Wreck Report for 'Carnaquheen', 1883

(No. 1789.)

"CARNAQUHEEN."

The Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 to 1876.

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 30th of April and the 1st of May 1883, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captain RONALDSON and Captain KENNEDY, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the sailing ship "CARNAQUHEEN," near St. Cyprian Bay, on the West Coast of Africa, on the 14th of March 1883.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the stranding and loss of the said ship was due to the negligent navigation thereof by James Simpson, the master, in having kept her for too long a time on the starboard tack heading for the land, he being at the time ignorant of the vessel's true position, not having obtained any observations either on the 12th or the 13th, and not having taken any steps, either by a cast of the lead or otherwise, to ascertain that she was at a safe distance from the shore.

For these wrongful acts, and defaults the Court suspends the certificate of the said James Simpson for three months.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 1st day of May 1883.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur in the above report.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

 

Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at the Sessions House, Westminster, on the 30th of April and the 1st of May 1883, when Mr. Meysey Thompson appeared for the Board of Trade, and Mr. Baden Powell for the master of the "Carnaquheen." Seven witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Meysey Thompson handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Baden Powell then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, and Mr. Meysey Thompson having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Carnaquheen" was a wooden barque, belonging to the Port of London, of 825 tons gross and register. She was built at Aberdeen in the year 1867, and at the time of her loss was the property of Mr. John J. Jacobs, of No. 6, Billiter Street, London, and others, Mr. Jacobs being the managing owner. She left Newport, in Monmouthshire, on the 16th of February last for Montevideo, with a crew of 19 hands all told, and a cargo of about 1,200 tons of railway materials; and at 8 a.m. of the 10th of March following was off Palma Island, the most westerly of the Canary Islands, when the master determined to take the eastern route between the Cape de Verde Islands and the main land, and with that view put her on a S.W. by S. course, the wind at the time being from the N.E. At noon of the 11th a good observation was obtained, which put the vessel in latitude 25º 49' north and longitude 19º 40' west, and she was kept upon the same course, heading S.W. by S., until the evening, when the wind having got more to the southward, she broke off to the westward, and at midnight was heading about W.S.W. to W. by S., the wind being at that time from the south. By 9 a.m. of the following morning, the 12th, the wind had got round to the S.W., and she was thereupon put on the starboard tack, and was kept, with the yards braced sharp up, under courses, topsails, jib and spanker, heading about S. by E. to S.S.E., varying a point or two either way, and making from 4 to 5 knots an hour. Owing to the haziness of the atmosphere no observations could be obtained on either the 12th or the 13th, but at noon of the latter day it was estimated by dead reckoning that she was in about latitude 23º 19' north and in longitude 18º 16' west according to the chief officer, or 17º 46' west according to the second mate. She was accordingly kept on the same course, close hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, the atmosphere being still somewhat hazy on the horizon but clear above. At about 8 p.m. the weather appeared to be a little clearer, although there was still a haze on the horizon; and the master having ordered the main topgallant sail and the outer jib to be set, went below at about 11 p.m., leaving the deck in charge of the chief officer, with orders to keep her braced sharp up on the starboard tack, and to call him if there was any change. During that watch we were told that she was heading from S. by E. to S.S.E., and that she made about a S. by E. 1/2 E. course. At midnight the second officer came on deck and relieved the first officer, and she was kept close hauled on the starboard tack, but heading apparently, if anything, a little more to the east. At about 3 a.m. the second mate observed what he supposed to be land ahead, upon which he went down to the cabin and asked the captain if he expected to see land. The captain replied that he did not, and immediately got out of bed and came on deck with him, and as they reached the deck the vessel struck. Orders were at once given by the master to put the yards aback and to hard up the helm, but after paying off a few points to the eastward she began bumping in towards the shore until she became fast, and by that time she was in the middle of the breakers. Between 8 and 10 a.m. the second mate and 4 hands were sent away in one of the boats, and although the boat was upset in the breakers they all succeeded in reaching the shore in safety. In the meantime the vessel was found to be making water, and at 10 a.m. there were 12 feet and a half of water in the hold. At about noon the chief officer and 8 hands were sent away in the lifeboat with sails and provisions, and succeeded in reaching the shore in safety. And at about 5 p.m. the master and the remaining hands left, and although their boat was upset, they were all rescued by the lifeboat. On the 16th the wind shifted to the N.E. and the sea went down, upon which they put off to the ship to get some provisions and water. On the 23rd, having repaired their boats they put out to sea, and having on the 26th fallen in with a Portuguese ship called the "Harmonia," and been taken on board, they were safely landed on the 29th at St. Vincent, one of the Cape de Verde Islands. The place where the vessel grounded was a little north of St. Cyprian's Bay and about 100 miles to the north of Cape Blanco. The vessel and cargo were of course totally lost.

