Wreck Report for 'Bendigo', 1882

(No. 1565.)

"BENDIGO" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Liverpool, on the 3rd and 4th November 1882, and at Westminster on the 7th of the same month, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains BEASLEY and COMYN, and C. W. MERRIFIELD, Esquire, F.R.S., as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship "BENDIGO," of Liverpool, and the loss of the lives of two of those on board, on the 1st of October last, whilst on a voyage from Liverpool to Demerara.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the loss of the said vessel was due to her having been overladen, and to the water which came on her deck not having been able to get away, owing to the jamming of the ports on the starboard side; and that Joseph Hoult, the managing owner, is responsible for having sent her to sea overladen, and John Chadwick, the master, for having taken her to sea in that state. The Court is, however, of opinion that the master used every effort to keep the ports open, when they became jammed, and that he is not to blame for the loss of life which occurred; and that the taking the vessel to sea, in the state in which she was, was due rather to an error of judgment than to any wrongful act or default on the part of the master, and it does not therefore deal with his certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 7th day of November 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

THS. BEASLEY,

 

 

 

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

 

 

C. W. MERRIFIELD,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was commenced at Liverpool on the 3rd and 4th, and was concluded at Westminster on the 7th of November instant. Mr. Howard Smith appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Kennedy for the owners, master, and officers of the "Bendigo," and Mr. James for the underwriters of a portion of the cargo. Twelve witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Howard Smith handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Eight witnesses having then been produced by Mr. Kennedy and examined, the inquiry was, with the consent of all parties, adjourned to Westminster, when Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Walton, who appeared for Mr. James, were heard on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Howard Smith having replied, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The facts of the case are as follow:—

