Wreck Report for 'Alfred', 1883

(No. 1763.)

"ALFRED" (S.S.)

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Newcastle on the 4th, 5th, and 6th days of April 1883, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains FORSTER and KENNEDY, and Mr. W. C. LANG, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the abandonment and loss of the steamship "ALFRED," of Newcastle, on the 13th of February last, whilst on a voyage from Smyrna to Falmouth with a cargo of barley.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the loss of the said vessel was due partly to her having been too deeply laden when she left Gibraltar, which caused her to labour and strain heavily, and to make water; partly to the fore and aft sails having been kept set, after she had taken a list to starboard, and when there was a strong beam wind and sea on the port side; and partly to her having been kept on her course to the northward, instead of being taken into Vigo Bay, as she might and ought to have been. The Court is, however, of opinion, that the vessel was not prematurely abandoned, and that it has not been proved to its satisfaction that the master was intoxicated at any time after leaving Gibraltar.

Looking, however, at all the facts, the Court is of opinion that for the wrongful acts and defaults abovementioned, the certificate of the said John Oliver Landells should be suspended for twelve months from this date, and it suspends it accordingly; but on the application of his solicitor, recommends that during the period of such suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 6th day of April 1883.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

 

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. CUNNINGHAM LANG,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Newcastle on the 4th, 5th, and 6th days of April instant, when Mr. Howard Smith appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Adamson for the owners, Mr. Roche for the master, and Mr. Storey for the chief engineer of the "Alfred." Nine witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Howard Smith handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Five witnesses were then produced on behalf of the owners of the "Alfred," and Mr. Adamson and Mr. Roche having been heard for their respective parties, and Mr. Howard Smith having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Alfred" was an iron screw steamship belonging to the port of Newcastle, of 1,062 tons gross, and 667 tons net register, and was fitted with engines of 99 horse power. She was built at Hebburn-on-Tyne in the year 1870, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. Henry Edward Pyle Adamson, of North Shields, and others, Mr. Adamson being the managing owner. She left Smyrna on the 17th of January last for Falmouth, with a crew of 21 hands all told, 6,929 quarters of barley, and about 70 tons of coal in her bunkers. On the 19th she met with heavy weather in the Grecian Archipelago, which caused her to take a list to port; and on the weather moderating it was found that the cargo had settled and shifted over to port, more especially in the after hold. The captain accordingly ordered that grain should be brought from the lower forecastle, which was a kind of feeder to the fore hold, to fill up the empty spaces in the after hold. They arrived at Malta on the 23rd, and labourers were at once engaged to complete the retrimming of the cargo, and having got the ship upright, and taken in 90 tons of coal, they left on the 24th for Gibraltar. Soon after leaving she again met with very bad weather, so that on the 30th they had to put into Algiers, and having by that time consumed a large quantity of her coal, 45 tons more were taken in, and she started again on the 31st, but had to put back again the same evening, and after lying in the Bay until the 2nd of February, she again resumed her voyage, arriving safely at Gibraltar on the 5th. Whilst lying there she came into collision with the Anchor Line Hulk, but without apparently doing herself any serious damage, and having taken in 140 tons of bunker coal, in addition to the 8 or 10 tons which she had remaining, she resumed her voyage on the 7th. After passing Tarifa Point the vessel was put upon a W. by N. 1/2 N. course, the wind being about W.N.W., but at midnight the course was altered to N.W., the wind having then gone to about W.S.W. At 4 p.m. of the 8th it was blowing a strong breeze from the N.W., with a strong head sea, and all sails were then taken in. During this day orders were given by the chief engineer to work three of the fires out of the starboard bunkers so as to keep her upright, the vessel having even then a tendency to list over to that side, owing no doubt to the beam sea, which they had had in the earlier part of the day. On the following