Wreck Report for 'Chiapas', 1883

(No. 1677.)

"CHIAPAS" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Glasgow, on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of February 1883, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain PARISH, Vice-Admiral POWELL, C.B., and Captain MURDOCH, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the foundering of the steamship "CHIAPAS," of Glasgow, off Queenstown, on the 30th of December 1882, whereby one life was lost.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the said ship, when she started, was in a good and seaworthy condition; that, although fully laden, she was not overladen; that the cargo was not properly trimmed, the vessel having been too much by the head; and that her loss was due to the water having got into the forehold, probably through a leak, but how that leak was caused there is nothing to shew. The Court is further of opinion that no blame attaches to the managing owner, and that the certificates of the master and officers should not be dealt with.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 3rd day of February 1883.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

Assessors.

 

 

ALEX. MURDOCH,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Glasgow on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of February 1883, when Mr. Douglas appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Fyfe for the owners, master, and officers, and Mr. Donald for the builders of the "Chiapas." Sixteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Douglas handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Donald and Mr. Fyfe, having then produced their witnesses, addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Douglas having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Chiapas" was a screw steamship belonging to the Port of Glasgow, of 1,581 tons gross and 997 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 200 horse power. She was a new vessel, built of steel by the eminent firm of Messrs. James and George Thomson, of Clydebank, Dumbarton, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. David Caw, of No. 175, West George Street, Glasgow, who was likewise the managing owner. The vessel having been handed over by the builders to the owner on the 17th of December, a general cargo was put on board her, and she left Glasgow at 1.30 p.m. of the 26th of December last, and dropped down to Gourock. There about 45 tons additional was put into her to complete her cargo; and her compasses having been adjusted, she left Gourock at 8 a.m. of the 28th, bound to Trinidad and Demerara, having a crew of 35 hands all told, and four passengers on board. On leaving she was between 7 and 8 inches by the head, and had a slight list to port; and meeting with strong head winds, she took in a good deal of water forward, rendering it necessary to ease the engines occasionally to allow the water to clear off the deck, so that by noon of the 29th she had run only 190 miles, being at the rate of 6.8 miles per hour. She passed the Tuskar at about 5 p.m., and the Saltees at about 8 p.m., and continued her course at full speed, the wind being still from the S.W. with a heavy sea, and the vessel shipping a good deal of water forward. At midnight the second officer's watch commenced; and the weather being then somewhat more moderate the vessel was continued at full speed until about 3 a.m. of the 30th, when the second officer observed that she was getting more down by the head, and he therefore deemed it expedient to call the master. At this time the wind and sea had again increased considerably, and accordingly the master on coming up at once ordered the engines to be slowed; and having called the chief engineer and carpenter, directed them to go forward to see what was the matter. Finding on going into the fore peak that there were from 5 to 7 feet of water in the lower compartment they reported it to the captain, who returned with them to the fore peak, and they then tried to find out where the water was coming in. It seemed to them to be coming in near the collision bulkhead on the starboard side; but although they could hear it running in, and a light was put down, they failed to detect the exact spot. The cock in the collision bulkhead was then opened to allow the water to get to the pumps, but finding that the only effect of doing so was to increase the flow of the water into the peak the master ordered it to be closed again. After this the vessel continued her course to the westward under easy steam, but seeing that she was getting deeper and deeper forward, between 5 and 6 a.m. the captain determined to put into Queenstown, which was distant about 42 miles, bearing N.N.W. true, and with that view he ordered all hands to be called. At this time the vessel was dipping her bows under, filling the fore well, and as the wind gave her a list to starboard the water found its way into the starboard alley way, and thence into the engineers' messroom and cabins, and finally through the doors in the alley way down into the stokehole and engine room. On the crew coming up orders were given to swing out the boats, and this having been done the port life and quarter boats were lowered into the water. At daylight signals were hoisted in the rigging for assistance, and at 9 the passengers and some of the crew were put into the port lifeboat, which was towing alongside. At 10 the wind went round to the N.E., and they found it difficult to keep the vessel on her course. At about this time the painter of the port lifeboat parted, and the crew then pulled for a pilot cutter which had come up, and were taken on board. There were then 12 hands remaining on board, and these, by the captain's directions, used every endeavour to keep the vessel on her course; but finding it to be impossible, orders were given to get into the quarter boat which was towing alongside. When all, with the exception of the master, chief officer, chief engineer, and a fireman, had got in, they were obliged to push off to prevent her being stove, and it was then found impossible to get alongside again, upon which, as the vessel was fast sinking, the chief engineer jumped into the water, and at about the same time a sea washed the chief mate overboard; both were, however, picked up by the boat, and almost immediately afterwards the vessel sank, taking the master and the fireman down with her. On coming to the surface the master seized a plank, and was then picked up and taken into the boat, but the fireman was not again seen. It was a little before 11 a.m. when the vessel went down, and the survivors having been taken into the pilot boat were safely landed at Queenstown.