Wreck Report for 'Antilles', 1882

(No. 1580.)

"ANTILLES" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Westminster, on the 1st of December 1882, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, damage sustained by the steamship "ANTILLES," of London, through striking on Minster Rock, Tobago, West Indies, on the 21st of September 1882.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the striking of the said ship on Minster Rock was due to her having been kept too close to the shore, and that the blame thereof rests with Edwin Ball, the master, and Robert Lord, the chief officer; with the master for having neglected, when he went below, to leave clear and definite instructions with the chief officer as to the course which he was to take; for not having called that officer's attention to the very strong current which was setting to the northward; and for not having directed that he should be called in sufficient time to enable him to lay a course which would take the vessel clear of the Minster Rock: with the chief officer for having taken so little notice of the chart, which lay open on the chart-room table, as not to observe that there was a strong current against him, which would set him towards the shore; for not having verified his position by a reference to the chart before altering the course of the vessel at 5.45 a.m. to W. 1/2 S.; and for mistaking a rock which was some 3 or 4 miles from Cape Bacolet, and which was above the water, for the Minster Rock, which was only about a mile from Cape Bacolet, and which was some 9 feet below the surface.

Seeing, however, that the learned counsel for the Board of Trade has stated that he does not press the charges against them, the Court will not deal with their certificates.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated the 1st day of December 1882.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

C. VAUX, R.N.R.,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 1st of December 1882, when Mr. Snagge appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Raikes for the owners, and Mr. Nelson for the master of the "Antilles." Four witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Snagge handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Raikes and Mr. Nelson then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Snagge having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Antilles" was an iron screw steamship, schooner rigged, of 1,341 tons gross and 857 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 160 horse-power. She was built at Yoker, in the county of Dumbarton, in the year 1881, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of the Antilles Steamship Company (Limited), Mr. Thomas Scrutton, of No. 9, Gracechurch Street, in the City of London, being the manager. She left London on the 2nd of September last for the West Indies with a crew of 30 hands all told, and a general cargo of from 1,500 to 1,600 tons, and arrived in due course at Barbadoes; and having there discharged a portion of her cargo she left again at about 4 p.m. of the 20th of the same month bound to Scarborough. a port on the south side of the Island of Tobago. At 4 a.m. of the 21st Melville Island bore W., and Little Tobago S. by W. 1/2 W., upon which the vessel was laid with her head to the south, and the chief officer having come on deck and taken charge, the master and second mate went below, directions being left with the chief officer that he was to keep her along the land, and to call the master when the ship was nearing the port; according to the chief mate the directions were that the master was to be called when they were close to Scarborough. The weather at the time was fine and the sea perfectly smooth, and the vessel was kept on her course with her head to the south until 4.40 a.m., when. supposing that she had run about 6 miles, the chief officer altered the course to S.W. At 5 a.m. the course was altered to S.W. by W., and at 5.45 it was again altered to W. 1/2 S., Bacolet Light, we are told, at that time bearing about W. by N. or W. 1/2 N., and Pedro Point N.E. by N. At about ten minutes after 6 the chief mate, seeing that they were nearing the port, called the captain, who came from the chart room, where he had been lying down, on to the lower bridge, looked about him, and then returned into the chart room to put his clothes on, and to take some coffee, which had been brought to him by the cabin boy. In about ten minutes he came out again, and was just going up on to the upper bridge, when the vessel suddenly struck upon what afterwards proved to be the Minster Rock, a rock lying about E.S.E. to E. by S. 1/2 S. from Cape Bacolet, and distant from it about a mile. The captain at once ordered the engines to be put full speed astern, and the boats to be got ready for lowering; but the vessel came off at once, and the carpenter having reported that the vessel was not making any water except in the forepeak, the captain continued his course to Scarborough, and having there discharged a portion of her cargo, she proceeded thence to Trinidad, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucre, and ultimately to Martinique, where she was put into dock, and the damages which she had sustained having been there repaired, she in due course returned with a cargo to this country.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What was the cause of the stranding or striking of the vessel, and whether she was materially damaged through such stranding or striking?" The cause of the stranding, there can be no doubt, was due to her having been steered on a course too near to the land, no allowance having been made, as will presently be seen, for the strong current which was setting her to the northward of her proper course. It is also equally clear that she was materially damaged within the meaning of the Act, for not only did the forepeak fill, owing to the damage to the stem, but on being put into dry dock at Martinique, which was the first place where she could be docked, a plate and a half had to be taken out on each side of the stem, necessitating a detention of some 16 or 17 days. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the damages were material.