morning, the 9th, at about 1 a.m., the chief engineer ordered the port bunker door to be shut down, and the coal to be thrown over to the port side of the stoke hole, the list to starboard having increased. At 4 a.m. they rounded Cape St. Vincent, when the course was altered to N. 1/4 E., the wind being strong from the N.W. At 4 p.m., although there was a strong beam sea, the wind being from the W.N.W., and the course of the vessel N. 1/4 E., all the fore and aft sails were set. During this day they continued to trim the coals from the starboard to the port side of the stoke hole, the list to starboard still continuing. At 1 a.m. of the 10th they passed Cape Roca, and at 7 a.m. the Burlings, the wind at that time being from the south, and the course of the vessel N. 1/2 E. to N. by E. 1/2 E. At noon however they had again a "strong breeze with strong beam sea," the wind having gone round to W.S.W., and the course of the vessel being N. by E. Apparently they had been carrying sail all through that day, for we are told in the log book that at 8 p.m. they had a "strong breeze with " strong beam sea," and that at that time they "took " in the foresail, ship having a slight list to starboard." But according to the boatswain and crew the list had been quite perceptible on deck from early that morning, and had gone on increasing during the day. At 10 p.m. we are told that the ship was rolling tremendously, and as there was then a good deal of water in the engine room, which could not be got at, owing to the list which the vessel had to starboard, she was kept off her course for a time, head to wind and sea, until they could pump her out, and this having been done, she was again kept away on her course. Early on the following morning there was so much water in the engine room that the donkey had to be put on, the list increasing; but notwithstanding this, and that there was a strong beam sea on, at 8 a.m. they set the foresail. At about 11 a.m., finding that he could not get the water to the pumps, the chief engineer disconnected the waste steam pipe of the winch, and put it inside the suction pipe with a basket secured to the end, so as to endeavour to reach the water in the bilges on the lee side. Finding however that the water was still gaining in the engine room, the chief engineer requested that the vessel should be again brought head to wind and sea to clear the bilges. At this time we are told that they were in latitude 41º 58' north, and longitude 9º 40' west, that there was a strong beam sea on, and that the ship was rolling heavily. By the captain's orders the foresail was then taken in, and the vessel brought head to wind, and having reduced the water in the engine room, although Vigo Bay was under their lee, the vessel was at 2.30 p.m. again put upon her course N. by E. 1/2 E. At 3 p.m. the water had again risen in the engine room so that it was lifting the stoke-hole plates, and accordingly at 5. p.m. she was again, at the request of the chief engineer, brought head to wind to clear the bilges; and having reduced it, she was again kept away on her course. The water however continued to gain to gain upon them, and at 10 p.m. it was so high that all hands were sent to the engine room to bale her. At 2 a.m. the next morning, the 12th, the ship was again hove to to pump the water out; at 3 a.m. the bilge pipes were choked; at 4 a.m. there were 5 feet of water in the stokehole; at 6 a.m. the water was washing into the starboard fires; at 7 a.m. the starboard fires were put out; at 8.30 a.m. the engines stopped, and at 9 a.m. all hands were driven out of the engineroom and stoke-hole by the water, it being dangerous for them to remain there any longer. At 9.30 a.m. the troop ship "Lusitania" hove in sight, and on being signalled to, bore down to them; the captain of the "Lusitania" however declined either to take her in tow or to stay by her, but he offered, if they chose to leave her, to take them onboard, but this the master of the "Alfred" refused to do, and the "Lusitania" there upon proceeded on her voyage. Shortly afterwards the steamship "Wellfield" came up, and at the request of the master of the "Alfred" agreed to take her in tow; and a tow-rope having been passed they proceeded in the direction of Corunna. During that and the next three days they tried to get her to Corunna, which was then the nearest port open to them, but owing to the breaking of the hawsers, and the condition of the vessel all their efforts proved to be vain, and at length, on the morning of the 16th they were obliged to leave her, the vessel being then full of water, and on her beam ends;. and the "Wellfield" then proceeded on her course to Gibraltar, where the crew of the "Alfred" were landed. The "Alfred" no doubt foundered soon after they had left, and with her cargo has been totally lost.

