Wreck Report for 'Benwell Tower', 1885

(No. 2509.)

"BENWELL TOWER" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 31st day of March and 1st day of April 1885, before H, C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains ANDERSON and HARLAND, Rear-Admiral MORESBY, and W. B. ROBINSON, Esquire, Chief Constructor, R.N., as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment of the steamship "BENWELL TOWER," of Liverpool, and the loss of the lives of two of her crew, in January last, whilst on a voyage from Baltimore to Liverpool.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the said vessel left Baltimore on her last voyage she was undermanned and overladen, and that her loss is due, partly to the extreme violence of the gale, partly to her being overladen, and partly to the loss of steam power, owing to the breaking down of the feed-pump, and to the coal having become wetted, which caused her to fall off into the trough of the sea. That no blame attaches to the master or to any of the officers who were on board the vessel, and that they were fully justified in abandoning her when they did; but that the owner is to blame for having sent her to sea overladen and undermanned.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 1st day of April 1885.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ABSM. ANDERSON,

ROBERT HARLAND,

W. B. ROBINSON,

C.C., R.N.,

J. MORESBY,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 31st of March ultimo and the 1st of April instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Aspinall for the owners, and Mr. Botterell for the master of the "Benwell Tower." Eleven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Aspinall and Mr. Botterell then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Mansel Jones having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment upon the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Benwell Tower" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the Port of London, of 3,096 tons gross, and 2,036 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 400 horse-power. She was built at Sunderland in the year 1884, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Frederick Stumore of No. 34 Leadenhall Street, in the City of London, and others, Mr. Stumore being the managing owner. She left Baltimore on the 20th January last for Liverpool, with a crew of 30 hands all told, two stowaways, and a cargo of 3,773 tons, of which about 2,035 tons was grain, besides about 500 tons of coal in her bunkers. For the first week they had favourable weather, the wind being from about S.W. to N.W., but squally; and at noon of the 27th they were in latitude 44° 3' north and longitude 45° 4' west, when the wind began to blow strong from the W.N.W., increasing by 7 p.m. to a hard gale at which hour a sea broke over the stern, breaking up the accommodation ladder and the hen coops, which were on the top of the saloon. During the night the wind continued to increase, and at midnight it was blowing with hurricane force, when the master and 2nd officer, who were on the bridge, heard a cracking noise amidships, as though the vessel was breaking up under them, which appears to have alarmed them a good deal. At this time the vessel was running before the wind under her two fore topsails, but between 2 and 3 a.m. the port clew of the upper topsail gave way, and the sails were immediately torn to ribbons. Soon afterwards the master observed that the vessel was beginning to lose her way, and the chief engineer coming up told him that the feed pump was working badly, and asked if she could be stopped for a short time; the master, however, replied that it was not possible, and that he must do his best to keep her going. Upon which the chief engineer went below, and whilst he was repairing the feed pump, proceeded to feed the boiler with the donkey, which had the effect of still further reducing the steam. At about 3 a.m. two of the derricks and a boom got adrift, and swinging about tore the tarpaulins off No. 2 hatchway, and knocked away the coamings of some of the ventilators level with the deck. In the meantime water had been coming into the engine-room and stokehole through the ventilators and the fiddley gratings; and although the fiddley covers were put on, and the ventilators turned away from the wind and sea, the water still continued to come in, wetting the coals, and still further reducing the pressure of steam; and at length, at about 4 a.m., she broached to, and fell off into the trough of the sea. Every effort seems to have been made to get her head to wind, but she had not speed enough to do so, and at daylight the steam steering gear parted, upon which orders were at once given to slip the after steering gear, which was done. In the meantime the starboard lifeboat had been smashed up, and was lying on the top of the engine room skylight; and whilst the officers and some of the hands were engaged clearing it away, a sea broke over them, carrying away the chart room and wheel house, which were on the top of the bridge, and at the same time washing overboard the second mate and one of the seamen, breaking the chief mate's leg, and seriously injuring another of the hands. At about 9 a.m. the after steering gear gave way, and it being found impossible to repair it, relieving tackles were rove, but all in vain, for the vessel still lay in the trough of the sea with her port gunwale under water, the bulwarks on both sides forward of the bridge, as well as those on the port side abaft the bridge having been washed away, rendering it impossible for any person to stand on the deck; the bridge also had become a complete wreck, having been stove in in different places, and all the boats were smashed up. During the morning of the 28th it was observed that water was coming into the engine room and stoke hole through the sides of the vessel between the seams and at the butts; and although the bilge injection was turned on, the water continued to gain upon them during that day and the following night. At daylight of the 29th it was found that No. 3 hatch was stove in, and was lying on the top of the cargo, and at 6 a.m. there were 4 feet of water in the engine room, which had increased by 8 a.m. to 5 feet. At length at about 9 a.m., a vessel, which proved to be the "Gladiolus," was seen away on the port bow, and signals having been made to her, she bore down to them, and sent her lifeboat, all the boats of the "Benwell Tower" having been washed away. The crew of the "Benwell Tower" then came aft and said that they wished to leave the vessel, and as, although the wind and sea had at that time gone down, the weather was threatening, the master, after consultation with the chief officer and the chief engineer, agreed to abandon her, and they were taken in three trips to the "Gladiolus," the master, and the chief and second engineers being the last to leave. It was then about 1 p.m., and as soon as they were all on board, the "Gladiolus" proceeded on her voyage, and arrived at New York on the 13th of February following.