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether when the vessel left Glasgow she was in good and seaworthy condition, and whether a proper and sufficient examination of the hull was made after she was completed?" We are told that she was built under special survey, the materials being of the best possible description, and the builders the well-known firm of Messrs J. and G. Thomson, the builders of the Cunard vessels; and that on completion she was classed 100 A 1 at Lloyd's. Both during and after her building she seems to have been most carefully and thoroughly surveyed by Lloyd's, Mr. Mumford, the chief surveyor to Lloyd's at Glasgow, having frequently inspected her during that time, and Mr. Fowling, the ship building inspector to Lloyd's at Glasgow, having during the building visited her, he told us about twice a week. It seems that she was also surveyed by the Board of Trade surveyor, and that a passenger certificate was granted to her. We have therefore no doubt whatever that, when she left Glasgow on the 26th December last, she was in thoroughly good and seaworthy condition.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether the pumps were sufficient and in good order?" Mr. Mollison, the engineer inspector to Lloyd's, has told us that they were constructed on a plan submitted to and approved of by Lloyd's; that there were two suction pipes to the well in the fore hold, 3 to the well in the engine room, and one to the well in the after hold; that there was also a bilge injection connected with the circulating pump, and terminating on the top of the cellular bottom of the ship in the engine room, in addition to two pumps worked by the donkey engine. He told us that all the pumps together, including the bilge injection, would, he believed, throw over 200 tons of water per hour, and that they were both sufficient and efficient; and in that opinion we entirely concur.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether the load line disc was so placed as to give the vessel sufficient freeboard?" That must mean, of course, assuming the vessel to be laden down to it. It seems that Mr. Caw left it to the builders, Messrs. Thomson, to fix the position of the load line, and Mr. Thomson has told us that he accordingly put it at 3 feet 8 inches below the deck, and he has given us his reasons for putting it there. He said that he had put it there, that being, as he supposed, in accordance with the requirements of Lloyd's rules for fixing the freeboard. He told us that in calculating its position he had taken the ship's length between the stem and the stern post at 273.5 feet, the breadth per register at 33.2 feet, and the moulded depth at 22.75 or 22.95, I cannot exactly make out which, and that from these dimensions he had estimated her coefficient of fineness to be 68. With such a coefficient of fineness, and with a moulded depth of 22 feet 9 inches, Table A of Lloyd's rules would, he said, give us a freeboard of 4 feet 3 inches. But from this he told us that certain deductions would have to be made for deck erections, consisting of a poop 60 feet long, a bridge house 56 feet long, and a forecastle 31 feet long, making a total of 147 feet, which was rather more than one half of the total length of the vessel; and for this he told us that the rules allowed a deduction of 3/10ths of the difference between the freeboards shown by Tables A and C. The freeboard by Table A is, as I have already said, 4 feet 3 inches, and that shewn in Table C is 2 feet 4 3/4 inches, the difference between them being 1 foot 10 1/4 inches, and 3/10ths of this would give 6 1/2 inches. Deducting this amount from the 4 feet 3 inches, the freeboard by Table A, we get 3 feet 8 1/2 inches as the proper freeboard by Lloyd's rules, and with this he said her draught would be 19 feet 11 inches, the total depth at the side being 23 feet 7 1/2 inches. No allowance or deduction he said had been made for either sheer or camber. Now, in examining Mr. Thomson's calculations, it is obvious that some very important errors have been made. In the first place, in calculating the coefficient of fineness, he has taken, not he depth per register, as prescribed by Lloyd's rules, but the moulded depth, which, as will be seen, makes a very considerable difference. Again, as to deck erections, we are told in Lloyd's rules that the allowance for freeboard on account of these erections may be made "when the deck erections consist of a forecastle " with short poop, or with a short poop and bridge house " disconnected, the latter being efficiently enclosed " with an iron bulkhead at each end;" and accordingly, in claiming to deduct 3/10ths of the difference between the freeboards shewn by Tables A and C, Mr. Thomson has assumed that the deck erections on board this vessel were in accordance with Lloyd's requirements. But, as a fact, we find that the bridge house, which was the longest of the three, instead of being "efficiently " enclosed with an iron bulkhead at each end," had alley ways on each side, the after ends of the alley ways being quite open, and the fore ends having indeed iron doors, but not so constructed as to be water-tight, for it allowed the water to get in from the fore well into the starboard alley way, in which there were, on one side, the engineers' mess room and cabins with wooden doors, and on the other two doors, one leading to the engine room, the other to the stokehole, and which, although they were of iron, were certainly not watertight, as they allowed the water to pass down into the engine room and stokehole. In claiming therefore the full allowances for these deck erections, as though they were efficiently constructed in accordance with Lloyd's rules, Mr. Thomson has made a very serious error. According to Mr. Mumford, the principal surveyor to Lloyd's at Glasgow, and a witness produced on behalf of the Messieurs Thomson, little if any allowance should have been made for that bridge house constructed as it was.

