Wreck Report for 'Crosby', 1882

(No. 1530.)

"CROSBY" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 11th and 12th of October 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain RONALDSON and Captain KENNEDY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the steamship "CROSBY," of Newcastle, near Peniche Point, on the Coast of Portugal, on the 31st of August 1882.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Titus Evans, the master, in having put her on a course too far to the eastward without making any allowance for the westerly wind which was then blowing, and in having gone below and turned in when they were approaching the most dangerous part of the navigation, and when the safety of the ship required his presence on deck, without having taken any steps to ascertain his true position either by a cast of the lead or otherwise.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court suspends the certificate of the said Titus Evans for six months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court is further of opinion that Robert Horsley, the first mate of the "Crosby," who was left in charge of the vessel when the master went below, is also to blame for not having called the master or telegraphed to the engine-room to reduce the speed of the vessel when the fog set in. The Court, however, is not asked to deal with his certificate, but it is of opinion that he is not entitled to his expenses.

Otherwise the Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 12th day of October 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 11th and 12th of October instant, when Mr. Ravenhill appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Botterell for the master of the "Crosby." Six witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Ravenhill handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Botterell then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Ravenhill having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked.

The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Crosby" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of Newcastle, of 1,813 tons gross and 1,161 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 180 horse-power. She was built at North Shields in the year 1870, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. William John Jobling, of Morpeth, in the county of Northumberland, and others, Mr. Jobling being the managing owner. She left Newport, in Monmouthshire, on the 26th of August last bound to Ancona, with a crew of 20 hands all told, and a cargo of 2,306 tons of coal besides what she had in her bunkers, and drawing 21 feet 1 forward and 22 feet 2 aft. A 9.30 p.m. of the 29th of the same month she had arrived off Cape Finisterre, distant from 5 to 6 miles, when she was put on a S.S.W. course both by the standard and bridge compasses, on which, as we are told, there was no deviation on that course; so that the course steered would be S.S.W. magnetic. At 9 o'clock of the following morning an observation was taken for longitude, and at noon another for latitude, which we are told showed that the vessel was making good her course, and that there was no deviation on either compass. During the day the weather was fine and clear, the sea smooth, and the wind from the N.W. on the starboard quarter, and she had her foresail, foretopsail, and fore-topgallant sail set. She was kept on a S.S.W. course till 7 p.m., when the master altered it to S.W. by S. to pass, as he told us, from one to two miles outside the Burlings. At half-past 12 the master, who had been on deck more or less throughout the day, went below and turned in, leaving the deck in charge of the chief officer, with directions to look after the vessel, and if he saw anything to refer to the chart. In about a quarter to half an hour after the master had gone below a fog came on, and the chief officer thereupon set the steam whistle going; but thinking that he should soon run through the fog he gave no orders to the engine-room to reduce the vessel's speed, which we are told had, owing to the badness of the coal, been gradually lessening. In about 10 or 12 minutes after the steam whistle had been going, the master hearing it came up on deck, and the first thing that he did was to order the course to be. altered a point further off the land to S.W., and he then went to his chart room to ascertain, as he told us, the true position of the vessel. Whilst he was so engaged, breakers were heard ahead and on the port bow, upon which the chief mate, who was in charge of the deck, at once ordered the engines to be reversed full speed, and called to the master to come out of the chart room. The master at once came out, and fearing that. if the vessel lost her way, she would drift on to the Burlings, outside of which he then believed himself to be, and that in that case they would all be drowned, he at once ordered the engines full speed ahead, but almost immediately afterwards, and before they had had time to alter the engines, he ordered them to be put full speed astern again. Hardly, however, had this been done before the vessel struck, and the main injection pipe having broken the engines became disabled. Thereupon the master ordered the boats to be got out, and the crew to get into them, and to lie off, whilst he and the chief mate remained on board the vessel. At daylight they found that the vessel had grounded on the N.W. point of Peniche promontory, and within a quarter of a mile of the lighthouse; and finding that it would be impossible to get her off, and that she was fast filling with water, they proceeded with the assistance of some boats from the shore to save what they could; but at about 4 p.m. they left her and went ashore, the vessel at the time being full of water, and she ultimately became a total wreck.