These then being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether the vessel was properly constructed and " of sufficient structural strength, and whether her " hatchways, ventilators, and all openings in the deck " were properly constructed and of sufficient strength " and size?" The vessel, it seems, was quite new, having been built last year by Mr. Laing, the wellknown ship-builder at Sunderland, and this was her first voyage. From the evidence of Mr. Oscar Gad, Mr. Laing's chief draftsman, under whose supervision the vessel was built, and from the plans and specifications which he has brought in, it would seem that she was a first-class vessel, built under special survey, and above the requirements of Lloyd's. He told us that her plates were 11/16ths thick in the middle, fining off at each end to 9/16ths; that all the butts were treble riveted amidships for half the vessel's length, and the remainder double riveted; that she had two decks laid, the main deck being of iron throughout, and the spar deck of iron for 200 feet of its length amidships; that she had 5 water-tight iron bulkheads, all carried up to the spar deck, and that all the reverse frames were also carried to the spar deck. He also told us that she had a watertank extending under the engine and boiler space and for 20 feet into No. 2 hold, constructed on the cellular principle, with one deep centre girder and 3 girders on each side; as well as a tank under the screw tunnel; that the bridge, which was 79 feet long, extended 14 feet forward of the boiler bulkhead, and 13 feet aft of the engine room bulkhead, and had a solid iron bulkhead forward, but was open aft, with alley ways on each side. According to Mr. Gad, she was a first-class ship in every respect, and well and substantially constructed throughout. He told us that she had been built under the special supervision of the surveyors to Lloyd's and to the Board of Trade, and of Captain McNab, the owner's representative; and although none of these gentlemen have been produced, we are told by Mr. Mansel Jones that we are fairly entitled to assume that their evidence would have been to the same effect as that of Mr. Gad, otherwise they would have been produced before us. On the other hand, we have the fact, which is spoken to by the master, the 2nd and 3rd engineers, the donkeyman, and a fireman, that, after she had been for some time in the trough of the sea, she began to make water through the seams and butts in the sides of the engine-room compartment, which might have been caused either by the starting of the butts or by the parting of the rivets; and Mr. Mansel Jones has said that the question, which we have to decide is, whether the vessel was lost through stress of weather or from structural defects. Now there can be no doubt that the weather was extremely violent, rising, as we are told, to hurricane force, and that, lying as she was in the trough of the sea for so many hours, she would be subjected to very severe strainings, so that, if there were any weak places in the construction, they would be very liable to give way. We have, however, nothing to show that there were any such weak places, and that the whole of the damages may not have been caused by the violence of the gale. On the whole, we do not think that with the evidence which we have before us, we should be justified in saying either that the vessel was not properly constructed and of sufficient structural strength, or that her hatchways, ventilators, and other openings in the deck were not properly constructed and of sufficient strength and size. And we must, therefore, hold that the defects, which shewed themselves in the sides, were due to the extreme violence of the gale.