And now let us see what is the minimum amount of freeboard which this vessel ought to have had in accordance with Lloyd's rules; and in making these calculations we have had the great advantage of having Mr. Mumford's assistance. According to Mr. Mumford, taking the dimensions as prescribed by Lloyd's rules, namely, the length between the inside of the stem and the fore side of the stern post, and the breadth and depth as given in the register book, we obtain a co. efficient of fineness of 78; and this by Table A would give us a freeboard of 4 feet 6 inches. To this, however, he told us an addition would have to be made for deficient sheer, the sheer forward being 4 feet 6 inches, and aft 1 foot, giving a mean of 2 feet 9, whereas the proper amount of sheer of 15 inches for every 100 feet of length would give a mean of 3 feet 5 inches, and the difference, 8 inches, being divided by 4 gives us 2 inches to be added to the freeboard. Mr. Mumford also told us that another inch should be added for the portion of the deck uncovered, making a total freeboard of 4 feet 9 inches. From this, however, would have to be deducted for the deck erections, which Mr. Mumford estimates at 6 1/2 inches; but why, seeing that according to him the deck house, constructed as it was, would count for little or nothing, it is not very easy to understand. Be this, however, as it may, the result at which Mr. Mumford arrives after deducting the 6 1/2 inches for deck erections, is that the minimum freeboard which this vessel should have had is 4 feet 2 1/2 inches; and in that opinion he is supported by Mr. Fowling, the shipbuilding inspector to Lloyd's at Glasgow, another of Mr. Thomson's witnesses.