These then being the facts of the case, the first question upon which our opinion has been asked, is, "Were the steam pumps of the 'Alfred' in good order " and sufficient to clear any part of the engine room " and stoke hole of water?" It seems that she had two bilge pumps, with suction pipes leading to the port and starboard side of the kelson respectively, and with the rose boxes placed at a distance of about 18 inches from it. The donkey was connected with the same suction pipes, but the bilge injection had a separate suction pipe leading to the port side of the kelson. The pumps themselves were no doubt quite sufficient for the vessel, the donkey alone being capable of throwing about 74 tons of water per hour; but it was in the internal construction of the vessel and the position of the suction pipes that the deficiency existed. In the first place, the suction pipes, instead of terminating, as they appear to have done, at the distance of about 18 inches on each side of the kelson, should have been carried into the wings, so as to reach the water when the vessel had a list to one side or the other. Again, owing to there being no limber holes; except at the centre line, the water, which was between the two frames, where the roses were, could not get to the pumps, until, indeed, the water had risen over the top of the floor plates. That this was a very great defect was fully admitted by Mr. Oyston, the superintendent engineer to the owners, for whenever the vessel got a list, even a wind list, any water that there might be in her would run into the bilges, and be there held between the frames, without there being any means of its getting to the pumps, except by bringing the vessel head to wind and sea; and we could hardly have a better proof that this was a very defective arrangement than the fact that of the 12 vessels which Messrs. Adamson & Short had, of which six are sister ships to the "Alfred," two only, namely, the "Alfred" and another vessel called the "Edgar," have this arrangement, all the rest having the suction pipes carried into the wings, with limber holes in the bilges; at least that, I think, is what Mr. Oyston told us.

The second question which we are asked is, "Was " the cargo properly stowed at Smyrna, and were the " provisions of the Act 43 & 44 Vict. c. 43, and the " rules and regulations issued by the Board of Trade, " and approved under section 5 thereof, duly complied " with?" A question arose in this case, whether the vessel was to be regarded as a single-decked ship, or a ship having two decks. It seems that she was what is ordinarily known as a well-decked ship, having a 'tween decks aft, but only a single deck forward; and it appeared to me, under these circumstances, that quà the fore part, we must regard her as a single-decked ship, but quà the after part, as a vessel having two decks. This being so, it was stated by the learned counsel for the Board of Trade that she would come under the provisions of section 3 of the official notice issued by the Board of Trade in August 1881, which provides that barley shipped from any port in the Mediterranean or Black Sea may be carried in bulk between decks, provided "(a) That the between deck " hatches shall not at any time be put on;" and "(b) that strakes of the deck be lifted, or if the deck " is an iron deck, sufficient openings be made through " the deck in the wings, which, with the open hatches, " shall admit of the cargo in the between decks feeding " the lower hold." These, he said, appeared to be the only regulations which applied to her. Now I think that there cannot be a doubt that this vessel had her 'tween deck hatches off; there has not been a suggestion to the contrary. She had also, we are told, six feeding hatches on each side in the 'tween decks, each about two feet long, so that the grain in the 'tween decks acted as a feed to the lower hold. It appears to us therefore that the regulations referred to have in this case been complied with.