The second question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, when the vessel left Baltimore, she " was in all respects in a good and seaworthy condition, " and whether her engines were in all respects efficient " and worked properly, and whether she was properly or sufficiently manned?" The vessel left Sunderland on the 9th of December last for Baltimore with her ballast tanks filled, about 500 tons of stone ballast, and about 1,100 tons of coals sufficient for the out and home voyages, but without any cargo. in going down Channel we are told that the feed pump was found not to be working well, and she had to put into Plymouth to repair it. There she was detained for some three or four days, when she started again, and we are told by the engineers that after, that on the way out, the engines worked well, but that the boilers primed, owing it is said to the dirty water which was in them, and which they had not been able to clean out whilst at Plymouth, as they had to keep up the steam the whole time. The result was that they had to stop two or three times on the way out to re-pack the glands, but beyond that we are told that the engines worked well, and continued to do so even after leaving Baltimore and until the 27th, when the feed pump again went wrong, and when they had to pump cold water from the donkey into the boilers, and this, with the wet condition of the coal, prevented their getting up a sufficient head of steam to keep the engines properly going; otherwise, however, there was nothing, we are told, wrong with the engines. As regards the vessel herself, we were told that on the voyage out she was, although in ballast, dirty, taking a good deal of water on deck, but that she made no water. And although at Baltimore she was twice laid upon the mud, there seems to be no objection to that, even for a vessel of the size of the "Benwell Tower," the mud there being, we are told, soft, and the less so, as the vessel had only a flat keel. If, then, she was properly constructed and structurally strong when she left this country, there is no reason to think that she would not be equally so when she left Baltimore. As regards her crew, however, we are told that she sailed from this country with 30 hands all told, and that she left Baltimore with the same crew, but with two stowaways in addition, who were, however, both of them landsmen. Now the deck hands consisted of the master, two mates, a boatswain, a carpenter, six A.B.'s, and two ordinary seamen. The carpenter, however, was a landsman, and the boatswain kept no watch; so that, practically, there would be only an officer and three A.B.'s, and one ordinary seaman, for each watch; but, as a fact, the two ordinaries and one of the able seamen fell sick two or three days after they left Baltimore, so that there were left three A.B.'s for one watch and only two A.B.'s for the other. In the latter watch, therefore, there was but one A.B. to take the helm and one to go on the look-out, and no one available in case of accident, or to trim the lamps, or do anything that might be required. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the vessel was very much under-manned; indeed, even if all the 6 A.B.'s and the 2 ordinaries had been available, we were told by the master as well as by all the crew who have been examined, that, in their opinion, she would not have had a sufficient number of hands, and that she ought to have had two more able seamen, an opinion in which the assessors entirely concur. They think that 8 A.B.'s and two ordinary seamen would be the minimum allowance for a vessel of her size.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " she had sufficient freeboard?" We are told that the load line was placed at 5 feet 6 from the top of the spar deck, and that, when she left Baltimore, the centre of the disc was 1 foot 1 or 2 out of the water, giving her therefore a freeboard of 6 feet 7 or 6 feet 8. It is said however, that at Baltimore the water is brackish, and that consequently she would on getting into salt water, rise about 4 1/2 inches, which would give her, when she got out to sea, a freeboard of say 7 feet from the top of the spar deck, thus putting the main deck about on a level with the water. Mr. Mansel Jones told us that he was not instructed, on behalf of the Board of Trade, to say whether this was or was not a sufficient freeboard, and that he had not been furnished with any calculations on the subject. Mr. Botterell however, brought in certain calculations, shewing the amount of freeboard which she should have had according to Lloyd's rules, and from these, and the evidence of Mr. Gad as to the dimensions of the vessel, we can form some estimate of the freeboard which she ought to have had. Now according to Mr. Oscar Gad, her moulded depth amidships to the top of the spar deck was 29 feet 8, and deducting about 7 feet for the height of the spar deck, we obtain a moulded depth of 22 feet 8, or, say 22 feet 6 to the top of the main deck amidships. She had also, according to the calculations given in by Mr. Botterell, a coefficient of fineness of .79. Now by Lloyd's rules, a spar deck vessel with a moulded depth of 22 feet 6 to the main deck, and a coefficient of fineness of .79, should have a freeboard amidships of 7 feet 10 1/4 inches. We are told, however, that from this certain deductions would have to be made. Thus, for instance, she had a sheer forward of 8 feet 4, and of 3 feet 4 aft, giving her a mean sheer of 5 feet 10, or 70 inches, and as at the rate of 15 inches for every 100 feet of length, the required sheer would be only 48, there would be an excess of sheer of 22 inches, one fourth of which, or 5 1/2 inches, would have to be deducted. For the bridge, again, which was 79 feet long, with an iron bulkhead in front, but open aft, Mr. Botterell claimed 2 1/8 inches. On the other hand, the camber was only 9 1/2 inches, whereas for a beam of 42 feet, allowing 1/4 of an inch for every foot of beam, it should have been 10 1/2 inches, and half the difference, or 1/2 an inch, would therefore have to be added to the freeboard. The total deductions then from the freeboard of 7 feet 10 1/4 inches would be 5 1/2 inches for extra sheer, 2 1/8 inches for the bridge, and an addition for short camber of 1/2 an inch, the result being that according to Lloyd's rules this vessel should have had a minimum freeboard in salt water on leaving Baltimore of 7 feet 3 1/8 inches, whereas we have seen that her freeboard was only about 7 feet, which was therefore clearly insufficient. When, too, it is remembered that she left Baltimore on the 20th of January, in midwinter, and was bound across the North Atlantic, it is obvious that her freeboard was wholly insufficient.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the cargo was properly stowed, and whether the deck " cargo was properly secured?" It appears from the stowage plan which has been brought in, that the wheat was stowed in the bottom of the ship, and for the most part in the centre, the cotton and other light goods being in the 'tween decks, and the bark right forward. Assuming then the cargo to have been stowed in the manner indicated on the plan, there is no reason to think that it was not properly stowed. As regards the 13 logs of walnut which were on deck, they seem to have been secured to eye bolts in the deck, and there is nothing to shew that they were not properly stowed.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "What was " the cause of the damage the vessel sustained on and " after the 27th January, and whether every possible " effort was made to repair such damage, and to pre- " vent water getting into the vessel and to keep it " under?" The damage to the vessel was no doubt due, partly to the extreme violence of the weather, partly to the derricks having got adrift and torn away the tarpaulins from the hatches as well as the coamings of the ventilators; partly to the depth to which the vessel was laden; and partly also to the loss of steam power from the breaking down of the feed-pump, and from the coals becoming wetted, causing the vessel to fall off into the trough of the sea, and to lie with her broadside exposed to the violence of the waves. It is to all these various causes that the damage to the vessel is due.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " every possible effort was made to ensure the safety " of the lives of the crew, and what was the cause of " the loss of life?" In our opinion every effort was made to ensure the safety of the lives of the crew; and the loss of the lives of the 2nd mate and one man was due to a wave having swept over the vessel whilst she lay in a helpless state in the trough of the sea.

