Wreck Report for 'Escambia', 1882

(No. 1582.)

"ESCAMBIA" (S.S.)

(RE-HEARING.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876, AND The Shipping Casualties Investigations Act, 1879.

IN the matter of a re-hearing, by order of the Board of Trade under Section 2 of the "Shipping Casualties Investigations Act, 1879," of a formal Investigation held before a Naval Court at San Francisco, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship "ESCAMBIA," of Liverpool, and of the lives of 25 of her crew, and which was heard at Westminster on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 27th, and 28th days of November 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted on the 8th, 9th, and 10th by Captains CASTLE and PARFITT, and C. W. MERRIFIELD, Esquire, F.R.S., as Assessors, and on the 27th and 28th by Captains CASTLE and PARFITT only, Mr. MERRIFIELD having been unable to attend through illness.

Report of Court.

The Court, having inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said ship, although in a good and efficient state as regards her hull and machinery, and with her cargo properly stowed when she left San Francisco, was overladen and had not sufficient stability, and that the water which she took on deck on crossing the bar at the entrance to San Francisco Bay having caused her to fall over on her beam ends, and at the same time the door at the after part of the alleyway on the port side being open the water passed through into the engine-room, and she filled and went down.

The Court is further of opinion that the master committed a grave error of judgment in putting to sea with the vessel in the state in which she was; but under the circumstances it will not deal with his certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 28th day of November 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

JOHN S. CASTLE,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case, which was originally an inquiry before the British Consul and two nautical assessors at San Francisco, came before this Court for a re-hearing on the 8th, 9th, and 10th days of November instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Barnes for the owners and master of the "Escambia," and Mr. Kennedy for the owners of the cargo on board that vessel. Three witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, and the evidence taken before the Court at San Francisco, and the depositions of eight witnesses having been put in and read, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Kennedy then applied for an adjournment to enable his parties to examine the plans and drawings of the ship, which had been given in, with a view to estimate the vessel's stability. The application was opposed by Mr. Barnes on behalf of the owners of the vessel, but the Court considered the application to be reasonable, and it accordingly ordered the case to be adjourned to Monday the 27th instant. The case again came before the Court on the 27th and 28th instant, when Mr. Merrifield, one of the assessors who had attended the hearing on the previous days, was prevented from attending by illness, and a witness having been produced and examined for the owners of the cargo, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Barnes addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties; and Mr. Mansel Jones having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Escambia" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of Liverpool, of 2,153 tons gross and 1,401 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 210 horse power. She was built at Sunderland in the year 1879, and at the time of her loss was the property of the Steam Ship Escambia Company, Limited, Mr. George Busk Crow, of 8B, Romford Place, Liverpool, being the manager. She left this country in November of last year, with a general cargo, bound to China and Japan, whence she proceeded to Hong Kong, and having there shipped 929 coolies she took them to Victoria, British Columbia, and there landed them. She then proceeded to Departure Bay, and having taken in a cargo of coal, estimated at 3,030 tons, she sailed for San Francisco, where, we are told, she discharged 2,300 tons, retaining on board for the use of the ship about 580 tons, of which 540 were put into the bunkers and 40 into a small compartment in the after part of the poop, the remainder having, we are told, been consumed on the voyage from Departure Bay. Having then taken on board a cargo of wheat, orders were given to pump out the ballast tanks, and at about 5 p.m. of the 19th of June last she left, with a crew of 29 hands all told, bound to the Cape de Verde Islands for orders. As the vessel lay inside the Mission Rock, with her head to the southward and the wind blowing strong from the N.W., she had a list of about 6 inches to port; but after getting under weigh it was necessary to starboard in order to bring her head round, and as soon as the wind was aft she came upright. She continued to go round under her starboard helm, and as soon as the wind came on her port bow she listed over to starboard. After passing the Island of Yerba Buena the helm was again starboarded, which brought her head to wind, and she then righted again. The pilot who was in charge of her continued his course until he had got well over on to the north shore, and when about midway between Point Lime and Point Diablo, and nearly abreast of Fort Point, he put her on a S.W. course to cross the bar, and then left her. No sooner, however, was she laid on a S.W. course, the wind being still from the N.W., blowing strong, than she again listed over to port. As they neared the bar the water, we are told, became rougher, but the vessel was still kept on her course, heading to the S.W., the wind and sea being abeam. I should here observe that the vessel was what is generally known as a double well-decked ship, having a poop, forecastle, and bridge house, and with the main deck exposed both forward and aft of the bridge house. On reaching the bar, and whilst still on a S.W. course, with the wind and sea abeam, we are told that three heavy seas broke over her in succession, filling the fore and after wells and throwing her still more over to port. The captain at once gave the order to hard-a-port the helm, so as to bring her head to wind and sea, but the vessel having by that time lost her way she refused to answer her helm, and she lay in the trough of the sea with her decks full of water, going over more and more, until at length the rail was under. Seeing that the vessel was about to founder orders were given to get out the boats, but there was no time to do anything, and the vessel continuing to go over, the water passed into the alley way on the port side, and through a door into the engine room; and in about 1/4 of an hour or 20 minutes from the time the heavy seas broke over her she foundered. Two boats only seem to have got clear, in one of which was the captain and 8 hands, and in the other about 5 or 6 were of the crew. Seeing that the other boat was in need of assistance, the captain's boat tried to get to them, but although they were only about 100 fathoms to windward it was impossible to do so, and night soon afterwards closing in she was lost sight of. The captain then kept the head of his boat pointing for the light on Bonita Point, but the wind and the sea drove them to leeward; and at length, finding that they were nearing the shore, the captain asked the men whether they would prefer to land or to wait for daylight, and on their saying that they would rather make for the land. the master turned the boat's head towards the shore, but no sooner was she in the breakers than she upset, and they were all thrown into the water. The captain and three of the hands succeeded in reaching the shore, but the other 5 hands were drowned. Nothing more was heard of the other boat, or of any of the rest of the crew, and the only survivors out of a crew of 29 hands, were the master, the 3rd engineer, and 2 hands.