The "Bendigo" was an iron screw steamship, belonging to the Port of Liverpool, of 1,414 tons gross and 925 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 150 horse-power. She was built at Barrow-in-Furness in the year 1877, and at the time of her loss was the property of the Steamship Bendigo Company, Limited, of No. 3, Wellington Buildings, South Castle Street, Liverpool, Mr. Joseph Hoult being the manager. She left Liverpool for Demerara at about midday of Friday, the 29th September last, with a crew of 25 hands all told, and one passenger, and having on board 1,255 tons of general cargo and 588 tons in her bunkers, making altogether a dead-weight of 1.843 tons, and at 8 a.m. of the following day she passed the Tuskar, when a W.S.W. course was steered. During this day the wind and sea, which had at first been favourable, began to rise, and by about 8 a.m. of Sunday, the 1st October, it was blowing a moderate gale from about S.W., gradually working round to S.S.W. As the gale increased the vessel's head was altered to S.W. by W., S.W., and ultimately to S.W. by S., so as to bring her more head to wind, and the engines were slowed down, but whether to "half-speed" or "slow" the chief engineer could not tell us. At 10.15 a.m. the master gave orders to make all snug aloft, and whilst they were so engaged the ports on the starboard side became jammed, so that the water, which the vessel was taking into the well between the raised poop and the forecastle, the vessel being what is called a well-decked ship, had no means of escaping, and the vessel would not rise to the sea. Orders were accordingly given to clear the ports, but owing to the large quantity of water which she was taking into the well, and to the ports being bent or buckled, it was found very difficult to do this; ultimately, however, they succeeded in clearing the two foremost ports, and they were able to keep them clear by telling off a man to each port, but they were not able to clear the two aftermost ports, owing to the quantity of the water in the well. In the meantime the vessel had taken a heavy list to starboard, which at noon had become so serious that the captain ordered the second mate to take some hands down into the after hold, and shift some of the bricks, which were stowed there, from the starboard to the port side; and they were thus engaged, and the chief officer was getting life lines for the men who were clearing the ports, when at about 1 o'clock a heavy sea came over the port side in the way of the fore rigging, and running aft stove in the hatch in the after part of the well, and striking against the bulkhead in front of the poop rose and smashed in the port side of the wheel house. The captain knowing that any water which went down that hatchway would find its way into the engine room, at once ordered planks and tarpaulins to be put over it, and himself went down into the engine room to order the pumps to be put on, but on coming on deck again and seeing the mass of water which was going down the hatchway he knew that the ship would not be able to float very long, and he accordingly gave orders for the boats to be got out at once. The men at first went to the starboard lifeboat, but no sooner was it in the water than a sea swept it away from the ship's side and it was lost. They then went to the port lifeboat, and the captain having ordered the helm to be put hard-a-starboard so as to make a lee on the port side, the boat was got safely over the ship's side into. the water, the engines stopping at about the same time. All hands were then ordered to get into the boat, which they proceeded to do, and after the captain had asked if they were all there, and been told that they were, he himself got into her and they then pushed off; but they had hardly done so when they saw the cook and the passenger coming out of the cabin on to the poop. They at once tried to put back, but several of the oars having been broken in clearing the ship, they found it impossible to do so. They then signalled to the cook, who had a life belt, to jump into the sea, which he did, but they were not able to get to him and he was drowned, and within four or five minutes after they had left her the vessel went down, carrying the passenger along with her. At this time we are told they were about 140 miles W.S.W. of the Tusker. The sea, however, was so heavy that they had to keep the boat's head to it, and they remained at the mercy of the wind and waves until the following Wednesday morning, the 4th October, when they fell in with the sailing vessel "Richard Cobden," and were taken on board and subsequently landed at Swansea.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Was the load line placed in such a position on the 'Bendigo' that she would have had sufficient freeboard if loaded down to it?" It seems to be admitted that the load line was placed at 2 feet below the main deck, for although in a report from Mr. Warner, one of the surveyors to the Board of Trade, dated March 1881, it is said that the distance between the deck line and the load line was 1 foot 11 inches, I think that Mr. Warner himself stated that he had not measured it very accurately, and we must therefore take it to have been at 2 feet. And what we have therefore to consider is, whether looking at the size and construction of this vessel, she would, if loaded down to that point, have been in a seaworthy condition. The vessel, it seems, was what is now generally known as a well-decked ship. Her length was 250 feet, breadth 32 feet, and depth of hold 20 feet, and she had a poop 125 feet long, and a forecastle 35 feet long, the two together making a total of 160 feet, the space between them, generally known as the well, being therefore 90 feet. The poop rose some 6 or 7 feet above the exposed part of the main deck, and had a solid iron bulkhead in front with two doors in it, one on each side, leading to the officers' quarters. At the sides of the well were iron bulwarks 4 feet 6 inches high, to the top of the rail, with 4 port holes on each side, 36 inches by 30 inches, besides the same number of scuppers. In the well were three hatches, the foremost being 14 feet by 8 feet, the next 26 feet by 12 feet, and the last, which was close up against the iron bulkhead, 12 feet by 12 feet, and they were all filled with coamings 24 inches high. Such being her character and dimensions, let us see what freeboard the vessel ought to have had by the Board of Trade and by Lloyd's rules. According to the Board of Trade rules a first-class steamship 250 feet long ought for a summer voyage to have a freeboard of 2.2 inches for every foot depth of hold, and as the hold of this vessel was 20 feet