These then being the facts of the case, the Board of Trade have asked for our opinion upon the following questions:—

" 1. Whether safe and proper courses were set and " steered after noon on the 11th of March, and whether " due and proper allowance was made for tides, currents, " and leeway?

" 2. Whether proper measures were taken to ascertain " and verify the position of the vessel at noon on the " 13th March, and from time to time thereafter?

" 3. Whether safe and proper courses were set and " steered after noon on the 13th March, and whether " proper allowance was made for tides, currents, and " leeway?

" 4. Whether the lead was used, and if not, whether " its neglect was justifiable?

" 5. Whether a good and proper look-out was kept, " particularly for shoal and discoloured water?

" 6. Whether the master was on deck at a time when " the safety of the vessel required his personal supervision?

" 7. Whether when the land was seen ahead prompt " and proper measures were taken to prevent the " stranding?

" 8. What was the cause of the casualty?

" 9. Whether the vessel was navigated with proper " and seamanlike care?

" 10. Whether the master and officers are, or either " of them is, in default?"

It is added that "the Board of Trade are of opinion " that the certificate of the master should be dealt " with."

In electing, as the master did, to take the eastern route between the Cape de Verde Islands and the mainland, it appears to us that he took neither the best nor the safest course. The "Africa Pilot," in discussing the proper course for a sailing vessel to take between the English Channel and the Cape of Good Hope, says in part I, page 2, "from longitude 10º or 12º west a " course should be shaped to pass Madeira at any " convenient distance. In the winter months it is " preferable to pass westward of it, for the strong " westerly gales, which occur in November, December, " and January, produce eddy winds and heavy squalls " eastward of the island. From Madeira the track " recommended is to pass to the westward (and just in " sight of) the Cape Verde Islands, as the winds are " stronger and steadier to the westward than to the " eastward of them. The Equator should be crossed at " points varying according to the season of the year," which at page 3 of the same book is defined to be in February, March, and April between 26º and 28º of of west longitude. Practically the same advice is given by Horsburgh, who in his book of directions, which the master says he had, tells us that, although the eastern route, that is to say, inside the Cape. de Verde Islands, may be taken at certain seasons, the western route outside those islands is the more certain at all times. If then to pass outside the Cape de Verde is the best and safest course for the voyage from England to the Cape of Good Hope, it must of course be so for the voyage from England to Montevideo. No doubt the course inside the islands is sometimes taken, and may under certain circumstances be taken with safety; but if the master chooses to take it, it is his duty to exercise the greatest care and caution to avoid, on the one hand the Cape de Verde Islands, and on the other the coast of Africa.