It seems that shortly after the casualty an inquiry took place at San Francisco, before a Court consisting of Mr. Booker, the British Consul, and the masters of two British vessels that happened to be at San Francisco at the time; and after an inquiry, extending, it would seem, over four days, the conclusions to which the Court came were that the vessel was not deficient in stability, that she was not overloaded, and that her cargo had been properly stowed. They also found that no blame whatever attached to the captain for going to sea as he did, or for anything in connection with the loss of the vessel; and "that the loss of the vessel was due to a peril of the sea," caused, as they say, by the engines having been "eased down at a most critical period when the ship was on the bar, where a heavy dangerous sea was running, causing her to fall off beam on to the sea." They add that the pressure of the wind and sea on the vessel's starboard side, and the strong ebb tide running in the opposite direction and acting upon her keel, caused her to careen over, filling her decks fore and aft, and that the immense top weight of water on her deck then caused her to roll over and founder. The Board of Trade, however, being apparently dissatisfied with this finding, have ordered the case to be re-heard, and it is thus that it has come before this Court.

And the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, when the vessel left San Francisco, she was in good and seaworthy condition; and whether the openings in her bulwarks were sufficient for the purpose of freeing the deck from water?" So far, indeed, as the hull and machinery are concerned, there seems to be no reason to think that they were not in a thoroughly good and efficient condition; she was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's; and, so far as appears, had been well and properly kept up. Questions indeed, were asked by Mr. Kennedy as to the state of the machinery of the vessel, with the object apparently of shewing that they were not in a thoroughly efficient condition. It seems that when the vessel was at Hong Kong and about to take in her cargo of coolies, it was found by the emigration officer that the crank shaft was cracked; it was accordingly taken out, and a spare one, which they had on board, was put in its place; and at the same time the engines and machinery were taken to pieces and thoroughly overhauled. it appeared also that very soon after she had got under weigh from San Francisco, and whilst going down the bay, it had been found necessary to ease the engines, owing to the heating of one of the bearings; but this might very well have happened from some grit or coal-dust getting into it, and would not shew that the machinery was in any respect defective. On the whole, we have every reason to think that when the vessel left San Francisco, both the hull and the machinery were in good and efficient condition.

