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Wreck Report for 'Dunstaffnage', 1883

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Unique ID:15103
Description:Board of Trade Wreck Report for 'Dunstaffnage', 1883
Creator:Board of Trade
Date:1883
Copyright:Out of copyright
Partner:SCC Libraries
Partner ID:Unknown

Transcription

(No. 1783.)

"DUNSTAFFNAGE."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at Liverpool on the 18th, 19th, and 20th days of April 1883, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Commander BURNEY, R.N., and Captains COMYN and PATTISON, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the loss of the sailing ship "DUNSTAFFNAGE," of Liverpool, and the loss of the lives of the 23 persons on board her, near Aberdeen, on the 17th March last, whilst being towed from Dundee to Liverpool by the tug "Recovery."

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that when the vessels left Dundee they were in good and seaworthy condition and fit for the intended voyage, and that the loss of the "Dunstaffnage" was due to the towing gear having parted during a violent squall of wind, and to her having thereupon driven on Findon Ness; and that no blame whatever attaches to the master of the "Recovery," who did all in his power after the vessels had parted to find the "Dunstaffnage," and to render her any assistance that she might require.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 20th day of April 1883.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

HENRY D. BURNEY, R.N., J.P.,

 

 

 

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN L. PATTISON,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at Liverpool on the 18th, 19th, and 20th days of April instant, when Mr. Mansel Jones appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Dickinson for the owners of the "Dunstaffnage," Mr. Rodway for the representatives of the decased master, and Mr. Miller for the owners of the tug "Recovery." Eighteen witnesses produced by the Board of Trade, and two witnesses produced by Mr. Dickinson, having been examined, Mr. Mansel Jones handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Dickinson then produced two further witnesses, and Mr. Miller recalled one witness; Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Owles for Mr. Rodway, and Mr. Miller then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Mansel Jones having replied for the Board of Trade, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions upon which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Dunstaffnage" was an iron sailing ship, belonging to the Port of Liverpool, of 1,945 tons gross, and 1,891 tons net register. She was built at Southampton in the year 1881, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John Houston, of Liverpool, in the county of Lancaster, and others, Mr. John Houston being the managing owner. She left Dundee about 8.30 a.m. of the 16th of March last for Liverpool iu ballast, with a crew consisting of a master and 20 runners and in tow of a steam tug called the "Recovery;" the master's wife and child being also on board. The "Dunstaffnage" having perished with all hands, all the information as to what subsequently occurred comes from the master and crew of the "Recovery." According to them, when about 3 miles to the east of the Fair Way Buoy at the entrance to the Tay, both vessels were at about half-past 11 a.m. put upon a N.E. by E. course with the view of going north about, the wind at the time being moderate from the N.W. with a force of about 3 or 4. In the afternoon it began to freshen and continued freshening until 7 p.m., when the Girdle Ness Lights at the entrance to Aberdeen were seen bearing N. by E. The same course was continued N.E. by E. the wind and sea increasing, with occasional snow storms, and about 11.30 p.m. the Girdle Ness Lights bore N.W. by N. At 12.30 it was bowing so hard that they had to prop the tug's wheel at hard-a-port, so as to prevent her head paying off to port. At about 2 a.m. the wind, which had been for some time at N. to N.N.E., suddenly flew round to E.N.E. blowing with hurricane force, and at the same instant the pin, which held the hook and shackle to which the towing line was attached broke, and the two vessels then parted, the hawser with the shackle attached to it going over the tug's stern. At this time we are told that the Girdle Ness Lights bore N.W. by W. distant from 10 to 12 miles. Orders were at once given by the master to ease the tug's engines, and the helm being kept hard port she came round and passed close under the stern of the "Dunstaffnage," which had paid off with her head to the N.W., the crew at the time being engaged setting the fore topmast staysail. On passing her the whistle of the tug was blown three or four times to attract the "Dunstaffnage's" attention, and the steering light was shifted to the port main rigging, but at this moment a blinding snowstorm came on, which completely hid the "Dunstaffnage" from them. The tug accordingly stood away under easy steam to the S.W., before wind and sea, expecting that the "Dunstaffnage" would come round and follow her down the coast. The snowstorm continued for about an hour and a half, rendering it impossible to see more than about half the length of the vessel, the seas continually breaking over her and filling her decks; and even when it had cleared off the weather was still so thick that they could not see more than about a mile off. The "Recovery" accordingly continued her course until she was off the bar of the Tay, which she reached between 8 and 9 the same morning, and not seeing the "Dunstaffnage," and the sea on the bar being heavy, she proceeded on to the Firth of Forth. thinking that she might have gone there. After running up, the south side of the Firth for a distance of about 18 miles without finding her she turned, and as it was still blowing a gale from the N.E., brought up at about 3 or 4 p.m. in Largo Bay. There she remained until abut 3 or 4 o'clock of the following morning, when the wind having somewhat moderated she again put to sea, and not seeing the "Dunstaffnage" she ran into Dundee, the port from which they had started, to enquire after her, and there for the first time ascertained what had become of her.

