Wreck Report for 'Canossa', 1885

(No. 2442.)

"CANOSSA."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 27th and 28th of January 1885, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains RONALDSON and HARLAND, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the sailing ship "CANOSSA," on the Kentish Knock, on the 11th of January 1885.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the negligent navigation thereof by Robert Ross, the master, in having allowed her to drive up channel and past the entrance to the Thames, until she grounded on the Kentish Knock, instead of bringing her to an anchor in the Downs, or in Margate Roads, or under the Foreland; in having, for the fifteen and a half hours immediately preceding the casualty, whilst the vessel was in a position of great danger, been below in his cabin; and in having, for some time before and at the time of the casualty, been in a state of intoxication.

For these wrongful acts and defaults the Court cancels the certificate of the said Robert Ross.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 28th day of January 1885.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Westminster on the 27th and 28th of January 1885, when Mr. McConnell appeared for the Board of Trade and Mr. Gibson for the owner and master of the "Canossa." Eight witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and one by Mr. Gibson, Mr. McConnell handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Gibson then addressed the Court on behalf of his parties, and Mr. McConnell having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:-

The "Canossa," which was an iron barque belonging to the Port of Liverpool, of 399 tons gross and 387 tons net register, was built at Newcastle in the year 1857, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Edward Charles Keegan, of 44, Chapel Street, Liverpool, Mr. Keegan being the managing owner. She left London on the 6th of January instant, with a crew of 12 hands all told, and a cargo of 532 tons of cement, bound to Rosario in the River Plate. Having been towed as far as Dungenness, she cast off between 3 and 4 o'clock of the 7th, and proceeded to beat down channel, the weather at the time being fine and the wind light from the S.W. During the night the wind freshened, increasing to a strong gale, and the vessel continued beating down channel, but apparently making no progress. On the 9th, at about 7.30 p.m., she was off Hastings, and the wind being S.W. she stood to the southward, close hauled on the starboard tack, until 5 a.m. of the following morning, when we are told that the two electric lights on the coast of France were seen, upon which she was tacked to the northward, and was kept on that course, close hauled to the wind on the port tack, till about 5 p.m., when finding that they had got into 17 fathoms of water, they wore ship, and again stood to the southward. At this time we are told that the weather was very hazy, and that it was blowing a hard gale from the westward; but between half-past seven and eight o'clock it suddenly cleared up, and they then saw the South Foreland Lights bearing north, and the Varne Light bearing N.W., which would place them close down on the French coast, and inside Cape Grisnez, which was about three miles distant. The vessel was accordingly put about with the greatest expedition, and she was kept close hauled to the wind on the port tack for the purpose of making the Downs; but at midnight, finding that she was drifting too fast to leeward, she was again tacked to the southward until 3 a.m., when they again found themselves on the French coast, upon which she was again laid on the port tack, and at 4 a.m. they sighted the North Sand Head Light bearing about north, and the East Goodwin Light about W.N.W.; and she was then brought close to the wind on the port tack under two lower topsails, and reefed upper main topsail, and a fore topmast staysail, heading about N. by W., the wind being about W. by N. From 4 to 8 a.m. it was the chief officer's watch, and during all that time the vessel was kept close hauled on the port tack, heading as I have stated; and then, having set the reefed foresail and reefed upper fore topsail, the mate gave up charge to the boatswain, with directions to keep her on the same course, close hauled to the wind on the port tack. At 9 a.m. we are told that a cast of the lead was taken, which gave 19 fathoms, and that at 10.30 a.m. they took a second cast and got 17 fathoms. The vessel was still kept on her course, no directions having been given to alter it, and at about 11.30 a.m. she suddenly struck on the Kentish Knock. Immediately afterwards breakers were seen about a quarter of a mile off, and as the tide fell, the breakers got nearer, and were at length all round the vessel. At two to half-past a smack called the "Nelson" came up, and having sent her boat alongside they succeeded with considerable difficulty in taking off half the crew. At about 5.30 she returned and took off the remainder, and they then immediately made for Ramsgate, which they reached between 8 and 9 p.m. the same day. No lives were lost, but the vessel became a total wreck, and was lost, together with all her cargo.