Secondly, as regards the deck openings. I have already stated that the vessel was what is called double well decked, having the main deck exposed between the forecastle and bridge-house and between the bridgehouse and poop, the length of the fore well being 69 feet, that of the after well 100 feet. Originally it seems there were in the fore well only 2 ports on each side, but a third was subsequently added: in the after well there were always three ports on each side. The ports were all, we are told, 3 feet long by 15 inches deep. So long, indeed, as the vessel remained upright, and the ports were out of water and acting efficiently, the assessors think that they would be sutficient to clear her decks. If, however, she was heeled over with the rail under, no ports however large would clear the decks of water, which must find its level, and would flow in as readily as out of the ports when the vessel was in that position. But upright, not too deeply laden, and with a good clear side, the assessors have no reason to think that the ports were not sufficient.

The next question which we are asked is, "Whether the vessel was overladen?" And first it may be well to inquire what cargo she had in her. We are told that it consisted of 39,85 bags of wheat, weighing in all about 5,336,824 lbs., equal, at 2,224 lb. to the ton, to 2,382 1/2 tons. In addition to which she had 580 tons of coal, of which 540 were in her bunkers, and 40 in a small compartment in the after part of the poop, making a total deadweight of 2,962 1/2 tons. We are also told that she drew 21 feet 6 forward and 23 feet aft giving her a mean of 22 feet 3, and that her freeboard was 4 feet 9 3/4 inches. But here we have some difficulty in reconciling the deadweight which she is said to have had on board with the admitted draught and freeboard for we were told by Mr. Foster, the builder, that the vessel had been built to carry 3 000 tons on a draught of 21 feet 10 inches, and with a freeboard of 5 feet 3 inches, and that with only 2,962 tons on board she should have drawn only 21 feet 8 3/4, and have had a freeboard of 5 feet 4 3/4. It is therefore very difficult to reconcile the deadweight, which she is stated to have had on board, with the admitted draught and free. board: with a mean draught of 22 feet 3 and a freeboard of 4 feet 9 3/4 inches she ought, it would seem, to have had 3,080 tons of deadweight, instead of only 2,962 tons. But be this as it may, the fact is undisputed that, when she left the Mission Rock, she drew 22 feet 3 mean, and had a freeboard of 4 feet 9 3/4, and no more, and the question therefore which we have to consider is, whether this was a sufficient freeboard for her under the circumstances. Taking first the Board of Trade Rules for the calculation of freeboard, it would seem that a first-class iron steam vessel, 291 feet long, which was the length of this vessel, should have for a summer voyage a freeboard of 2 6 inches for every foot depth of hold, and as her hold was 24.55 feet deep that would give us a freeboard of 5 feet 4 inches. Again, if we take Lloyd's Rules of the 10th of August last, we find that with a co-efficient of fineness of 81, which is what we are told she had, and with a moulded depth of 26 feet 3, and allowing for the deck erections, the forecastle, poop, and bridge house, which it seems covered about 2/5ths of the deck, leaving about 3/5ths of it exposed, this vessel should by these Rules have had a freeboard of about 5 feet 4, the same as we obtain from the Board of Trade Rules. It must also be remembered that this is the minimum amount of freeboard which she should have had, and that in arriving at that result all the allowances have been made in favour of the ship. Thus, in calculating the freeboard from the Board of Trade Rules, we have assumed that the voyage was a summer voyage, and so no doubt it was when she left San Francisco, but when she got down towards the Cape it would be midwinter, and as she was about to replenish her stock of coal at a place called Lota, which is far down on the west coasn of South America, to take her round to Rio, she would then be nearly in the same condition, as regards freeboard, as when leaving San Francisco. Again, in estimating the amount of freeboard by Lloyd's Rules, we have assumed that the deck erections were of the best construction, and that the bridge house was thoroughly and efficiently protected at each end with iron water-tight bulkheads, which it can hardly be said that she was in this case. Seeing then that with all these allowances in her favour the vessel ought, by the Board of Trade as well as by Lloyd's Rules, to have had a minimum freeboard of 5 feet 4 inches, whereas it is admitted that she had a freeboard of only 4 feet 9 3/4, it seems clear that she must have been overladen when she left San Francisco.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether the cargo was stowed in accordance with the regulations for the stowage of grain cargoes at San Francisco, as approved by the Board of Trade; and whether in all the circumstances the surveyor was justified in giving a certificate to the effect that the cargo was stowed in accordance with such regulations?" it is not suggested that the cargo was not properly stowed; it was all in bags, laid alternately in longers and à burton. The lower hold, we are told, was quite full, but in the 'tween decks there were empty spaces at each end, the bags being there stepped down to one bag. There is, therefore, nothing to complain of in regard to the stowage of the cargo.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether, as laden, the vessel had sufficient stability?" This is by far the most important question in this case, and it has had our most careful consideration. It has been already stated that, as the vessel lay inside the Mission Rock with her head to the southward, and with the wind from the N.W., she had a list of about 6 inches to port; that when the wind came aft, she righted; that as soon as it got on the port bow, she listed to starboard; that on its coming ahead she righted again; and that as soon as she got it again on her starboard side, she again listed over to port. These facts alone would seem to shew that, to use the pilot's words, she was very tender, or, in other words, that she had very little initial stability. Fortunately, however, we are not left in any doubt on this point, the evidence that has been laid before us relative to the vessel's stability being of the clearest and most conclusive character. The circumstances under which this evidence was produced are as follow:—On the conclusion of the evidence by the Board of Trade, Mr. Kennedy applied on behalf of the owners of the cargo that his parties should be allowed to have copies of the plans and drawings of the vessel, which had been brought in by Mr. Foster, the builder; he said that they wanted to submit them to Mr. White, one of the chief constructors in the Navy, and the author of a most valuable work on naval architecture, who had attended the inquiry from the