These being the facts, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether a proper course was set and steered after passing Cape Finisterre at 9.30 p.m. on the 29th of August, and whether due and proper allowance was made for wind, tides, and currents?" It will be seen on reference to a chart that a S.S.W. course magnetic would from a point five to six miles off Cape Finisterre take a vessel about midway between the Burlings and Peniche Point, assuming that that course was made good and that she was not set either to the eastward or westward of her course by winds, tides, or currents. So far, indeed, as the tides and currents are concerned, I am told by the assessors that, as they run parallel to the coast at this part, they would not have any effect in pulling the vessel out of her course. Not so, however, with the wind, which on the present occasion was from the N.W.; and as the vessel had her square sails set during the day, they would necessarily have the effect of setting the vessel somewhat to the eastward of her course. A S.S.W. course magnetic, therefore, from off Cape Finisterre was not a proper course, even assuming that the master had intended to pass between the Burlings and Peniche Point, for he made no allowance for the wind setting her to the eastward; still less, therefore, was it a proper course, seeing that, according to the master, it was his intention to pass outside the Burlings. The master, however, told us that on previous voyages he had steered a S.S.W. course, and that he had found it take him well outside the Burlings; and this might possibly have been so, if the wind had been from the eastward instead of, as it was on this occasion, from the westward. But there is, perhaps, another reason why a S.S.W. course on a previous voyage might have taken him outside the Burlings, whilst on the present occasion it landed him on Peniche Point. We are not told when it was that the master had last gone down this coast, but it seems clear that it must have been some months ago, for immediately before this last voyage he had been from some port in the Mediterranean to the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and had returned thence with grain. Now the master has brought in the deviation cards for the bridge and standard compasses, which are dated the 10th of December last, and from them it would appear that to make a S.S.W. course magnetic it was then necessary to steer from 1/4 to 1/2 point more southerly, in other words, that when the compasses shewed S.S.W. the vessel was in fact making a course from 1/4 to 1/2 a point more to the westward. On the other hand, the master told us that on the voyage on which the vessel was lost there was no perceptible deviation on that course on either of those compasses, and that when they shewed S.S.W. they were steering S.S.W. magnetic. It is therefore quite possible that on both voyages they might have steered S.S.W. by the compasses, and yet on the former voyage have been going from 1/4 to 1/2 a point to the westward of the course indicated, which in a run of 210 miles, the distance between Cape Finisterre and Peniche, would have been sufficient to put the vessel some 15 miles or so to the westward of her assumed position, and therefore well outside of the Burlings. I do not say that this is necessarily the explanation, for we have not the facts of the previous voyage before us, and they may for all we know have had an easterly wind on that voyage; but it may very well account for the vessel being outside the Burlings on that voyage even if they had steered a S.SW. course by the compasses. On the whole it appears to us that the course steered from Cape Finisterre was not a proper course, having regard to the direction of the wind which was then blowing.

