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Wreck Report for 'Banshee', 1885

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Unique ID:14878
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Banshee', 1885
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1885
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 2584.)

"BANSHEE" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 26th and 27th of June 1885, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains HYDE and PATTISON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the steamship "BANSHEE," on the rocks under the North Stack Signal Station, Holyhead, on the 4th of June 1885.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding of the said ship was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of James Alexander Beaumont, the master. The Court accordingly suspends his certificate for three months.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 27th day of June 1885.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE HYDE,

JOHN L. PATTISON,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case came before the Court at Westminster, on Friday, 26th of June 1885, when Mr. Macdonell appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Carson for the Dublin Steam Packet Company, the owners of the steamship "Leinster." The master of the "Banshee" was present, but stated that in the notice which the owners had received from the Board of Trade, the case was said to have been fixed for Monday, the 29th, and that consequently neither the owners nor their counsel were present; and under these circumstances he asked that the hearing should be adjourned. The Court accordingly—Mr. Macdonell, for the Board of Trade, not objecting thereto—adjourned the hearing to tomorrow.

On Saturday, the 27th, Mr. Aspinall appeared for the London and North Western Railway Company, the owners, and for the master of the "Banshee;" and seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Macdonell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Aspinall then produced a witness, and having addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Carson and Mr. Macdonell having been also heard, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Banshee" is a paddle wheel steamer, belonging to the port of Dublin, of 1108 tons gross, and 246 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 420 horse power. She was built of steel at Birkenhead in the year 1884, and at the time of the casualty, which forms the subject of this inquiry, was the property of the London and North Western Railway Company, Admiral Dent of Holyhead in the island of Anglesey being the manager. She left the North Wall, Dublin, at about 7.27 p.m. of the 4th instant with a crew of 43 hands all told, and 161 passengers, bound to Holyhead, and as soon as she was clear of the bay, she was put upon a S.E. by E. 1/4 E. course by compass equivalent to S.E. by E. 3/4 E. magnetic, and proceeded at full speed, making from 17 to 19 knots an hour. At this time the tide was about the last quarter ebb, the weather clear, and there was a strong breeze blowing from the S.W. For the first half of the distance it was the chief officer's watch, but at 9.15 the second officer came up to take charge, and at this time, we are told, the weather had become slightly hazy, but not sufficiently so to prevent the vessel from continuing her course at fall speed. At about 10.30 p.m. the weather began to get thicker, and accordingly at about 10.40 the master, who had been on the bridge ever since leaving Dublin, altered the course a quarter of a point more to the northward, and reduced the engines to half speed, which, we are told, still gave her about 11 knots, About 10 minutes afterwards the glare of the light on the South Stack was observed about a point and a half on the starboard bow, upon which the master ordered the helm to be starboarded, and he continued starboarding gradually, until her head was about E. or E. by N., when the flash of the gun on the North Stack was seen about half a point on the starboard bow, and immediately afterwards land was reported right ahead; upon which orders were at once given to hard-a-starboard the helm, and to reverse full speed, but it was too late, and she ran with her fore foot on to the rocks at the extreme S.W. point of the North Stack. Orders were at once given to clear the boats, but finding that she was not making any water, except in the fore peak, the captain countermanded the order to lower them, and in about 10 minutes afterwards the vessel came off with the rise of the tide, and proceeded slowly towards Holyhead harbour, where she arrived at about 7 minutes after 12 the same night.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether a " safe and proper course was set and steered after " leaving the North Wall, and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tide and currents?" The proper course to steer on leaving Dublin depends, of course, as the master has told us, upon the state of the wind and tide; but there is no reason to think that the course steered, namely, S.E. by E. 3/4 E. magnetic, was not a safe and proper course, having regard to the condition of the wind and tide at the time.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper alteration was made in the course " at or about 10.40 p.m., and whether due and proper " allowance was made for tides and currents?" Seeing that the weather had then become more hazy, the assessors are of opinion that it was a proper thing to do to haul her head a quarter of a point to the northward, and thus take her further off the land.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when the glare of the South Stack Light was seen, " at or about 10.50 p.m., proper measures were taken " to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel; and " whether safe and proper alterations were then and " thereafter made in the course?" It does not appear that any measures were taken by the master to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel. When the glare of the South Stack Light was seen, he simply guessed his distance from the Light to be between two and three miles; and, acting on this impression, he altered the vessel's course gradually until he had brought her head to about east or E. by N. This was, however, neither a safe nor a prudent course to take, for he should have remembered that it is always most difficult to estimate distances correctly in a fog; and, indeed, we were told by the second officer that he had at the time estimated the distance of the light at half a mile, which Admiral Dent stated was no doubt a more correct estimate. Under these circumstances the alteration was neither a safe nor a proper one. What the master should have done was to have put her head off the shore, and to have taken measures to ascertain and verify his position before steering for the harbour.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whe- " ther, when the weather became hazy, the speed of " the vessel was promptly and sufficiently reduced?" No doubt the speed of the vessel was very great, being from 17 to 19 knots at full speed and 11 at half speed. Seeing, however, that she was a paddle-wheel steamer, so that her speed could be very readily reduced, and that there is strong evidence that, although somewhat hazy at sea, the fog was not dense except on the land, and would not be visible until he was in it, we are not prepared to say that the speed was too great under the circumstances.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the lead was used, and if not, whether its neglect " was justifiable?" Now it has been contended by Mr. Aspinall, that the lead would have been of no use, and would not have indicated to him where he was. It is, no doubt, quite true that the line of 20 fathom soundings runs at a distance of some two miles from the South Stack, and thence across Holyhead Bay; so that, if he had taken soundings, and had got 20 fathoms, or thereabouts, it would not have shown him whether he was off the South Stack or in Holyhead Bay. But, having sighted the South Stack Light, if he had then laid his head off the shore, and taken a cast of the lead, what it would have shown him was, whether the distance from the South Stack was, as he supposed, 2 or 3 miles, or only half a mile. Under these circumstances we think that the neglect of the lead was not justifiable, as it was the only means he had of ascertaining and verifying his position.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a good and proper look-out was kept?" We are told that the master was on the bridge, that the second mate and one hand were on the starboard side, and two hands on the port side of the bridge, and that there was a man stationed forward on the top gallant forecastle, and that they were all looking out. It would have been difficult to have had a better look-out.