But in addition to these two gentlemen we have had the advantage of hearing the evidence of Mr. Jago, shipwright surveyor to the Board of Trade at Glasgow, and a witness on behalf of the owners; and he told us that, according to the Board of Trade tables, a vessel of her length, that is, 275 feet, should for a winter voyage have 2.6 inches of freeboard for every foot depth of hold. Mr. Jago further stated that in estimating what should be the depth of this vessel's hold for freeboard allowance must be made for the cellular bottom with which she was fitted. He said that the moulded depth being 22 feet 9 inches, he should deduct from it about 1 foot 9 for the normal height of the floors, leaving 21 feet as the depth of hold for estimating the freeboard, and that this, multiplied by 2.6, would give us a freeboard of 4 feet 6 1/2 inches. From this, however, he said that he should deduct 2 inches for the deck erections, that being the extreme amount that he would allow, and 1 inch for the exceptional height of the coamings of the hatches, which he said were 40 inches, or 3 feet 4 inches high, and were on a level with the bulwarks. This would leave 4 feet 3 1/2 inches as the minimum freeboard, which in Mr. Jago's opinion this vessel ought to have had. It will thus be seen that the results arrived at by Mr. Mumford from Lloyd's rules, and by Mr. Jago from the Board of Trade rules, agree within an inch, the former fixing the minimum freeboard at 4 feet 2 1/2 inches, the latter at 4 feet 3 1/2. And seeing that it is admitted that the load line was placed at 3 feet 8, it is obvious that if she had been loaded down to it she would have had a very insufficient freeboard.

I propose next to take questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 together; they are as follows:—4. "Whether, when the vessel left Glasgow, she was overladen?" 5. "Whether her cargo was properly stowed?" 6. "Whether, when the vessel left Gourock, she was overladen, and whether she was in good and proper sailing trim?" and 7. "Whether the vessel at that time was down by the head and had a list to port to any serious extent, and, if so, whether the master was justified in proceeding on his voyage without having this remedied?" And first let us see whether the vessel was, or was not, overladen when she left Gourock, that being the place where the loading was completed, and whence the voyage commenced. Mr. Watson, Mr. Caw's shipping clerk, told us that the total weight of cargo put on board was 1533 tons, in addition to which there were 480 tons of coal, 20 tons of stores and water, about 16 tons of dunnage wood, and 4 tons of mats, making a total of 2053 tons. And seeing that this, although somewhat over double her register tonnage, is considerably under 50 per cent. above the gross tonnage, we should be disposed to think, judging from the total dead weight on board, that she was not overladen. But now let us see what was the vessel's freeboard on her leaving Gourock. According to both the master and the mate she drew at that time 19 feet aft and 19 feet 8 inches forward, giving a mean of 19 feet 4. The master, however, went on to tell us that the load line was then awash on both sides; but in this he must have been mistaken, for that would have given her a freeboard of only 3 feet 8 inches, and would, therefore, make her total depth at side 23 feet, whereas the evidence is conclusive that the depth at side was about 23 feet 7 1/2. What he probably meant to say was that the bottom of the disc, not the load line, was awash on both sides, which would give her a freeboard of 4 feet 4 inches; and that would agree with the evidence of the mate, who told us that on the starboard side the bottom of the disc was two inches out of the water, and on the port side two inches below the water, so that, if she had had no list, the bottom of the disc would have been just about flush with the water. As confirmatory of this we have the evidence of Mr. Watson Mr. Caw's shipping clerk, as well as that of Mr. Jago, as to what the vessel's depth was on her leaving Glasgow. Mr. Watson told us that her draft at that time was 19 feet 3 inches aft and 19 feet 10 inches forward, giving a mean of 19 feet 6 1/2 inches. At Gourock he said she took in 45 tons, which would sink her about 2 1/2 inches, making her draught 19 feet 9 inches. On the other hand she would rise 5 inches on passing from the fresh water at Glasgow to the salt water at Gourock, leaving the draught, when she left Gourock, 19 feet 4 inches, the same as the captain and chief officer say, and her depth at side being 23 feet 7 1/2 inches; that would give a freeboard on leaving Gourock of 4 feet 3 1/2 inches. Mr. Jago's evidence is also nearly to the same effect; he told us that he was standing on the dock head when the vessel passed out; but not being able to determine accurately her freeboard when she was under weigh, he asked the chief officer, and the answer he got was 19 feet 4 inches aft and 19 feet 11 inches forward, giving a mean draught of 19 feet 7 1/2 inches. To this must be added 2 1/2 inches for the 45 tons put in at Gourock, making 19 feet 10 inches, and deducting the 5 inches for the difference between fresh and salt water, leaves 19 feet 5 inches as her draught, according to Mr. Jago, on leaving Gourock, and with a freeboard therefore of 4 feet 2 1/2 inches. With this evidence before us, and putting aside that of those two firemen who said that the disc was on both sides below the water when they left Gourock, I think that we are fairly entitled to say that her freeboard when she left Gourock was from 4 feet 2 1/2 inches to 4 feet 4 inches. Seeing, then, that according to Mr. Mumford the minimum freeboard by Lloyd's rules is 4 feet 2 1/2 inches, and according to Mr. Jago the minimum by the Board of Trade rules is 4 feet 3 1/2 inches, we are not prepared to say that with a freeboard of from 4 feet 2 1/2 to 4 feet 4 inches this vessel was overladen, assuming always that she was upon an even keel and not too much by the head or by the stern; at the same time we think that she was very fully laden.