The third question which we are asked is, "Had the " 'Alfred' sufficient freeboard on leaving Smyrna on " the 17th day of January 1883, or was she overladen?" According to the managing owner, Mr. Adamson, she had 6,950 quarters of barley, the weight of which, at 400 lbs. to the quarter, he estimated to be 1,240 tons, to which we should have to add the 70 tons of coal which she had on board when leaving Smyrna, making a total of 1,310 tons, or between 50 and 60 per cent. above her under deck tonnage. With this weight on board she drew, we are told, 16 feet forward and 17 feet 6 aft, giving a mean of 16 feet 9 inches, which agrees with the log book, as well as with the statutory notice which was left with the British Consul at Smyrna. As to the freeboard, however, which she would have with this draft, it is stated in the statutory notice referred to that it was 2 feet 1, but we are inclined to think that there must be some mistake here; and that the person who filled in the notice for the captain, instead of inserting in the column of "Clear side" the actual freeboard which the vessel had at the time, put down the depth at which the load line was placed below the line of the deck, or, in other words, the freeboard which she would have had had she been loaded down to the centre of her disc; and that this was so is, I think, clear, for the captain has told us that the load line was placed at 2 feet 1 inch below the deck, and that is confirmed by the entry in the ship's articles, and both he and the mate say that, when they left Smyrna, the bottom of the disc was about awash, and if that was so her freeboard would have been, not 2 feet 1, but 2 feet 6 or 7 inches. I ought here to observe that, according to Mr. Adamson, the load line was at 2 feet 3, and not at 2 feet 1, as stated by the captain, and as shewn in the ship's articles, and he told us that that was its position in all the six sister ships which they possessed, and of which the "Alfred" was one. He, however, stated that he had never actually measured it, and in the course of his examination admitted that during the hearing of this case he had ascertained that another of those sister ships, the "Athelstan," the only one at present in this country, had the load line at 2 feet 1, it having been raised without his knowledge by a former master 2 inches, when the vessel was in the Danube, and it may well be that the same thing may have occurred in the case of the "Alfred." But we have another way, and perhaps a more accurate one, of arriving at the freeboard, from the particulars given to us by Mr. Skinner, the naval architect to the builders, Messrs. Leslie, and on whose plans the vessel was built. He told us that her moulded depth was 18 feet 2 inches, depth of keel 7 1/2 inches, deck 3 1/2 inches, stringer plate 1/2 an inch, and he also claimed. 1 inch more for what he called the bevilling out of the deck at the side, but which it is very doubtful whether it ought to be allowed at all. Allowing-it, however, we get a total depth at side of 19 feet 2 1/2 inches, and if from this we deduct the mean draft, 16 feet 9 inches, we get a freeboard of about 2 feet 5 1/2 inches, which is in all probability the freeboard which she had on leaving Smyrna. Now was this a sufficient freeboard?

Taking first the Board of Trade tables for estimating the freeboard; I am told that we are not to call them the Board of Trade rules, but the Board of Trade tables for freeboard-what the distinction is, I fail to understand; be this however as it may, I find that by the Board of Trade tables a steamship 225 feet long ought, for a winter voyage, to have a freeboard of 2.2 inches for every foot depth of hold; and as this vessel was 224.4 feet long, and her hold 17.3 feet deep, that would give us a freeboard of 3 feet 2 inches; from that, however, we should have to deduct first 4 inches for the long poop, and there would then have to be a further deduction made on account of the measurements for freeboard being taken under these tables, not at the disc, but at the break of the poop. What would be the difference by taking the measurements at the centre, or at the break of the poop we have no means of ascertaining with any great accuracy; but we can make a fair approximation to it by calculating the distance which the poop extends beyond the centre, and the sheer of the vessel forward. It is of course only an approximation, but it is all that we have to go upon. Now we are told that the poop was 123 feet long, and as half the length of the vessel was 112.2 feet, the poop would extend some 10 or 11 feet forward of the centre, and the distance between the centre and the break of the poop would be about one-tenth of the distance from the centre to the stem of the vessel. We were also told by Mr. Skinner, the naval architect, that the sheer of the vessel forward was 4 feet 10 1/2 inches, or 58 1/2 inches, and that it was about uniform; so that taking one tenth of this as the difference between the height of the deck at the centre, and the height at the break of the poop, we get a further deduction of 6 inches from the freeboard; no allowance, however, as I understand, would be made by these tables for any excess of camber in this case. Deducting then from the freeboard of 3 feet 2 previously obtained, the 4 inches for the poop, and 6 inches on account of the measurements being taken at the break of the poop instead of at the centre, we get 2 feet 4 inches as the freeboard, which this vessel should have had by the Board of Trade tables.