commencement, in order that he might therefrom calculate the vessel's stability. To this Mr. Barnes, on behalf of the owners of the ship, strongly objected, saying that there were proceedings pending in another Court between the owners of the ship and the underwriters on the cargo, in which the stability of the vessel would be one of the principal matters in issue, and that, if the owners of the cargo could now obtain copies of the plans and drawings of the ship, the interests of his parties might be seriously damnified. He stated that they had no objection to the owners of the cargo, or to any persons on their behalf, inspecting the plans in Court, but that they objected to their being furnished with copies. It appeared to me, however, that this Court had nothing whatever to do with the proceedings in any other Court; that what we had to do was to ascertain to the best of our ability what was the amount of stability which this vessel possessed when she left San Francisco, and that the best way of doing this was by allowing the owners of the cargo to have copies of the plans and drawings of the vessel, in order that they might submit them to some skilled naval architect to estimate her stability. Moreover, it appeared to me to be very difficult to contend that they might inspect these plans and drawings but not to take copies thereof, seeing that the only result would be that in the former case we should have mere approximations, whereas in the latter case we should probably have accurate calculations on which to found our decision. As regards, too, any proceedings that might be pending in another Court, I should be loth to believe that the judge of that Court would not order copies of these documents to be furnished to the adverse party, if it would assist the Court in arriving at a just and satisfactory result. On these grounds I ordered that the owners of the cargo should be at liberty, at their own expense, to take copies of the plans and drawings of the vessel, and, to enable them to make the requisite calculations, it was agreed that the case should stand adjourned to the 27th. Accordingly, on that day the owners of the cargo produced Mr. White, the author of the well known treatise on marine architecture, and one of the highest authorities on the subject of the stability of vessels in this, or, perhaps, any other country, who told us that since the previous sitting of the Court he had gone very carefully through the plans and drawings of the vessel, and had made the most minute and careful calculations of her stability when she left San Francisco. He said that he had taken the weights and disposition of the cargo, as deposed to by the master, giving the ship in every instance the benefit of the doubt; and the result to which he had come was that the vessel when she left San Francisco had a metacentric height of only 6 inches, whereas, in order that she should be "decently safe at all," she ought, he said, to have had a metacentric height of 1 foot to 15 inches. He told us that her angle of maximum stability was 27 degrees, and that at an angle of 49 degrees her stability vanished. He told us also that her maximum righting moment was 1,315 tons; that heeled over to an angle of 16°, which would be the angle of inclination with the gunwale touching the water, 60 tons of water on her deck would be sufficient to balance the righting moment; and that with the same angle of heel he found that the quantity of water on her deck might be 180 tons. He also told us that with the rail under she would have a heel of 32°, which was more than the angle of maximum stability, and from which, therefore. it would be impossible for her to right herself. Mr. White also informed us that he had examined her with reference to the previous voyages, when we are told she had been as deeply, if not more deeply laden, the cargoes carried on those occasions being sugar in bags, coal, and wheat in bulk; and that the conclusion to which he had come was that on her last voyage she had been more unstable than on either of the previous voyages. He said that from the best information he had been able to obtain he had found that on an average 39 cubic feet of sugar in bags go to a ton, 42 of coal, 45 of wheat in bulk, and 48 of wheat in bags; so that a vessel fully laden with wheat in bags would have its centre of gravity higher, and have, therefore, less stability than if laden either with wheat in bulk, or with coal, or with sugar in bags. The fact, therefore, that the "Escambia" may on her previous voyages have carried even heavier cargoes would be no proof that she could carry with safety the cargo of wheat in bags which she had on board when she left San Francisco, the specific gravity of the latter being less than either of the others. Mr. White was subjected to a very severe and searching cross-examination, but I do not think that his evidence was in any way shaken. He was asked if he had ever had any experience in the building or designing of merchant vessels, and he admitted that he had not; but I have yet to learn that the principles on which the stability or the metacentric height of a vessel are ascertained are different in the Merchant Service to what they are in the Navy, or that iron or other things have a different specific gravity in the one service to what they have in the other. Mr. White was also asked whether he had the sanction of his superior officers for giving evidence in this case; whether he had made his calculations during office hours, and whether he had been assisted in making his calculations; and on all these points Mr. White's evidence was entirely satisfactory. He said that he had had the sanction and authority of the Admiralty for all that he had done; that all his calculations had been made out of office hours; and that he had been assisted by two competent draughtsmen, but that he had checked, and was convinced of the accuracy of all the calculations and of all that he had said. As shewing, too, that Mr. White's evidence could not be disputed, we were told that, although the owners of the ship had had a naval architect in Court during the whole of the proceedings, they had not dared to call him as a witness. But be this as it may, Mr. White's evidence stands uncontradicted, and the conclusion to which we are bound to come is that the "Escambia," when she left San Francisco, was dangerously unstable. The Court cannot conclude this part of the subject without expressing its high appreciation of the great care and attention which Mr. White has given to this case. Even without his evidence we should have been disposed to think, from the behaviour of the vessel on going out of harbour, that she was dangerously unstable when she left San Francisco; but Mr. White's evidence is conclusive on the point. Hitherto in cases relating to the stability of the vessel the Court has often had to form its opinion upon evidence which, to say the least, cannot be said to have been conclusive; but in this case, thanks to Mr. White's evidence, the question admits of no doubt whatever.