This brings me to the next branch of this inquiry, Whether the cargo was properly stowed and the vessel in good and proper trim. All the witnesses agree in saying that on leaving Gourock she was from 7 to 8 inches by the head. This was owing to the very heavy cargo in the forehold; I refer to the two boilers weighing 15 tons each, and to the iron machinery stowed between them. Now with the strong head winds which she encountered, the fact of her being 8 inches by the head would undoubtedly tend to make her plunge and to ship very heavy water over the bows, more especially when she was being driven at full speed; and water lodging, as we know it did, in the space between the bridge-house and the forecastle, would be a source of danger to the vessel by getting, as it did, into the starboard alley-way, and thence into the engineers' room and cabins, and ultimately into the engine room and stokehole. Mr. Jago, indeed, thought that her being 8 inches by the head would not be a matter of any consequence. But Mr. Mumford and Mr. Fowling were of a different opinion; they thought that it would affect her seaworthiness; indeed, Mr. Mumford stated that had he seen her going out as she was, loaded down 8 inches by the head, he should have made very little allowance for the forecastle in estimating her freeboard. And we are disposed to concur with those gentlemen in their opinion, the more so as any water that might get into the forewell would, from her being by the head, be very likely to get through the doors into the forecastle, and to remain there. Under these circumstances, the question which we are asked is whether, seeing that she was so much by the head, and that she had a list to port, the master was justified in proceeding on his voyage. As regards the list, it was but small and would not affect the vessel's seaworthiness; but the fact that she was some 7 or 8 inches by the head was different, and we think that it would have been better and more prudent if the master had, before continuing his voyage, had a portion of the heavier goods shifted to the after hold, so as to put her on a more even keel. The master would no doubt justify himself by saying that Mr. Caw, the owner, was there, and was cognisant of the fact; and Mr. Caw has said that if he had thought it a matter of any importance he should have had it done, no matter what the expense might have been. The only justification seems to be that both the master and the owner seems to have thought, as did Mr. Jago, that it was a matter of no consequence.

The eighth question upon which our opinion is asked is, "Whether the vessel went further down by the head from the time of leaving Gourock until 3 am. on the 30th December, and if so, whether prompt and proper measures were taken to ascertain the cause?" There is no evidence of the vessel having gone any further down by the head from the time of leaving until it was observed by the second officer at 3 a.m. of the 30th.

The ninth question on which our opinion is asked is, "What was the cause of the vessel going down by the head on the 30th December, and what was the cause of the water in the fore peak?" We are told that the fore peak, even if quite full, would not have contained more than from 10 to 15 tons of water, which would have been quite insufficient to put her down by the head to the extent she went after 3 a.m. of the 30th. The cause of her going down by the head as she did, was no doubt the water in the fore hold, which passed thence into the fore peak either through a rent in the bulkhead or between the bulkhead and the side of the ship, for we are told that when the cock between the fore hold and the fore peak was turned on, the only effect was to cause the water to rise more rapidly in the fore peak, shewing that it must have been higher in the fore hold than in the fore peak.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether prompt and proper measures were taken to get the water out of the fore peak, and whether the master was justified in ordering the sluice in the bulkhead to be opened?" The only mode of getting the water out of the fore peak was to open the cock in the collision bulkhead, and thus allow the water to run to the pumps. That was accordingly done, but when they found that the only result was to raise the water more rapidly in the fore peak, the master was, in our opinion, fully justified in ordering it to be closed again.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the vessel then taking a list to starboard?" Heading as she was to the westward, and with the wind from the S.W., the vessel would necessarily be listed over to starboard, any water therefore coming on board, whether on deck or into the hold, would naturally go over to starboard, and so increase the list.