Taking now Lloyd's tables, we were told by Mr. Skinner that her moulded depth was 18 feet 2 inches, and according to the dimensions given us she would have a co-efficient of fineness of .71, which by Table A would give us a freeboard of 3 feet and three-fourths of an inch. From this, however, certain deductions would have to be made. First then the length of the poop and forecastle together being 159 feet, or about seven-tenths of the total length of the vessel, we shall have to deduct six-tenths of the difference between the freeboards shewn by Tables A and C. Now the freeboard by Table A is 3 feet 3/4 of an inch, and that by Table C 1 foot 7 1/4 inches, the difference between 1 foot 5 1/2 inches, and six-tenths of this would be 10 1/2 inches Then there is the sheer, which we are told was 4 feet 10 inches forward, and 1 foot 4 1/2 inches aft, giving a mean sheer of 3 feet 1 1/2 inches, whereas the normal sheer by the tables for a length of 224 feet is only 2 feet 10 inches, and the difference being divided by 4 gives nearly an inch to be deducted from the freeboard. The camber again, we are told, was 9 inches, whereas for a vessel of her beam, 30 feet, 7 inches would, we are told, be sufficient, and dividing the difference by 2 gives us 3/4 of an inch more, but this may, I think, be very fairly set off against the inch claimed by Mr. Skinner for the bevelling of the deck. The deductions then would be 10 1/2 inches for deck erections, and 1 inch for extra sheer, giving a total of 11 1/2 inches, and this being deducted from the freeboard shewn by Table A, namely 3 feet and 3/4 of an inch, leaves 2 feet 1 1/4 inches as the freeboard which this vessel should have had by Lloyd's tables.

It should, however, be observed that these are the minimum amounts of freeboard allowed both by the Board of Trade as well as by Lloyd's tables, and for first-class vessels only, which the "Alfred" certainly was not, having been originally only a 90 Al vessel, and at the time of her loss 13 years old. At the same time, seeing that the freeboard required by the Board of Trade tables for a vessel of these dimensions is 2 feet 4; and by Lloyd's tables 2 feet 1 1/4 inches, we should not be disposed to say that 2 feet 5 1/2 inches would be an insufficient freeboard for this vessel on leaving Smyrna, and that consequently she was not then overladen.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the cargo shifting between Smyrna " and Malta; and whether on the arrival of the vessel " at the latter port it was properly and efficiently secured?"

The heavy weather which she encountered in the Grecian Archipelago no doubt caused the barley to settle down, as it would be very likely to do; and the strong wind on the starboard side giving her a list to port would naturally cause the grain on the starboard side to fall against the shifting boards in the centre, and the grain on the port side to fall into the wing; and that is what was found to have occurred when they were able to take the hatches off. There seems, however, to be no doubt that before she left Malta the cargo had been all properly and efficiently secured, the empty spaces in the holds being filled with grain taken from the lower forecastle.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " on leaving Gibraltar on the 7th of February 1883, " the 'Alfred' was overladen?"

We have seen that on leaving Smyrna with 70 tons of coal on board, she had a freeboard of about 2 feet 5 1/2 inches. But on leaving Gibraltar she had about 150 tons of coal on board, or about 80 tons more than when she left Smyrna. Now we find from the displacement scale that 80 tons would sink the vessel about 6 inches, and allowing say an inch for the increased saltness of the water at Gibraltar, it follows, if we are correct in thinking that she had a freeboard on leaving Smyrna of 2 feet 5 1/2, that she would on leaving Gibraltar have had only 2 feet and half an inch. And that this was so, is strongly confirmed by the evidence of the master and mate, who told us that when they left Gibraltar she drew 16 feet forward and 18 feet 4 aft, giving her a mean of 17 feet 2, or 5 inches more than the mean on leaving Smyrna; and, deducting 17 feet 2 from 19 feet 2 1/2 inches, the total depth at side; we get a freeboard of 2 feet and half an inch. That this, too, was the depth to which she was probably laden derives some confirmation from the evidence of Mr. Adamson, who told us that his instructions to his captains were that they were not to load below 18 feet inches aft and 16 feet forward. Seeing then that, if she had been a first-class vessel of modern construction, which as I have said she most certainly was not, both the Board of Trade and Lloyd's would have required her to have a minimum freeboard of from 2 feet 1 1/4 inches to 2 feet 4 inches, we cannot think that on such a voyage and at such a time of the year 2 feet and half an inch would be a sufficient freeboard for her; and we are therefore of opinion that when she left Gibraltar she was overladen.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "What was " the cause of the vessel taking a list to starboard and " making water after leaving Gibraltar?" According to the chief and third engineers, she commenced listing over to starboard from the morning after leaving Gibraltar, and that list was quite perceptible to the crew on deck from the morning of the 10th; but it was when she got the wind and sea abeam that the list became more serious, and yet the captain still continued to carry his fore and aft canvas, even after she was seriously listed over to starboard, and was making a great deal of water, which would still further tend to increase the list. How it was that the water got into the engine-room, the engineers were not able to tell us, nor, indeed, could the captain, as he admits that he never went down to see. But no doubt it was due in great measure to the weight which she had on board, which caused her to strain heavily; for, on the voyage out, when, according to Mr. Armstrong, the, owners' overlooker, she was as deeply laden as on leaving Gibraltar, drawing, as we are told, in the Northumberland dock in the Tyne, 16 feet forward and 18 feet 4 aft, we fid that on meeting with heavy weather in the Gulf of Lyons, she made so much water, that they had some difficulty in keeping it down. On the other hand, although she seems to have met with as bad, if not worse, weather between Smyrna and Malta, and between Malta and Gibraltar, we hear nothing of her making any water.