To return now to the "Dunstaffnage." On parting from the tug she paid off, with her head to the N.W., before the gale, and it was observed that her crew were setting the fore topmast staysail, and from that time nothing more was seen of her. But between 5 and 6 a.m. the same morning some fishermen of Dunnies, a small fishing village about midway between Aberdeen and Stonehaven, observed a quantity of wreckage along the coast, which, there can be no doubt, must have belonged to the "Dunstaffnage," two buoys and the stern board of one of her boats having been picked up with the vessel's name painted on them. The wreckage was subsequently strewn along the beach from Findon Ness to Carron Rock, a distance of about six miles, and as the tide began to flow that morning at about 2 a.m., and would carry the wreckage to the south, there is every reason to think that the vessel struck on Findon Ness, and there went to pieces, no wreckage having been found to the northward of that point.

These being the facts of the case, the first question on which our opinion has been asked is, "Whether, " when the 'Dunstaffnage' left Dundee, she was in good " and seaworthy condition, well found in anchors and " cables, and whether her sails were bent, and were all " ready for setting, in case they were required?" The vessel which, as I have said, was built in the year 1881, was classed 100 Al at Lloyd's. Since she was built she had made only two voyages, the first to San Francisco, and the second to Calcutta, from which she had returned with a cargo of jute to Dundee. On the homeward voyage she had encountered some bad weather, both off the Cape and after passing the Western Islands, and being somewhat crank, owing to the cargo which she had in her, she had been frequently thrown upon her beam ends and had shipped a good deal of water on deck at the same time she does not appear to have sustained any damage beyond the loss of her foresail, which was replaced. When, then, she left Dundee, we have no reason to think that she was not in a thoroughly good and seaworthy condition, so far as the hull was concerned. She seems also to have been well found in anchors and cables, having three best bower anchors, weighing 45 cwt. each, a stream anchor, and two kedges, and a great many good hawsers, both hemp and wire. She had also a double suit of canvas, and all her sails, except the top gallant and royals, were bent and ready for setting, in case they were required. There is, therefore, no ground to complain of the condition of the vessel and her equipments.

The second question which we are asked is, "Whether " she was sufficiently and properly ballasted?" it seems that, besides the 200 tons of stone ballast which she had in her, when she arrived with the cargo of jute, 408 tons more were taken in at Dundee, making a total of 608 tons, and with this she drew about 11 feet 10 or 11 inches. It was all, we are told, good stone ballast, and had been trimmed from the main hatch both fore and aft, as well as into the wings, so that, according to the stevedore, it was not. possible for it to shift. We are told also that when she had been originally brought round from Southampton to Cardiff, she had had only 467 tons of ballast in her, and then drew 11 feet 3. We are also told that a sister ship to her, the "Dundrennan," belonging to the same owner, had come round from Southampton to Cardiff with 560 tons of ballast; and that on a subsequent occasion, when being towed from Dundee to Liverpool, she had 580 tons of ballast and drew 11 feet 7, and although on that occasion she met with exceptionally bad weather, and had in consequence to put back twice, she made the voyage in safety. With these facts before us there seems to be no doubt that the "Dunstaffnage," with 608 tons of ballast in her, would be sufficiently ballasted. The vessel, therefore, would seem to have been both properly and sufficiently ballasted when she left Dundee.

