engine-room, there was another bulkhead, which went up to the main deck; and, lastly, there was the bulkhead at the after end of the screw tunnel, terminating at the lower deck, and plated over aft. There were also water-tight doors of course between the boiler and engine rooms, and into the screw tunnel from the engine-room, as well as on the lower decks, for the convenience of the passengers and servants going to and fro; and there were the usual sluice valves, which were worked from the upper side of the main deck. The carpenter has told us that the sluice valves were all closed at the time, that he had worked them on that very day, and had found them to be all in proper working order. Probably, however, the water-tight doors in the bulkheads were open at the time. As to the bulkheads they divided the vessel into a number of water-tight compartments, which would probably be sufficient for all ordinary purposes, the only one appearing to be exceptionally large being the after compartment, which extended from the engine-room aft; but it must be observed that that compartment contained the screw tunnel, which occupied a considerable space, and was itself a separate water-tight compartment. But it is asked, How did it happen that the "Douro," being built in so many water-tight compartments, foundered in less than half an hour after she had been struck? The reason seems to be that the blow must have damaged the bulkhead separating the after compartment from the engine-room, so that if the doors between the engine and boiler rooms were open, as they probably were, there was nothing to prevent the water from filling all the compartments from the boiler-room aft; and in that case the vessel could not float very long, but would soon go down stern foremost, as we are told she did.

I think that I have now answered all the questions on which we were told that the Board of Trade desired our opinion, although not quite in the order in which they were put to us. I have only to add that no order was made as to costs, none having been asked for.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

HENRY KNOX,

 

 

 

Captain, R.N.,

Assessors.

 

 

R. METHVEN,

 

L 367. 1198. 150.—7/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.