These being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked is, "What was " the cause of the stranding of the vessel?" It is admitted by the master that the stranding of the vessel is due to her having been kept from 4 a.m. to about 11.30 a.m., or for seven and a half hours, on a course close hauled to the wind on the port tack, and driving to leeward with the wind and tide, until she got on the Kentish Knock. And seeing that the distance from the place where she is stated to have been at 4 a.m. to the Kentish Knock is only 25 miles, it will be seen that if, during those 7 1/2 hours she made under the combined effects of headway, leeway, and tide a little over three knots an hour in that direction, that would be sufficient to put her on the Kentish Knock. That, no doubt, is how she got there.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " a safe and proper course was set and steered after " passing the East Goodwin Light? and whether due " and proper allowance was made for tide, currents, " and leeway?" This question has been already answered in answering the preceding question. The master has admitted that it was not a proper course, due allowance not having been made for tide and leeway.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master was on deck at a time when the safety of " the vessel required his personal supervision? and " whether at any time during the voyage he was under " the influence of drink?" It was the chief mate's watch on that night from 8 p.m. to midnight, the master's watch from midnight to 4 a.m., the chief officer's from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m., and then the master's again from 8 a.m. until 11.30 a.m., when the vessel struck. Now during the whole of these fifteen hours and a half, from 8 p.m. of the 10th to 11.30 a.m. of the 11th, the master admits that he was never once on deck, although at 8 p.m. she had only just escaped running on the French Coast near to Cape Grisnez; had tacked at midnight, had again tacked off the French Coast at 3 a.m. and from that time had been in a position of constant peril, urgently requiring the master's attention. During all this time he had left the vessel entirely in the hands of the chief officer and boatswain, so that when it was not the chief officer's watch, that is, from midnight to 4 a.m., and from 8 a.m. to 11.30 a.m., she was left to the charge of the boatswain, who was uncertificated.

And now, what appears to have been the reason of so grave a dereliction of duty on the part of the master as to leave the vessel when she was in a position of very considerable peril for some 15 1/2 hours before she went ashore, without ever once going on deck. It seems that the master having caught a fever about two years ago in the West Indies, had ever since that time been on shore, and having contracted the habit of taking laudanum, he had taken on board with him a pint bottle of laudanum for his own use. There had also been put on board by the owner a dozen of port wine as medical stores for the crew, and this was kept in a locker in the captain's cabin. The captain admitted that he had drunk two of these bottles of port, but when they left, a much larger quantity was found to have been drunk. He also admitted that when the steward came to him, after the vessel had struck, he told him to get a bottle of port, and on being asked where it was, he said that it was in his bunk, and there the steward found it, tucked in at the foot, but quite empty. The chief officer, who certainly shewed no ill-feeling to the master, told us that immediately after the casualty the latter had every appearance of being the worse for liquor, giving absurd and contradictory orders. The boatswain also told us that the master was certainly not properly sober when the vessel struck. I will not refer to the evidence of Wills, the steward, as he seems to have had some feeling against the master; but there was a seaman, named Gulbranson, who also said that the master was not sober when the vessel struck. On the other hand there were two seamen, named Euglan and Hultengren, who said that in their opinion the master was not the worse for liquor; but then one of these men could not speak a word of English, and had to be examined through an interpreter, and the other admitted that he had not spoken to the master. In fact, the evidence seemed to be so overwhelming, that Mr. Gibson was at length compelled to admit that the master could not have been in a proper state when the vessel struck, whether from the effects of laudanum or from port wine, or as he said, probably from both combined, and that also is the conclusion to which we have come.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether " proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify " the position of the vessel from time to time?" When the North Sand Head Light and the East Goodwin Light were seen, there was an excellent opportunity of taking cross bearings, and fixing the position of the vessel exactly; but no steps appear to have been taken for that purpose, for the bearings given to us of north for the North Sand Head Light, and W.N.W. for the East Goodwin Light, would place the vessel so close to the latter, that it seems almost impossible she could have been there. After this no steps whatever Were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel, except the two soundings taken by the boatswain, and to which we shall presently have to refer.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " a good and proper look out was kept, especially for " shoal or discoloured water?" There seems to have been a look-out man stationed forward until daylight, but after that there was no one forward. The steward said something about having seen shoal or discoloured water, but it turned out that that was only just at about the time that the vessel struck, if not after it. But there was no look out kept for shoal or discoloured water, for they do not seem to have known at all where they were or that they were in the neighbourhood of sand banks or shoal water.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the lead was used with sufficient frequency and the " results reported?" The master in his first examination stated that he gave orders that soundings should be taken every hour; that accordingly soundings were taken at 9 a.m. which gave 19 fathoms, that at 10 a.m. they got 18 fathoms, and at 11 a.m. 17 fathoms, and that these soundings were duly reported to him. But this was an evident untruth, for he admitted afterwards that it was only after the stranding of the vessel that the boatswain had told him that he had taken three soundings, and had got 19, 18, and 17 fathoms. The boatswain, however, when he was examined, told us that he had taken only two soundings, one at 9 a.m. which gave 19 fathoms, and one at 10.30 a.m. which gave 17 fathoms; that he took them by himself with the hand lead, that he did not call them out, and did not report them to the captain. That the soundings, as spoken to by the boatswain could have been correctly taken, seems almost impossible, as the chart shews on the course, which the vessel must have taken from the Goodwin to the Kentish Knock, only from 12 to 14 fathoms. It is clear however, in our opinion that the soundings were not taken sufficiently frequent, and that those which were taken were not reported to the master.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Whether " the vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike " care?" and the eighth is, "Whether the master and officers are, or either of them is, in default?" We have seldom, if ever, seen a case in which a vessel has been navigated in a more improper and unseamanlike manner; or which was left more entirely at the mercy of the wind and waves than this vessel was. From the evening of the 7th, after she had cast off the tug, until 11.30 a.m. of the 11th, when she went on the Kentish Knock, she seems to have been knocking about the channel at imminent risk to herself and other vessels. She barely escaped getting on the French coast, near Cape Grisnez, and how she escaped striking on the Varne or the Ridge, appears to me to be a miracle. The master's duty, when he found that he could not get down channel, but was being driven back, was to have run to the Downs for shelter. When again he found himself outside the Goodwins, his proper course was to have made for Margate Roads, as the chief officer advised him to do, or under the North Foreland, instead of drifting down towards the Kentish Knock and the other dangerous sands which lie in that direction. We could hardly say that the vessel was navigated at all, she was left almost to chance, the master giving no directions, and leaving it to the officers to do what they thought best. So far, indeed, as the officers were concerned, we do not think that they are to blame; they did the best they could under the circumstances. The whole blame rests with the master, and with the master alone.