The third question which we are asked is, "Whether " she was sufficiently and properly manned?" The crew we are told consisted of the master, who had brought her from Calcutta, and 20 runners, almost all of whom were entire strangers to her, only three apprentices and two of the A.B.'s having come in her from Calcutta; and there was not a single officer except the master who had sailed in her before. So far, indeed, as the number of the hands is concerned, the assessors are not disposed to think that she was undermanned, seeing that she was coming round the whole way in tow of a powerful tug; it is, indeed, about the same number as the "Dundrennan," the sister ship, had had when she came round; at the same time they think that it would have been more prudent had she had another officer on board who was acquainted with the vessel, instead of leaving the entire responsibility for the navigation upon the master, who in case of any difficulty would have the additional anxiety of having his wife and child on board to take care of. Whilst then the assessors are of opinion that she could not be said to have been undermanned, they think that she was not sufficiently officered.

The fourth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when the tug "Recovery" left Dundee, she was in " all respects in good and seaworthy condition, and fit " for the service intended; and whether proper " measures had previously been taken from time to " time to examine the towing hook, lugs, pin, and all " other appurtenances for the purpose of towing, and " whether they were of sufficient strength for the " service?" It seems that the "Recovery," which was built in the year 1878, is a twin screw, of about 500 tons gross, and 150 horse-power; and we are told that she is one of the most powerful tugs in the kingdom. She was chartered by the Government in June or July last to go out to Egypt for the purpose of towing large vessels of war, a service for which she certainly would not have been selected had she not been a very powerful vessel, and in a thoroughly efficient state; whilst there she had to undergo a monthly inspection, and was always found to be in a thoroughly efficient state; indeed, if she had not been, she would not have been kept. On her return to this country in November last, her services being no longer required, we are told by Mr. Prendeville, the agent, that she was carefully overhauled, and that she has since been kept in a thoroughly good condition. Her crew, too, when she left Dundee, consisted of a master, a mate, three A.B.'s, an ordinary seaman, two engineers, and four firemen, which appears to the assessors to be amply sufficient for her. We have, therefore, no reason to think that the vesssel, when she left Dundee, was not in a thoroughly good and seaworthy condition, and fit for the service on which she was engaged. As however the casualty appears to have been due to the breaking of the pin to which the towing hawser was attached, it may be well to describe the nature of the towing gear and its connections. It seems that there are two semi-circular iron bands 8 7/16 inches deep by about 1 8/16 inches thick going round the mainmast, the fore ends of which are firmly bolted together, whilst the after ends are not brought together, but are connected by a bolt or pin of wrought iron 2 1/2 inches thick, on which hangs the hook and shackle attached to the end of the hawser. Round the mast where the ring formed by the bands goes, there is an iron casing, between which and the ring is wooden packing to prevent the mast from being chaffed, the ring having a certain amount of play in a horizontal direction. It is not the usual way in which towing hawsers are attached, but that is owing to the fact that there are very few steam tugs with two masts, and still fewer with iron masts, which is necessary for this mode of attachment. But although it is not the same form of arrangement that we find on board other steam tugs, the assessors have no reason to think that it is not sufficiently strong and efficient; it is, we are told, adopted in the steam tugs belonging to the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, which are employed to tow the light vessels to and from their stations, and occasionally in very bad weather, and in which efficiency would be more likely to be considered than expense. We have also been told by Mr. Barrie, the agent of the owners of the "Dunstaffnage" at Dundee, a gentleman of considerable experience, that he examined the towing gear and the mode of its attachment before the vessels left Dundee, and that he was perfectly satisfied with it.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Whether " from the time the tug left Dundee, until about 2 a.m. " on the 17th of March, she was navigated in a proper " and skilful manner, on a safe and proper course; and " whether she kept that course, or whether she was " navigated too close to the land?" We are told that a N.E. by E. course was laid from about 3 miles to the east of the Fairway Buoy, and that that course was kept until the vessels parted. It was admitted by Mr. Dickinson that, if that course had been steered, and if it had been made good, it would have been a very proper course, for it would have taken them some 6 miles outside of Tod Head, from 9 to 10 miles from Findon Ness, and between 11 and 12 miles from the Girdle Ness Lights. It was suggested, however, not only by Mr. Dickinson, but also by the learned counsel for the Board of Trade, that the vessels must in some way or other have got much nearer to the coast, and the only ground for this suggestion seems to be that the "Dunstaffnage," after she parted from the tug, ran upon Findon Ness, but there is not a particle of evidence to show that the vessels were ever seen together near the coast. Yesterday afternoon the case was adjourned on the application of the learned counsel for the