Wreck Report for 'Balbus', 1885

(No. 2842.)

"BALBUS" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 5th day of March 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains PARFITT and DAVIES, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the material damage sustained by the steamship "BALBUS," of Barrow, through striking the ground near Cape La Hague, France, on the 22nd of November last.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of the said vessel was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Alfred Butler, the second officer, and it accordingly suspends his certificate for three months.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 5th day of March 1886.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

WM. PAFITT,

T. DAVIES,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle-on-Tyne on the 5th day of March instant, when Mr. de Hamel appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Bowey for the owners, and Mr. Strachan for the master and first officer of the "Balbus." The second officer of the "Balbus" was present, but was not represented by either counsel or solicitor. Six witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. de Hamel handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Strachan then addressed the Court on behalf of the master and first officer, and the second officer having been heard on his own behalf, and Mr. de Hamel in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Balbus" is an iron screw steamship, belonging to the port of Barrow-in-Furness, of 1,190 tons gross, and 770 tons net register and is fitted with engines of 150 horse power. She was built at Barrow in the year 1883, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of the present inquiry, she was the property of Mr. Thomas Kish, of Sunderland, and others, Mr. Thomas Kish being the managing owner. She left the Tyne on the 20th of November last, with a crew of 18 hands all told, and a cargo of about 1,300 tons of coals, besides 200 tons in her bunkers, bound to Bordeaux; and at 9 a.m. of the 22nd had arrived off the Royal Sovereign Lightship, when she was put on a W. 1/2 S. course to make the Casquets. During the day she continued on that course, making from 8 to 8 1/2 knots, the weather being fine, but with more or less haze and passing showers as the night came on. At 8 p.m. the second officer took charge, and at about 9.40, observing what he took to be a cloud on the port bow, he ordered the man at the wheel to port. Shortly afterwards, seeing that the cloud appeared to be getting darker, he ordered the helm hard-a-port, and at the same time telegraphed to the engine room to stop, and almost immediately afterwards the light on Cape La Hague was observed on the starboard bow. The sound of the telegraph brought the captain on deck, and seeing land ahead he at once ordered the engines to be put full speed astern, but before she had time to lose her way she touched the ground forward, but came off immediately afterwards. Finding that she was making water in the fore peak only, the master determined to continue his voyage to Bordeaux, which he reached in safety. There it was found that one plate in the fore peak had been slightly holed, and four others bent, and temporary repairs having been done to her, she returned to Sunderland.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper course was set on taking a de- " parture from the Royal Sovereign Lightship, and " whether due and proper allowance was made therein " for tide?" The place from which she took her departure was two miles to the south of the Sovereign Lightship, and the course set was W. 1/2 S., and if that course had been made good, it would have taken them from 12 to 15 miles north of Cape La Hague. The master stated that he allowed seven miles for the set of the current to the southward, it being spring tides, which would give them a margin of from 5 to 8 miles; and this, in the opinion of the assessors, was sufficient. We are therefore of opinion that the course set from the Royal Sovereign Lightship was a safe and proper one.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " the weather became thick before 8 p.m. on the 22nd " of November, and, if so, whether the neglect to " reduce the speed of the vessel was justifiable?" We are told that there was a certain amount of haze with passing showers as the night closed in, but not sufficient, in the opinion of the assessors, to render it necessary to reduce the speed of the vessel.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the second officer on taking charge at 8 p.m. mistook " the course for W. by S. 1/2 S., and, if so, whether he " was justified in so doing?" In our opinion the course which the second officer got when he took charge was W. 1/2 S., and not W. by S. 1/2 S. What occurred seems to have been this: the second officer when he attended before the Receiver of Wreck to make his deposition, told him that he was not sure whether the course given him was W. 1/2 S. or W. by S. 1/2 S. The Receiver, however, seems to have put it down as W. by S. 1/2 S., but the second officer admits that the course given him was no doubt W. 1/2 S., and that that was the course he steered. And that this was so is most probable from the fact that the master was on the bridge after the chief officer had gone below, and if they had been steering a W. by S. 1/2 S. course the master would have detected the mistake.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master was on deck at a time when the safe " navigation of the vessel required his personal super- " vision?" it seems that the master when he left the bridge at 8.30 told the second officer that he was to look out for a red light on the port side, and a bright light on the port bow, and that as soon as he saw either of them he was to call him, and that, under any circumstances, he was to be called at 10 o'clock, as it was his intention to take her past the Casquets. The Assessors think that it would have been better had he remained on deck until he had put her on a safe course for the Casquets; for, if the weather had been clear, it would not have been very long before he sighted them, and if it was hazy there was the greater reason for his being on deck. So far therefore we think that the master was not on deck when the safe navigation of the vessel required his supervision.

The fifth and sixth questions I propose to take together; they are as follow: (5) "Whether the vessel " was navigated with proper and seamanlike care?" and (6) "What was the cause of the stranding?" We have already said that the course set was in our opinion a safe and proper one, and would, if it had been kept, have taken her clear, even allowing for a southerly set of the tide of seven miles; and the question therefore is, how came she to get on the rocks off Cape La Hague? Up to 8.30 p.m., when the master left the deck, the course steered was no doubt W. 1/2 S., and it must have been after this that she must have been allowed to run off her course to the southward. Unfortunately the man who was at the wheel from 8 to 10 p.m. has not been produced, but we have the fact, which is not denied by the second officer, that when the master came up on deck immediately before she struck, her head was S.W., or 3 1/2 points off her course; and it would therefore appear that the second officer must have either altered the course, or allowed her to run off on a much more southerly course, for her to have got ashore where she did. This in our opinion was the cause of the stranding.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "What " was the cost of the vessel to her owners?" Mr. Kish has told us that the vessel cost them 21,400l., besides some 500l. or 600l. for inspections and other charges.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "What " was her value at the time she left on her last " voyage?" The vessel would have a carrying capacity of about 1,500 tons, or about twice the registered tonnage, and I am informed by the assessors that she could have been bought new for about 10l. a ton or about 15,000l. And that that was about her value may fairly be inferred from the fact that in February last Mr. Kish fixed the insurances upon her at that sum.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " were the insurances effected on her, and how were " they apportioned?" We are told that she was at first insured for 21,000l., but that in February 1885 the insurances were reduced to 20,000l.; and these, as I have stated, were again reduced in February last to 15,000l. Besides this there were insurances for 2,800Z. on disbursements, premiums, &c., and an insurance on the freight for 600l. I ought however to add that the outward freight was 425l., and the homeward freight, for which there was a charter, was 407l., making a total of 832l. at risk, none of which had, it is said, been advanced.

Lastly it is said that "in the opinion of the Board of " Trade the certificates of both the master and second " mate should be dealt with." As regards the master, although we think that he would have acted more wisely if he had remained on deck until he had sighted the Casquets, his neglect to do so was not a default for which we should be disposed to deal with his certificate. As regards the second mate, however, it was clearly his duty as officer of the watch to see that the vessel was kept upon her proper course, and had he done so she would have gone clear of the rocks whether he wilfully altered the course, or negligently allowed her to run off it, he is equally to blame, and we shall therefore suspend his certificate for three months.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

WM. PAFITT,

T. DAVIES,

Assessors.

L 367. 2621. 180.—3/86. Wt. 408. E. & S.