Under these circumstances the Board of Trade have asked that "the certificate of the master should be " dealt with." it appears to us that this master has committed some of the most serious offences of which a master can be guilty. Instead of getting his vessel into a safe anchorage to ride out the gale, he allowed her to drive up the channel for several days at imminent risk to the lives of all on board, as well as to other vessels; he took no pains to ascertain and verify his position, thereby barely escaping to run upon the French coast, and on the Ridge and the Varne, and finally landed her on the Kentish Rock; for fifteen and a half hours before she stranded, he was not on deck; and to add to all his offences he chose to get intoxicated, when the vessel was in imminent peril, whether with port wine or laudanum, or with both combined, matters in our opinion very little. It is said that he caught a fever two years ago, and has not since been to sea; that he was not wholly recovered from the effects of it, when he took charge of this vessel; but that only shows that he ought not to have taken charge of her at all. Again, it is said that his leg was injured by being thrown down on the deck, when he went to the wheel, immediately after the vessel grounded; but that would be no justification for his conduct before the casualty, or for the acts which led to it. We think that this man is not fit to command a vessel, and that we must cancel his certificate. The Board of Trade may hereafter, if they think fit, and are satisfied that he is competent, restore it to him; but we are not prepared to accept the responsibility of allowing this man to have the chance of commanding another vessel, and of again risking the lives or property that may be entrusted to him.

There remains the three last questions, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, which are as follow:-"What was " the cost of the vessel to her owner?" "What was " the value of the vessel at the time when she last left " the United Kingdom?" "What were the insurances " effected, and how were they apportioned?" Mr. Gibson stated that he had advised his client not to answer these questions, but that his client had determined to do so, and we are thus able to give the required information. It seems that the vessel, which was built in the year 1857, was launched under the name of the "Mary Rogerson," but in 1865 she was sold to foreigners, her British register was closed, and she became the "Ysabel." After being in the possession of foreigners for about 19 years, she was purchased in December last by Mr. Keegan for the sum of 2,100l., and in accordance with the requirements of the Board of Trade and of Lloyds, he had to spend upon her a sum of 365l., making the total cost to him 2,465l. She was insured, he told us, at the time of her loss for 3,000l., and we are then asked what her value was when she last left the United Kingdom. Originally no doubt she was a very good ship, having been built under special survey, and classed at Lloyds. She was specially surveyed by Lloyds in 1878, and again in 1882, and on the 31st of December last she was reported "to be in a " good and efficient state, and fit to carry dry and " perishable cargoes to and from all parts of the world." She was therefore no doubt a good vessel. At the same time she was 27 years old, and had been for 19 years of that period in the possession of foreigners, and whether during that period she had been well kept up or not, there was nothing to shew. Mr. James West, manager to Messrs. Hingston and Son, who did the repairs to her, after she had been purchased by Mr. Keegan, told us that he had examined her, and that, in his opinion, she was a very cheap ship, and well worth 3000l. Mr. West, however, went on to say that she was a vessel which it would be very difficult for the owner to replace, for that they were not built now; but that would seem to be a reason for thinking that they were not worth building, for if they were worth building, and there was a demand for them, we can see no reason why shipbuilders should not build them. On the whole, however, it appears to us, that 3000l., which would be 7l. 10s. per ton on the gross tonnage, would be a very full price for such a vessel.

The freight, we are told, was 30s. a ton, on 532 tons, making a total of 798l., but of this, 532l., or two-thirds of it, had been advanced before the vessel sailed, and the remaining 266l. was payable on her arrival at Rosario. This was insured by a policy for 400l., but with power to recover only to the extent of the freight at risk, that is to say, 266l. It should, however, be observed, that if the vessel had reached Rosario in safety, the wages, as well as the port and discharging dues, would have had to come out of it.

I should add that the disbursements of the ship were insured for a sum of 350l.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

ROBERT HARLAND,

Assessors.

L 367. 2217. 170.-2/85. Wt. 36. E. & S.