The second question that we are asked is, "Whether the master was on deck at the time, when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision, and whether before going below he gave proper and specific orders to the chief officer as to the course to be set?" According to the master the orders which he gave on going below, were that she should be kept along the land, and that he was to be called when she was nearing the port; according to the chief officer the orders were that he was to call the captain when they were close to Scarborough. There is really not much difference between them; whether the order was that he should be called "when she was nearing the port," or whether he was to be called "when she was close to Scar- " borough," it was not sufficiently definite. They both agree in saying that the order to the chief officer was to keep her along the land, but he was not told at what distance, nor when exactly it was that he was to be called. The master must have known that within about a mile of Bacolet Lighthouse, and situate at more than half a mile from the shore, there was this Minster ?? in the opinion of the assessors the instructions that he was to be called when they were nearing the port were much too indefiuite; they think that he should have been on deck before they reached the Minster Rock, to have seen that she went clear of it, and that the instructions to the chief mate should have been to call him when Point Bacolet came in sight. In our opinion the master was not on deck at a time when the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision, and took no steps to effect that object.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether safe and proper courses were set and steered after 4 a.m. on the 21st of September, and whether due and proper allowance was made for currents, and whether the vessel was kept at a safe distance from the land?" The chief officer told us that from 4 to 4.40 a.m. he kept her on a south course, and from 4.40 to 5 a.m. S.W. He stated that, as the vessel was going at full speed, which was about 9 or 10 knots an hour, he supposed that she would, during those 40 minutes, when she was on a south course, have run about 6 knots from where they were when he took charge. He said that he made no allowance for any current, although if he had looked at the chart, which he admits was lying on the chart room table, open for his inspection, he would have seen that during the whole of the time that he was standing to the south he had a current directly against him, setting to the north at the rate of about 4 knots an hour. Special attention also is called to this current at pages 74-5 of the "West India Pilot;" it is there said that "Tobago, being in a prominent position " off the N.E. coast of South America, is subjected, " with Trinidad, to much of the force of the equatorial " stream and outpouring from the nearer large rivers; " this current, with a general motion N.N.W., strikes " Tobago on its south side, and dividing, one part " rushes always past the east end of the island at the " rate of 4 miles per hour, whilst the other passes " between those Islands, and although slightly modi- " fied by the tides, is generally running so strong to " the N.W. that ships cannot work up against it; " therefore vessels coming from the Atlantic to make " Tobago should, when near, allow for a strong stream " to the N.W. This," it adds, "will ensure a good " position for either going to Scarborough or for pass- " ing through." When therefore the mate, in total ignorance of this strong current, thought that he had run 6 miles to the south, he could have made barely 4 miles, and he therefore altered his course to the S.W. some 2 miles short of what he ought to have done, thus bringing the vessel much nearer to the island than she should have been. The courses steered therefore were not proper ones, due allowance not having been made for the strong current, which was setting him to the north; he ought to have continued his course to the south for at least some 20 minutes longer before altering it to the S.W.

The fourth question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether a safe and proper alteration was made in the course at 5 a.m. and again at 5.45 a.m.?" If, instead of altering his course at 4.40 a.m. to S.W., he had continued for some 20 minutes longer on a south course, then, no doubt, the alteration of the helm at 5 to S.W. by W., and at 5.45 to W. 1/2 S., would not have been improper, as the vessel would then have been at a safe distance from the coast. But having altered his course to S.W. at 4.40, and thereby brought himself too near to the coast, the alteration of the course at 5 a.m. and 5.45 a.m. was neither safe nor proper.

The fifth question that we are asked is, "Whether proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at 5.45 a.m.?" The chief officer told us that, when he altered his course at 5 a.m. to S.W. by W., he went into the chart room and looked at the chart; but the time when he should have verified his position by an inspection of the chart was not at 5 but at 5.45, when Cape Bacolet was in sight, and when he was laying his course for the harbour. It was then that he should have laid a course to take him clear of the Minster Rock, but no proper measures appear to have been taken at that time for the purpose. He tells us that he then took the bearings of Cape Bacolet and Pedro Point, but he did not go into the chart room and verify his position by a reference to the chart, or it would have shewn him that he was dangerously near to the land, and that a W. 1/2 S. course would probably take him on the rock.