Board of Trade until this morning, in order to give them an opportunity of telegraphing to the Board of Trade authorities on the coast, to ascertain if any evidence could be obtained that the vessels had been seen near the coast; this morning, however, we are told that they have no such evidence to produce, and we must therefore conclude that none can be obtained. But apart from this, the facts appear to us to shew very conclusively that the vessels were steered from off the mouth of the Tay on a N.E. by E. course, and that that course was continued until they parted. In the first place a N.E. by E. course was the only proper course to take at starting, as it would take them well clear of the headlands, and at a safe distance from the land, and there was no reason why they should not have taken that course, the wind at the time being moderate from the N.W. On reference also to the chart it will be seen that, had a more northerly course been steered, it would have taken them close to, if not on Tod Head, which we see from the North Sea Pilot, part II., p. 132, " stands prominently in advance of the coast north " and south of it," so much so indeed that even if they had steered a course which would have taken them close to Tod Head, they would still have passed, if they had continued that course, some 3 or 4 miles outside of Findon Ness. But it may perhaps be said that, although they might have started on a N.E. by E. course, when they found the wind freshening they may have tried to get nearer to and under shelter of the land. Of this, however, I may observe there is not a particle of evidence, and it is distinctly contradicted by all the witnesses from the "Recovery," who state that she was kept throughout upon a N.E. by E. course, with the wind during the whole of the time upon the port bow, which would tend to set the vessel off rather than towards the shore. We are told, indeed, that from about 12.15 the wheel was propped to port, as though she had a tendency to fall off in that direction; and one of the witnesses did say that at about that time the wind did for a short time fly off to the E.N.E., but that afterwards it went round again to N.N.E. But however this-may be, the bearings of the Girdle Ness Lights shew pretty clearly that the vessels must have been kept on a N.E. by E. course, and are quite inconsistent with their having been kept nearer to the shore. And as this seems to be the turning point in the case, it may be well to examine it with some care. We are told that these lights bore N. by E. at 7 p.m., N.W. by N. at 11.30 p.m., and N.W. by W. at 2 a.m., when the two vessels parted. From 11.30 a.m. to 7 p.m. the wind was moderate, but freshening in the afternoon; between 7 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. it was rising to a gale, and from 11.36 p.m. to 2 a.m. it had increased to hurricane force. We might therefore naturally expect that from 11.30 a.m. to 7 p.m. the vessel would make good progress, from 7 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. she would make less, and from 11.30 p.m. to 2 a.m. still less if any progress, the wind all the time being ahead. And this is exactly what we find to have occurred, assuming her to have been all the time on a N.E. by E. course; for if the positions be laid down on the chart it will be seen that if she was kept on a N.E. by E. course from 11.30 a.m., when she was off the Tay Bay, until 7 p.m., when the Girdle Ness Lights bore N. by E., she would have run 34 miles, or at the rate of 4 1/2 knots an hour; from there to 11.30 p.m., when the Girdle Ness Lights bore N.W. by N. she would run 10 miles more, or at the rate of 2 1/4 miles per hour; and from 11.30 p.m. to 2 a.m., when she got the Girdle Ness Lights to bear N.W. by W., she would have made 4 miles, or at the rate of one and a half miles per hour. That then is quite consistent with the evidence that we have as to the character and the gradual increase in the force of the gale. On the other hand, if the vessels had been, as is pretended, close in to the shore, it is obvious that between 7 p.m. and 11.30 p.m., when the gale was not very strong and when they were making fair progress, the bearings of Girdle Ness Lights must have altered in those 4 1/2 hours more than from N. by E. to N.W. by N. On the whole we have come to the conclusion, on a careful review of all the facts, that the vessels were put on a proper course, N.E. by E., and that they were kept throughout and until they parted on that course; and that there is nothing to shew that they were ever too close to the land.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "Whether, " when she encountered the gale, proper measures " were taken to relieve as far as possible the strain on " the tow rope and its appurtenances; and whether all " reasonable and proper precautions were taken to " prevent accident?" The only mode of relieving the strain on the tow rope was by reducing the speed; but seeing that, when the gale was at its height shortly before the vessels parted, the tug could only just hold her own, to have reduced her speed then would have been to have allowed the two vessels to drift to leeward before the gale. It may be said, however, that when she found that she could make little or no progress against it, the tug should have turned round and run before the gale. She could, however, hardly have done so without the sanction of the master of the "Dunstaffnage," and there is no evidence that the master of the "Dunstaffnage" expressed a wish to do so. It is perhaps reasonable to conclude that, seeing that between 11.30 and 2 o'clock they had altered the bearings of the Girdle Ness Lights from N.W. by N. to N.W. by W., and that they were therefore making some headway, they may have thought it better to hold on their course to the northward, the more so as there was no safe place to run for short of the Firth of Forth.