The fifth question which we are asked is "What was the cause of the loss of the vessel?" According to the finding of the Court at San Francisco, the loss of the vessel was due to the engines having been slowed down without the master's instructions, thus, it is said, rendering the vessel unmanageabie, and causing her "to fall off beam-on to the sea." But, in the first place, there is nothing to shew that the engines were slowed down before she took the water on her deck; indeed the evidence would seem to shew that the vessel did not lose her way until she had fallen over on her beam ends, owing to the weight of water on her deck. Nor do we quite understand what is meant by the vessel having fallen off "beam on to the sea;" for from the time the pilot left her until she went down her head was to the S.W., the wind and sea being, according to the master, from the N.W.; she can hardly, therefore, be said to have fallen off' beam on to the sea," her course having been along the trough of the sea, with the wind and sea abeam. It is also said that the pressure of the wind and sea being "brought to bear upon the vessel's broadside, and the strong ebb tide running in the opposite direction acting on her keel, caused her to careen over, filling her decks fore and aft with water." The course of the vessel being S.W., no doubt the wind and sea, which was from the N.W., would press upon her starboard broadside, but we fail to see how the ebb tide could have been running in an opposite direction to the wind and sea, for it was setting out of the bay in the direction of the vessel's course, and could, therefore, have had no effect to turn the keel either one way or the other. The loss of the vessel, there can be no doubt, was due to her having been overladen and dangerously unstable when she left the port, so that when in crossing the bar she shipped a quantity of water, which, if she had not been so deeply laden and unstable, would have been of no consequence, she fell over on to her beam ends. and the door at the after part of the alley way, which was on the port side of the midship house, being open, the water passed into it, and through a door into the engine room, filling it, and thus contributing to the catastrophe.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether every possible effort was made to save life?" There seems to have been no time before the vessel foundered to do anything to get the boats out, the vessel having fallen over on her beam ends so soon after she had shipped those seas. The master, we are told, was at first thrown into the sea and was picked up by the boat in which he was ultimately saved. Every effort seems to have been made to get to the other boat, which was about 100 fathoms to windward of them, but in vain. After night closed in nothing more could be done except to keep the boat head to wind and sea; and when they found themselves nearing the shore, it seems to have been the wish of all in the boat that they should try to land. We are of opinion that every possible effort was made by the survivors to save life.