The twelfth question we are asked is, "Whether the ventilators and all other deck openings were properly constructed, and whether they were so fitted and arranged as not to be or become a source of danger by affording ingress of water to the hold in the event of the vessel shipping heavy seas?" We were told that the hatches were exceptionally strong, the coamings being 3 feet 4 inches high, and on a level with the bulwarks; they were also strengthened at the side by iron stanchions, a very unusual thing in any vessel; and there is not a particle of evidence to shew that any of them gave way, or that any water got down through any of them. As regards the ventilators it seems that there were four, two to each hold, one at one end, the other at the other. The foremost ventilator passed up through the forecastle, the aftermost through the poop; both would therefore be well out of harm's way. The other two were one just forward of the 'thwartship bunker, the other just abaft the engine room. But we are told that they were strong and of the best construction, and had good high coamings, and there is nothing to shew that they sustained any damage, or that water got down any of them.

The thirteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether when the vessel was found to be down by the head, prompt and proper measures were taken to secure the ventilators, and all other deck openings?" The third officer told us that he was instructed to cover the ventilators with tarpaulins, and that he did so.

The fourteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the vessel making water in the fore hold, and whether prompt and proper measures were taken to clear it?" That there was water in the fore hold admits of no doubt whatever; but we are told that after Thursday evening they were never able to sound the well or to ascertain how much water there was in the fore hold, owing to the quantity of water on deck. It seems that the only way they had of ascertaining what water there was in the well was by sounding from the upper deck, but if there was water washing over the top of the pipe, it would of course be impossible to guage the depth of the water in the well with the sounding rod. It certainly does appear that the manner of ascertaining the depth of the water in the hold is of the rudest possible character, and one which is quite unworthy of the present age. It is not for this Court to suggest how this should be remedied; but with the great amount of skill and ingenuity which is now devoted to these matters, it does seem that some means might be devised to meet the difficulty; one way in which it could be done might be by carrying small pipes from the wells into the engine-room, which would indicate by a gauge the height of the water at any moment in any of the wells. Such an instrument could, it appears to us, be very easily constructed. At present the quantity of water in the hold is only known at certain intervals of time when they are sounded, and sometimes when water is washing about the decks, as in this case, cannot be ascertained at all.