The sixth question that we are asked is, "Whether ?? whether proper and correct measures were taken to ascertain the position of the vessel with a view to avoid it?" It seems that the master and both the mates have been in the vessel ever since she was launched, and that during that time they have made 5 voyages in her to the West Indies and back again, and that on the voyage he previous to the last they had gone into Scarborough. On that occasion we are told by the first and second mates that the master pointed out to them a small black rock standing well out of the water, and told them that that was the Minster Rock. The chief mate said that the rock which the master had pointed out to them was some 3 or miles from Cape Bacolet, and that he had seen it and passed it on the morning of the 21st of September some time before he had called the master. But the Minster Rock is, as we know, only 1 mile, and not 3 or 4 miles from Cape Bacolet, and moreover it is never seen above water, but is about 9 feet below the surface. It would seem then either that the master did not know which was the Minster Rock, or that he wilfully misled his officers by pointing out another rock to them for it. That the master, however, could have been ignorant of the position of the Minster Rock is hardly possible, seeing that his own chart has been produced in Court, and that on that chart there is a black ink line to shew the bearing of the rock from Cape Bacolet, and we have the evidence not of the master only, but of both the mates, that that ink line was made on the chart on the voyage previous to the last. The master therefore could clearly not have been ignorant of the position of the Minster Rock, and it is also incredible that he could have wished to mislead his officers as to its position. What probably occured was, that when passing the Minster Rock on the previous occasion the master may have pointed with his finger in the direction, and said "there's the Minster Rock," and the mates not knowing that the rock never shewed above water, and seeing a rock in that direction, but further off and nearly opposite to Smith's Island, mistook it for the Minster Rock. Whilst then we can have no doubt that the master must have been well aware of the position of the Minster Rock, it is not so clear that he took any measures to ascertain that the chief officer was aware of its position. But however this may be it is certain that no proper measures were taken either by the master or by the chief officer to avoid it.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether a good and proper look out was kept?" There is nothing to shew that there was not a good and proper look out being kept. No look out, however, could have averted the casualty, the rock being about 9 feet below the surface of the water, and the sea at the time perfectly smooth, so that there would be no indication of its presence.

The eighth and ninth questions are, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" and "Whether the master and officers are, or either of them is, in default?" and it is added that "The Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificates of the master and chief officer shall be dealt with." There seems to be no doubt that the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care, and that the blame for the casualty rests with the master and the chief officer. The master is in our opinion to blame for not having, before he went below, given clear and precise instructions to the chief officer as to the course which he was to follow; for not having called his attention to the strong current, to which reference has been made; and for not having given directions that he should be called as soon as Cape Bacolet was in sight, so that he might have been on deck in time to put the vessel on a course which would take her clear of the Minster Rock. The chief mate is also in our opinion to blame for having, when left in sole charge of the deck, with the chart laid out on the table in the chart room and open for his inspection, taken such little notice of it as not to have seen that there was a current setting at the rate of 4 knots an hour to the north, which on the courses he was steering would necessarily take him closer to the land; for having altered the course at 5.45 a.m. without having taken careful bearings or verified his position by a reference to the chart; and for having made so superficial an inspection of the chart as to suppose that the Minster Rock was some 3 or 4 miles from Cape Bacolet, when in fact it was not more than a mile off.

Under these circumstances the question which we have to consider is, whether we ought to deal with these gentlemen's certificates? The learned counsel for the Board of Trade, in the exercise of his discretion, has said that he does not wish to press the charges against them, very little damage having been done to the vessel, and that possibly the object of the inquiry might be sufficiently answered by the attention which has been drawn to the circumstances of the case, without actually suspending their certificates. We are told that they have been in the vessel ever since she was launched; that during that time they have worked harmoniously together without having before met with any misfortune; and under these circumstances, although we think that they have shewn very great neglect in this case, we shall not deal with their certificates.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

C. VAUX, R.N.R.,

 

L 367. 1351. 150.—12/82. Wt. 171. E. & S.