The seventh question which we are asked is. "Whether, having regard to the list the vessel had on leaving the wharf, the master was justified in proceeding to sea; and whether the master is in default; and whether blame attaches to any person; and, if so, to whom?" It is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificate of the master should be dealt with." It is admitted in this case that the vessel was listing over to port when she lay inside the Mission Rock; that she righted when the wind came aft; that she took a list to starboard when she got the wind on her port side; that she righted again when the wind came ahead; and that she immediately listed again over to port when the wind came on her starboard side. With these facts before him we think that the master ought not to have gone to sea, but that he should have returned at once to port, in order to have taken out a portion of his cargo, and either removed the coal from the poop or filled one of the ballast tanks with water, which would, Mr. White informs us, have added considerably to her stability. He ought to have thought that, although it was then midsummer, it would be midwinter when he neared the Cape. On the other hand few masters, or even owners, seem to know much about the stability of their vessels, or what cargoes they can and what they cannot carry with safety. As an excuse, too, for him, he had had a letter from his owners informing him that he was to take in 550 tons of coal to carry him to Lota, which he is told would enable him to take from 2,500 to 2,600 tons of wheat, making a total dead weight of 3,050 to 3,150 tons, but at the same time that he was not to put her below the load line. As a fact, we are told that she took 580 tons of coal and 2,382 tons of wheat, or a total dead weight of 2,962 tons only. Whether, indeed, this be the correct weight which she had on board or not, it seems to be clearly proved that she was not sunk below the load line, so that the master may very fairly have thought, this being his first voyage in her, that she could safely carry that amount of dead weight. The man has been already tried once and acquitted by a competent Court, and he has undergone no doubt very great suffering. Whilst, then, we think that he ought not to have gone to sea with his vessel in the state in which she was, we think that he has bee guilty rather of an error of judgment than of any wilful act of negligence or misconduct, and under these circumstances we shall not deal with his certificate.

As regards the owners, it is but right to say that it was by their orders that the load line was lowered from 4 feet, at which it was originally placed, to 5 feet; this was done on the occasion of her second voyage, at the latter end of 1880, when she was about to cross the Atlantic in the winter months. It appears, however, from the affidavit of Captain Wildgoose, her master during the three first voyages, that after her arrival in London, and whilst being painted in dry dock, he, of his own authority, and without communicating with his owners, raised the load line from 5 feet to 4 feet 9, at which it was when she was lost, although the owner was under the impression that it was then at 5 feet. The owner also stated, and the Court has heard it with great pleasure, that, owing to the attention which has been called to the question of stability by Courts of Inquiry, he has directed that the curves of stability of all his vessels should be calculated as well in their light as their loaded condition, with a view to see what cargoes they can carry with safety. No doubt it had never occurred to this gentleman that 2,500 to 2,600 tons of wheat in bags, besides 550 tons of bunker coal, might be too much for this vessel, seeing that she had, as we are told, already carried heavier cargoes before; and the fact that its comparative lightness, by unduly raising the centre of gravity, would perhaps render the vessel unstable, had no doubt never entered his mind. That the owner had ordered the load line of this vessel to be lowered 1 foot, and that he has had the stability of all his vessels carefully ascertained, are facts which seem to shew that these inquiries are not perhaps wholly useless. And the Court will be glad to hear that other owners have followed the example set by Mr. Crow, and have had their vessels tested, and the measure of their stability ascertained, with reference both to their light and to their loaded condition.

The Court cannot conclude this inquiry without expressing its great regret that Mr. Merrifield, from illness, has been prevented taking part in the last two days' proceedings. If we had had any doubt as to the views which he entertained on the case we should have delayed pronouncing our final decision until he had been able to attend, but he expressed himself so clearly at our last meeting, and before we had heard the evidence of Mr. White, that the vessel was, in his opinion, dangerously unstable, that it seems unnecessary to delay the case any longer.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

 

 

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

JOHN S. CASTLE,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. PARFITT,

 

L 367. 1353. 150.—12/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.