I will take the three next questions together; they are as follow:—"7. Whether the vessel was navigated " with proper and seamanlike care?" "8. What was " the cause of the casualty?" and "9. Whether the " master and officers are, or either of them, is in " default?" It is admitted that the blame for the casualty rests with the master, and with the master alone, as he was on the bridge, and in charge at the time, and that it was due to his having miscalculated his distance from the South Stack when he saw the glare of the Light. But it is said that this was a mere error of judgment, and not a wrongful act or default, for which this Court would be justified in dealing with his certificate. No doubt, if the vessel had been, where the master assumed her to be, some 2 or 3 miles from the South Stack, the alteration of the course to east or E. by N. would probably have taken him quite clear of the North Stack; he has told us that he thought it would take him about the third of a mile clear of it. But had the master any right whatever to act on this assumption, knowing, as he must have done, that nothing is more deceptive than distances in a fog. We have also the fact that, whilst the master estimated the distance to be between 2 and 3 miles, the second officer said that it appeared to him to be only about half a mile off, or a little more, and that it loomed very high, showing that they were pretty close upon it, and in this he is confirmed by the quartermaster, Hugh Williams, who was at the wheel. On the whole, we think that this is more than a mere error of judgment, and that the master has been guilty of a wrongful act and default in not having navigated the vessel with proper and seamanlike care.

Under these circumstances the Board of Trade have asked "that the certificate of the master should be " dealt with." Now it seems that Captain Beaumont has been for 46 years at sea, and for the last 30 years has commanded vessels belonging to the London and North Western Railway Company, and Admiral Dent, who has known him for the last 20 years, has told us that it is impossible to speak too highly of him, both as a careful navigator and for the attention which he pays to his duties; and that, if he has any equal, he certainly has no superior on the line between Dublin and Holyhead. Admiral Dent has admitted that no doubt it would have been a more prudent course for him to have put the ship's head off shore and to have ascertained and verified his position before laying his course for the harbour; but he stated that, if he had done so, and had then taken a cast of the lead, there would in all probability have been an outcry from the 161 passengers whom he had on board that he did not know his business. The fact has also come out in the course of this inquiry that the "Leinster," a steam boat belonging to an opposition line, and which runs from Kingstown to Holyhead, was close behind them, and if Captain Beaumont had stopped to take a cast of the lead to ascertain his distance from the South Stack, the "Leinster" would probably have been in Holyhead before them. These considerations no doubt influenced Captain Beaumont not to adopt the prudent course of putting his head off shore and taking a cast of the lead, but in the opinion of the assessors he ought not to have allowed any such considerations to weigh with him, and thus exposed the 161 passengers and 43 hands to a danger from which they seem to have been saved only by the extreme goodness and strength of the vessel. On the whole the assessors are of opinion that it is a case in which the Court is bound to deal with his certificate. One of the assessors thinks that the captain's certificate should be suspended for six months, while the other is of opinion that a suspension for three months would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the case. Under these circumstances, and bearing in mind the very high character which Captain Beaumont has received from Admiral Dent, and the fact that during the last 30 years that he has commanded the company's vessels he has never before stranded any of them, the Court is disposed to take a more lenient view of the case, and to order that his certificate be suspended for three months only.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE HYDE,

JOHN L. PATTISON,

Assessors.

L 367. 2361. 180.—7/85. Wt. 408. E. & S.

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