The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether safe and proper alterations were made in the course at 7 p.m. on the 30th, and whether due and proper allowance was made for wind, tide, and currents?" We are told that at 7 p.m. the course was altered one point to the westward to S.W. by S., the object, as the master has stated, being to pass from one to two miles outside the Burlings. Now if that was his intention it certainly was not a proper course to steer, for a glance at his chart and at his sailing directions would have shewn him that outside the Burlings there are some very dangerous rocks and islands, namely, the Estellas and Farilhoes. At page 272 of the "Sailing instructions for the West Coast of France, Spain, and Portugal," the following is the description which we have of these dangerous island:— " The Estellas, a group of islets lying from half a mile " to a mile to the N.W. of Burling Island, extend three " quarters of a mile W. by S. and E. by N.; a rocky " shoal near the western islet shows at low water. The " channel separating these islets from Burling Island is " deep but dangerous from the rapid currents, and its " foul rocky bottom affords no anchorage." Then, speaking of the Farilhoes, it says they are "a cluster " of rocky islets covering a circular space about three " quarters of a mile in diameter, are steep, and that " called the Great Farilho, rising to the height of " 315 feet, bears north 4 miles from Burling Island. " Some sunken rocks, which break at low water, lie " nearly three quarters of a mile on their north and " eastern sides." "The strait," it is said, "between " the Farilhoes and the Estellas is from 20 to 50 fathoms " deep, and its navigable breadth 2 1/2 miles, but the cur- " rent before spoken of sets strongly from the former to " the latter, and renders great caution necessary." It then says, "Caution is necessary in sailing along this " part of the coast in thick weather to avoid running on " these isles, as they lie so far from the land, and the " depth around and almost close to them on every side is " so great that the lead would hardly give warning in " time to clear them." To steer, therefore, as the master says he did, so as to pass one or two miles outside the Burlings was, it is needless to observe a very improper course; and I am advised by the assessors that it is not safe in thick weather to pass nearer than from 5 to 7 miles to the westward of the Burlings, and that it would generally be better to pass between the Burlings and Peniche Point than between the Burlings and the Farilhoes.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether proper and sufficient efforts were made to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel on the courses steered after passing Cape Finisterre?" The master told us that he took observations for longitude at 9 a.m. and for latitude at noon of the 30th, and that they shewed him that he was making good a S.S.W. course magnetic from Cape Finisterre, but beyond this he does not appear to have taken any means to ascertain his true position. He had a patent log on board, but it was not set; and when at 7.30 p.m. he altered the course to S.W. by S., he could have had but a very incorrect idea of the vessel's position, the more so as we were told by the chief engineer that from noon of the 30th the engines had begun to slacken and the speed of the vessel to diminish, but to what extent the captain seems to have been quite ignorant. Again at 12 30, when he turned in, he must have been quite ignorant of the vessel's position; all that he seems to have known was that she was nearing the Burlings, for when at 1.30 he went in to his chart-room to ascertain his position, he thought that he was then just abreast of the Burlings and about a mile or two to the westward of it, for he told us that he had marked the position of the vessel on his chart, and that chart he produced in Court. We are of opinion, therefore, that the master did not take any proper or sufficient means to ascertain and verify his position, at all events after noon of the 30th.

The fourth question that we are asked is, "Whether, having regard to the state of the weather at 12.40 a.m. on the 31st of August, the speed of the vessel was promptly and sufficiently reduced?" The chief mate told us that about a quarter of an hour after the master had gone below the fog came on, and we are told that it was so thick that they could not see more than half the ship's length ahead. The chief mate, however, gave no orders to the engine-room to reduce the speed of the vessel, and the reasons which he gave for not ordering the engines to be slowed were because he had observed that the speed of the vessel had at that time been considerably reduced, owing to the engines going slower; and, moreover, he said that he thought they would soon get through the fog, and that therefore it was not necessary to reduce the speed. The two reasons given are not wholly consistent with one another; but however this may be, it was clearly his duty, with the fog as thick as it is described to have been, to have telegraphed to the engine-room to slow the engines, and this he admits he did not do, but he allowed the indicator to stand at full speed. The chief engineer wished us to believe that from noon of the 30th until she took the ground, or for about the last 13 hours, the speed of the vessel had been gradually going. down, so that at midnight the engines were making only 30 to 35 revolutions, full speed being from 62 to 63 revolutions; but the fact that the vessel had run from Cape Finisterre to Peniche, a distance of about 210 miles between 9.30 p.m. of the 29th and 1.30 a.m. of the 31st, that is to say, in 28 hours, giving an average speed through out of 7 1/2 knots, seems to shew that the speed could not have fallen off to the extent which we are asked to believe. The fact too that the vessel ran on the shore where she did, notwithstanding that the engines were put full speed astern as soon as the breakers were heard, seems to shew both that the vessel must have been going at considerable speed, and that the fog must have been very thick; at all events, it was too thick to enable them to stop the vessel in time to prevent her striking.

The fifth question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether the lead was used, and if not, whether the neglect of it was justifiable?" It is not pretended that the lead was used at any time until just before the vessel struck, and it is also quite clear from the course on which the vessel was that if it had been used at any time within the last two hours before she struck, they would have got soundings at from 20 to 30 fathoms, and would have been aware of the dangerons position into which they had got. Knowing too, as he must have done, that they were nearing the Burlings, not seeing any light, and not having obtained any observation to fix his true position, the master had no right to keep the vessel on the course she was on, more especially with the wind from the N.W., without taking a cast of the lead to see that he had not been set to the eastward of his course. The neglect to us the lead was in our opinion not justifiable.