deep, that would give us a freeboard of 3 feet 8 inches. From this, however, there would have to be a deduction of 4 inches for the poop, it being one-half the length of the ship. According also to Mr. Laslett, one of the shipwright surveyors to the Board of Trade at Liverpool, there should be a deduction of 1 inch for the height of the hatch coamings, but as they were only 24 inches high it does not appear to us that by the rules any deduction would have to be made on that account. The result then would seem to be that, according to the Board of Trade rules, a vessel of her dimensions and construction should have had a freeboard of 3 feet 4 inches. Again, let us see what should have been her freeboard by the rules issued by Lloyd's on the 10th of August last. It seems that she had a co-efficient of fineness of 72 to 73, and a moulded depth of 21 feet 6 inches, and, consequently, by Table A, she ought, as a flush deck ship, to have a freeboard of 4 feet. From this, however, a deduction would have to be made for the deck erections, the poop and forecastle amounting together to 160 feet, or rather more than 6-10ths of the total length of the ship; for which we are told that there ought to be an allowance of one half the difference between the freeboards as estimated under Table A, which applies to flush deck ships, and Table C, which applies to awning deck ships. Now by Table A, as we have seen, the freeboard should be 4 feet, and by Table C it would be only 2 feet 2 1/2 inches, the difference between which would be 1 foot 9 1/2, and the half of that would be 10 3/4 inches. Deducting this from the 4 feet, the freeboard which she ought to have as a flush deck ship, we get 3 feet 1 1/4 inches as the proper freeboard for this vessel. From this, however, we are told that there ought to be a further deduction of 3 inches for the great height of the poop above the main deck, leaving a balance of only 2 feet 10 1/4 inches. On the other hand, we were told by Mr. Mylchreest, a witness produced on behalf of the owner, that the vessel had a camber of only 5 inches, whereas by Lloyd's rules she ought to have a camber of 8 inches, and for this, therefore, we shall have to add one half the difference or 1 1/2 inches to the freeboard, making the total freeboard, according to Lloyd's rules, 2 feet 11 3/4. Whether, then, we estimate the freeboard by the Board of Trade rules or by Lloyd's rules, it is clear that a freeboard of only 2 feet would be wholly insufficient. We were told, however, that the practice of estimating the amount of freeboard by an allowance of a certain number of inches for every foot depth of hold was exploded, and that the true principle to proceed upon was to ascertain the amount of spare or surplus buoyancy which the vessel would have at a certain draught. No doubt there is some truth in this, although it is not to be supposed that either the Board of Trade or Lloyd's in fixing the freeboard have left out of consideration all question of the surplus buoyancy; what they have no doubt done was to allow that number of inches for every foot depth of hold which would in their opinion give a sufficiency of surplus buoyancy. And now let us see what the witnesses who were produced for the owners—Mr. Mylchreest, Mr. Moberly, and Mr. Oldham—say would have been a proper amount of freeboard for this vessel. They all agree in saying that the mode of estimating the freeboard by so many inches for every foot depth of hold is erroneous and that the true basis of calculation should be the surplus buoyancy; but when they come to tell us what should be the percentage of surplus buoyancy, and how it ought to be estimated, they differ very materially. Mr. Mylchreest, a marine engineer and naval architect living at Liverpool, who was employed by the owner to overlook the "Bendigo" whilst she was building, and who seems to be in Mr. Hoult's regular employ to supervise his vessels, whenever they come to Liverpool told us that he estimated the total capacity of the vessel under the main deck to be equivalent to 3,845 tons, and adding thereto 3/8ths of the cubical contents of the poop, forecastle, and hatch on the poop, he found that with a draft of 19 feet 10, her total depth at side being 21 feet 10, she would have a surplus buoyancy of 25 per cent.; and that, in his opinion, would be quite sufficient. Again, Mr. Moberly, one of Lloyd's surveyors for the Port of Liverpool, assuming Mr. Mylchreest's figures as to the capacity of the vessel and the deck erections to be correct, and allowing 40 per cent. of the deck erections to count for spare buoyancy, told us that he thought she would be rather deep with only 2 feet of freeboard. On the other hand, Mr. Oldham, a naval architect and consulting engineer, and a surveyor for the Liverpool Register, said that he thought 2 feet would have been the proper place to put the load line on this vessel, even without any deck erections, and that with her deck erections it might safely have been put higher, but how much higher he would not say; in his opinion 20 per cent. of spare buoyancy below the main deck, even with a flush decked ship, would be ample. At the conclusion, however, of his evidence, Mr. Oldham's views seem to have been somewhat modified, for he told us that, although he thought 2 feet would be a very proper place at which to put the load line on the ship's side, he did not mean to say that he thought she could be safely loaded down to that point; he said that he liked to put the load line high up on the ship's side, for he found that masters had a great objection to load down to it, an objection which is, perhaps, not to be wondered at, if the load line is fixed on the principles laid down by Mr. Oldham. But, assuming surplus buoyancy to be the right principle in estimating the proper amount of freeboard, there seems to be no reason, at least none was given us, why, according to Mr. Mylchreest, 25 per cent., or, according to Mr. Oldham, only 20 per cent., of surplus buoyancy is sufficient; nor why 3/8ths, or 40 per cent., or any other percentage of the capacity of the deck erections should be allowed to count for spare buoyancy. On the whole there is nothing in the evidence of any of these witnesses to lead us to think that the estimates, which we have formed from the Board of Trade and Lloyd's rules as to the proper amount of freeboard which a vessel of the size and construction of the "Bendigo" should have are erroneous; that is to say, a freeboard of from 2 feet 11 3/4 to 3 feet 4. The conclusion, therefore, to which we have come is that, if the vessel had been loaded down to her load line, which was placed at 2 feet below the main deck, she would not have been seaworthy.