The 7th and 8th questions I will take together; they are as follow:—"What was the cause of the ships " parting, and whether prompt and proper measures were taken by the master of the 'Recovery' to return " and render assistance to the 'Dunstaffnage'?" and, " Whether every possible effort was subsequently " made by the master of the 'Recovery' to find the " 'Dunstaffnage'?" The cause of the ships parting was, no doubt, the breaking of this 2 1/2-inch pin. And when this had occurred, it seems to be admitted that the proper course for the master of the "Dunstaffnage" was to put about, and either run for the Forth or put her head off shore in order to get more sea room. This being so, what is it that the master of the "Recovery" does? As soon as he has got his vessel round, he runs down the coast under easy steam, with sufficient way to keep her ahead of the seas, expecting, from seeing her set her foretopmast staysail, that the "Dunstaffnage" would do the same, and that he should be able to pick her up when the weather cleared and the gale abated. In this way he runs until abreast of the Tay, and, not seeing the "Dunstaffnage," there he goes on to the Firth of Forth, that being the place for which he thought the vessel would probably run. On getting into the Firth she runs some 18 miles up it, and then, as night was coming on, and it was till blowing a hard gale, he anchors in Largo Bay. The following morning he starts again, some hours before daylight, to go and search for her, and, not finding her, proceeds to Dundee, when for the first time he hears of her fate. It appears to us that the master took the most reasonable and proper course under the circumstances. He thought that she would do what all the witnesses say that she ought to have done, that is, either run for the Firth of Forth, or lay her head off the shore. If she had run for the Firth of Forth, the "Recovery," by taking the course she did, would have been at hand to pick her up, and give her what assistance she required; if, on the other hand, she had laid her head off the shore, she would, having plenty of sea room, have had less need of the tug than if she had been near the shore. We are of opinion that prompt and proper measures were taken by the master of the "Recovery" to return and render assistance to the "Dunstaffnage," and that every possible effort was made by him to find the "Dunstaffnage."