The seventh question which we are asked is, "Was " every possible effort made thereafter to clear the " vessel of water?" I take it that this question is intended to apply to the engineers, and so far as they are concerned they seem to us to have used every effort to keep the vessel clear, but this was impossible, owing to the defective arrangements in the bottom, so long as the vessel was kept on her course, and had a list to starboard; they did, however, what they could, by asking from time to time to have the vessel brought to, so as to pump her out, but as soon as this had been done, the vessel was then again kept away on her course.

The eighth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the steam pumps becoming choked, " and of the deck pumps being unworkable?" The steam pumps no doubt became choked from the stokehole plates having got adrift, and the coal getting down into the bilges, and stopping up the pipes. The deck pump seems never to have been used, and when it became choked, and they tried to lift the box, they found it jammed, so that they were unable to use it; but, even if they could have cleared it, we do not think that it would have made much difference in the result.

The ninth question which we are asked is, "Was she " navigated with proper and seamanlike care, and was " every possible effort made to save her?" In keeping as he did the fore and aft sails set, when the vessel had a considerable list to starboard, and with a strong beam wind and sea on her port side, the master seems to have taken the most effectual means in his power to ensure the destruction of the vessel. By noon of the 11th she was already in great difficulties, with a heavy list to starboard, and making so much water that she had to be brought head to wind and sea to pump it out. She was then in 41º 58' north and 9º 40' west, and was therefore abreast of Vigo Bay, with the wind from the westward, and she could therefore have easily run into that harbour, which was directly under her lee; instead however of doing so, as soon as a portion of the water had been pumped out of her, she was again put on her course to the northward. The captain was asked why he did not put into Vigo Bay, and his answer was that he did not know that it was a safe place to go into. On turning, however, to page 251 of the Sailing Directions for the West Coasts of France, Spain, and Portugal, we find that "With the exception of the neighbourhood of the " points, the whole of the bay affords good anchor- " age in 14 to 23 fathoms, mud and sand." It then goes on as follows: "The usual anchorage is between the " town of Vigo in 11 to 6 fathoms, mud, sheltered by " the Bayona Islands from westerly winds, which throw " in the heaviest sea. The Bay of Teis, the next bend " of the shore eastward of Vigo, affords safe anchorage " sheltered from all winds; vessels may lie here in six " fathoms with a cable fast to the shore, and an anchor " to the northward. There is also space sufficient at a " quarter of a mile eastward of Beslias and Ronde " Points, at the entrance of the shallow basin, for a " number of vessels to lie in 15 to 16 fathoms safe " from all winds. There is also an outside anchorage " in 11 fathoms, sand, off the east side of the low sandy " neck uniting the two parts of the northern of the " Bayona Islands. The other parts of this basin " may also be serviceable to vessels taking the bay " without anchors or cables, as they may run aground " anywhere on the mud, until necessaries be procured, " and then by lightening she may be got off without the " least damage." I think a safer or better port for a vessel in distress could hardly be found in any part of the world. It appears to us that the vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care, and that proper efforts were not made to save her.