The second question which we are asked is, "Having regard to the construction of this vessel, were the openings in the bulwarks sufficient to carry off the water from the main deck?" I have stated that there were four ports on each side in a length of 90 feet, each port being 3 feet by 2 feet 6 inches deep. The shutters were in two parts, the lower 9 inches being set on hinges so as to act independently of the upper part. I am told by the assessors that there is no objection to ports thus constructed; and that if they had not unfortunately become jammed, they would probably have been sufficient readily to carry off any water that might have got into the well.

The third question which we are asked is, "Was the cargo properly stowed and secured from shifting?" We were told that after she had taken in her cargo in the Brunswick Dock, she went into the Coburg Duck, and there took in some heavy pieces of machinery, weighing altogether about 20 tons, and that these were put down the fore hold, and were blocked off from the sides with bricks. No doubt bricks are not a very good thing with which to block off heavy pieces of machinery, for they would be very liable to be crushed up and reduced to powder, and then there Would be nothing to prevent the cargo getting adrift. At the same time it is proper to observe that there is no evidence whatever that any of the cargo did shift. The second mate, who went down into the after hold by the captain's orders to shift some of the cargo from the starboard to the port side with a view of getting the vessel upright again, told us that they there found a quantity of bricks, but that no part of the cargo had shifted. And we have little doubt that the list which the vessel had was due, not to any shifting of the cargo, but to the great weight of water on her deck.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Was the vessel overladen?" The balance of the evidence seems to show that she drew when she left about 18 feet 10 inches forward and 19 feet 7 inches aft, giving her a mean of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches; and the first question is what freeboard would that give her? According to Mr. Mylchreest, her total depth in the centre was 22 feet 3 inches, which with a camber of 5 inches, which he tells us she had, would give her a depth at side of 21 feet 10 inches, so that with a draft of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches, she would have a freeboard of 2 feet 7 1/2 inches. On the other hand Mr. Simpson, a draughtsman in the employ of the Barrow Shipbuilding Company, the builders of the "Bendigo," and who had charge of all the working drawings for this vessel, tells us that the total depth of the vessel at side was only 21 feet 7 1/2 inches; so that with a draft of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches she would have had a freeboard of only 2 feet 5 inches. Again we were told by the master and the first officer that when they left the Coburg Dock the water was just lapping over the lower part of the disc; the carpenter said that the lower portion of the disc was covered to about half way up to the centre. Taking, however, the master's and chief officers statement that the water was just lapping over the lower part of the disc, that would give her a freeboard of about 2 feet 5, the load line being placed at 2 feet below the deck, which would agree with Mr. Simpson's evidence that her total depth at side was 21 feet 7 1/2. Now assuming this to have been her freeboard, would it be sufficient for her under the circumstances? We have seen that by the Board of Trade rules she should, on the assumption that it was a summer voyage, have had a freeboard of 3 feet 3 to 3 feet 4, and by Lloyd's rules 2 feet 11 3/4, or very nearly 3 feet; these, it should be remembered, being the minimum amounts allowed by those rules. Seeing, too, that she was leaving at a time of the year when she was not unlikely to encounter tempestuous weather, we think that a freeboard of 2 feet 5, or nearly 7 inches less than the minimum allowed by Lloyd's rules, and nearly a foot less than that allowed by the Board of Trade rules, was insufficient. It was said that she has often before sailed as deeply, if not more deeply laden, than she was on this occasion; but the fact that she escaped on those occasions is no proof that she was not overladen on this occasion; she escaped on the previous occasions, but she did not do so on this. And as a proof that the vessel must have been too deeply laden on this occasion, we have the evidence of Mr. Warner, a Board of Trade surveyor, who told us that he examined her when she was in the Port of London in March 1881, and that he was then informed by the master that in the ordinary passage across the well was full about one third of the time, and that when the vessel drew about 19 feet 4 inches, which gave her, he said, a freeboard of 2 feet 3, she was in the master's opinion dangerously unsafe. The master was not prepared to deny that such a conversation had passed between them; indeed he admitted that he might have said so; and we have Mr. Warner's report of that conversation written down very shortly after it had occurred, fully bearing out his statement. On the whole we think that this vessel, when she left Liverpool on the 29th of September last, was much too deeply laden.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "On leaving Liverpool on the 29th of September 1882, was the vessel in a good and seaworthy condition?" If the vessel was, as we have said she was, overladen, she could hardly have been in a good and seaworthy condition.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the freeing ports becoming jammed, and whether every possible effort was made to free them?" The cause of the freeing ports becoming jammed was the buckling of the iron. Every effort seems to have been made to keep them clear, but such was the quantity of water in the well that although they were able to free the two foremost ports, the two aftermost on the starboard side remained closed, notwithstanding all their efforts.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Who is the person responsible for sending the vessel to sea?" Of course Mr. Hoult, the managing owner, is the person legally responsible for sending the vessel to sea. He seeks to relieve himself from liability by saying that he knew nothing of the details, and that he had instructed Messrs. Cook and Mylchreest, skilled persons, to fix the load line upon her, and to see that she was in a seaworthy condition on every occasion of her coming to Liverpool. Messrs. Cook and Mylchreest no doubt examined the hull and machinery, and gave a certificate that the vessel was in a seaworthy condition, but we do not understand that their responsibility extended to the loading of the vessel, and it is in this respect only, and for which Mr. Hoult, as managing owner, is alone; responsible, that the vessel was unseaworthy.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Who is the person responsible for taking the vessel to sea?" Of course the captain is the person who is responsible for having taken her to sea in the state in which she was.