The seventh question which we are asked is, " Whether she was navigated with proper and sea " manlike care, and whether the vessel was pre- " maturely abandoned?" The assessors are of opinion that she was navigated with proper and seamanlike care. We are told that, when they left her, the water was nearly up to the port wing furnace, and was gaining upon them, so that in a comparatively short time afterwards they must have been put out. Of the crew 3 were sick and off duty, the second officer and 1 A.B. had been washed overboard, the chief officer had had his leg broken, and another A.B. had been seriously injured, thus leaving the master, the boatswain, and 3 A.B.'s to do the whole of the work on deck. In our opinion the vessel was certainly not prematurely abandoned, and she probably foundered a few hours after they had left her.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master and officers are, or either of them is, in " default?" In our opinion neither the master nor either of the officers is in any way to blame for the loss of the vessel, and we think that the Board of Trade have acted quite rightly in not asking that their certificates should be dealt with.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Whether " blame attaches to the owner?" In our opinion blame does attach to the owner in this case, for having sent this vessel to sea greatly undermanned and too deeply laden, considering the season of the year, and the nature of the voyage on which she was bound. And although it has not been shewn that the casualty was due to any deficiency in her crew, we think that an owner is not justified in sending his ship to sea with an insufficient crew.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

ABSM. ANDERSON,

ROBERT HARLAND,

W. B. ROBINSON,

J. MORESBY,

Assessors.

L 367. 2284. 170.—4/85. Wt. 36. E. & S.