The sixth question that we are asked is, "Whether, when breakers were reported, prompt and proper measures were taken to avoid the casualty?" If the master, when he came out of the chart room, had not ordered the engines to be put on full speed ahead, but had kept them going astern, the casualty might possibly have been avoided; but the mistake was immediately corrected, and the engines again ordered full speed astern. With this exception, it appears to us that prompt and proper measures were taken after the breakers were heard to avoid a casualty.

The seventh question that we are asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" The stranding of the vessel at the place where she took the ground was no doubt due to her having been put and kept on a course too much to the eastward, and to no allowance having been made for the wind, which was setting her to the eastward of her course.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" In our opinion she was not. For the master to go below and turn in when he knew that he was nearing the Burlings, and was at the same time in ignorance of his true position, was most improper and unseamanlike conduct. As Mr. Ravenhill has observed, this master might have taken any needful rest which he may have required during the day time, when the weather was clear and there were no dangers about, and when therefore the vessel might safely have been left in charge of one of the officers, so as to have left him free to be on deck and to take charge of the vessel when they were approaching the most dangerous part of the navigation. Again, at half-past 12, when he went below, he must according to his own admissions, have known that he was within about 7 miles of the Burling Light, and as he must have known that that light was visible at a distance of 25 miles, it was clear, if he did not then see it, either that it was concealed by fog, or that he was altogether out of his course; and under these circumstances it was his bounden duty to have remained on deck until he had made out his true position, and was clear of all dangers. In our opinion she was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care.

Lastly, we are asked, "Whether the master and chief mate are, or either of them, is in default;" and it is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that the " certificate of the master should be dealt with." In our opinion the master is to blame, first, for having put the vessel on a course too far to the eastward without making any allowance for the wind on his starboard side; secondly, for having continued that course without making any attempt to verify his position after noon of the 30th, either by taking a cast of the lead, or in any other way; and above all, he is to blame for having gone below and turned in when he knew that he was approaching the most dangerous part of the navigation, and when he might have thought from not seeing the Burlings Light, either that there was a fog ahead, or that he was entirely out of his position; and all the directions which he leaves with the mate are that he was to look after the ship, and if he saw anything to refer to the chart. As regards the chief officer, he also is in our opinion to blame for not having called the master and telegraphed to the engine room to slow the engines down as soon as the fog had come on. We are not, however, asked by the Board of Trade to deal with his certificate, but only with that of the master.

Now Mr. Botterell has told us that the judgments of this Court are beginning to have a great moral effect, and that when a master's certificate has been suspended he finds it very difficult to obtain employment again. The Court is very glad to hear that this is so, for it is not right that valuable ships and cargoes and the lives of those on board should be entrusted to reckless or negligent captains, when there are so many good and deserving masters seeking employment. But Mr. Botterell went on to say that the Court of Appeal had, in a case which had come before it, expressed an opinion that a suspension of a master's certificate for six, or even for three months, was a very heavy sentence, and one out of all proportion to the nature of the offence committed. I confess that I am surprised to hear this, for I had thought that the general impression was that the punishments inflicted by this Court on officers who had by gross negligence thrown away valuable property, for which they were utterly unable to make due compensation, sometimes with the lives of many of the persons on board, were very inadequate to the nature of the offences committed; and that gross acts of negligence, which if committed on land would expose a man to being put on his trial for manslaughter, and possibly to a long term of imprisonment, was in the case of the master or officer of a ship punished only with a suspension of his certificate for some three or six months. Not indeed that the Court is disposed to think that the suspension of a master's certificate is a very light punishment; but it is to be remembered that it has not the effect of depriving him altogether of the means of earning his livelihood; all that it does is to say that a man who has lost or imperilled a valuable ship with the lives of those on board by gross negligence, must not be entrusted with the same powers over the lives and property of others, but must be content, at all events for a time, to earn his livelihood in an inferior capacity. Under all the circumstances of the case, the assessors are of opinion that this master's certificate must be suspended for six months, and they desire me to add that in passing that sentence they think that we have erred rather on the side of leniency than of severity; and that, had the punisement been heavier, it would not have been too severe for the offence of which he has been found guilty. The Court, however, on the application of Mr. Botterell, agreed to recommend to the Board of Trade that during the suspension of his master's certificate he should be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court was also of opinion that the chief officer was not entitled to his expenses, but otherwise it made no order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

 

L 367. 1298. 150.—10/82, Wt. 171, E. & S.