The ninth question is, "What is the cause of the loss of the vessel and the loss of the lives thereby occasioned?" It seems that immediately forward of the engine room was a compartment, the upper part of which was generally used as a spare coal bunker, the lower part being what is called a water ballast tank, and capable of being used either for water ballast, for coal, or for cargo. On the present occasion both the upper and lower compartments were filled with coals, the hatch between them being open, and there were two doors opening from the upper compartment into the side bunkers, through which the coals were passed down to the engine room. We were also told by the engineer that on the Saturday, the day after they left Liverpool, the doors were opened to allow the coals to be passed from the upper compartment into the bunkers, so that when the hatch which was over this compartment was burst in the water would flow through these doors into the bunkers, and thence find its way into the engine room. The loss, then, of the vessel and of the lives of those on board was due in the first place to the fact that she was too deeply laden, which caused her to ship such heavy seas on her deck that the crew were not able to free the ports when they became jammed, and a heavy sea smashing in No. 3 hatchway filled the engine room, and that caused the vessel to founder. There seems to be no doubt that the hatchway was exceptionally strong, being 3 inches thick, but it proved not strong enough to resist the pressure due to the large accumulation of water in the well, and of the seas which broke over her, owing to the depth to which she was laden.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Was the said loss caused by any wrongful act or default of John Chadwick, master of the vessel?" Captain Chadwick had been the master of this vessel for the last five years, in fact ever since she was built; and having made so many voyages in her he had no doubt acquired a confidence in her capacity to carry heavy cargoes, which the facts of the last voyage have not justified. It was said by Captain Comyn, one of the assessors, that if the captain had, when the hatch was stove in, put the ship about, she would probably have been saved; but the captain stated that he did not dare to do so. And in justice to the master I ought to say that Captain Beasley, the other nautical assessor, thinks that had the master put the ship about as is suggested, and brought her broadside to the waves, she would in all probability, when she got into the trough of the sea, have gone down instantly. We cannot therefore think that Captain Chadwick was to blame for not having put the vessel about after the hatch had been burst in; nor do we think that any blame attaches to him for the loss of life which ensued, for he did not get into the boat until he had reason to believe that all the crew were in her. in our opinion the only blame that attaches to Captain Chadwick is for having been somewhat too confident in the capabilities of his vessel; he made the mistake of thinking that having already carried very heavy cargoes she would continue to do so with impunity.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Is Mr. Joseph Hoult, the registered manager of the vessel, to blame for the said loss?" There can be no doubt that this vessel, so far as her hull and equipments are concerned, was kept up in good condition, and that she was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's. We are told also that Mr. Hoult had insured her himself for 2,050l., showing that he had entire confidence in her seaworthiness; but he cannot, as managing owner, relieve himself wholly from the responsibility of having sent this vessel to sea too deeply laden.

Lastly. The Board of Trade have stated that "in their opinion the certificate of the master should be dealt with." Seeing, however, that the casualty is due rather to an error of judgment than to a wilful neglect or default on the part of the master, we shall not deal with his certificate.

Mr. Walton, who has appeared for the underwriters, has called our attention to the terms of a clause in the bills of lading, which states that the owner shall not be liable for any act of negligence or default on his own part, or for the unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage, provided that all reasonable means have been taken to provide against the same, and he has asked us to express a strong opinion upon the impropriety and impolicy of such a clause. It appears to us, however, that it is a matter on which we are not called upon to express any opinion Messrs. Waltons' parties entered into this contract with their eyes open, and it appears to us that the principle of caveat emptor clearly applies to them.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

THS. BEASLEY,

 

 

 

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

 

 

C. W. MERRIFIELD,

 

L 367. 1336. 150.—11/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.