The tenth question is, "Was she prematurely aban- " doned?" There can be little doubt that she was not prematurely abandoned, the vessel being on her beam ends and full of water when they left her.

The eleventh question which we are asked is, "Was " her master, John Oliver Landells, intoxicated from " the time the vessel left Gibraltar to the time of her " abandonment, or during any period of that time?" This is a question which has caused us a great deal of anxious consideration. On the one hand we have the evidence of the first and third engineers, and of a Maltese seaman named Camilleri, that the master was the worse for liquor, not only after leaving Gibraltar, but at other times during the voyage. On the other hand we have the chief officer, the boatswain, and several of the crew swearing that they never saw him the worse for liquor at any time during the voyage. As regards Camilleri, we see no reason to believe him rather than any of the other seamen, and the letters which he wrote to the owners, threatening to prevent their getting the insurance on the vessel unless they paid him the value of the effects which he had lost in the vessel, throw a good deal of suspicion on his evidence. We cannot, however, thus dispose of the first and third engineers, who gave their evidence very fairly, and without any apparent bias against the master. On one point, however, they are in a measure contradicted. They said that the master was the worse for liquor in crossing the bar when she left the Tyne on her outward voyage. Against this we have the evidence of Mr. Adamson, the owner, who stated that he saw the master at his office at half past 10 of the day on which the vessel left, and just before he went on board; and there is also the evidence of Mr. Armstrong, the owners' overlooker, who went down the river in the vessel, and left her with the pilot when they were within about a quarter of a mile of the bar. Now both these gentlemen told us that the captain was quite sober when they saw him, so that if he was the worse for liquor on crossing the bar, as the engineers stated, he had but a very short time after parting from Mr. Armstrong in which he could do it. At the same time the pilot has not been produced, nor indeed has the steward, who could have told us more about the master's habits than any one. On the whole, however, we are disposed to give the captain the benefit of the doubt, and to hold that it has not been proved to our satisfaction that he was intoxicated at any time between the time of leaving Gibraltar and the abandonment of the vessel.

The twelfth question which we are asked is "Having " regard to the above questions, was the abandonment " and loss of the 'Alfred' caused by any wrongful act " or default on the part of the said John Oliver " Landells? And is Mr. Henry E. P. Adamson, or is " any other person, and who, to blame for the said " loss?" It is added that "in the opinion of the Board " of Trade the certificate of the said John Oliver " Landells should be dealt with." It has been already stated that in our opinion the loss of this valuable vessel and her cargo was due to the neglect and default of the master in keeping her under her fore and aft sails when she already had a list to starboard, and there was a strong beam wind and sea on the port side, and in continuing his course to the northward instead of putting into Vigo Bay as he might and ought to have done. We think also that he shewed great indifference to the safety of the vessel and to the lives of those on board in never having gone into the engine room to endeavour to ascertain by personal inspection where the water was coming in. Looking at all these facts the assessors are clearly of opinion that this master's certificate should be dealt with. Had the charge of intoxication been proved we should have had no hesitation in cancelling it, but under the circumstances we think that we cannot do less than suspend it for twelve months.

As regards Mr. Henry E. P. Adamson, the managing owner, we think that he is somewhat to blame for having authorised the master to load the vessel down to 16 feet forward and 18 feet 4 aft, being a mean of 17 feet 2, which would give her a freeboard of only 2 feet and 1/2 an inch, and this too without telling him whether he might do so in salt or in fresh water. It is clear, in our opinion, that 2 feet and 1/2 an inch would be a wholly insufficient freeboard for a vessel of her age and class, more especially in the winter, and that if in that state she met with very bad weather she would probably go down. In other respects Messrs. Adamson seem to have kept the vessel in a good condition.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

GEORGE H. FORSTER,

 

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

Assessors.

 

 

WM. CUNNINGHAM LANG,

 

L 367. 1535. 150.—4/83. Wt. 171. E. & S.