It being admitted that there was water in the forehold, but how much we have no means of knowing, the question is, How did it get there? It was suggested by the master that possibly they might have struck some floating wreckage, but if they had done so, so severe a blow as to make a hole in the side of the vessel would surely have been heard or felt by someone on board; moreover it must have been a most severe blow to have damaged the side of the vessel as well as the collision bulkhead, for it must not be forgotten that the bulkhead itself must have been either damaged or displaced, seeing that the water flowed from the fore hold into the fore peak, and a blow given in the way of the bulkhead would be exceptionally severe, seeing that this is a part of the vessel which is perhaps the most capable of resistance. It was also suggested by the learned advocate for the Board of Trade that possibly the boilers and iron work might have got loose, and so made a hole in the side of the vessel. No doubt if these heavy goods had got adrift they might have made a hole in the side of the ship, but how are we then to account for the damage to the bulkhead, seeing that they were stowed quite in the after part of the fore hold and some 48 feet from the collision bulkhead, and that between them and the bulkhead were casks of manure and casks of beer, besides a large water tank, which would afford some protection to the bulkhead. Moreover there is not a particle of evidence that any portion of the cargo ever got adrift, and we do not think that it offers a reasonable solution of the difficulty. It remains to be seen whether there is any other way of accounting for the casualty; at the best it can be only conjecture, for we have no positive evidence on which we can rely; all that we know is, that whilst there was water both in the fore peak and in the fore hold, that in the fore hold was higher than in the fore peak, and that as no leak could be seen in the fore peak, it seems perhaps fair to conclude that the leak must have been in the fore hold, and that the water may have got into the fore peak by a rent or displacement at the side of the bulkhead. That seems to be the fair result of the evidence of the captain, the chief engineer, and the carpenter, who were the only persons who went into the fore peak to examine the damage. Let us see, then, whether these facts are sufficient to afford any clue to the mystery. It seems that the bulkhead was secured to the shell of the ship by angle irons 3 by 5 on each side, the 3-inch face being against the shell of the ship, whilst the 5-inch face was on the bulkhead. The 3-inch face was attached to the shell by a single line of rivets, there being only room for one line of rivets, whereas on the 5-inch face the rivets were angled, which I am told by the assessors would give a firmer grip of the iron. Now it is to be observed that the shell of the ship was formed of steel, which was springy and elastic, whilst the bulkhead was of rigid iron. And this being so, it has occurred to the assessors that, seeing that the vessel was exposed to a strong head sea almost from the time of leaving Gourock, and is described as continually pitching bows under, that a certain amount of play might have been set up between the elastic shell of the ship and the rigid bulkhead, which may ultimately have led to the rending of the parts and to a slight displacement of the bulkhead; if so, it can readily be understood that the water might then leak into the fore hold, and the vessel being down by the head might get into the fore peak between the bulkhead and the side of the vessel. Of course it is only a conjecture, but it is the only one which, in our opinion, offers any reasonable or probable solution of the casualty. It is right, however, to say that Mr. Fowling, under whose inspection the vessel was built, told us that the vessel was so strongly built that he did not think that any such separation of the parts would be likely to occur by the straining of the vessel in a seaway; he said that there were three strong intercostal girders on each side, the two lowest of which extended the whole length of the ship, whilst the two uppermost met the line of the lower deck, and that this gave such great strength and rigidity to the vessel that he did not think that any play or motion could be set up between the bulkhead and the shell of the ship; and in that opinion Mr. Mumford was disposed to concur. No doubt the opinion of gentlemen of such large experience is entitled to the greatest deference and respect, but at the same time we can offer no other suggestion to account for the casualty.

The fifteenth question which weare asked is, "Whether every possible effort was made to keep the water under?" No time seems to have been lost in getting all the pumps connected with the main engines to work, and in setting the donkey pumps going. As regards the hand or deck pumps, it seems that they could not be worked owing to the quantity of water in the fore well. There is, however, one thing which was not done, and which seems not to have occurred to them to do, and that was to open the sluices between the fore hold and the engine room, so that, as was truly observed by one of the witnesses, the powerful pumps in the engine room, and especially the bilge injection, was never brought to bear on the water in the fore hold. Seeing that the vessel was getting deeper and deeper in the water it does appear to the assessors that as a last resort these sluices might have been opened so as to allow the water to flow from the fore hold into the engine room. No doubt there was a risk that the water might have risen in the engine room faster than they could pump it out, and that in that case it would quickly have extinguished the fires. Once, too, the sluices were opened, there was a risk that they might never be able to close them again owing to some piece of wood, coal, or other article from the fore hold getting into them; at the same time, the assessors think that that course might have been taken as a last resource, although we cannot conceal from ourselves that it would have been attended with considerable risk.