Now we are told that at noon of the 11th they obtained a very good observation, which placed the vessel in 25º 49' north and 19º 40' west; from that time, however, no observation whatever was obtained, but at noon of the 13th the master estimated the position of the vessel by dead reckoning to be 23º 19' north and 18º 16' west according to the chief officer, or 17º 46' west according to the second officer. It should, however, be observed that during this time she had been at first on a S.W. by S. course until the wind had gone to the southward, when she was obliged to keep away until at midnight she was on a W.S.W. and W. by S. course, and from 9 a.m. of the 12th she had been heading to the, southward and eastward, not being kept on any particular course, but with the yards braced sharp up on the starboard tack, the wind being from about S.W., varying occasionally a point or two either way. Now, Mr. Baden Powell has very properly observed that nothing is more difficult, when a vessel is on these varying courses, than to fix with any degree of accuracy her position, without having any observation by which to verify it. The master also told us that in fixing his position at noon of the 13th he had made no allowance for either current or leeway; he said that his chart shewed him a current setting down the coast to the southward and westward, and he estimated that it would about balance the leeway which the vessel would make. But the Africa Pilot, Part I, page 12, tells us that, although from the Canaries to the Cape Verde Islands the current generally sets from S.S.W. to S.W. with a velocity of from 6 to 24 miles a day, it varies according to the direction, duration, and force of the wind, and it adds: "Chronometric observations are, therefore, " especially necessary in order to correct a vessel's " position for the effects of the currents which prevail " between the parallel of Cape Finisterre and that of " Cape Verde Islands." Now, as the wind had been blowing ever since about 9 a.m. of the 12th from the S.W., it is reasonable to suppose that it would have affected the course of the current before noon of the 13th, so that the master's estimate of the vessel's position at that time must have been extremely uncertain, depending as it did partly on the courses steered, partly on the strength and direction of the current, and partly on the amount of leeway that she would make. It was in fact pure guess work; and yet the master acted as though he was quite certain of its correctness, putting the vessel on a course directly for the land, and without taking any steps whatever to verify his position. He told us that at 8 p.m. of the 13th he estimated his distance from the land to be about 75 miles, and at 11 p.m. when he went below and turned in he supposed that he was about 60 miles from it, and that he could therefore safely continue on that course until daylight; but if during the forty or more hours that he had been close hauled on the starboard tack, heading from S. by E. to S.S.E., he had been making a point of leeway, as the second officer told us she was doing, it is obvious that she would have been much further to the eastward and much nearer therefore to the coast. It may be that at noon of the 13th the master had no means of verifying his position; but at either 8 p.m. or 11 p.m., if he had taken a cast of the lead, he would have found himself in soundings, for the chart shews us that on the course that he was steering, and making, as we are told she was, about 4 or 5 knots an hour, she must for nearly the last twelve hours before she took the ground have been in only from 20 to 30 fathoms of water. The neglect, therefore, to use the lead was in our opinion quite unjustifiable. Knowing too that the vessel was heading for the shore, and in ignorance of his distance from it, it was the master's duty either to have put the vessel about, or, if he chose to continue his course, to have been on deck prepared to give the necessary orders in case she should get into danger. The master has attributed the casualty to some unforeseen and unexpected current setting him to the eastward; but there is no evidence of the existence of any such current. On the other hand, the leeway which the vessel must have made during the 44 hours that she was with her yards braced sharp up on the starboard tack, between 9 a.m. of the 12th and 3 a.m. of the 14th, when she went ashore, is quite sufficient to account for her having got to the eastward of her estimated position, and this, combined with her having been kept for too long a time on the starboard tack heading for the shore, is the true cause of the casualty.

To put a vessel on a course heading directly for the land, when in ignorance of the vessel's true position, and how far that land was off, and without taking any steps, either by a cast of the lead or otherwise, to verify the vessel's position, was in our opinion neither a proper nor a seamanlike act; and for this the master is alone responsible. I have left it, as I always do, to the assessors to say whether or not under these circumstances his certificate should be dealt with. It seems that he has been a master for 23 years, and that during all that time he has conducted himself to the satisfaction of his employers; at the same time he has by his negligent conduct caused the loss of a valuable ship and cargo, with imminent risk to the lives of all on board, and under these circumstances the assessors are of opinion that his certificate should be suspended for three months.

No blame is attributable to the first mate; but as regards the second mate, who was the officer of the watch, although we have no reason to suppose that he was not keeping a good look-out, we think that he is to blame for having left the deck and gone below to call the master; he ought, when he saw what he believed to be land ahead, to have remained on deck ready to give the necessary orders, and should have sent one of the watch below to call the master; but we are not asked to deal with his certificate.

The Court was not asked to make any order as to costs.

 

(Signed)

H. C. ROTHERY,

Wreck Commissioner.

We concur.

 

(Signed)

A. RONALDSON,

Assessors.

 

 

H. C. KENNEDY,

 

L 367. 1561. 150.—5/83. Wt. 73. E. & S.