The ninth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the loss of the "Dunstaffnage?" It seems that the tow rope was attached to the "Dunstaffnage" by a chain passed through the eye of the hawser, and that both ends of the chain were brought back through the same hawse hole, instead of the ends being carried through the hawse holes on either bow so as to act as a kind of bridle. When, then, the pin broke, and the "Dunstaffnage's" head had paid off to the N.W., she would have a hawser of some 120 fathoms, with the shackle attached, hanging out from her starboard bow, and unless it was slipped it would be impossible for her to have paid off. Whether; indeed, this was so, it is impossible for us to say, everyone on board the "Dunstaffnage" having perished. Seeing, however, the smallness of her crew, sufficient, no doubt, to manage her whilst in tow of the tug, but not sufficient to navigate her when under sail; that most of them were strangers to her that she had but one officer, who had been in her before, namely, the master, all the rest of the rest of the crew being runners; and that consequently the entire responsibility for the navigation of the vessel rested with him, and with him alone, and that he had the additional anxiety of having his wife and child on board with him, it is far from improbable that it may have escaped his observation to give orders to slip the hawser, or that both ends of the chain having been passed through the same hawse hole may have become fouled. If so, we can well understand how, with such a gale as was then blowing, with the fore topmast staysail set, and a flood tide, the vessel might have stood on through this blinding snow storm until she struck on Findon Ness. It was said by Mr. Mansel Jones that the fact of the wreck having been found off Dunnies between 5 and 6 a.m. was inconsistent with-her having been some 11 or 12 miles from the Girdle Ness Lights when she parted from the tugs; but, in our opinion, that is not so. With the wind as it was, from about E.N.E., and the tide setting to the S.W., the vessel would easily do the distance to Findon Ness in a couple of hours, scudding before the gale under her fore topmast staysail, which would bring her ashore by about 4 a.m. The second wave, the assessors tell me, would probably have knocked her all to pieces; and in that case there would be no difficulty in some portion of the wreckage drifting down to Dunnies by between. 5 and 6 a.m. This is, in our opinion the only reasonable solution of the casualty.

The tenth question which we are asked is, "Whether " the master of the 'Recovery' is in default, and " whether blame attaches to the managing owners of " either of the vessels;" and it is added that "the " Board of Trade state that in their opinion the certifi- " cate of the master of the tug should be dealt with." According to the view which we have taken of this case, no blame whatever attaches to the master of the "Recovery" for anything that has occurred; he seems to have navigated the vessels with care and skill, and after they had parted he did everything that a prudent and careful seaman should do, to pick up and render assistance to the "Dunstaffnage."" We shall therefore certainly not deal with his certificate. As regards the managing owner of the "Recovery" he seems to have seen that the vessel was kept in a good and efficient state, and the fact that the pin, to which the hawser was attached, broke, is in our opinion no reason why he should be blamed, seeing that it was apparently quite sound, and of exceptional strength. As regards the managing owner of the "Dunstaffnage" he also appears to us to be free from blame; he took care that she should be sent to sea in a thoroughly efficient state as regards her hull and equipments, leaving it to the master, who had formerly served with him as chief officer, and in whom he had great confidence, to make all the necessary arrangements in regard to the ballast and the crew, it appears to us that, so far as the managing owners of these two vessels are concerned, it was an accident, against which no reasonable precautions on their part could have provided.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

HENRY D. BURNEY, R.N., J.P.,

 

 

 

D. R. COMYN,

Assessors.

 

 

JOHN L. PATTISON,

 

L 367. 1555. 150.—5/83. Wt. . E. & S.

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