The sixteenth question on which the opinion of the Court is asked is, "Whether the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" Seeing that the vessel was so much by the head, and that she was shipping so much water forward, there can be no doubt that it was not a very prudent act on the part of the second officer to drive her at full speed against it, and that he would have acted more prudently if, when he saw the wind and sea rising, he had either eased the engines or called the captain. As regards the captain also, when he saw at 3 a.m. that there was from 5 to 7 feet of water in the fore peak, and that it was coming in from the fore hold, we think that it would have been better if he had at once altered his course for Queenstown, as in that case he would probably have got in before the vessel sank. There really could have been no use in continuing his course for some two or three hours more, namely, till between 5 and 6 o'clock, for with from 5 to 7 feet of water in the fore peak, and with the water coming into it from the fore hold, where he could not get at it to stop the leak, it would have been absurd to attempt to continue his voyage across the Atlantic in mid-winter. Had he put the ship about at once, with a strong favourable wind from the S.W., at which it continued until within an hour of the vessel sinking, it is quite possible that they might have reached Queenstown in time, the distance being only about 40 miles, and the vessel having continued afloat for some 8 hours after her condition had been ascertained. The loss of those two first hours, during which they were steaming against a head sea, was probably fatal to the vessel.

The seventeenth question which we are asked is. "Whether every possible effort was made to save life?" There is no doubt that every possible effort was made to save life, and that in putting the passengers and a portion of the crew into the port lifeboat for some time before they finally abandoned the ship the captain acted properly.

The eighteenth question which we are asked is, "What was the cause of the loss of the life of the fireman?" It seems that this poor man had originally got into the port lifeboat, but on the captain calling for volunteers to assist in keeping the fires going, he returned to the vessel, and continued to perform his duty to the last, thus affording a very good example to the other firemen who refused to leave the lifeboat. When however all hope was gone, and the captain ordered the hands into the quarter boat, which was alongside, the fireman seems to have lost his head, and was last seen by those in the boats on his knees near the bridge house, neither the captain nor the chief officer nor chief engineer, who alone were left on board, saw him, and the unfortunate man went down with the vessel and never was seen again.

The nineteenth question which we are asked is, "Whether the master and officers are, or any of them is, in default, and whether blame attaches to the managing owner?" and it is added that" in the circumstances the Board of Trade are of opinion that the certificates of the master and the officers should be dealt with." Except in keeping her going at full speed after the wind and sea had begun to rise again, in not steering for Queenstown as soon as the condition of the ship was discovered, and perhaps also in not opening the sluices between the fore hold and the engine room to allow the water to get to the bilge injection, we do not think that any blame attaches to the master or to any of the officers. They seem all to have acted with the greatest courage, and the three superior officers, the master, the mate, and the chief engineer, were the last to remain by the ship; and if in the matters which we have pointed out they may have shown some trifling error of judgment, it is certainly not a case in which we should think of dealing with their certificates, and we do not understand the Advocate for the Board of Trade to press the charge against them. As regards the owner, it seems that he gave orders to Mr. Watson, his shipping clerk, not to load the vessel within 100 tons of the point to which he understood that he was at liberty to load her; and accordingly we find that she was so loaded that her load line was 6 inches out of water when she got to sea, those 6 inches being equivalent to about 100 tons of cargo. It is certainly unfortunate that Mr. Thomson should have made a mistake of some 6 or 7 inches in estimating the proper amount of freeboard by Lloyd's rules; it is a mistake, however, which Mr. Mumford says he is not likely to commit again. No doubt Mr. Caw, as the managing owner, is legally responsible for seeing that his vessel is not sent to sea too deeply laden, but when the position of the load line had been fixed by so eminent a ship builder as Mr. Thomson, Mr. Caw could hardly suspect that so serious an error had been made in estimating the proper amount of the freeboard; and when he gave orders that she should be loaded, so that the load line would be six inches out of water, Mr. Caw took all proper and reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of the vessel and of the lives of those on board. In our opinion, therefore, no blame attaches to Mr. Caw.

We cannot conclude this inquiry without expressing the very great obligations under which the Court is to all the learned gentlemen who have been engaged in the case for the very fair and straightforward way in which they have one and all conducted it, and for the manner in which all the facts likely to throw light upon this casualty have been laid before us. Under the circumstances there will of course be no costs of this inquiry, and none indeed are asked for.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY, Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ALFRED PARISH,

 

 

 

R. ASHMORE POWELL,

Assessors.

 

 

ALEX. MURDOCH,

 

L 367. 1449. 150.—2/83. Wt. 171. E. & S.